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Jeff Immelt, the CEO of GE, introduced a new innovation strategy named "healthymagination" in Spring 2009. With cost, quality, and access as its three pillars, healthymagination ensures a strong focus for new product introduction efforts all around GE. But will this focus enable GE to achieve and maintain market leadership across a healthcare market that is being buffeted by strong currents, including cost pressures, changes in chronic disease patterns, and rationalization of buyer behavior? Moreover, healthcare spending is also increasing in emerging economies, which could provide a strong growth engine for the future. Tom Gentile, the CEO of GE Healthcare Systems (GEHS), a key player in the Medical Imaging market, wonders how the innovation strategy might respond to these changes. GE has historically been a technology leader, selling the most advanced equipment to a variety of medical establishments. Will a complete shift to healthymagination allow GE to demonstrate strong organic growth through innovation, as Immelt had charged executives at GE?

The CareerLeader business career self-assessment program provides diagnostic information in three key areas of individual differences.

On August 5, 2010, 700,000 tons of some of the hardest rock in the world caved in Chile's century-old San José mine. The collapse buried 33 miners at a depth almost twice the height of the Empire State Building-over 600 meters (2000 feet) below ground. Never had a recovery been attempted at such depths, let alone in the face of challenges like those posed by the San José mine: unstable terrain, rock so hard it defied ordinary drill bits, severely limited time, and the potentially immobilizing fear that plagued the buried miners. Could the trapped miners and rescue workers mobilize before air and resources were depleted? The case describes the ensuing efforts that draw the resources of countless people and multiple organizations in Chile and around the world.

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Bryan Preston, CEO of the Back Office Cooperative, leads several large human service providers through the process of building a shared-services platform to leverage scale and efficiencies. This successful collaboration matches the business case for restructuring against the constraints of mission-driven enterprises.

The Arbor City Community Foundation (ACCF) was a medium-sized endowment established in Illinois in the late 1970s through the hard work of several local families. The vision of the ACCF was to be a comprehensive center for philanthropy in the greater Arbor City region. ACCF had a fund balance (known collectively as "the fund") of just under $240 million. The ACCF board of trustees had appointed a committee to oversee investment decisions relating to the foundation assets. The investment committee, under the guidance of the board, pursued an active risk-management policy for the fund. The committee members were primarily concerned with the volatility and distribution of portfolio returns. They relied on the value-at-risk (VaR) methodology as a measurement of the risk of both short- and mid-term investment losses. The questions in Part (A) of the case direct the students to analyze the risk inherent in both one particular asset and the entire ACCF portfolio. For this analysis the students need to calculate daily VaR and monthly VaR values and interpret these figures in the context of ACCF's risk management. In Part (B) the foundation receives a major donation. As a result, the risk inherent in its portfolio changes considerably. The students are asked to evaluate the risk of the fund's new portfolio and to perform a portfolio rebalancing analysis.

The Arbor City Community Foundation (ACCF) was a medium-sized endowment established in Illinois in the late 1970s through the hard work of several local families. The vision of the ACCF was to be a comprehensive center for philanthropy in the greater Arbor City region. ACCF had a fund balance (known collectively as "the fund") of just under $240 million. The ACCF board of trustees had appointed a committee to oversee investment decisions relating to the foundation assets. The investment committee, under the guidance of the board, pursued an active risk-management policy for the fund. The committee members were primarily concerned with the volatility and distribution of portfolio returns. They relied on the value-at-risk (VaR) methodology as a measurement of the risk of both short- and mid-term investment losses. The questions in Part (A) of the case direct the students to analyze the risk inherent in both one particular asset and the entire ACCF portfolio. For this analysis the students need to calculate daily VaR and monthly VaR values and interpret these figures in the context of ACCF's risk management. In Part (B) the foundation receives a major donation. As a result, the risk inherent in its portfolio changes considerably. The students are asked to evaluate the risk of the fund's new portfolio and to perform a portfolio rebalancing analysis.

The Arbor City Community Foundation (ACCF) was a medium-sized endowment established in Illinois in the late 1970s through the hard work of several local families. The vision of the ACCF was to be a comprehensive center for philanthropy in the greater Arbor City region. ACCF had a fund balance (known collectively as "the fund") of just under $240 million. The ACCF board of trustees had appointed a committee to oversee investment decisions relating to the foundation assets. The investment committee, under the guidance of the board, pursued an active risk-management policy for the fund. The committee members were primarily concerned with the volatility and distribution of portfolio returns. They relied on the value-at-risk (VaR) methodology as a measurement of the risk of both short- and mid-term investment losses. In its report for the investment committee, the ACCF risk analytics team recommended the daily VaR at 95% confidence as a measure for short-term risk and reported the corresponding numbers. It is now the task of the investment committee to interpret these figures. The case questions guide the executive students to a critical evaluation of both the reported VaR figures as well as of the VaR methodology.

A midwest hospital purchases new CT Scanners which are much faster than the existing technology. Processes in the radiology department are optimized to the older, existing scanners, and technicians are unable to take full advantage of the new scanner speed. The hospital finds itself working to change the processes to suit the new scanners capabilities and take full advantage of their speed.

