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Nearly all environmental organizations have a similar aim: to stop the degradation of the natural environment. However, the strategies which environmental organizations choose to employ are sometimes starkly different. Compares the models of two dissimilar environmental powerhouses: Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Active in 100 countries, WWF works with governments, businesses, other NGOs, and communities to set up conservation programs to preserve natural habitat. In contrast, Greenpeace works to campaign for environmental change against governments and corporations and accepts funding only through individuals and foundation grants. Explores the detailed history and business models of both organizations.

Describes the auction of Cable & Wireless America (CWA), a bankrupt subsidiary of the British telecommunications company Cable & Wireless. While an initial "stalking horse" bid valued the assets at $125 million, after a long day and night of bidding between eight groups, the best bid was in the high $60 million range. The sell-side team, comprised of bankers from the Blackstone Group and Greenhill, and lawyers from Wachtell Lipton and Kirkland & Ellis, is forced to regroup and reconsider their options for galvanizing the bidding process. Describes these events in detail, while providing information for students on CWA's history, the nature of Section 363 auctions, and the bidders who were involved in the process.

In 2006, Rio Tinto Iron Ore (RTIO) faced a number of challenges. The iron ore business had traditionally been dominated by a few large suppliers, who sold to a relatively few large steel producers. The business environment was changing, however, with the rapid development of China. Demand was growing faster than supply, causing increased prices, particularly on the spot market. Most of RTIO's production was committed to fulfilling long-term contracts, so it could not fully benefit from the high spot market prices. New entrants, however, were not committed to long-term contracts and were attracted by these high prices. In addition, many new Chinese iron and steel mills were small operations, geographically disbursed, and did not secure their iron ore supplies before building their plants. An important part of the iron ore supply chain was transportation. Traditionally, customers were responsible for shipping, but this did not meet the needs of small, remotely located Chinese mills. In addition to these changes in the marketplace, RTIO had developed new steelmaking technology that enabled the use of lower quality iron ore and also generated substantially fewer greenhouse gas emissions than conventional technology. There were a number of possible approaches to commercializing this technology, ranging from vertical integration to licensing.

These three caselets provide practice using risk preference and utility, with both exponential utility (constant risk aversion) and logarithmic utility (decreasing risk aversion). The second caselet is an extension of "Integrated Siting Systems, Inc." (UV0355). Students may use TreePlan to conduct a sensitivity analysis of risk tolerance, and can employ Solver to find optimal risk sharing. Students will learn concepts and garner insights regarding portfolio risk in making investments, how intangibles can affect evaluation of risk, and how expected utility can exploit risk sharing.

The case delineates how Olam International Limited became a global supplier of 14 agro-products including cashew nuts, cocoa and coffee. As Olam embarked on a growth-by-acquisition model, in addition to its organic growth model, the company had to reassess the need to adjust its present risk management system. The Board's risk committee was tasked to deliberate on the matter.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. While most managers would think long and hard before bringing to market a product that lacked patent protection and could be easily imitated, many invest in sales promotions--sweepstakes, coupons, time-limited price discounts, free gifts or samples, special events, displays, membership rewards, consumer-directed promotions, and so on--that are easier to imitate than the simplest new product. Others sign off on plans so generic that they seem unrelated to the brand or company offering them, despite the fact that sales promotions may absorb a significant portion of a company's promotional dollars--currently a reported 31% of marketing budgets. By contrast, a strategic focus--considering how customers and competitors will react to any promotional effort, as well as the message delivered and the stature in the marketplace of the brand delivering it--leads to promotions that defy or delay imitation and yield disproportionate benefit for companies that have already developed a strong competitive position. Suggests that when all these strategic factors are aligned, the result is a successful promotion, and illustrates that with successful promotions conducted by General Motors, Home Depot, and Procter & Gamble, among others. However, such promotional strategies require inventiveness, originality, and swift action--qualities neither present nor encouraged in many corporate cultures in which familiarity and predictability are prized. Managers in such organizations not only must successfully tailor a promotion to its intended market, but also skillfully shepherd it through internal barriers. Knowing why, how, and for whom sales promotions will most likely be profitable surely will help in that regard.