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The problems with traditional approaches to strategic planning have long been recognized: they attempt to make a 'science' of planning, with its subsequent loss of creativity; there is an excessive emphasis on data; the drive for administrative efficiency at the expense of substance; and the dominance of single techniques, inappropriately applied. Yet today's strategists continue to struggle to propose clear alternatives to traditional processes. Design offers a different approach and suggests processes that are more widely participative, dialog-based, issue-rather-than-calendar-driven, and conflict-using rather than conflict-avoiding, all aimed at invention and learning, rather than control. The author describes the elements of the 'design approach' and ten steps organizations can take if they want to take design seriously.

Coming up with fresh ideas for new or existing products, services and processes is widely recognized as the key to enduring economic advantage, and as a result, employee creativity has taken center stage in discussions of innovation. But how can creativity be actively fostered and sustained in the workplace? Paying attention to employee emotions is critical, say the authors. Organizations are emotion-laden environments, and while research has begun to validate affective (i.e. emotional) influences on a number of work outcomes (including task quality, productivity and efficiency), little is known about how naturally-occurring affective experiences in the flow of our daily work lives relate to creative thinking on the job. The authors show that the emotion-creativity system is a cycle, whereby influences at any point can begin a dynamic pattern of increasing or decreasing positive affect and creativity.

Something is tragically missing from modern management practice and education, say the authors: an image of the manager as an idea generator who gives form to new possibilities with a well-developed vocabulary of design. Achieving this requires the development of a 'design attitude', which goes beyond default solutions to create new possibilities for the future. The authors describe the differences between a 'design attitude' and the 'decision attitude' that is so prevalent in business today. They explain why creativity needs the guiding energy of a design attitude in order to focus our efforts on results that will be truly innovative and produce long-lasting organizational betterments. This article is excerpted from Managing as Designing (Stanford Business Books, 2004), edited by the two authors.

The paradigmatic shift taking place in economic value creation requires organizations to move away from an obsession with reliability and towards a more welcoming environment for validity. A reliable process is one that produces a consistent and predictable result, over and over. To enhance the reliability of any process, one has to reduce the number of variables considered and use quantitative, bias-free measurement. On the other hand, to increase the validity of any process, one must consider a much wider array of relevant variables and use intuition and gut instinct. Ultimately, reliability and validity anchor down opposite ends of a spectrum: more reliability requires fewer variables and therefore less validity, and vice versa. How does this trade-off relate to design, and why should it matter to today's business leaders? Because design possesses an inherent bias toward validity: great designers seek deep understanding of the user and the context, which entails the consideration of many variables; they don't limit their considerations to aspects that can be thoroughly quantified; they worry less about whether they can replicate a particular process, and more about producing a valid solution to the problem before them. The author presents five strategies for being effective in a reliability-obsessed organization.

Are hedge funds heroes or villains? Management of Blockbuster, Time Warner, Six Flags, Knight-Ridder, and Bally Total Fitness might prefer the "villain" appellation, but Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth shareholders might view management as the real villains and hedge funds as vehicles to oust incompetent corporate managers before they run companies into the ground or steal them through fraudulent transactions. Could the pressure exerted by activist hedge funds on targeted companies result in increased share prices, management accountability, and better communication with shareholders? Or does it distract management from its primary goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value?

Since the days of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, the American public's regard for the competence of public agencies and the value of the services they perform has steadily declined. During that time, innovations in management practice and thinking have mostly originated and been tested in the private sector. But recent events, such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the engulfment of New Orleans, have demonstrated how essential it is for public agencies to be well run, too. Unfortunately, few public administrators have a background in change management, and a variety of factors--such as civil service rules, political considerations, and the limited tenures of agency heads--have combined to make true reform a rare event. These facts of public life may never go away. But some agency leaders have figured out how to court important stakeholders, rededicate staffers to an agency's true mission, undertake reform so comprehensively that resistant elements are unable to subvert it, and lay the groundwork for next steps clearly and systematically. Consultant Frank Ostroff has studied turnarounds at the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Government Accountability Office, and Special Operations Forces--the fast-response, clandestine arm of the military. From these examples and others, he has distilled five principles that underlie successful change efforts: Improve performance against agency mission; win over external and internal stakeholders; establish a road map; recognize the connections among all the organizational elements; and be a leader, not a bureaucrat. Change programs that follow these principles are more likely to survive when leadership changes hands.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. Commenting on this fictional case study in R0605A and R0605Z are Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. Commenting on this fictional case study in R0605A and R0605Z are Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Jack Donally was a colossal figure who commanded a lot of respect, if not affection. Just before Jack suddenly died, the board appointed Stephanie Fortas as the new CEO to lead Innostat, the world's best-known manufacturer of prosthetic limbs and surgical implants. Innostat has recently been struggling; its once generous margins have been narrowing for the past several years as other companies have found ways to engineer around its patents and develop competitive products of their own. Worse, the company seems to have lost its innovative edge: It has not launched a major new product in four years. The previous year, the board rejected a plan for a large-scale reorganization that might have addressed many of these fundamental problems. Should Stephanie revive the plan? Her coach tells her she doesn't have the clout to survive a reorg and advises her to scope out new products and drive them through the way Jack used to. Meanwhile, Stephanie deliberates about whether to fire Frank Timoshotsky, the self-effacing head of production who had been Jack's protege and who was passed over for the CEO position. In R0605A and R0605Z, four experts discuss this fictional case study: Robert A. Eckert, the chairman and CEO of Mattel in El Segundo, California; Steven F. Dichter, the director of TruePoint Partners in Waltham, Massachusetts; Patrick J. Canavan, a senior vice-president and the director of global governance at Motorola in Schaumburg, Illinois; and Kerry Sulkowicz, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who founded the New York-based Boswell Group.

