個案總覽

Describes and contrasts the roles and challenges of three high-performing finance heads at Novartis Consumer Health businesses in Australia, Japan, and Venezuela. All three faced tremendous pressures in terms of managing time and limited resources, but the particular circumstances of each business made for some specific challenges. Remi Escurel, CFO for Animal Health in Australia and New Zealand and regional CFO for Asia Pacific, juggled a demanding dual role. In Australia, Animal Health was a market leader, but dependence on climate-sensitive products made for uneven performance. Tanya Ferretto served as both finance head and general manager for Animal Health in Japan, where the business was a niche player struggling for survival. Jaime Maturana filled the business, planning, and analysis role for Over-the-Counter in Venezuela, a fast-growing business in a volatile political and economic environment. Describes and contracts the roles and challenges of three high-performing finance heads at Novartis Consumer Heath businesses in Australia, Japan, and Venezuela. Examines whether the skills that made these executives successful are portable from one country or region to another. Focuses on how an administrative function such as finance can play a strategic role.

Nutricia's Middle East and African region is transitioning from a trading to a customer focus. CEO Ernest Vandenbussche must decide how to market infant milk formula most effectively in a region where the information environment is much less rich than in other countries/sectors and in which managers are concerned about measuring the effectiveness of their commercial actions. Among the most immediate decisions they need to make is the size of the salesforce--a decision that must be made in the context of a commercial strategy that is not yet fully defined. As Nutricia defines its strategy, it also has to define the strategic control systems it will use to monitor and fine-tune the strategy moving forward.

Involves the copyright issues associated with Bram Cohen's revolutionary software program BitTorrent, which makes it possible to transfer very large files, such as movies, at a high speed over the Internet. The program, which is available for free over the Internet, is used for peer-to-peer sharing of movies and music and for the legitimate distribution of licensed software, including games. Also discusses the litigation against Napster and Grokster over peer-to-peer sharing, as well as cases against Google in connection with its efforts to digitize entire libraries to facilitate electronic searches.

Black Duck Software involves a venture-backed start-up that converted software developers' concerns about violating copyright licensing agreements or open source protocols into an opportunity to help firms use technology to better manage their compliance efforts. Requires students to wrestle with the uncertainties of copyright compliance as they decide whether Black Duck should certify that their clients' code is noninfringing. Also raises questions about which growth opportunities Black Duck should pursue.

Managers receiving letters claiming that their products or services violate the intellectual property rights of another sometimes have a tendency to ignore them after their technical staff advises them that the claims have no merit. Illustrates the perils of that approach. Legally astute managers accept responsibility for managing patent disputes; they do not hand them off to lawyers with a "you-take-care-of-it" approach. Litigation is less predictable than many managers realize. A number of choices must be made without full information.

No question, Galen McDowell knew how to sell. He quickly hooked a big-league outfit, Kinan Motors, as a potential customer. He invited their representatives to come take a tour of the company and, while they were in town, visit the Red Ruby Club. The Red Ruby? That's a strip club. Galen assured CEO Bob Carlton that it was upscale and full of businesspeople. He said his reps had often made use of the club to woo important accounts away from rivals. As if to prove his point, Kinan quickly signed a multimillion-dollar contract with OptiMotors after the visit. Then April Hartley, Bob's first salesperson, quit. She had tried to build relationships with customers, but the really big accounts, it seemed, were looking for "more exciting stuff" than she could give them. Now Joan Warren--another saleswoman, and one who would happily close a deal anywhere she got the chance--is complaining because Galen won't let her go to the club with him. "I won't stand by and be disadvantaged simply because I'm a woman," she says. When does client entertainment cross the line? In R0604A and R0604Z, four experts discuss this fictional case study: John Brown, the director of institutional sales and customer relations at Fortis Investments; Katherine Frank, a former dancer who is now an author and postdoctoral fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Das Narayandas, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School; and Denise Rousseau, a professor at Carnegie Mellon's Heinz School of Public Policy and Tepper School of Business.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Robert A. Caro shares his insights about the nature of power, the complexity of ambition, and the role that the greater good can play in the making of a leader. Power doesn't always corrupt, he insists. But what it invariably does is reveal a leader's true nature. "Today, when CEOs have acquired more and more power to change our lives," Caro says, "they have become like presidents in their own right, and they, too, need to align themselves with something greater than themselves if they hope to become truly great leaders."

