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Growth in an adjacent market is tougher than it looks; three-quarters of the time, the effort fails. But companies can change those odds dramatically. Results from a five-year study of corporate growth conducted by Bain & Co. reveal that adjacency expansion succeeds only when built around strong core businesses that have the potential to become market leaders. And the best place to look for adjacency opportunities is inside a company's strongest customers. The study also found that the most successful companies were able to outgrow their rivals consistently and profitably by developing a formula for pushing out the boundaries of their core businesses in predictable, repeatable ways. Companies use their repeatability formulas to expand into any number of adjacencies. Some companies make repeated geographic moves, whereas others apply a superior business model to new segments. In other cases, companies develop hybrid approaches. The successful repeaters in the study had two common characteristics: they were extraordinarily disciplined, applying rigorous screens before they made an adjacency move, and in almost all cases, they developed their repeatable formulas by carefully studying their customers and their customers' economics.

Why do so many newly minted leaders fail so spectacularly? Part of the problem is that in many companies, succession planning is little more than creating a list of high-potential employees and the slots they might fill. It's a mechanical process that's too narrow and hidebound to uncover and correct skill gaps that can derail promising young executives. And it's completely divorced from organizational efforts to transform managers into leaders. Some companies, however, do succeed in building a steady, reliable pipeline of leadership talent by marrying succession planning with leadership development. Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and Sonoco Products have created long-term processes for managing the talent roster throughout their organizations--a process Conger and Fulmer call succession management. Drawing on the experiences of these best-practice organizations, the authors outline five rules for establishing a healthy succession management system: Focus on opportunities for development, identify linchpin positions, make the system transparent, measure progress regularly, and be flexible.

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. Next, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained.

Among all the companies that were touched by scandal in 2002, Tyco was uniquely positioned to serve as a laboratory for governance reform. It had solid manufacturing businesses and, unlike Enron or WorldCom, it was not the victim of massive, systemic accounting fraud. Yes, there was serious malfeasance at the top, but undergirding the company was a foundation of profitable basic businesses. In this article, Tyco's first-ever senior vice-president for corporate governance describes the steps the company is taking to wipe the slate clean and restore shareholders' and employees' trust in its operations. The company began by bringing in a new CEO, Ed Breen; hiring some 60 new senior executives; swapping out the entire board of directors with individuals who boast strong backgrounds in operations as well as in finance; and meticulously, systematically scrubbing all the books. Tyco's new board is clear about who has authority over which transactions and, with three executives within the company reporting directly to it, has a window into day-to-day affairs. Most important, Tyco is creating the conditions for good governance below the senior executive level, including a stronger boundary between finance and operations management.

Now that companies such as General Electric and Citigroup have accepted the premise that employee stock options are an expense, the debate is shifting from whether to report options on income statements to how to report them. The authors present a new accounting mechanism that maintains the rationale underlying stock option expensing while addressing critics' concerns about measurement error and the lack of reconciliation to actual experience. A procedure they call fair-value expensing adjusts and eventually reconciles cost estimates made at grant date with subsequent changes in the value of the options, and it does so in a way that eliminates forecasting and measurement errors over time. The method captures the chief characteristic of stock option compensation--that employees receive part of their compensation in the form of a contingent claim on the value they are helping to produce. The mechanism involves creating entries on both the asset and equity sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, companies create a prepaid-compensation account equal to the estimated cost of the options granted; on the owners'-equity side, they create a paid-in capital stock-option account for the same amount. The prepaid-compensation account is then expensed through the income statement, and the stock option account is adjusted on the balance sheet to reflect changes in the estimated fair value of the granted options. The amortization of prepaid compensation is added to the change in the option grant's value to provide the total reported expense of the options grant for the year. At the end of the vesting period, the company uses the fair value of the vested option to make a final adjustment on the income statement to reconcile any difference between that fair value and the total of the amounts already reported.

Chief Technology Officer Barry Golding is meeting with Mathews & Co.'s department heads to ask for another round of investment so he can begin implementing customer relationship management software at the menswear chain. For months, he has been the CRM project's cheerleader, and it is Barry whose reputation is at stake. He quickly loses control of the meeting. One department head is disappointed that so few of her wish list items are in Barry's latest plan. Another is sour on the project now that he's discovered he won't get any payback for two years. The CEO, who has given the project his blessing, isn't present to back up Barry. Barry can't see what he could have done to keep the department heads on his side. But a friend later tells him about what she calls the "blue sky paradox:" You have to get people to dream big to sell a project, but by doing that you set them up to be disappointed. What can Barry do to save the project? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0312A and R0312Z, are Nathaniel Leonard, the supply chain director of Goodyear's Engineered Products business; Andrew McAfee, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School; Barry J. Gilway, the executive vice-president of Zurich North America Services; and John Freeland, the managing partner of Accenture's CRM practice.

Chief Technology Officer Barry Golding is meeting with Mathews & Co.'s department heads to ask for another round of investment so he can begin implementing customer relationship management software at the menswear chain. For months, he has been the CRM project's cheerleader, and it is Barry whose reputation is at stake. He quickly loses control of the meeting. One department head is disappointed that so few of her wish list items are in Barry's latest plan. Another is sour on the project now that he's discovered he won't get any payback for two years. The CEO, who has given the project his blessing, isn't present to back up Barry. Barry can't see what he could have done to keep the department heads on his side. But a friend later tells him about what she calls the "blue sky paradox:" You have to get people to dream big to sell a project, but by doing that you set them up to be disappointed. What can Barry do to save the project? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0312A and R0312Z, are Nathaniel Leonard, the supply chain director of Goodyear's Engineered Products business; Andrew McAfee, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School; Barry J. Gilway, the executive vice-president of Zurich North America Services; and John Freeland, the managing partner of Accenture's CRM practice.

