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In August 2002, the French retail giant Carrefour S.A. was considering alternative currencies for raising (euro) EUR750 million in the Eurobond market. Carrefour's investment bankers believed that the bonds can be issued at 5.25% in euros, 5.375% in British pounds, 3.625% in Swiss francs, and 5.5% in U.S. dollars. Despite the high nominal coupon rate and the lack of any material business activity in the United Kingdom, the British-pound issue appears to provide the lowest cost of funds. This case was designed to introduce topics in international finance such as interest-rate parity, currency risk management, and the Eurobond market. Students are tasked with exploring why forward-currency exchange rates vary from spot rates and proposing a Eurobond financing strategy for Carrefour.

Furqan Nazeeri is looking to spin out a promising set of products and technologies from an established financial services firm. Designed as an exercise in negotiation. Includes material from the original business plan, and it is possible to simulate a negotiation around key issues involved in the spin-out: timing and financing, equity distribution, asset transfer, personnel transitions and roles of key players, customer retention, CEO selection, and new board formation.

Presents a comprehensive review of the valuation methods based on discounting cash flows or value creation metrics and shows, through simple example and a straightforward "how-to-do" framework, the perfect consistency and identity of their results under similar assumptions.

Describes a meeting of an executive team to discuss strategy for a company turnaround. The exercise is to construct a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard to capture the new strategy.

In March 2005, Mark Schneider, CEO of Fresenius, is considering the group's strategic and organizational future. The highly decentralized 7 billion euro German health care group is active in three different business units, with the largest, FMC AG, listed separately from the parent Fresenius AG and representing the lion's share of the company's revenue and profit. A decentralized approach had let the group units grow independently over the years, and Fresenius took pride in its adaptive, entrepreneurial spirit. Schneider, however, wonders whether the decentralized approach will allow the group to continue to grow in a coordinated and cost-conscious fashion. How should he combine the company's entrepreneurial and profit-oriented culture with any latent synergies in the existing organization? Although Fresenius looks healthy at the moment, Schneider knows that the company's future is tied to improved sales and profitability.

Despite years of social and political turmoil, Israel's high-tech industry had managed to flourish. Although the economic growth rate was satisfactory by 2004, the nation's unemployment rate was still high, the national debt remained a troublesome risk, and the economy seemed far to reliant on public spending. Could a country such as Israel really become one of the richest countries in the world? This case explores the context for Israel's successes and challenges.

Surveys indicate that when new rules on expensing stock options take effect, many companies are likely to limit the number of employees who can receive equity compensation. But companies that reserve equity for executives are bound to suffer in the long run. Study after study proves that broad-based ownership, when done right, leads to higher productivity, lower workforce turnover, better recruits, and bigger profits. "Done right" is the key. Here are the four most important factors in implementing a broad-based employee equity plan: A significant portion of the workforce--generally, most of the full-time people--must hold equity; employees must think the amounts they hold can significantly improve their financial prospects; managerial practices and policies must reinforce the plan; and employees must feel a true sense of company ownership. Those factors add up to an ownership culture in which employees' interests are aligned with the company's. The result is a workforce that is loyal, cooperative, and willing to go above and beyond to make the organization successful. A wide variety of companies have recorded exceptional business performance with the help of employee-ownership programs supported by management policies. The authors examine two: Science Applications International, a research and development contractor, and Scot Forge, which shapes metal and other materials for industrial machinery. At both companies, every employee with a year or so of service holds equity, and employees who stay on can accumulate a comfortable nest egg. Management's sharing of financial information reinforces workers' sense of ownership. So does the expectation that employees will accept the responsibilities of ownership. Workers with an ownership stake internalize their responsibilities and feel they have an obligation not only to management but to one another.

A 2004 McKinsey survey of more than 30 companies reveals that at least 70% of them have major alliances that are underperforming and in need of restructuring. Moreover, JVs that broaden or otherwise adjust their scope have a 79% success rate, vs. 33% for ventures that remain essentially unchanged. Yet, most firms don't routinely evaluate the need to overhaul their alliances or intervene to correct performance problems. That means corporations are missing huge opportunities: By revamping just one large alliance, a company can generate $100 million to $300 million in extra income a year. Here's how to unlock more value from alliances: (1) Launch the process. Don't wait until your venture is in the middle of a crisis; regularly scan your major alliances to determine which need restructuring. Once you've targeted one, designate a restructuring team and find a senior sponsor to push the process along. Then delineate the scope of the team's work. (2) Diagnose performance. Evaluate the venture on the following performance dimensions: ownership and financials, strategy, operations, governance, and organization and talent. Identify the root causes of the venture's problems, not just the symptoms, and estimate how much each problem is costing the company. (3) Generate restructuring options. Based on the diagnosis, decide whether to fix, grow, or exit the alliance. Assuming the answer is fix or grow, determine whether fundamental or incremental changes are needed, using the five performance dimensions above as a framework. Then assemble three or four packages of restructuring options, test them with shareholders, and gain parents' approval. (4) Execute the changes. Embark on a widespread and consistent communication effort, building support among executives in the JV and the parent companies. So the process stays on track, assign accountability to certain groups or individuals.

