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ESPE, the market leader, is a medium-sized German manufacturer of precision dental impression materials competing in a shrinking market. To grow the business, ESPE invests substantial resources in innovative impression materials and associated distribution mechanisms. Squeezed by the shrinking market, the competition is increasingly using the proprietary channels (dispensing mechanisms) and brand equity (trademark) of ESPE to maintain their market share. There is a potential infringement. Explores how ESPE is organized to execute on the options imbedded in its IP rights.

The case concerns a real $25 million program consisting of nine concurrent projects to deliver and implement a custom-built in-store customer relationship management (CRM) system and a new point-of-sale system in 400 stores of a national retail chain. The name of the company has been disguised for confidentiality reasons. Once deployed, the new system should give Clothes 'R' Us a significant strategic advantage over competitors in the marketplace; it will increase in-store manager productivity, cut costs, and ultimately drive increased sales for the retail chain. The program is in crisis, however, because the product managers have just left to join a competitor. The explicit details of the program are given, including examples of best practice program governance and the real activity network diagram for the program. Detailed Excel spreadsheets are also provided with the actual earned value data for the program. Students analyze the spreadsheets and the data given in the case to diagnose the impact of the most recent risk event and past risk events that occurred in the program. Ultimately students must answer the essential executive questions: What is wrong with the program? How should it be fixed, and what is the impact in time and money to the program? In addition, qualitative warning signs are given throughout the case-these warning signs are red flags to executives for early proactive intervention in troubled projects.

Technology projects are inherently risky; research shows that large IT projects succeed as originally planned only 28 percent of the time. Building flexibility, or real options, into a project can help manage this risk. Furthermore, the management flexibility of options has value, as the downside risk is reduced and the upside is increased. The case is based upon real options analysis for an enterprise data warehouse (EDW) and analytic customer relationship management (CRM) program at a major U.S. firm. The firm has been disguised as Global Airlines for confidentiality reasons. The data mart consolidation or EDW marginally meets the hurdle rate for the firm as analyzed using a traditional net present value (NPV) analysis. However, different tactical deployment strategies help mitigate the risk of the project by building options into the project, and the traditional NPV is expanded by the real option value. Students analyze the different deployment strategies using a binomial model compound option Excel macro, and calculate the volatility using Monte Carlo analysis in Excel. A step-by-step tutorial is provided to teach students how to accomplish the real options analysis for a simplified project, and this tutorial is easily generalized by students to the case scenario. In addition to the tactical options, the case also has the strategic growth option of analytic CRM. Students must therefore analyze both the tactical and strategic growth options and make a management recommendation on funding the project and also recommend an optimal deployment strategy to manage the project risk.

Tom McKillop, CEO of AstraZeneca, faced the classic quandary of large pharmaceutical firms. Within the year, the firm's patent for Prilosec (active ingredient omeprazole) was expiring. Prilosec was a US$6.2 billion/year blockbuster that revolutionized the treatment of chronic gastro-esophageal reflux disorders (GERD). Severe cost-based competition from generic drug manufacturers was, however, inevitable. Patent expirations were nothing new for the US$15.8 billion in revenues drug firm. AstraZeneca had Nexium, an improvement on the original Prilosec molecule, in the pipeline. Ideally, it would like to move brand-loyal Prilosec customers to Nexium. Additionally, the company had the opportunity to introduce its own version of generic omeprazole, hence becoming the first mover in the generic segment, and/or introduce an over-the-counter (OTC) version of omeprazole. Tactically, AstraZeneca would like to use regulatory incentives and intellectual property rights to strengthen its competitive position. How could the company use its entire portfolio of intellectual properties-including patents and trademarks-to actively manage the priced-based competition and achieve a revenue growth strategy in the GERD market?