The vice-president of rehabilitation and support at a hospital must decide if the request from a department to automate and track the dispatch of porters within the hospital is the best solution. He is aware that this area has been experiencing problems, however, he is not sure he has enough information to make the decision and instructs the manager of the department to provide a cost-benefit analysis and alternatives.

In mid-2003, China was the fastest-growing telecom market. Telecom subscribers are estimated at 472 million. With the size and growth of telecom, China is a hot spot for new telecom and IT technologies. Furthermore, China's sheer market power provides a strong position for establishing telecom policies and standards that have important global and economic implications. This case provides the underlying background to discuss the key issues and decisions facing China's policymakers.

Looks at the consumer psychology of new product adoption. Identifies a key reason why consumers do not adopt innovations as quickly as developers think they should--an irrational resistance to behavioral change. Identifies strategies for firms to manage and overcome this resistance.

Describes Flextronics' evolution from providing outsourced manufacturing services for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electronics industry to developing entire unbranded products for purchase by OEMs. In 2001, Flextronics began a development program that yielded several unbranded cell phones that--even by the admission of several OEMs--delivered performance comparable to that of branded products at a significantly lower cost. Nonetheless, as of early 2003, no major OEM had yet agreed to purchase any of these phones from Flextronics. As chairman and CEO of Flextronics, Michael Marks must decide how aggressively to pursue full product development.

Describes a set of decisions confronting some managers in the oral care division of Procter & Gamble. They must decide whether to buy a company that has developed an inexpensive, battery-operated toothbrush. The company's product has done well in one market, but determining an appropriate value and structure is challenging.

Supplements the (A) case.

What price should Dow Chemical bid for PBB, a petrochemical complex that is being privatized by the Argentine government? To answer this question, students are forced to consider the role of country risk, the underlying currency exposure of the business, and how to value an investment opportunity that has several stages. Given that it is a privatization, students are also forced to consider the political dynamics involved, the incentives of local managers, and the bidding process of a privatization. The case provides detailed cash flows and discount rate information, allowing students to conduct a thorough valuation for an emerging markets project. To obtain executable spreadsheets (courseware), please contact our customer service department at [email protected].

The Brazilian oil company, Petrobras, is evaluating the acquisition of an Argentine oil company, the Perez Companc Group (Pecom). The acquisition would increase Petrobras' oil reserves and expand its interests outside Brazil, a significant step for the largest company in Brazil. Pecom is for sale because it has been severely affected by the financial crisis in Argentina. Students have the opportunity to assess the impact of a severe devaluation on a company. There is also considerable uncertainty about how to value Pecom, and students must weigh the importance of country risk in determining the appropriate discount rate to use in the valuation. Finally, there is also uncertainty about Petrobras's own future as the Brazilian government has controlled it. Students are allowed to review the efficacy of changes in corporate governance implemented by Petrobras, despite its ongoing link to the Brazilian state and the associated political uncertainties of that affiliation. Students will consider different methods of valuation and the impact of politics on cross-border acquisitions. To obtain executable spreadsheets (courseware), please contact our customer service department at [email protected].

This case presents the dilemma of a multinational oil and gas company, ExxonMobil, as it factors in the ethics issues related to the environment and cultural differences in deciding whether to proceed with building a pipeline in Chad and Cameroon, two of the poorest and most corrupt developing countries in West Africa. The many players in this project included the World Bank, which cofinanced the project and put restrictions into place that would hopefully prevent government corruption in both Chad and Cameroon and many environmental and human rights groups that warned of potential disaster. The case also covers the environmental and social analysis of the areas that would be affected by the pipeline.

In 2003, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys football team wanted to build a new stadium complex. The team's existing stadium was aging, and a new stadium offered enhanced revenue potential for one of the NFL's premier teams. The team wanted taxpayer assistance in financing the stadium, and the state legislature voted to put the matter to voters. Discusses the arguments for and against taxpayer financing of sports facilities and the economics of professional football teams. Raises the question of how the Cowboys can persuade the public to support the plan, as well as what alternatives the team should consider if voters reject the proposal.

Reviews Josie Esquivel's career history, detailing how, through her personal attributes, skills, experiences, and organizational practices she has developed into a star analyst. Should Esquivel accept an offer to leave Lehman Brothers for Morgan Stanley? To make this decision, Esquivel needs to reflect on what made her successful and to consider seriously what it would take to move her "franchise" to another company without compromising her performance as a star.

A shift in strategy from broadcasting standardized programs throughout its footprint to localized programming necessitates a review of STAR's organizational structure. Growing complexity and a need for local responsiveness point toward adoption of a country-based organizational structure. The question arises concerning the systems that must be in place if headquarters is truly to decentralize decision rights. The case also raises the issue of the need for senior executives at corporate to redefine their roles.

The managers of British business forum planner, Richmond Events, are struggling to expand their conference offerings into new territories. At the same time, they are trying to decide how product managers, who are critical to event success, should be hired, trained, managed, and retained. There is a philosophical disagreement between managers about how to take Richmond Events to the next level. Founder Mark Rayner wants to stay the course and give project managers as much autonomy as possible. He asserts that autonomy leads to priceless innovation and argues that normative controls will prevent product managers from going too far astray. Marketer Deborah Parkes wants to streamline the production process and build hierarchy into the system to promote consistent service quality. As management considers leveraging its service platform and expanding into Asia, these working tensions intensify.