Health care in the United States--and in most other developed countries--is ailing. Medical treatment has made astonishing advances, but the packaging and delivery of health care are often inefficient, ineffective, and user unfriendly. Problems ranging from costs to medical errors beg for ingenious solutions--and, indeed, there have been enormous investments in innovation. But too many efforts fail. To find out why, it's necessary to break down the problem, look at the different types of innovation, and examine the forces that affect them. Three kinds of innovation can make health care better and cheaper: One changes the way in which consumers buy and use health care, another taps into technology, and the third generates new business models. However, the health care system erects an array of barriers to each type of innovation. More often than not, organizations can overcome the barriers by managing the six forces that have an impact on health care innovation: players--the friends and foes who can bolster or destroy; funding--the revenue-generation and capital-acquisition processes, which differ from those in other industries; policy--the regulations that pervade the industry; technology--the foundation for innovations that can make health care delivery more efficient and convenient; customers--the empowered and engaged consumers of health care; and accountability--the demand from consumers, payers, and regulators that innovations be safe, effective, and cost effective. The analytical framework the author describes can also be used to examine other industries.

Asking the question, "What makes a great COO?" is akin to asking "What makes a great candidate for U.S. vice president?" It all depends on the first name on the ticket-the CEO. New research sheds light on this most contingent, and most mysterious, of C-suite jobs. After in-depth conversations with dozens of executives who have held the position and with CEOs who have worked with COOs, the authors have concluded that different views of the COO role arise from the different motives behind creating the position in the first place. There are seven basic reasons why companies decide to hire a COO: to implement the CEO's strategy; to lead a particular initiative, such as a turnaround; to mentor a young, inexperienced CEO; to complement the strengths or make up for the weaknesses of the CEO; to provide a partner to the CEO; to test out a possible successor; or to stave off the defection of a highly valuable executive, particularly to a rival. This tremendous variation implies that there is no standard set of great COO attributes, which makes finding suitable candidates difficult for companies and recruiters alike. Still, certain common success factors came up consistently in the interviews, the most important being building a high level of trust between CEO and COO. Trust comes from meeting obligations on both sides: The COO must truly support the CEO's vision; keep ego in check; and exhibit strong execution, coaching, and coordination skills. The CEO must communicate faithfully, grant real authority and decision rights, and not stymie the COO's career. It's surprising that COOs are not more common. They would be, the authors contend, if there were less confusion surrounding the role. As we continue to demystify that role, more companies will benefit from more effective leadership.

Sooner or later, most companies can't attain the growth rates expected by their boards and CEOs and demanded by investors. To some extent, such businesses are victims of their own successes. Many were able to sustain high growth rates for a long time because they were in high-growth industries. But once those industries slowed down, the businesses could no longer deliver the performance that investors had come to take for granted. Often, companies have resorted to acquisition, though this strategy has a discouraging track record. Over time, 65% of acquisitions destroy more value than they create. So where does real growth come from? For the past 12 years, the authors have researched and advised companies on this issue. With the support of researchers at Harvard Business School and INSEAD, they instituted a project titled The CEO Agenda and Growth. They identified and approached 24 companies that had achieved significant organic growth and interviewed their CEOs, chief strategists, heads of R&D, CFOs, and top-line managers. They asked, "Where does your growth come from?" and found a consistent pattern in the answers. All the businesses grew by creating new growth platforms (NGPs) on which they could build families of products and services and extend their capabilities into multiple new domains. Identifying NGP opportunities calls for executives to challenge conventional wisdom. In all the companies studied, top management believed that NGP innovation differed significantly from traditional product or service innovation. They had independent, senior-level units with a standing responsibility to create NGPs, and their CEOs spent as much as 50% of their time working with these units. The payoff has been spectacular and lasting. For example, from 1985 to 2004, the medical device company Medtronic grew revenues at 18% per year, earnings at 20%, and market capitalization at 30%.

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors' findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can contribute significantly to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.