CEO Peter Walsh faces a classic innovator's dilemma. His company, Crescordia, produces high-quality metal plates, pins, and screws that orthopedic surgeons use to repair broken bones. In fact, because of the company's long-standing commitment to quality, some orthopedic surgeons use nothing but Crescordia hardware. And now these customers have begun to clamor for the next-generation technology: resorbable hardware. Resorbables offer clear advantages over the traditional hardware. Like dissolving sutures, resorbable plates and screws are made of biodegradable polymers. They hold up long enough to support a healing bone, then gradually and harmlessly disintegrate in the patient's body. The new products, however, are not yet reliable; they fail about 8% of the time. That's why Crescordia has delayed launching a line using the new technology. But time is running out. A few competitors have begun to sell resorbables, despite their imperfections, and these companies are picking up market share. Should Crescordia join the fray and risk tarnishing its brand? Or should the company sit tight until it can offer a perfect product? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0506A and R0506Z are Robert A. Lutz, vice-chairman of product development at General Motors; Clayton M. Christensen, the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Jason Wittes, a senior equity analyst covering medical supplies and devices at Leerink Swann; and Nick Galakatos, a general partner of MPM Capital.

CEO Peter Walsh faces a classic innovator's dilemma. His company, Crescordia, produces high-quality metal plates, pins, and screws that orthopedic surgeons use to repair broken bones. In fact, because of the company's long-standing commitment to quality, some orthopedic surgeons use nothing but Crescordia hardware. And now these customers have begun to clamor for the next-generation technology: resorbable hardware. Resorbables offer clear advantages over the traditional hardware. Like dissolving sutures, resorbable plates and screws are made of biodegradable polymers. They hold up long enough to support a healing bone, then gradually and harmlessly disintegrate in the patient's body. The new products, however, are not yet reliable; they fail about 8% of the time. That's why Crescordia has delayed launching a line using the new technology. But time is running out. A few competitors have begun to sell resorbables, despite their imperfections, and these companies are picking up market share. Should Crescordia join the fray and risk tarnishing its brand? Or should the company sit tight until it can offer a perfect product? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0506A and R0506Z are Robert A. Lutz, vice-chairman of product development at General Motors; Clayton M. Christensen, the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Jason Wittes, a senior equity analyst covering medical supplies and devices at Leerink Swann; and Nick Galakatos, a general partner of MPM Capital.

CEO Peter Walsh faces a classic innovator's dilemma. His company, Crescordia, produces high-quality metal plates, pins, and screws that orthopedic surgeons use to repair broken bones. In fact, because of the company's long-standing commitment to quality, some orthopedic surgeons use nothing but Crescordia hardware. And now these customers have begun to clamor for the next-generation technology: resorbable hardware. Resorbables offer clear advantages over the traditional hardware. Like dissolving sutures, resorbable plates and screws are made of biodegradable polymers. They hold up long enough to support a healing bone, then gradually and harmlessly disintegrate in the patient's body. The new products, however, are not yet reliable; they fail about 8% of the time. That's why Crescordia has delayed launching a line using the new technology. But time is running out. A few competitors have begun to sell resorbables, despite their imperfections, and these companies are picking up market share. Should Crescordia join the fray and risk tarnishing its brand? Or should the company sit tight until it can offer a perfect product? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0506A and R0506Z are Robert A. Lutz, vice-chairman of product development at General Motors; Clayton M. Christensen, the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Jason Wittes, a senior equity analyst covering medical supplies and devices at Leerink Swann; and Nick Galakatos, a general partner of MPM Capital.

With emerging markets like China and politically unstable countries like Saudi Arabia figuring more than ever into companies' investment calculations, business leaders are turning to political risk analysis to measure the impact of politics on potential markets, minimize risks, and make the most of global opportunities. But political risk is more subjective than its economic counterpart. It is influenced by the passage of laws, the foibles of government leaders, and the rise of popular movements. So corporate leaders must grapple not just with broad, easily observable trends but also with nuances of society and even quirks of personality. And those hard-to-quantify factors must constantly be pieced together into an ongoing narrative within historical and regional contexts. As goods, services, information, ideas, and people cross borders today with unprecedented velocity, corporations debating operational or infrastructural investments abroad increasingly need objective, rigorous assessments. One tool for measuring and presenting stability data, for example, incorporates 20 composite indicators of risk in emerging markets and scores risk variables according to both their structural and their temporal components. The indicators are then organized into four equally weighted subcategories whose ratings are aggregated into a single stability score. Companies can buy political risk analyses from consultants or develop them in-house.

