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This case presents the second phase of DBS Bank's internationally acclaimed digital transformation. Upon completing the first phase (2009-2014) of the transformation that radically "rewired" the entire enterprise for digital innovation, DBS initiated its second digital push in 2015 to address ever-emerging threats from fintech companies and institutional constraints on acquisition-led organic expansion. To DBS, the largest bank in Southeast Asia by assets, this digital transformation was an on-going journey in building a next-generation enterprise. It centred on developing the core capabilities to be ready for a digital future, i.e., the agility to scale technology infrastructure, to delight customers, to connect with ecosystem partners, and to innovate in ways that are unimaginable today. The case details how DBS was preparing these capabilities by undertaking three fundamental "philosophical shifts": to reinvent DBS by becoming digital to the core, embedding DBS in the customer journey, and creating a 26,000-person start-up. The case also highlights the bank's methodology for measuring financial value created by digitalisation; DBS is believed to be the first bank in the world to have done so. Furthermore, the case describes DBS's latest strategic move to embark onto its next stage of transformation, i.e., to reorganise the company around (technology) platforms.

As a typical investor in India, you sought to attain reasonable growth in her capital with adequate diversification and low volatility in returns. It was suggested that you consider investing in mutual funds in order to obtain diversified exposure to India's equity and debt markets. In particular, it was suggested that you invest in the Tata Equity P/E Fund, which had witnessed stellar performance in the recent past. However, before you can decide whether to invest in mutual funds, you must thoroughly understand the key features and their benefits and costs. You also need to identify specific sources of outperformance and to assess the fund's true outperformance, actively attained after adjusting for risk.

Student spreadsheet to case W18774

Student spreadsheet for case W18813

The new business development manager for Evergreen Executive Education has been asked by the firm's CEO to develop a list of as many revenue growth ideas as he could over the next week. The COE saw this task as critical for the new services initiative that he had been hired to lead. The list would be an inventory of possibilities for ongoing consideration as well as a catalyst for other professionals in the firm to generate additional ideas. The CEO had described the task for him was to keep his primary business-development mission in mind, and to think big and out of the box.

Supplement to case UV7653

When a consumer purchases an item, the presumption is that the benefit obtained from it exceeds the price paid-we can think of this difference as the consumer profit. How do consumers calculate this profit, especially when they do not immediately consume the purchased item? This technical note presents a model of mental accounting that gives insights into the process that consumers follow to calculate value. It compares rational logic, accounting logic, and mental accounting logic, incorporating the phenomena of loss aversion, transaction utility, and consumer anomalies. This note is used at Darden in the second-year "Behavioral Decision Making" course. It would also be suitable in courses covering rational decision making in business.

The dean of a prominent business school has learned that the system that his-and many other-business schools use to help select and notify MBA students has been hacked. The hacker posted instructions for applicants to gain access to schools' decisions ahead of time. During the 10 hours MyMBA's system was compromised, several hundred applicants viewed their admission status at multiple top-tier schools. MyMBA now has offered the names of the applicants who took advantage of the hack, and the dean's phone is ringing off the hook with media queries. How should he handle this breach, and what public statement should he make? The case is designed to surface and explore students' instinctive decision-making tendencies around a complicated problem. Thus it is short enough to be read and responded to in class. Students are assigned readings and assignments related to the case after class discussion in which they are encouraged to reflect on their initial responses. The case is quite flexible and would work in any course that deals with leadership, ethics, difficult conversations, decision-making, organizational behavior, moral disengagement, and related topics. It is appropriate for a range of levels and audiences, including undergraduate, MBA, and executive education.

The case opens in 2016 as Barbaros Ozbugutu, co-founder and CEO of the Istanbul-based payment technology start-up iyzico, contemplates the offers the company received for its Series C round. The case then describes iyzico's origins and provides a detailed overview of the business model and growth story that led iyzico to dominate the industry in Turkey within three years of its founding. Having raised A and B rounds from local and institutional investors in 2014 and 2015 respectively, in 2016 Ozbugutu believes that iyzico could benefit from another round, this time from international venture capital, to reach its aggressive growth targets. In the summer of 2016, after an intense few months of talks with potential investors, Ozbugutu was looking at five competitive term sheets from funds with great fintech know-how and emerging markets experience. From the previous rounds, he knew that if he chose the right investors-ones who could also act as advisors-surprises would be rare. He now needed to weigh the pros and cons of the different term sheets and VCs and decide which offers to ultimately accept.