What could be harder than turning around a seemingly wildly successful company by imposing a centralized framework on a heretofore radically decentralized, antiestablishment, free-spirited organization? That was the challenge GE alumnus Robert Nardelli faced when he abruptly succeeded Home Depot's popular founders, Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, as the top executive in December 2000. Talk about a shock: No one expected Marcus and Blank, both in their 50s, to leave. And, as Nardelli himself acknowledges, the last thing anyone wanted was an outsider who would "GE-ize their company and culture." But despite its glossy high-growth exterior, Home Depot was standing on shaky financial footings. Rapid expansion had stretched cash flow, inventory turns, profits, and store manager ranks thin. Each store's vaunted independence was making the company as a whole highly inflexible, unable to take advantage of economies of scale. What so effectively got Home Depot from zero to $50 billion in sales wasn't going to get it to the next $50 billion. The story of the vision, strategy, and leadership skills Nardelli used to move Home Depot to the next level has been told. But vision, strategy, and leadership alone--while necessary--are not enough. Typically, culture change is unsystematic and, when it works, is based on the charisma of the person leading the change, Ram Charan says. "But Home Depot shows--in perhaps the best example I have seen in my 30-year career--that a cultural transition can be achieved systematically." In this article, Charan lays out the panoply of tools that, wielded in a coordinated and systematic fashion, enabled Home Depot to get a grip on its freewheeling culture so that the company could reap--and sustain--the advantages inherent in its size. Many an up-and-coming company would do well to look to this model to gain similar advantage when the time comes to exchange the thrill of entrepreneurial spirit for the strength of established power.

When corporate leaders or the organizations they represent mess up, they face the difficult decision of whether to apologize publicly. A public apology is a risky move. It's highly political, and every word matters. Refusal to apologize can be smart, or it can be suicidal. Readiness to apologize can be seen as a sign of character or one of weakness. A successful apology can turn enmity into personal and organizational triumph--whereas an apology that's too little, too late, or too transparently tactical can open the floodgates to individual and institutional ruin. Because the stakes are so high, Barbara Kellerman says, leaders should not extend public apologies often or lightly. One or more of the following conditions should apply: The apology is likely to serve an important purpose; the offense is of serious consequence; it's appropriate that the leader assume responsibility for the offense; the leader is the only one who can get the job done; and the cost of saying something is likely lower than the cost of staying silent. The author draws her conclusions from hard data and abundant anecdotal evidence, examining notoriously bad apologizers as well as exceptionally good ones. While selectivity is key, good apologies usually do work. What constitutes a good apology? Acknowledgment of the mistake or wrongdoing, acceptance of responsibility, expression of regret, and assurance that the offense will not be repeated.

Standardization has been a powerful strategy in consumer markets, but it's reached the point of diminishing returns. And diversity is not the only chink in standardization's armor: Attempts to build stores in remaining attractive locations often meet fierce resistance from community activists. From California to Florida to New Jersey, neighborhoods are passing ordinances that dictate the sizes and even architectural styles of new shops. Building more of the same--long the cornerstone of retailer growth--seems to be tapped out as a strategy. Of course, a company can't customize every element of its business in every location. Strategists have begun to use clustering techniques to simplify and smooth out decision making and to focus their efforts on the relatively small number of variables that usually drive the bulk of consumer purchases. The customization-by-clusters approach, which began as a strategy for grocery stores in 1995, has since proven effective in drugstores, department stores, mass merchants, big-box retailers, restaurants, apparel companies, and a variety of consumer goods manufacturers. Clustering sorts things into groups, so that the associations are strong between members of the same cluster and weak between members of different clusters. In fact, by centralizing data-intensive and scale-sensitive functions (such as store design, merchandise assortment, buying, and supply chain management), localization liberates store personnel to do what they do best: Test innovative solutions to local challenges and forge strong bonds with communities. Ultimately, all companies serving consumers will face the challenge of local customization. We are advancing to a world where the strategies of the most successful businesses will be as diverse as the communities they serve.

High-definition televisions (HDTVs) should, by now, be a huge success. Philips, Sony, and Thompson invested billions of dollars to develop TV sets with astonishing picture quality. From a technology perspective, they've succeeded: Console manufacturers have been ready for the mass market since the early 1990s. Yet, the category has been an unmitigated failure because critical complements such as studio production equipment were not developed or adopted in time. Underperforming complements have left console producers in the position of offering a Ferrari in a world without gasoline or highways--an admirable engineering feat, but not one that creates value for customers. The HDTV story exemplifies the promise and peril of innovation ecosystems--the collaborative arrangements through which firms combine their individual offers into a coherent, customer-facing solution. When they work, innovation ecosystems allow companies to create value that no one firm could have created alone. The benefits of these systems are real. But for many organizations, the attempt at ecosystem innovation has been a costly failure. This is because, along with new opportunities, innovation ecosystems also present a new set of risks that can brutally derail a firm's best efforts. Innovation ecosystems are characterized by three fundamental types of risk: initiative risks--the familiar uncertainties of managing a project; interdependence risks--the uncertainties of coordinating with complementary innovators; and integration risks--the uncertainties presented by the adoption process across the value chain. Firms that assess ecosystem risks holistically and systematically will be able to establish more realistic expectations, develop a more refined set of environmental contingencies, and arrive at a more robust innovation strategy. Collectively, these actions will lead to more effective implementation and more profitable innovation.