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The place of multinational corporations (MNCs) in China has rapidly changed since the 1970s. No longer expected to bring cash and management expertise to China, argues that MNCs have taken on a new role as teachers and role models. However, recent high-profile mistakes, including a McDonald's Corp. (Oak Brook, Illinois) ad that over 80% of Chinese surveyed found offensive, show that MNCs are not entirely up to this task. Illustrates the consequences of this inability to cope and suggests eight strategies for improving MNC's success in China: think local--act global, don't apply double standards, don't bend the rules, avoid making "symbolic" acquisitions, avoid employing aggressive tactics over intellectual property rights, guard against management insensitivity, don't "strip mine" profits, and don't use China as a lab. Shows how these strategies can be executed to increase MNC's profits and standing in China.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In studying teams at large companies in Europe and the United States, finds that diversity and complexity are becoming the rule. Diverse teams bring to bear a range of experiences and attitudes to tackle companies' hardest challenges. Paradoxically, however, the very nature of team diversity often creates conditions that reduce teams' innovative capacity. Illustrates many failures in collaboration and knowledge-sharing that resulted from faultlines--subgroups or coalitions that emerge naturally within teams, typically along demographic lines such as age, gender, and functional background, yet finds that some teams were able to collaborate and share knowledge despite the presence of faultlines. A defining factor was the behavior of the team leader and, in particular, the extent to which the leader was task-oriented or relationship-oriented. Where it is likely strong faultlines will emerge, many leaders tend to encourage team members to come together. However, simple socializing can make people's differences more apparent and cause faultlines to solidify. Recommends that leaders vary their leadership style according to how long a team has been together and outlines four steps for successful functioning of diverse teams: leaders should diagnose the likely extent of faultlines in a new team; focus on task orientation when a team is newly formed; consider when a switch in leadership style would be most appropriate; and finally, build a relationship-oriented style. Switching from task orientation to relationship orientation will be successful only when a team has developed a clear protocol for communication and coordination and an established operational structure.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Many markets are affected by the complex interactions of multiple variables: geopolitics, technical innovation, capital market swings, competitive dynamics, shifting consumer preferences, and so on. These volatile markets throw out a steady stream of opportunities and threats, and managers can neither predict nor control the form, magnitude, or timing of future events with accuracy. In such environments, the traditional linear view of strategy--plan then execute--is woefully inadequate because it hinders people from incorporating new information into action. But instead of thinking of strategy as a linear process, why not consider it as inherently iterative--a loop instead of a line? According to this view, every strategy is a work in progress that is subject to revision in light of ongoing interactions between the organization and its shifting environment. To accommodate those interactions, the strategy loop consists of four major steps: making sense of a situation, making choices on what to do (and what not to do), making those things happen, and making revisions based on new information. Reconceptualizing strategy as an iterative loop is simple enough, but putting that new mindset into practice is not. Here, the crucial thing to remember is that discussions--formal and informal, short and long, one-on-one and in groups--are the key mechanism for coordinating activity inside a company. Thus, to put the strategy loop into practice, managers at every level in the organization must be proficient at leading discussions that reflect the four major steps (making sense, making choices, making things happen, and making revisions). Companies such as Diageo Ireland, All America Latina Logistica, and Onset Venture Services demonstrate that each of the four types of discussions has a different objective that requires a specific tone, supporting information, leadership traits, and accompanying tactics.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For executives running global companies, the challenge of keeping abreast of events in markets around the world is mind-boggling. The problem is not a lack of information--it is having the time and energy to process the information. How should executives prioritize their time to ensure that it is focused on the countries and subsidiaries that need the attention? Which markets should they emphasize, and which ones can they allow to fall off their radar screen? Researches executive attention at global companies for five years, interviewing 50 executives at 30 corporations--including ABB, Dun & Bradstreet, Nestle, and Sara Lee--and finds that executives end up prioritizing a handful of markets at the expense of the others, but they don't always select the most promising ones. Because executive attention is so limited, executives tend to focus on the home market or on "hot" markets, always at the expense of other opportunities. Examines the nature of executive attention and identifies mechanisms by which subsidiary companies attract attention from the top executives. Although attention can be harmful as well as helpful, focuses on the positive aspects, three elements in particular: support, in terms of how headquarters executives interact with and help subsidiary managers achieve their goals; visibility, in terms of the public statements headquarters executives make about how the subsidiary is doing; and relative standing, in terms of the subsidiary's perceived status vis-a-vis other subsidiaries in the organization.