It's no easy task to identify strategies for entering new international markets or to decide which countries to do business with. Many firms simply go with what they know--and fall far short of their goals. Part of the problem is that emerging markets have "institutional voids": They lack specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing methods. These gaps have made it difficult for multinationals to succeed in developing nations; thus, many companies have resisted investing there. That may be a mistake. If Western companies don't come up with good strategies for engaging with emerging markets, they are unlikely to remain competitive. Many firms choose their markets and strategies for the wrong reasons, relying on everything from senior managers' gut feelings to the behaviors of rivals. Corporations also depend on composite indexes for help making decisions. But these analyses can be misleading; they don't account for vital information about the soft infrastructures in developing nations. A better approach is to understand institutional variations between countries. The best way to do this, the authors have found, is by using the five contexts framework. The five contexts are a country's political and social systems, its degree of openness, its product markets, its labor markets, and its capital markets. By asking a series of questions that pertain to each of the five areas, executives can map the institutional contexts of any nation. When companies match their strategies to each country's contexts, they can take advantage of a location's unique strengths. But first firms should weigh the benefits against the costs. If they find that the risks of adaptation are too great, they should try to change the contexts in which they operate or simply stay away.

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs--that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business--or a company that includes one or more of them--how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous, people-oriented metrics--for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. After you have assessed the business' true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).

When looking for help with a task at work, people turn to those best able to do the job. Right? Wrong. New research shows that work partners tend to be chosen not for ability but for likeability. Drawing from their study encompassing 10,000 work relationships in five organizations, the authors have classified work partners into four archetypes: the competent jerk, who knows a lot but is unpleasant; the lovable fool, who doesn't know much but is a delight; the lovable star, who's both smart and likeable; and the incompetent jerk, who...well, that's self-explanatory. Of course, everybody wants to work with the lovable star, and nobody wants to work with the incompetent jerk. More interesting is that people prefer the lovable fool over the competent jerk. That has big implications for every organization, as both of these types often represent missed opportunities. Lovable fools can bridge gaps between diverse groups that might not otherwise interact. But their networking skills are often developed at the expense of job performance, which can make these employees underappreciated and vulnerable to downsizing. To get the most out of them, managers need to protect them and put them in positions that don't waste their bridge-building talents. As for the competent jerks, many can be socialized through coaching or by being made accountable for bad behavior.

Despite the much-ballyhooed increase in outsourcing, most companies are in do-it-yourself mode for the bulk of their processes, in large part because there's no way to compare outside organizations' capabilities with those of internal functions. Given the lack of comparability, it's almost surprising that anyone outsources today. But it's not surprising that cost is by far companies' primary criterion for evaluating outsourcers or that many companies are dissatisfied with their outsourcing relationships. A new world is coming, says the author, and it will lead to dramatic changes in the shape and structure of corporations. A broad set of process standards will soon make it easy to determine whether a business capability can be improved by outsourcing it. Such standards will also help businesses compare service providers and evaluate the costs vs. the benefits of outsourcing. Eventually these costs and benefits will be so visible to buyers that outsourced processes will become a commodity, and prices will drop significantly. The low costs and low risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, force companies to reassess their strategies, and change the basis of competition. The speed with which some businesses have already adopted process standards suggests that many previously unscrutinized areas are ripe for change. In the field of technology, for instance, the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute has developed a global standard for software development processes, called the Capability Maturity Model. For companies that don't have process standards in place, it makes sense for them to create standards by working with customers, competitors, software providers, businesses that processes may be outsourced to, and objective researchers and standard-setters. Setting standards is likely to lead to the improvement of both internal and outsourced processes.

Oil and energy corporation BP was well aware of the importance of its work group managers on the front lines. Their decisions, in aggregate, make an enormous difference in BP's turnover, costs, quality control, safety, innovation, and environmental performance. There were about 10,000 such supervisors, working in every part of the company--from solar plants in Spain, to drilling platforms in the North Sea, to marketing teams in Chicago. Some 70% to 80% of BP employees reported directly to these lower level managers. Yet, until recently, the corporation didn't have a comprehensive training program for them. For their part, the frontline managers felt disconnected; it was often hard for them to understand how their individual decisions contributed to the growth and reputation of BP as a whole. In this article, BP executive Andreas Priestland and Dialogos VP Robert Hanig describe how BP in the past five years has learned to connect with this population of managers. After one and a half years of design and development, there is now a companywide name--"first-level leaders"--and a comprehensive training program for this cohort. The authors describe the collaborative effort they led to create the program's four components: Supervisory Essentials, Context and Connections, the Leadership Event, and Peer Partnerships. The design team surveyed those it had deemed first-level leaders and others throughout BP; extensively benchmarked other companies' training efforts for lower level managers; and conducted a series of pilot programs that involved dozens of advisers. The training sessions were first offered early in 2002 and, since then, more than 8,000 of BP's first-level leaders have attended. The managers who've been through training are consistently ranked higher in performance than those who haven't, both by their bosses and by the employees who report to them, the authors say.

TCL considers the underlying logic behind the globalization of one of China's most prominent companies. TCL, and similarly prominent companies in China, are in the forefront of China's emergence as one of the world's preeminent economic powers. Allows a discussion of how TCL's approach to globalization compares with those of other Chinese companies and those of companies from other developing countries. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

In business lore, the eureka moment overshadows the more important matter of how an invention reaches the marketplace, says author Sir Harold Evans.