No matter how hard companies try, their approaches to innovation often don't grow the top line in the sustained, profitable way investors expect. For many companies, there's a huge difference between what's in their business plans and the market's expectations for growth (as reflected in firms' share prices, market capitalizations, and P/E ratios). This growth gap springs from the fact that companies are pouring money into their insular R&D labs instead of working to understand what the customer wants and using that understanding to drive innovation. As a result, even companies that spend the most on R&D remain starved for both customer innovation and market-capitalization growth. In this article, the authors spell out a systematic approach to innovation that continuously fuels sustained, profitable growth. They call this approach customer-centric innovation, or CCI. At the heart of CCI is a rigorous customer R&D process that helps companies to continually improve their understanding of who their customers are and what they need. By so doing, they consistently create or improve their customer value proposition. Customer R&D also focuses on better ways of communicating value propositions and delivering the complete experience to real customers. Because so much of the learning about customers and so much of the experimentation with different segmentations, value propositions, and delivery mechanisms involve the people who regularly deal with customers, it is essential for frontline employees to be at the center of the CCI process. Simply put, customer R&D propels the innovation effort away from headquarters and the traditional R&D lab out to those closest to the customer. Using the example of the luggage manufacturer Tumi, the authors provide a step-by-step approach for achieving true customer-centric innovation.

Even as loyalty programs are launched left and right, many are being scuttled. How can that be? These days, everyone knows that an old customer retained is worth more than a new customer won. What is so hard about making a simple loyalty program work? Quite a lot, the authors say. The biggest challenges include clarifying business goals, engineering the reward structure, and creating incentives powerful enough to change buying behavior but not so generous that they erode margins. Additionally, companies have to sort out the puzzles of consumer psychology, which can result, for example, in two rewards of equal economic value, inspiring very different levels of purchasing. In their research, the authors have discovered patterns in what the successful loyalty programs get right and in how the others fail. Together, their findings constitute a toolkit for designing something rare indeed: a program that won't do you wrong. To begin with, it's important to know exactly what a loyalty program can do. It can keep customers from defecting, induce them to consolidate certain purchases with one seller (in other words, win a greater share of wallet), prompt customers to make additional purchases, yield insight into their behavior and preferences, and turn a profit. A program can meet these objectives in several ways--for instance, by offering rewards (points, say, or frequent-flier miles) divisible enough to provide many redemption opportunities but not so divisible that they fail to lock in customers. Companies striving to generate customer loyalty should avoid five common mistakes: Don't create a new commodity, which can result in price wars and other tit-for-tat competitive moves; don't cater to the disloyal by making rewards easy for just anyone to reap; don't reward purchasing volume over profitability; don't give away the store; and, finally, don't promise what can't be delivered.

In the wake of a series of gross corporate abuses around the turn of the century, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, which was intended to make corporate governance more rigorous, financial practices more transparent, and management criminally liable for lapses. The first year of implementation was costly and onerous, far more so than companies had been led to expect. In the view of a few open-minded firms, however, the second year of compliance turned out to be not only less costly and less onerous (as doing something for the second time usually turns out to be), but a source of valuable insights into operations, which management has translated into improved efficiencies and cost savings. The areas of improvement go well beyond technical statutory compliance. They include a strengthened control environment; more reliable documentation; increased audit committee involvement; better, less burdensome compliance with other statutory regimes; more standardized processes for IT and other functions; reduced complexity of organizational processes; better internal controls within partner companies; and more effective use of both automated and manual controls. The result is not only shareholder protection, the official purpose of the act, but also enhanced shareholder value. More than a year since the first deadline arrived, Sarbanes-Oxley still inspires fear--of enforcement actions, of the stock market's reaction to a deficiency, and of personal liability. Fear can be a powerful generator of upstanding conduct. But businesses run on discovering and creating value. Companies need to start viewing Sarbanes-Oxley as an ally in that effort.

No question, Galen McDowell knew how to sell. He quickly hooked a big-league outfit, Kinan Motors, as a potential customer. He invited their representatives to come take a tour of the company and, while they were in town, visit the Red Ruby Club. The Red Ruby? That's a strip club. Galen assured CEO Bob Carlton that it was upscale and full of businesspeople. He said his reps had often made use of the club to woo important accounts away from rivals. As if to prove his point, Kinan quickly signed a multimillion-dollar contract with OptiMotors after the visit. Then April Hartley, Bob's first salesperson, quit. She had tried to build relationships with customers, but the really big accounts, it seemed, were looking for "more exciting stuff" than she could give them. Now Joan Warren--another saleswoman, and one who would happily close a deal anywhere she got the chance--is complaining because Galen won't let her go to the club with him. "I won't stand by and be disadvantaged simply because I'm a woman," she says. When does client entertainment cross the line? In R0604A and R0604Z, four experts discuss this fictional case study: John Brown, the director of institutional sales and customer relations at Fortis Investments; Katherine Frank, a former dancer who is now an author and postdoctoral fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Das Narayandas, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School; and Denise Rousseau, a professor at Carnegie Mellon's Heinz School of Public Policy and Tepper School of Business.