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Tom McKillop, CEO of AstraZeneca, faced the classic quandary of large pharmaceutical firms. The firm's patent for Prilosec (active ingredient omeprazole) was expiring. Severe cost-based competition from generic drug manufacturers was inevitable. Patent expirations were nothing new for the US$15.8 billion in revenues drug firm, but Prilosec was the firm's most successful drug franchise, with global sales of US$6.2 billion. How could the company innovate its way around the generic cost-based competition and avoid the drop in revenues associated with generic drug market entry? AstraZeneca had other follow-on drugs in the pipeline-namely Nexium, an improvement on the original Prilosec molecule. Additionally, the company had the opportunity to introduce its own version of generic omeprazole, hence becoming the first mover in the generic segment, and/or introduce an OTC version of omeprazole that might tap into other markets. Ideally, AstraZeneca would like to move brand-loyal Prilosec customers to Nexium. In this market, direct-to-consumer advertising has remarkable efficacy. Classical marketing challenges of pricing and promotion need to be resolved for the Nexium launch as well as possible product and place challenges for the generic or OTC opportunity. Which combination of marketing options will allow the firm to best sustain the value of the original omeprazole innovation?

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Despite considerable research on customer retention and word-of-mouth referrals, it has always been difficult quantifying their contributions to the bottom line. Using a metric known as "net promoter score" (NPS), the author believes firms can measure the dollar value of customers based on satisfaction levels. A survey of thousands of customers in six industries reveals that customers tend to cluster into one of three categories: promoters, passives, and detractors. Promoters represent more than 80% of the positive referrals a company receives, whereas detractors represent more than 80% of the negative word-of-mouth. NPS is determined by subtracting the percentage of detractors from the percentage of promoters. Using this data, a firm can quantify the value of a customer by tracking five categories: retention rate, profit margins, spending, cost efficiencies, and word-of-mouth. The firm can then use NPS to make strategic decisions by targeting its efforts to leverage the most value for its customer service dollar.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. China's institutional private equity and venture capital market is similar to that of the United States and Europe, but there are important differences. Many practices that are taken for granted in areas such as Silicon Valley have yet to become routine in China. There is a lack of readily available information about opportunities, entrepreneurs, and companies. In addition, Chinese entrepreneurs know little about finance, corporate structures, and governance, thereby requiring investors to educate them and fill the gaps. Identifies seven disciplines critical to successful investment in China: knowledge and appreciation of the importance of social capital networks, or guanxi; understanding of corporate governance and shareholder rights; the ability to manage intellectual property; the ability to adapt business models to local conditions; the ability to add managerial and technical value to young enterprises; knowledge of the legal structure; and an ability to navigate complex regulatory environments.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Although IT portfolio management has been a best practice for some time, many companies still generate substandard returns from their IT investments. Points out that investing the right amounts in the right IT asset classes is only the first step--a suite of interlocking business practices and processes collectively labeled "IT savvy" must complement IT portfolio management techniques. The benefits of establishing such practices add up to a tangible IT savvy premium: higher net profits and other performance gains. Cites a range of organizations in which IT savvy is ingrained, informing many of the companies' business decisions and sharply focusing their IT investments. Draws on the findings of a multiyear survey to review the different IT assets in which companies invest before discussing the gap in IT investment returns that separates those with IT savvy from those without. Presents five hallmarks of IT savvy and offers a series of practical suggestions for how managers can start to match IT savvy with the IT asset mix.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Case studies suggest that companies, including Avon, Stonyfield Farm, and Starbucks, have benefited from marketing initiatives associating the company with a socially beneficial cause. But how should managers allocate dollars between social-cause marketing and other types of marketing programs? The authors use a market-research technique called "conjoint analysis" to help managers evaluate the relative benefits of various types of affinity marketing programs, including sponsorship of social causes, sports, or entertainment events. Conjoint analysis involves creating a variety of hypothetical brand profiles that contain combinations of brand attributes; by asking consumers to rank the profiles, researchers can gain insights into how different brand attributes affect consumer preferences. For some of the products studied, affiliations with social causes had more positive effects on consumer rankings than affiliations with sports or entertainment events. However, this was not always true; for example, it was not the case for the milk brands studied, suggesting that the effect of social-cause marketing initiatives may vary by industry. Also discusses how brand managers can use conjoint analysis to compare potential marketing initiatives.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Service businesses now make up about 70% of the aggregate production and employment in the OECD nations, yet true innovation is rare in the service sector. Many companies incrementally improve their offerings, but few succeed in creating service innovations that launch new markets or reshape existing ones. By thinking about a service in terms of its core benefits and the separability of its use from its production, managers can more easily see how to out-innovate their competitors. Before they can do so, though, they must understand the different types of market-creating service innovations as well as the factors that enable them. Introduces and describes a two-by-two matrix whose taxonomy helps managers think strategically about service innovations that can create new markets. The dimensions of the matrix refer to the type of benefit offered and the degree of service separability. References best-practices examples to illuminate each cell of the matrix and explain the value of understanding the dynamics of the cell that is most applicable to a service innovation effort.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. New products suffer from notoriously high failure rates. Many fail, not because of technical shortcomings, but because they simply have no market. Not surprisingly, studies have found that timely and reliable knowledge about customer preferences and requirements is the single most important area of information necessary for product development. To obtain such data, many organizations have made heavy--but often unsuccessful--investments in traditional market research. The authors provide an alternative. Companies including Threadless, Yamaha, and Ryohin Keikaku have integrated customers into the innovation process by soliciting new product concepts directly from them. These firms also ask customers to commit to purchasing a new product before the companies commence final development and manufacturing. This process--called "collective customer commitment"--can help companies avoid costly product failures. In essence, collective customer commitment enables firms to serve a market segment efficiently without first having to identify that segment and helps convert expenditures in market research directly into sales.