The case opens in July 2016 as Barbaros Ozbugutu, co-founder and CEO of the Istanbul-based payment technology start-up iyzico, contemplates the pros and cons of the different term sheets the company has received for its Series C round. The case then informs the reader about some changes in circumstances that affected the terms of the shortlisted offers. At the end, the case poses this question: Being faced with worsening terms in a volatile environment, should Ozbugutu go ahead with the round, or should he wait and try again at a later point in time?

At the end of 2017 First Utility Ltd. was the largest of the middle-tier domestic energy suppliers in the United Kingdom, serving 808,000 of the country's 27 million households with electricity and gas. In Q1 2017 First Utility captured 3% market share. The company had grown rapidly from 2011 to 2014, doubling in size each year, and CEO Ian McCaig had signaled that he was considering an IPO. However, in 2015 growth slowed, and profits fell by 84%. The same year, the company began expanding into Germany and Poland and building its own billing system. Growth slowed further in early 2016, and First Utility recorded a loss of £12.7 million for the year. Plans for an IPO were shelved. Instead, the company began looking for strategic partnerships to offer new products and services to its UK customer base. Whether First Utility's new geographies and product lines would revive growth was unclear. Meanwhile, in May 2017, CEO McCaig announced that he would step down in September. In December 2017, the company announced that Royal Dutch Shell would acquire First Utility for an undisclosed sum. The deal was approved in February 2018, and First Utility was rolled into Shell's New Energies division.

This case describes the history of the United Kingdom's domestic energy industry and the country's efforts to create a more competitive, greener, and distributed power sector. On July 24, 2017, the United Kingdom government and the industry regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), published a report listing 29 actions to be taken to "remove barriers to smart technologies," "enable smart homes and businesses," and "improve access to energy markets for new technologies and business models." The report promised yet more disruption for the 60 suppliers who provided energy for the UK's 27.1 million households. How welcome the proposals would be to the players in the industry was not clear. The "Big Six" vertically-integrated generators and retailers, which accounted for more than 80% of the market, were facing declining sales and market share in the face of a huge number of new entrants: 30 in the last three years alone. The recent threat of a price cap on bills-or even a government take-over-did little to encourage further investment. Meanwhile, a group of six mid-tier challengers, accounting for 12% of the market, had grown big enough to be burdened with the many social and environmental charges faced by the Big Six and their growth had slowed. Several of them were now diversifying into other service offerings such as broadband or homeowner's insurance, or were looking for opportunities overseas. Then there were more than 50 small players, mostly recent entrants. While many were growing fast, often using their customers' deposits to fund growth, they were not profitable and had limited capacity for investment in "smarter energy." Meanwhile, the UK government was keen to encourage players such as Google and Amazon into the market to drive disruption. Just how quickly the UK energy market would get smarter remained to be seen.

In late August 2015, Amit Gudka and Hayden Wood, co-founders of Bulb, Ltd (Bulb), were ready to offer affordable renewable energy to the United Kingdom's 27 million households. They hoped to capitalize on the hundreds of thousands of customers switching their energy provider each month, by promising excellent customer service, a simple, low-priced tariff, 100%-renewable electricity, and services to reduce energy consumption. At the time, there were only about 250,000 households on renewable tariffs, typically paying a high price for the privilege. Gudka and Wood were convinced that many more households would opt for renewable energy and turn it into a mainstream product if prices were more reasonable. Their goal was to sign up more than 23,000 properties by March 31, 2017 to reach breakeven, and then grow to more than 69,000 properties by March 31, 2021, by capturing 0.5% of all households who switched during the year. They aimed for £31 in operating profit per household for the year ended March 31, 2021. They had given up high-paying jobs to create Bulb and invested 18 months and £250,000 of their own money in the venture. They had also persuaded angel investors to invest £1 million to fund growth. On Friday August 21, 2015, Gudka and Wood sent out a batch of 1,400 emails to friends and family, encouraging them to switch to Bulb. How many would sign up?