MentorMob had sprung from the passions-for web development and for online communities-of the company's co-founders, Kris Chinosorn (CEO) and Vince Leung (COO). The company pursued the ambitious goals of reinventing the way people learn and becoming the world's utility for learning about anything. The website leveraged a crowdsourcing model for information sharing, teaching, and learning. By enabling participants to learn-and to crowdsource from each other while learning-the site sought to both engage users at different stages of learning and to develop a compelling experience unobtainable without a crowd. Chinosorn and Leung needed to prioritize in order to achieve the growth and scale needed to become world's utility for learning. What should they do next to keep MentorMob's growth on track? What issues should get their greatest attention?

This is part of a case series. This case takes two perspectives on the same set of case facts about a military logistics supplier gone wrong: one from the perspective of the Department of Defense contractor ('Bill') and one from the perspective of the Kuwaiti-based supplier ('Rohit'). The case develops fictional characters to help elicit class discussion and teaching opportunities on issues of (1) how difficult it is to manage complicated ethical issues across national and cultural boundaries, and in stressful environments such as regions embroiled in military conflict, (2) how these contexts elicit in-group favouritism and out-group biases, and (3) how overcoming these limitations in global environments requires expanding one's circle of moral regard. The case involves fictional characters but the content of the case is based on publicly available information about Agility Corporation, a Kuwaiti-based supplier of food and transport for the US Department of Defense who has been indicted for fraud.

Supplement to case LBS190 This is part of a case series. This case takes two perspectives on the same set of case facts about a military logistics supplier gone wrong: one from the perspective of the Department of Defense contractor ('Bill') and one from the perspective of the Kuwaiti-based supplier ('Rohit'). The case develops fictional characters to help elicit class discussion and teaching opportunities on issues of (1) how difficult it is to manage complicated ethical issues across national and cultural boundaries, and in stressful environments such as regions embroiled in military conflict, (2) how these contexts elicit in-group favouritism and out-group biases, and (3) how overcoming these limitations in global environments requires expanding one's circle of moral regard. The case involves fictional characters but the content of the case is based on publicly available information about Agility Corporation, a Kuwaiti-based supplier of food and transport for the US Department of Defense who has been indicted for fraud.

In 2009, the digital world was in a period of drastic change. The YES Network, the regional sports network linked to the New York Yankees baseball club, was at the forefront of the issue of the day: the management of digital rights. In simpler terms, they were faced with the challenge of merchandising broadband, wireless and interactive TV while not undermining our existing television audiences. Risks were high and the management challenge intense. This issue was facing all regional sport networks (RSNs) as club and league management seek to maintain their fanbases, grow their revenues and expand their footprints. In 2009, the technology for online streaming existed, was in place, and was affordable. However, the quest for a business model between the content owners (television networks and content rights holders such as MLBAM) and the 'TV Everywhere' concept of cable operators such as Time Warner and Comcast was ongoing. This case outlines the challenge of monetizing these new areas while not disrupting core business models and cannibalizing current revenue sources. Notably, the television cable model was superior to the broadcast model in terms of revenue generation with cable networks reporting high profitability in 2009.

When Kevin Peters became president of Office Depot's North American operations, in 2010, its customer service scores (as graded by a third-party mystery-shopping firm) were soaring-but sales were falling. To understand why, he went undercover, quietly visiting 70 stores in more than 15 states. He talked to customers and observed their behavior. What struck him most was how often they walked out of the store empty-handed. It turned out that Office Depot's customer service scores depended on factors that shoppers didn't really care about-such as the cleanliness of floors and bathrooms. And its employees were being incentivized to focus on the wrong things. (In fact, the company learned that some of its associates preferred interacting with stock over interacting with people.) Peters's conversations with customers gave him three insights: The chain needed to offer smaller stores, to dramatically improve the in-store experience, and to add value with services such as shipping and copying. Office Depot has since rolled out 30 pilot stores, retrained associates, and begun to see the first signs of improvement.

Providing earnings guidance-publicly releasing managerial forecasts of a company's profits-has become a highly controversial practice, with critics ranging from Warren Buffett to a McKinsey team to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Yet more than a thousand U.S. corporations issue such forecasts each year. Are they making a mistake? On the contrary, argues Lev, an accounting professor at NYU Stern: Investors want more information, and they will reward companies that make it available. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, Lev maintains that investors care a lot about what drives a company's long-term growth; however, they often need help understanding what the drivers are. Guidance, non-GAAP pro forma earnings statements, and executive conference calls with investors and analysts after the release of earnings statements are potent tools. Done right, they can bring higher stock prices, lower volatility, and reduced cost of capital, and they may also temper shareholder litigation and its consequences. Some guidance for guiders is in order: Offer guidance only if your predictions are consistently better than analysts' consensus forecasts. Don't stand out as a "guidance refusenik" in a sector where guidance is prevalent. Maintain credibility and don't duck the truth-manipulating expectations so that reported earnings will comfortably exceed them breeds mistrust. Resist legal advice to be cryptic or bland, and don't overlook the value of "soft" information; executives' narrative and tone color many investors' decisions and account for most stock price changes in the wake of financial reports. These are not easy times to be an executive dealing with financial markets. But running away from disillusioned investors only makes things worse. Far better is to figure out what they value and to shape your financial reporting and communications strategies accordingly.