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. It is estimated that of the $255 billion spent per year on information technology projects in the United States, more than a quarter is burned up in failures and cost overruns. Project professionals and management experts have attempted to respond to these failures by improving the formal systems related to program governance, project management, and project-related technologies. Though these new approaches have produced improved results, with more than two out of three projects continuing to disappoint, something is still missing. Suggests five crucial questions to ask to help prevent project failure; are we planning around facts, is the project sponsor providing support, are we faithful to the process, are we honestly assessing our progress and risk, and are team members pulling their weight? Examines the success of project managers who do engage in these conversations, and then lays out a plan for using them in the organization.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Dynamic pricing, in which prices respond to supply and demand pressures in real time or near-real time, has long been used by airlines and hotels. Now dynamic pricing is making inroads in many different sectors, including apparel, automobiles, consumer electronics, personal services, telecommunications, and second-hand goods. These companies are making use of new findings on dynamic pricing and of increases in data processing power to raise their average realized prices, thereby increasing revenues and profits. There are two mechanisms for dynamic pricing: posted prices that customers can see; and price-discovery mechanisms, in which customers determine prices through their own actions. These two mechanisms are employed in seven different forms: yield management (commonly used by airlines), demand-based pricing, three types of auctions, group buying, and negotiations. Describes eight situations for using the various forms of dynamic pricing. An important constraint in employing dynamic pricing is consumers' Latitude of Price Acceptance, which varies for different products and situations and which can be discovered through observation, surveys, or analysis of demand elasticities. Customer participation in the pricing process decreases the chances of a consumer backlash. Customers also tend to embrace dynamic pricing in the following situations: where the price reflects intensity of demand for the product, there is communication between the seller and the consumer, and the price difference is explained by a difference in perceived value across channels through which the transaction occurred. The more the seller understands the buying cycles and habits of the customer, the more he is able to manage price margins to the rhythm of the customer's shopping, to segment customers, and to develop price discrimination.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In the past, companies have tried to manage risks by focusing on potential threats outside the organization: competitors, shifts in the strategic landscape, natural disasters, or geopolitical events. They are generally less adept at detecting internal vulnerabilities that creep into organizations and other human-designed systems. Indeed, as companies increase the complexity of their systems they often fail to pay sufficient attention to the introduction and proliferation of loopholes and flaws. A crucial thing to remember is that the possibility of random failure rises as the number of combinations of things that can go wrong increases, while the opportunity for acts of malicious intent also goes up. Build new applications on top of legacy systems and errors creep in between the lines of code. Merge two companies and weaknesses sprout between the organizational boundaries. Build Byzantine corporate structures and processes and obscure pockets are created where bad behavior can hide. Furthermore, the enormous complexity of large systems like communications networks means that even tiny glitches can cascade into catastrophic events. In fact, catastrophic events are almost guaranteed to occur in many complex systems, much like big earthquakes are bound to happen. So, without the benefit of perfect foresight, how can businesses uncover and forestall the fatal flaws lurking within their organizations? There are three complementary strategies: (1) Assess the risk to make better-informed decisions, such as purchasing an insurance policy to cover the risk; (2) spot vulnerabilities and fix them before catastrophic events occur; and (3) design out weaknesses through resilience. These ideas have been around for years, but researchers have recently had to reinvent them in the context of extremely complex, interconnected, cascade-prone systems.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Numerous studies confirm that few people can make it through a typical day without lying. So it should not be surprising that falsehoods and deception are widespread in business negotiations as well. The unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, thought is that if everyone lies, why is it so bad? Examines legal and ethical views of lying, noting that while courts often hold parties to the truth of their representations, negotiators have many ways to mislead the opposing side. For example, negotiating tactics such as nondisclosure and evasion are rarely considered illegal. Indeed, it is often possible to avoid liability by using misleading behaviors that make no representations but which seem to. In light of the moral and legal ambiguity of lying, offers suggestions for how to detect lies and how to protect oneself against bargaining deception, including: establishing negotiating ground rules before the discussions begin; asking the same question in different ways; asking questions to which you already know the answer; including written claims in the final agreement; and using contingent agreements, an escrow agent, or a performance bond.