No question, Galen McDowell knew how to sell. He quickly hooked a big-league outfit, Kinan Motors, as a potential customer. He invited their representatives to come take a tour of the company and, while they were in town, visit the Red Ruby Club. The Red Ruby? That's a strip club. Galen assured CEO Bob Carlton that it was upscale and full of businesspeople. He said his reps had often made use of the club to woo important accounts away from rivals. As if to prove his point, Kinan quickly signed a multimillion-dollar contract with OptiMotors after the visit. Then April Hartley, Bob's first salesperson, quit. She had tried to build relationships with customers, but the really big accounts, it seemed, were looking for "more exciting stuff" than she could give them. Now Joan Warren--another saleswoman, and one who would happily close a deal anywhere she got the chance--is complaining because Galen won't let her go to the club with him. "I won't stand by and be disadvantaged simply because I'm a woman," she says. When does client entertainment cross the line? In R0604A and R0604Z, four experts discuss this fictional case study: John Brown, the director of institutional sales and customer relations at Fortis Investments; Katherine Frank, a former dancer who is now an author and postdoctoral fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Das Narayandas, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School; and Denise Rousseau, a professor at Carnegie Mellon's Heinz School of Public Policy and Tepper School of Business.

This case is about an affluent and educated woman who decided to start her own organization to support young mothers. Shortly after the birth of her first child, Karin Marques stopped working full-time and soon felt the pangs of "maternal isolation" that mothers commonly report. Finding no satisfaction in the already-existing network of Mothers' Centers, which were geared more towards childcare, Karin formulated a concept for a mothers' center that would "provide support to women before, during, and after their maternity leave." By adopting a theme of "equal opportunities for men and women" - a priority for European Union Member States and an area where the Czech nation planned to grow - Karin registered Klub K2 as a non-governmental (non-profit) organization (NGO), and hoped to access funding from foundations or the European Union. The thematic focus Karin has chosen - women's reentry to the labor market after maternity leave - is a hot-button issue, particularly in new European Union Member States. Yet as Karin's start-up costs rose, and some members of her team of instructors backed out, Karin wondered how all of the pieces would come together by the time she was ready to launch her organization.

In 2002, Brazilian-based Petrobras joined the Argentine fuel retail (gas stations) market. The venture faced several challenges. On the one hand, Argentina was undergoing one of the most severe economic and social crises in history. On the other, the local fuel market was dominated by a few players with brands that held significant consumer mindshare over many years. Additionally, employee morale at Eg3, the company acquired by Petrobras to enter the local market, was besieged by uncertainty and disillusionment as a result of a string of mergers and acquisitions and underlying H.R. management remoteness. Finally, the company's Brazilian origin could jeopardize its appeal for Argentine consumers, given the cultural and sports-based (soccer) rivalry between these neighboring countries. The case presents this scenario and calls for decisions as to which market segment(s) it should target, how it should brand its stations, and what other related marketing decisions it should make given it domestic and international ambitions. This case received the 2007 Curtis E. Tate Jr. Award for the best case published in Case Research Journal and is also available in Spanish and Portuguese versions.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. There is a new wave of business communication tools, including blogs, wikis, and group messaging software (which the author collectively calls "Enterprise 2.0") that allow for more spontaneous, knowledge-based collaboration. These new tools, the author contends, may well supplant other communication and knowledge management systems with their superior ability to capture tacit knowledge, best practices, and relevant experiences from throughout a company and make them readily available to more users. This article offers a paradigm that highlights the salient characteristics of these new technologies. The resulting organizational communication patterns can lead to highly productive and highly collaborative environments by making both the practices of knowledge work and its outputs more visible. Drawing on case studies and survey data, the article offers managers a set of ground rules for implementing the new technologies. First, create a receptive culture to prepare the way for new practices. Second, create a common platform to allow for a collaboration infrastructure. Third, plan an informal rollout of the technologies rather than a more formal procedural change. And fourth, secure managerial support and leadership. Even when implanted and implemented well, these new technologies will certainly bring with them new challenges. These tools may well reduce management's ability to exert unilateral control and to express some level of negativity. Whether a company's leaders really want this to happen and will be able to resist the temptation to silence dissent is an open question. Leaders will have to play a delicate role if they want Enterprise 2.0 technologies to succeed.