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The case sets out a dilemma faced within International Paper (IP) in deciding how best to manage a particular set of environmental responsibilities and liabilities - remediation to repair past instances of environmental pollution. Remediation issues are resolved over long time-frames because of their technical and regulatory complexity. In addition, the regulatory environment has been continuing to evolve. The underlying case issue is how best to manage corporate social responsibilities where both the number of liabilities and the future costs are uncertain. In this case, the number of remediation issues faced, the costs of remediation and the impact of future regulatory inflation are all unpredictable. Consequently through this case students see the wider external and internal context within which companies must manage their corporate social and environmental responsibilities and the underlying reasons for conflicts of interests between the different stakeholders.

Cox Communications, the third largest U.S. cable television system operator, is confronting strategy decisions in mid-2004. Cox managers must decide whether to speed its deployment of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), which offers capital and operating costs savings compared to the traditional circuit-switched technologies Cox has used to offer phone service. Cox has had great success in attacking incumbent phone companies with bundles that include TV, high-speed Internet, and telephone services. However, VoIP deployment will be capital intensive, and Wall Street is pressuring Cox, like other cable operators, to deliver free cash flow. At the same time, cable operators have been losing market share to satellite TV providers, and Cox managers must decide whether to accelerate the capital-intensive deployment of digital video recorders (DVRs) to address this competitive threat. Can Cox afford to offer both VoIP and DVRs? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Silver Lake Partners led a syndicate that took Seagate private in 2000. Crystal Decisions was an underperforming software subsidiary of Seagate and had been an immaterial part of Seagate. Silver Lake assigned $95 million (of the $1.1 billion in equity paid for Seagate) to Crystal Decisions. Chronicles the turnaround of Crystal Decisions and the eventual harvest of the company in 2003. The Silver Lake syndicate must consider whether to sell the company to Business Objects or pursue an IPO.

In 2004, MySQL was a small, $10 million Scandinavian software company that seriously challenged the big three IT companies, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle, in their high-margin, $10 billion database business. A new phenomenon in the software industry--open source--provided ways for new entrants to challenge the incumbents and gain a foothold in a low-cost segment of the market. This case provides the opportunity to study the forces that would determine whether MySQL could change the database software category in the way Linux did for server operating system space. MySQL relied on a low-cost business model with a global, virtual organization, and the case frames the question of whether this innovative, Internet-based business model could be scaled into a large, profitable growth company. The case describes the open source software phenomenon through a specific case, MySQL, and the innovator's dilemma: MySQL gained a foothold by serving the needs of the growing Web services market that was ignored by the big three DBMS players. After the foothold was established, MySQL was in the position potentially to challenge every DBMS player in the market.

Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a drug discovery company that recently decided to pursue a vertically integrated business model, chose to build up its clinical development and commercial capabilities and infrastructure. For the first time in its history, Vertex will select two drug candidates from its internal research portfolio of four projects to develop on its own, without the help of strategic partners. CEO Joshua Boger and President Vicki Sato are grappling with which two projects to select. Focuses on how to select projects and how to manage the process of portfolio selection.

Scientific-Atlantia (S-A), a leading manufacturer of cable TV equipment, is confronting strategic challenges in mid-2004. For decades, cable operators have faced high switching costs that have locked them into exclusive supply relationships with either S-A or its somewhat larger rival, Motorola. S-A has developed technology that substantially reduces switching costs, and it is positioned to capture market share because it has an 18-month lead over Motorola in developing cable set-top boxes that incorporate digital video recorders (DVRs). Cable operators are eager to offer DVRs to stem subscriber losses to satellite TV. The case asks whether S-A should aggressively pursue opportunities to overlay its set-tops in cable systems that previously employed only Motorola gear. If so, to what extent should S-A subsidize cable operators' remaining switching costs? Are there risks in introducing more competition into what had previously been a stable duopoly? Also explores S-A's strategic options for dealing with a transition to all-digital television technology and consumers' growing demand for solutions for managing their digital media files (photos, music, etc.). Asks whether S-A should continue to offer an integrated, proprietary, end-to-end transmission solution or, instead, embrace a more open "ecosystem," relying to a greater extent on third-party software and hardware providers and offering solution elements on an unbundled basis. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Latin American

In 1993, the Swatch is the best-selling watch in history. Traces the history of the watch industry up to the early 1980s, when the Swatch was introduced. Describes the various elements that made the Swatch different from any watch the industry had ever seen. Also includes a discussion of SMH, which controls Swatch, exploring how the company has managed the Swatch brand in the context of its brand portfolio (nine global watch brands in total.)