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Business schools and others interested in management education and development have vigorously debated how best to teach strategy to future leaders. Some experts have questioned whether the topic should be taught at all--or at least whether it should be taught to managers. Often missing from the debate, however, has been any in-depth discussion of how individuals learn to think strategically in the first place. What specific experiences are important and how do they contribute? Moreover, what are the different ways in which people absorb those experiences to develop the ability to think strategically? To answer these and other questions, conducts a study that identified executives who were considered the top strategic thinkers in their industries. The study then investigated the totality of experiences (educational, job related, or other) that contributed to the high ability of those individuals. In addition, the research investigated the different ways in which the executives acquired their expertise in strategic thinking--a process that typically took more than a decade. The data showed that strategic thinking arises from 10 specific types of experiences--for instance, spearheading a major growth initiative or dealing with a threat to organizational survival. Moreover, executives appear to gain their expertise in strategic thinking through one of three developmental patterns. These findings help demystify the process by which strategic thinking is learned, offering important implications for management development and the practice of strategy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. When consumers resist adopting an innovation because it requires them to alter established habits, the innovation is called a resistant innovation. Uses a study involving the diffusion of screwcap wine closures in three countries--Australia, New Zealand, and the United States--to analyze strategies for marketing a resistant innovation. For winemakers, screwcap closures represent a solution to "cork taint," a quality problem that can be caused by poor-quality corks and that can affect wine flavor. But consumers have shown resistance to screwcap closures, associating them with cheap wines or preferring the tradition associated with cork. However, among wine consumers in Australia and New Zealand, screwcaps have now achieved widespread acceptance. But 2005 wine industry statistics showed that less than 5% of U.S. wineries used screwcaps on fine wines. What is the reason for this difference? Earlier research in 2004 had found few differences between U.S. wine consumers and those in Australia and New Zealand--except in their attitudes toward screwcaps. Interviews decision makers at more than two dozen wineries in the three countries, and concludes that winemakers in Australia and New Zealand had generally taken a different approach to marketing screwcap wine closures than United States wineries did. Concludes that under certain circumstances coopetition strategies, which involve some cooperation among competitive firms, can be an effective strategy for marketing a resistant innovation. Suggests that managers should analyze the marketing problem the new innovation faces and the resources available to address it; consider the kind of specific resources and knowledge that might be exchanged during coopetition; and evaluate the industry climate, including the role of trade associations and industry experts.

Peachtree Healthcare has major IT infrastructure problems, and CEO Max Berndt is struggling to find the right fix. He can go with a single set of systems and applications that will provide consistency across Peachtree's facilities but may not give doctors enough flexibility. Or he can choose service-oriented architecture (SOA), a modular design that will allow Peachtree to standardize incrementally and selectively but poses certain risks as a newer technology. What should he do? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0707A and R0707Z, authored by John P. Glaser, CIO for Partners HealthCare System. George C. Halvorson, the chairman and CEO of Kaiser Permanente, warns against using untested methodologies such as SOA in a health care environment, where lives are at stake. He says Peachtree's management must clarify its overall IT vision before devising a plan to achieve each of its objectives. Monte Ford, the chief information officer at American Airlines, says Peachtree can gradually replace its old systems with SOA. An incremental approach, he points out, would not only minimize risk but also enhance flexibility and control, and would allow IT to shift priorities along the way. Randy Heffner, a vice president at Forrester Research who focuses on technology architectures for computer-based business systems, thinks SOA's modular approach to business design would best meet Peachtree's need for flexibility. He says that Peachtree's CIO sees SOA as a new product category but should instead view it as a methodology. John A. Kastor, a professor at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, questions the goal of standardized care. He argues that it would be difficult to persuade doctors, many of whom are fiercely independent, to follow rigid patterns in their work.