Combining design-process experts with business-content experts creates a capacity to envision and realize futures that are both desirable for stakeholders and viable for organizations. The authors, from leading design firm IDEO, show how organizations can look to tools from the field of design to help their leaders get in touch with their stakeholders' unarticulated needs and desires, and intentionally imagine and create futures based on the one thing that seems to remain relatively stable, even in times of great change: human behavior. When made a part of an organization's work processes and competencies, the design tools they describe can enable an organization to embrace change as a normal part of managing its business.

Most experts agree that when it comes to a global flu pandemic, it's not a matter of 'if', but 'when'. One thing is certain: the effects on the global economy will be severe and widespread. The author, the chief economist for BMO Nesbitt Burns and Harris Bank, shows how businesses can plan for their own continuity of service and the safety of their workers. She shows how the need to coordinate these efforts locally, nationally, and globally in both the private and public sectors is unprecedented, extremely demanding, and above all, necessary.

Nutrorim's products have been gaining national attention. In particular, sales of the company's organic, performance-enhancing sports supplement powder, ChargeUp, have gone through the roof. Now the new and improved version, called ChargeUp with Lipitrene, has recently hit the market, and expectations are high. CEO Don Rifkin has tried hard to build an inclusive, democratic culture at this successful company. But the organization's open decision-making process has proved problematic, especially during times of conflict and crisis--and a crisis there is. Several months after ChargeUp with Lipitrene is initially released, an investigator from the Minnesota state department of health calls Rifkin to report "11 cases of gastrointestinal distress" among those using the supplement. Nutrorim's top executives must now decide whether to recall the product. The head of R&D, Steve Ford, insists there is nothing wrong with the new ChargeUp, citing elaborate toxicity studies in animals and humans. Meanwhile, the heads of PR and legal want to stem any negative publicity by recalling the product and issuing a press release to that effect. The company decides to recall the supplement--but, two weeks later, the health department investigator calls back with good news: The people who had become ill, it turns out, had actually picked up a bug from their gym's smoothie bar. In other words, Nutrorim is exonerated. But the close call prompts Nutrorim to bring in a consultant to review the company's methods for making decisions. Among the many questions he's asking is, What's the right decision-making process for Nutrorim? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0601A and R0601Z are Christopher J. McCormick, the president and CEO of L.L.Bean; Hauke Moje, a partner at Roland Berger Strategy Consultants; Ralph Biggadike, a professor of professional practice at Columbia Business School; and Paul Domorski, the vice-president of service operations at Avaya.

Sometime around the middle of the past century, telephone executive Chester Barnard imported the term "decision making" from public administration into the business world. There it began to replace narrower terms, like "resource allocation" and "policy making," shifting the way managers thought about their role from continuous, Hamlet-like deliberation toward a crisp series of conclusions reached and actions taken. Yet, decision making is, of course, a broad and ancient human pursuit, dating back to a time when people sought guidance from the stars. From those earliest days, we have strived to invent better tools for the purpose, from the Hindu-Arabic systems for numbering and algebra to Aristotle's systematic empiricism to Friar Occam's advances in logic to Francis Bacon's inductive reasoning to Descartes' application of the scientific method. A growing sophistication with managing risk, along with a nuanced understanding of human behavior and advances in technology that support and mimic cognitive processes, has improved decision making in many situations. Even so, the history of decision-making strategies has not marched steadily toward perfect rationalism. Twentieth-century theorists showed that the costs of acquiring information lead executives to make do with only good-enough decisions. Worse, people decide against their own economic interests even when they know better. And in the absence of emotion, it's impossible to make any decisions at all. Erroneous framing, bounded awareness, excessive optimism: The debunking of Descartes' rational man threatens to swamp our confidence in our choices. Is it really surprising, then, that even as technology dramatically increases our access to information, Malcolm Gladwell extols the virtues of gut decisions made, literally, in the blink of an eye?