In the complex sport of American football, teams rely on playbooks as thick as the Manhattan phone directory. But when it comes to creating innovative growth businesses--which is at least as complicated as professional football--most companies have not developed detailed game plans. Indeed, many managers have concluded that a fog enshrouds the world of innovation, obscuring high-potential opportunities. The authors believe that companies can penetrate that fog by developing growth strategies based on disruptive innovations, as defined by Clayton Christensen. Such innovations conform to a pattern: They offer an entirely new solution; they perform adequately along traditional dimensions and much better along other dimensions that matter more to target customers; and they are not initially appealing to powerful incumbents. Companies can develop customized checklists, or playbooks, by combining this basic pattern with analysis of major innovations in their markets. The key early on is to focus not on detailed financial estimates--which will always guide companies toward the markets most hostile to disruptive innovations--but on how well the innovation fits the pattern of success. It's also crucial to encourage flexibility: Companies must be willing to kill projects that are going nowhere, exempt innovations from standard development processes, and avoid burdening project teams with extra financing, which can keep them heading in the wrong direction. Companies can create competitive advantage by becoming champions at defining the pattern of successful innovations and executing against it. But as that pattern becomes obvious--and others emerge--building a sustainable advantage on innovation competencies will again prove elusive.

If you want to know why so many organizations sink into chaos, look no further than their leaders' mouths. Over and over, leaders present grand, overarching--yet fuzzy--notions of where they think the company is going. They assume everyone shares their definitions of "vision," "accountability," and "results." The result is often sloppy behavior and misalignment that can cost a company dearly. Effective communication is a leader's most critical tool for doing the essential job of leadership: inspiring the organization to take responsibility for creating a better future. Five topics wield extraordinary influence within a company: organizational structure and hierarchy, financial results, the leader's sense of his or her job, time management, and corporate culture. Properly defined, disseminated, and controlled, these topics give the leader opportunities for increased accountability and substantially better performance. For example, one CEO always keeps communications about hierarchy admirably brief and to the point. When he realized he needed to realign internal resources, he told the staff: "I'm changing the structure of resources so that we can execute more effectively." After unveiling a new organization chart, he said, "It's 10:45. You have until noon to be annoyed, should that be your reaction. At noon, pizza will be served. At one o'clock, we go to work in our new positions." The most effective leaders ask themselves, "What needs to happen today to get where we want to go? What vague belief or notion can I clarify or debunk?" A CEO who communicates precisely to 10 direct reports, each of whom communicates with equal precision to 40 other employees, aligns the organization's commitment and energy with a well-understood vision of the firm's real goals and opportunities.

Ever since businesses started offering solutions instead of products, they have acknowledged that selling spare parts and after-sales services could be a lucrative source of profits. So why do so many companies still treat aftermarket services as an afterthought? One reason is that after-sales support is so hard to manage. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) often subject their customers to unnecessary delays when problems arise, and many OEMs outsource customer service. As a result, customers are dissatisfied with the level of service they receive, and companies don't benefit from the aftermarket's potential. Only businesses that provide services efficiently can truly benefit. Focusing on after-sales services can pay off in a number of ways. For example, it's cheaper for businesses to increase sales of parts and service-related products than to find new customers. And when companies provide aftermarket support, they gain unique insight into their customers' businesses that's difficult for rivals to acquire. The authors, who have studied after-sales service networks for more than 20 years, have developed a six-step approach to help companies improve after-sales service quality levels, reduce investments in service assets, and cut operating costs. To be successful, firms must identify the products they want to support, design a portfolio of service products, use multiple business models, determine after-sales organizational structures, create an after-sales supply chain, and monitor performance. Companies that ignore these steps, say the authors, are doomed to mediocrity.

Examines a company that has been extremely successful in several product categories in its own domestic market and is defending its market position against intense competition from powerful multinational corporations, emerging domestic rivals, and newer low-cost alternatives. The multinational corporations include some of the world's most sophisticated marketing companies.

A senior manager at Laurel Upholstery learns from an unexpected meeting with a former senior manager at the firm's Montreal factory that only managers of a certain origin - regardless of seniority or performance - were being promoted into top management positions. Although the former manager alleged he had no interest in pursuing the matter, he was frustrated enough to leave the firm, and indicated the matter seemed serious enough to warrant further investigation.

Hugo Chavez often pointed to Simon Bolivar as the model for his political philosophy, centered on Bolivar's vision of a unified and independent Latin America. In 1998, Chavez ran in the presidential election, on a platform that opposed what he termed the "savage neoliberalism" of the 1990s. Chavez's speeches in the presidential election campaign emphasized the importance of "national sovereignty" and "economic justice." As president, Chavez passed a new Hydrocarbons Law to enhance the share oil revenue that would be owed to the government; he created a new government-owned bank; he introduced a radical land reform law; and he encouraged takeovers by the government and employees of privately-owned factories. Venezuela sold oil to Cuba at reduced prices in return for professionals, especially doctors who created health missions in many low-income areas. Chavez sought to foment socialist anti-American revolutions throughout Latin America. In the context of this socialist agenda, analysts expected that Venezuela's economy would experience serious challenges in the coming years. The combination of high inflation, fiscal pressure, and slow growth would be a boiling political cauldron in which violent opposition could ferment.

An entrepreneur has received additional information on the Cartridge World franchising concept--a store focused on the refilling of printer cartridges. The idea for Cartridge World began in Australia in 1988 and has grown to almost 200 locations in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The entrepreneur must look at the market opportunity in Canada and decide whether he should apply for the country's master franchise, a single franchise, or abandon the concept altogether. Evaluates a franchise concept based on market opportunity and the franchise contract.