A computer subsidiary appears to be unprofitable. Managers must determine whether it is actually unprofitable and consider whether changes in prices or promotion might improve profitability. Allows clear separation of variable costs from fixed costs. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

In 2003, a year in which Hong Kong's small and medium-size enterprises faced an extraordinary disruption of normal operations as a result of the outbreak of SARS, the advantages of Internet-facilitated, remote-access solutions such as IP-VPN, telecommuting capabilities, and video conferencing became all the more evident. In February 2003, the Information Technology Services Department and the Hong Kong Productivity Council released the results of their biannual survey on the progress of e-business adoption in Hong Kong. The survey found that 47% of active businesses in Hong Kong had not adopted and/or did not have any plans to adopt online business capabilities (in even the most basic forms) within a six-month, forward-looking time frame, an increase of three percentage points over the previous survey. As a result of economic difficulties, a number of businesses had abandoned basic Internet capabilities such as e-mail accounts and company Web sites altogether to save on operating costs. Just one month later, many of these companies had reversed course and were scrambling to deploy technologies to support business operations as uncertainty gripped the region. In what ways were network technologies able to assist small and medium businesses in contingency planning? What were the long-term cost and efficiency improvements that might be realized with a "virtual office" capability? Examines how some businesses have enhanced their Hong Kong and regional presence by deploying technologies to facilitate communications and collaboration.

Tirstrup BioMechanics (Denmark) was considering an investment of $410 million in the United States, and Julie Harbjerg, Assistant Treasurer International for Tirstrup, was charged with evaluating different alternatives for raising the funds for the acquisition.

Examines the role of technology licensing in strategies for high-technology companies. In the 1990s, Rambus developed a revolutionary memory technology that would improve the ability of DRAMs to keep pace with ever-faster microprocessors. To commercialize the technology, Rambus licensed the technology to several DRAM vendors, who had to agree to allow Rambus to cross-license any improvements a licensee made to all other licensees. In its attempt to set the standard for the industry, Rambus faced competition from higher frequency versions of standard DRAMs; a consortium of DRAM manufacturers and systems companies, known as the SyncLink Consortium; and an alternative DRAM technology known as Double Data Rate SDRAM. Rambus' relationship with Intel, the dominant producer of microprocessors, didn't prove as successful as either party would have liked. Even more devastating to Rambus was its litigation with several of its customers, the DRAM vendors, and a suit by the Federal Trade Commission. Although most of the lawsuits against Rambus had been dropped in 2004, Rambus needed a new strategy to rebuild its business for the future.

In late 1999, India's second largest tea company, Tata Tea, is faced with a highly competitive home market that is about to become more so as impending deregulation takes effect. The company is thus contemplating internationalisation. Tata Tea is grappling with the decision of how to internationalise. It can choose to build its own international brand or, take the opportunity of buying Tetley Tea, the world¿s second largest tea brand, which has recently been put up for sale. Should Tata Tea build its own brand or buy Tetley. If the decision is to buy, how much should they offer?

The case narrates the internal processes of choosing and implementing a corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative. It illustrates the process of choosing a cause, selecting partners, creating a working plan, and finally getting the company's executive board's commitment.

Norman Windom, the chairman of Tiverton Media, may not know much about the world of popular music, but he does fancy himself a careful planner and a superb judge of managerial talent. That's why he's been grooming COO Sean Kinnane, a Wharton-minted numbers man, to take over an important division, Aleph Records, and one day Tiverton itself. But Derek Solomon, Aleph's 68-year-old CEO and founder, remains a creative force and a father figure to the label's artists. What's more, he's touchy about anything that might slow down Aleph's responses to the market's ever-shifting preferences--or that might call into question his indispensability. Though Sean dutifully participates in Tiverton's broad-based and elaborate executive development plan, he senses that Aleph's future leadership structure is uncertain. As impatient as he is ambitious, he announces that he's leaving Tiverton for more suitable pastures. Several of his associates, also unsure about their fate within Aleph, are following him out the door. In one fell swoop, they've torn Norman's proud succession plan apart. What kind of plan should the board adopt going forward? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0406A and R0406Z are Francis N. Bonsignore, a senior vice-president at Marsh & McLennan; Michelle L. Buck, a clinical associate professor of management and organizations at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management; Jon Younger, who heads leadership development at National City Corp., a financial holding company in Cleveland; and Thomas Leppert, the chairman and CEO of the Turner Corp., a large construction company in Dallas.