When we make decisions, we're not always in charge. One moment we hotheadedly let our emotions get the better of us; the next, we're paralyzed by uncertainty. Then we'll pull a brilliant decision out of thin air--and wonder how we did it. Though we may have no idea how decision making happens, neuroscientists peering deep into our brains are beginning to get the picture. What they're finding may not be what you want to hear, but it's worth listening. We have dog brains, basically, with human cortexes stuck on top. By watching the brain in action as it deliberates and decides, neuroscientists are finding that not a second goes by that our animal brains aren't conferring with our modern cortexes to influence their choices. Scientists have discovered, for example, that the "reward" circuits in the brain that activate in response to cocaine, chocolate, sex, and music also find pleasure in the mere anticipation of making money--or getting revenge. And the "aversion" circuits that react to the threat of physical pain also respond with disgust when we feel cheated by a partner. In this article, HBR Senior Editor Gardiner Morse describes the experiments that illuminate the aggressive participation of our emotion-driven animal brains in decision making. This research also shows that our emotional brains needn't always operate beneath our radar. Although our dog brains sometimes hijack our higher cognitive functions to drive bad, or at least illogical, decisions, they play an important part in rational decision making as well. The more we understand how we make decisions, the better we can manage them.

Decisions are the coin of the realm in business. But even in highly respected companies, decisions can get stuck inside the organization like loose change. As a result, the entire decision-making process can stall, usually at one of four bottlenecks: global vs. local, center vs. business unit, function vs. function, and inside vs. outside partners. Decision-making bottlenecks can occur whenever there is ambiguity or tension over who gets to decide what. For example, do marketers or product developers get to decide the features of a new product? Should a major capital investment depend on the approval of the business unit that will own it, or should headquarters make the final call? Which decisions can be delegated to an outsourcing partner, and which must be made internally? Bain consultants Paul Rogers and Marcia Blenko use an approach called RAPID (recommend, agree, perform, input, and decide) to help companies unclog their decision-making bottlenecks by explicitly defining roles and responsibilities. For example, British American Tobacco struck a new balance between global and local decision making to take advantage of the company's scale while maintaining its agility in local markets. At Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, a growth opportunity revealed the need to push more decisions down to the business units. And at the UK department-store chain John Lewis, buyers and sales staff clarified their decision roles to implement a new strategy for selling its salt and pepper mills. When revamping its decision-making process, a company must take some practical steps: Align decision roles with the most important sources of value, make sure that decisions are made by the right people at the right levels of the organization, and let the people who will live with the new process help design it.

For the most part, managers looking to cure their organizational ills rely on obsolete knowledge they picked up in school, long-standing but never proven traditions, patterns gleaned from experience, methods they happen to be skilled in applying, and information from vendors. They could learn a thing or two from practitioners of evidence-based medicine, a movement that has taken the medical establishment by storm over the past decade. A growing number of physicians are eschewing the usual, flawed resources and are instead identifying, disseminating, and applying research that is soundly conducted and clinically relevant. It's time for managers to do the same. The challenge is, quite simply, to ground decisions in the latest and best knowledge of what actually works. In some ways, that's more difficult to do in business than in medicine. The evidence is weaker in business; almost anyone can (and many people do) claim to be a management expert; and a motley crew of sources--Shakespeare, Billy Graham, Jack Welch, Attila the Hun--are used to generate management advice. Still, it makes sense that when managers act on better logic and strong evidence, their companies will beat the competition. Like medicine, management is learned through practice and experience. Yet managers (like doctors) can practice their craft more effectively if they relentlessly seek new knowledge and insight, from both inside and outside their companies, so they can keep updating their assumptions, skills, and knowledge.

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.