On August 21, 2015, Amit Gudka and Hayden Wood, co-founders of Bulb Ltd. (Bulb) launched a new business to supply energy to the United Kingdom's 27 million residential homes with a promise of 100% renewable electricity at affordable prices. By the end of March 2017, Bulb had grown to supply 29,311 properties, well ahead of its Launch Plan of 23,166 and beyond the point of breakeven. It had been a slow start, and growth had been volatile, reaching a rate of over 3,000 new members per week at one point, putting severe strains on service levels. Moreover, Gudka and Wood had been forced to change many aspects of their plan and defer launching value-added services to help customers reduce energy consumption and create Bulb's vision of distributed generation. Now, the company was generating profits; enough to grow, but not at the level of the original plan, and there would be nothing left to invest in value-added services. Should the founders scale back on their growth ambitions and delay adding services until they had reached the scale to support them? Or should they seek more funding and accelerate growth?

After a wild and volatile year, Bulb, a new entrant in the UK residential energy market, ended March 2018 with 329,171 properties, 1.2% of the total residential energy market). This was 150% ahead of a plan for 130,000 properties and almost ten times the size the founders, Amit Gudka and Hayden Wood, had imagined in August 2015 when they first launched. Bulb was now one of the top 12 energy suppliers in the UK. Gudka and Wood were convinced that if they reinvested all their profits in growth, they would reach 500,000 properties by March 2019, and reach more than 1 million by March 2021. This would mean postponing the launch of a range of value-added services they had included in their original Launch Plan, but it could make Bulb number 7 in the industry and the first real challenger to the UK's "Big Six" leading energy suppliers to pass the one million-member mark. Even so, Bulb would still be less than 40% of the size of the smallest member of the Big Six and one sixth the size of the leader, British Gas. Was it time to seek more funding to really challenge the Big Six, making renewable energy mainstream? And did it make sense to delay value-added services to support energy conservation, distributed generation, and the switch to electric vehicles, or should they seek funding to support these initiatives too?

Nike's selection of politically polarizing Colin Kaepernick as the spokesperson for the 30th anniversary of its iconic "Just Do It" campaign catapulted the brand into the media spotlight and made it a political flashpoint for consumers across America. Would the choice of Kaepernick positively or negatively affect Nike's business results or just generate a lot of social media chatter? As Nike's management team watched some people burn their sneakers in protest on YouTube and others applaud the company's behavior on Facebook, they wondered whether inserting Nike into the middle of a heated political debate was the right thing to do or the most reckless action Nike's brand stewards had ever taken, putting Nike's $30 billion brand asset at risk? After all, on social media, it was easy to say that one would boycott or buycott a brand due to one's political beliefs, but in the marketplace, other purchase criteria often reigned supreme.

In January 2018, Manoj Sinha-founder and CEO of Husk Power-was contemplating raising $20 million to scale operations for a second time. From 2007 through 2013, Husk built 80 biomass waste plants that provided electricity to 250,000 villagers and shop owners spread across 350 villages in rural India and Africa. But in 2015, Husk underwent a major pivot. Rather than providing power through biomass gasification alone, Husk shifted to plants that used biomass gasification, solar energy and battery power in tandem, allowing for power generation nearly 24-7. And rather than serving households as their core customer demographic, Sinha shifted Husk's focus to village commercial centers. To bring this vision to reality Sinha ceased operations of nearly all of the existing plant locations and began the conversion to new locations built around the "new" hybrid plant. Thus in 2015, Husk was operating a mere 10 power plants and serving roughly 2000 customers, down from the 80 plants and roughly 250,000 customers they had prior to this shift. After downsizing and reorganizing operations, was Husk Power once again ready to scale? Would impact investors be interested in providing the capital? Traditional, value-neutral investors? And which type of investors should the founders of Husk prefer?

This short case, meant for pairing with HBS case 615-013 "AmazonFresh: Rekindling the Online Grocery Market," explores Amazon's rationale for acquiring Whole Foods.

This note introduces the first module of the RC Strategy course, What Is Strategy? It helps students develop their perspective on what is a strategy, what is a good strategy, and how strategy development differs across contexts.