Business projects with very long time horizons--such as those involving product R&D, workplace design, and total compensation planning--have to contend with a crucial question: What will be the needs, demands, and desires of consumers and employees decades from now? If you think the answer is "Just more of the same," you're in for a surprise. Howe and Strauss, the authors of "Generations", "The Fourth Turning", "Millennials Rising", and other books, have studied the differences among generations for some 30 years. Their extensive research has revealed a fascinating pattern--one so strong that it supports a measure of predictability. On the basis of historical precedent, they say, we can foresee how the generations that are alive today will think and act in decades to come. Three of those generations will still be vital forces in American society 20 years from now: Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. Their attitudes and behaviors will have profound effects on the economy, the workplace, and social institutions in general. For example, as aging Boomers eschew high-tech medicine in favor of holistic self-care, natural foods, and mind-body healing techniques, some hospitals are opening new wings featuring alternative medicine and spiritual counseling. Gen Xers, having grown up in an era of failing schools and marriages, will remain alienated, disaffected, and pragmatic as they enter midlife. Already the greatest entrepreneurial generation in U.S. history, they will be highly effective at pushing innovation, efficiency, and mass customization. In contrast, young adult Millennials will favor teamwork, close family relationships, job security, and a bland popular culture. Their unprecedented digital empowerment and talent for organizing will create a political powerhouse and may even revitalize the union movement.

Day-to-day management is challenging enough for CEOs. How do they manage for the long term as well? We posed that question to four top executives of global companies. According to Maurice Levy, chairman and CEO of Publicis Groupe, building the future is really about building the present and keeping close to the front line--those who deal with your customers and markets. He also attributes his company's success in large part to knowing when to take action: In a market where clients' needs steer your long-term future, timing is everything. UPS Chairman and CEO Mike Eskew emphasizes staying true to your vision and values over the long run, despite meeting obstacles along the way. It took more than 20 years, and many lessons learned, to produce consistent profits in what is today the company's fastest-growing and most profitable business: international small packages. Wulf H. Bernotat, CEO of E.ON, examines the challenges facing business leaders and politicians as they try to balance energy needs against potential environmental damage. He calls for educating people about consumption and waste, and he maintains that a diverse and reliable mix of energy sources is the only way to ensure a secure supply while protecting our environment. Finally, Marianne Barner, the director of corporate communications and ombudsman for children's issues at IKEA, discusses how the company is taking steps to improve the environment and be otherwise socially responsible. For example, it's partnering with NGOs to address child labor issues and, on its own, is working to help mitigate climate change. IKEA's goals include using renewable sources for 100% of its energy needs and cutting its overall energy consumption by 25%.

When your company is doing well, and money is pouring in, how do you know if it could be doing better? How can you tell which management practices are making the difference--and which are merely not doing obvious harm? To find out, Professor Stadler and a team at Innsbruck University's business school conducted a massive benchmarking study comparing nine pairs of European companies over 50 years. Each pair was from the same industry (and, preferably, the same country) and included one exceptional performer and one less impressive, but solid performer. The project yielded four main findings, which Stadler calls the four principles of enduring success: Exploit before you explore: Great companies don't innovate their way to growth--they grow by efficiently exploiting the fullest potential of existing innovations. Diversify your business portfolio: Good companies, conscious of the dangers of irrational conglomeration, tend to stick to their knitting. But the great companies know when to diversify, and they remain resilient by maintaining a wide range of suppliers and a broad base of customers. Remember your mistakes: Good companies tell stories of success, but great companies also tell stories of past failures to avoid repeating them. Be conservative about change: Great companies very seldom make radical changes--and take great care in their planning and implementation. How much difference do these principles make? An investment of $1 in 1953 in the group of companies in the study that consistently applied them--insurers Allianz, Legal & General, and Munich Re; financial services firm HSBC; building materials maker Lafarge; high-tech firms Nokia and Siemens; oil giant Shell; and pharmaceutical firm GlaxoSmithKline--would be worth $4,077 today. A $1 investment in the comparison companies--Aachener und Munchener, Prudential Limited, and Cologne Re; Standard Chartered; Ciments Francais; Ericsson and AEG; BP; and Wellcome--would have yielded $713.