Norman Windom, the chairman of Tiverton Media, may not know much about the world of popular music, but he does fancy himself a careful planner and a superb judge of managerial talent. That's why he's been grooming COO Sean Kinnane, a Wharton-minted numbers man, to take over an important division, Aleph Records, and one day Tiverton itself. But Derek Solomon, Aleph's 68-year-old CEO and founder, remains a creative force and a father figure to the label's artists. What's more, he's touchy about anything that might slow down Aleph's responses to the market's ever-shifting preferences--or that might call into question his indispensability. Though Sean dutifully participates in Tiverton's broad-based and elaborate executive development plan, he senses that Aleph's future leadership structure is uncertain. As impatient as he is ambitious, he announces that he's leaving Tiverton for more suitable pastures. Several of his associates, also unsure about their fate within Aleph, are following him out the door. In one fell swoop, they've torn Norman's proud succession plan apart. What kind of plan should the board adopt going forward? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0406A and R0406Z are Francis N. Bonsignore, a senior vice-president at Marsh & McLennan; Michelle L. Buck, a clinical associate professor of management and organizations at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management; Jon Younger, who heads leadership development at National City Corp., a financial holding company in Cleveland; and Thomas Leppert, the chairman and CEO of the Turner Corp., a large construction company in Dallas.

Norman Windom, the chairman of Tiverton Media, may not know much about the world of popular music, but he does fancy himself a careful planner and a superb judge of managerial talent. That's why he's been grooming COO Sean Kinnane, a Wharton-minted numbers man, to take over an important division, Aleph Records, and one day Tiverton itself. But Derek Solomon, Aleph's 68-year-old CEO and founder, remains a creative force and a father figure to the label's artists. What's more, he's touchy about anything that might slow down Aleph's responses to the market's ever-shifting preferences--or that might call into question his indispensability. Though Sean dutifully participates in Tiverton's broad-based and elaborate executive development plan, he senses that Aleph's future leadership structure is uncertain. As impatient as he is ambitious, he announces that he's leaving Tiverton for more suitable pastures. Several of his associates, also unsure about their fate within Aleph, are following him out the door. In one fell swoop, they've torn Norman's proud succession plan apart. What kind of plan should the board adopt going forward? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0406A and R0406Z are Francis N. Bonsignore, a senior vice-president at Marsh & McLennan; Michelle L. Buck, a clinical associate professor of management and organizations at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management; Jon Younger, who heads leadership development at National City Corp., a financial holding company in Cleveland; and Thomas Leppert, the chairman and CEO of the Turner Corp., a large construction company in Dallas.

Citigroup, the world's largest project finance bank, provided financing for extractive projects such as mining, logging, and oil exploration. Some of these projects took place in developing countries and in rainforests and other endangered ecosystems. In 2000, the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) launched its Global Finance Campaign, with Citigroup as the target. The goal was to convince Citigroup, and eventually all lenders, to stop financing destructive activities in endangered ecosystems. The campaign began in early April 2000 when RAN wrote to Citigroup, urging it to address its role in financing the destruction of the world's remaining old growth forests and the acceleration of climate change. Shortly thereafter, at Citigroup's annual meeting, RAN campaigners questioned the board of directors and CEO Sandy Weill in front of an audience of shareholders. Citigroup agreed to meet with RAN immediately following the annual meeting. For the next two years, Citigroup and RAN held regular meetings, while RAN continued its protest activities. Mike Brune, executive director of RAN, believed that Citigroup was stalling--the meetings were discussions, not negotiations.

New York's public parks, brought to their magnificent peak by the legendary Parks Commissioner Robert Moses in the mid-20th-century heyday of direct government activism, were in disarray in a new era of public-sector austerity. As the City's hard-pressed government found itself short of money and manpower the parks-from the iconic Central Park to neighborhood playgrounds-grew dingy and dangerous. With few other options, park officials began experimenting in the 1980s with a new approach: Shifting responsibilities to the private sector. By 2003 this "partnership" strategy had become the linchpin of the park system. Private organizations-ranging from sophisticated organizations funded by New York's rich and famous to informal networks of neighborhood volunteers-had taken on major roles in maintaining, upgrading, and day-to-day management of the City's park system. Commission Adrian Benepe, though a veteran Parks Department employee deeply committed to public service, had contributed to the development of the partnership approach throughout his career. But as he was promoted to the top job, he faced the challenge of pursuing a complex mission when much of the essential capacity was subject to his influence but by no means under his control. Attending fundraisers, massaging donors' egos, and motivating volunteers-rather than the direct exercise of authority-are Benepe's most important management tools. HKS Case Number 1743.0

Microlending, defined as very small loans advanced to very low-income entrepreneurs, has attracted wide attention as a potentially effective means to aid the economic development of impoverished nations. This case focuses on one of the largest and most successful of such microlenders, Mexico's Compartamos ("we share") organization, and raises questions about the most effective business model and scale of microlenders. Specifically, the case tells the story of how Compartamos, which had found great success making small loans in villages and rural areas, fared when it sought to expand into Mexico City. A series of reverses--higher default rates, personnel problems, and unexpected competition and regulatory issues--implicitly pose the question of whether Compartamos and microlenders of its type, which historically have relied on peer group pressure to ensure repayment of otherwise unsecured loans to small start-up businesses, can expand and adapt to an urban setting. HKS Case Number 1761.0