Corporate leaders have long subscribed to the belief that the sole purpose of business is to make money. That narrow view, deeply embedded in the American capitalist system, molds the actions of most corporations, constraining them to focus on maximizing short-term profits and returns to shareholders at the expense of worker safety and health, the environment, and society in general. In this article, HBS professor Kanter argues that a very different logic informs the practices of most high-performing and sustainable companies: an institutional logic. These companies believe that they are more than money making machines; they are also a vehicle for advancing societal goals. They deliver more than just financial returns; they also build enduring institutions. At great companies, institutional logic takes its place alongside economic logic in research, analysis, and managerial decision making. Six facets of institutional logic-a common purpose, a long-term focus, emotional engagement, partnering with the public, innovation, and self-organization-radically alter leadership and corporate behavior and form the building blocks of a more sustainable competitive advantage.

He may not appear to be one, but Murthy is quite the contrarian. At a time when few Indians felt they could become entrepreneurs, he founded Infosys with just $1,000. When no one believed that India could compete in the high tech arena, he dared to develop software services for export. In an era when hardly anyone in India conducted business ethically, he set out to create a values-based corporation. Over his 30-year tenure, Murthy has largely succeeded. He helped create a $6 billion technology firm with over 134,000 employees, pioneered an innovative way of delivering software services globally, and strove to make Infosys the epitome of a "good" company. That's a reputation that is hard won and easily lost, especially in India today, where companies are notorious for their lack of transparency. In fact, public outrage against corruption reached a flashpoint in August 2011, with millions taking to the streets in protest. As businesses gird for change in India, Infosys faces its own turning point. In August, Murthy stepped down as chairman, according to plan. In this interview, Murthy explains that building a values-based firm is a never-ending process. Leaders must demonstrate that values matter every day, at every turn.

Excellence in community engagement, labor relations, environmental protection, corporate governance, and supply chain accountability isn't easy to achieve. But in the long run, top performance in those areas strengthens an organization, as the five companies profiled in this article demonstrate. They prove that doing the right thing isn't at odds at all with building the bottom line, and in fact it can be integral to a firm's economic logic. Dutch chemical maker Royal DSM, for instance, not only specializes in nutritional and environmental products but gives them away to people in need. That unconventional move is helping DSM win the talent war and crack critical markets. Southwest has become America's largest domestic airline by committing to employee happiness. China's Broad Group has won industrial customers worldwide with its energy-efficient air conditioning and filtration systems and is now moving into sustainable building construction. PotashCorp, a Canadian fertilizer company, has raised the bar on transparency in governance-and is reaping the reputational rewards. And Unilever has proved that it is possible to make your supply chain more sustainable, even if you sell 170 billion products across 180 countries a year and run 250 factories.

A growing number of socially motivated entrepreneurs have been creating new kinds of organizations that combine a social mission with a business engine. Unlike typical for-profits, these "for-benefit" enterprises have social or environmental outcomes as their ultimate bottom line; and unlike typical nonprofits, they derive their income mostly from the sale of goods and services rather than from grants and donations. They defy classification as pure business or non-profit and are very much a blend of the two. Many more such enterprises would exist, except that most entrepreneurs haven't been able to choose "for-benefit" as a legally recognized organizational structure. Most countries' legal and economic systems allow only for-profit or nonprofit activity, so entrepreneurs often end up shoehorning their vision into one or the other structure and accepting burdensome trade-offs in the process. All this seems destined to change. For-benefit enterprises will become more commonplace as entrepreneurs learn to better navigate existing constraints, and as an ecosystem of specialized support-including public policy, financial markets, accounting standards, and professional services-develops around them. The even bigger news is what will happen then, writes the author. With formalization of the for-benefit structure, we will see the emergence of a fourth sector of the economy, interacting with but separate from government, nonprofits, and for-profit businesses. The rise of that sector is likely to reshape the future of capitalism.

The sharper a company's differentiation, the greater its competitive advantage. In studying companies that sustained a high level of performance over many years, the authors, both partners at Bain, have found that more than 80% of them had a well-defined and easily understood differentiation at the center of strategy. But differentiation can wear with age: The growth it generates creates complexity, and complex companies tend to forget what they're good at. Often they respond by trying to reimagine their entire business models quickly and dramatically. That's rarely the answer, the authors write. Really successful companies relentlessly build on their fundamental differentiation, going from strength to strength. They learn to deliver it to the front line, creating an organization that lives and breathes its strategic advantages day in and day out. They learn to sustain it through constant adaptation to changes in the market. And they learn to resist the siren song of today's hot market better than their less-focused competitors do. The result is a simple, repeatable business model that a company can apply to new products and markets over and over again to generate sustained growth.