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While the Gilead: Hepatitis-C Access Strategy (A) case (515-025) poses questions on what the company should do with respect to hart hit countries like Egypt and India, this (B) case provides the answer. In both cases, the company chose to pursue a proactive strategy to enable access at affordable prices.

With four outlets of Taco Bell opened in Bangalore, India by December 2013, the managing director of Yum! Restaurants India, the parent company, felt eager to expand. The company took pride in providing the best Mexican-inspired fast food at a low price in a friendly atmosphere. Its target market was young people with global aspirations and/or experiences who were aware of the brand and willing to try something new. India appeared to be a large and fitting market for this quick service restaurant: a population of more than a billion people, the majority of whom were under 35, growing income levels and increasing tastes for international cuisines. Yet, despite a record-breaking launch in 2010, its retail foot traffic was declining. The addition of vegetarian items to the menu had limited success in luring customers to repeat visits. Were the price changes on the new menu reasonable and consistent with the brand promise Taco Bell had made during its launch? What could be done to sustain the company's survival in India?

Michael Lewis's book Flash Boys, published in 2014, revealed to the public numerous controversial Wall Street trading practices made possible by advances in technology, as well as regulatory changes that were (ironically) intended to improve pricing fairness in the financial markets. Lewis's story focused on the man who blew the whistle: Brad Katsuyama, a Canadian banker who ran the New York trading desk for the Royal Bank of Canada. In 2010, he had noticed some odd system responses to his trading requests and began to ask questions. The answers he discovered, and publicized, about high frequency trading set off a firestorm regarding the moral integrity of the financial markets. Very few people understood what was happening, and fewer still comprehended the central role played by information technology.

After a series of strikes in its Manesar manufacturing plant in 2011, Maruti Suzuki India Limited is beginning to recover from the after-effects of the strike. Amid this tense atmosphere, a minor brawl breaks out between supervisors and workers, then escalates into full-scale violence and arson, which results in the death of the plant's general manager of human resources. The company locks down the plant, and law enforcement agencies initiate criminal proceedings against the workers. The incident raises serious questions about industrial relations at the plant and, in particular, the suitability of the Japanese management style in the Indian context.

This case deals with the revitalization of Tata Chemicals Ltd. (TCL) by way of significant international acquisitions in the first decade of the new millennium. Set in 2011, TCL has a decision to make on the potential acquisition of a stake in a North American early stage potash development company. This acquisition could allow TCL to set up a fertilizer plant, which might give the company a jumpstart just as earlier acquisitions had helped the company to be ranked number two in the world in soda ash production. As backward integration can be a risky strategy, the acquisition needs to be carefully considered in terms of when to integrate and when to rely on market-driven contractual arrangements.

Gilead had come up with an innovative drug for Hepatitis C, which affected 180 million people worldwide. The drug was priced at $1,000 a pill for the US market. Gilead had to decide how to price and market the pill in developing countries that bore the brunt of the disease. The company had earned accolades for its work in HIV/AIDS, where its innovative medicines now accounted for 60% of all patients on Anti-Retroviral (ARV) medicines. Much of this was accomplished through generic licensing, which brought a $10,000/year treatment regimen down to $100! Should the company replicate that strategy for Hepatitis C? If so, how would its US Healthcare customers, who were paying $84,000 per patient, react? On the other hand, Gilead had to balance the interests of its shareholders, who paid $11 billion for an acquisition that led to the new Hepatitis C drug.

MasterCard CEO Ajay Banga was investing significant time and attention to increase financial inclusion among individuals with historically no access to banking or financial services in countries around the world with large underserved populations. The effort included partnerships with governments and banks to issue MasterCard branded debit cards to millions of individuals. Financial inclusion could potentially help these individuals by increasing financial literacy, building credit records, improving savings rates, providing access to loans and other financial products, and, in general, by increasing the economic opportunities for these newly banked consumers. And by adding more customers, MasterCard potentially could also grow its bottom line. Financial inclusion raised questions for MasterCard. Was the management time and attention well spent given the low returns expected from adding millions of mostly very poor customers? What risks might MasterCard encounter-particularly in some countries where citizens resented their government partnering with and providing personal data to a large U.S. company.

CEO Dave Cote spent six years turning around an ailing Honeywell and in 2008 Cote and his team face a new challenge: how to respond to the Great Recession. Cote does not want to give up the gains he made in transforming and unifying Honeywell. With a fall-off in demand, Cote and the team must decide how to enact spending cuts in all parts of the business. They face choices in whether to employ layoffs or furloughs (unpaid leaves) for any needed workforce reductions, and whether to enact hiring freezes and other cost-saving changes to employee and executive compensation programs and benefits. Each of these choices is hard, and together they may derail the company's momentum if not handled carefully.

Five years after the Great Recession, Honeywell's CEO Dave Cote and his executive team reflect on the choices they made to manage costs and earnings forecasts during that uncertain time. They discuss which cost cutting measures they decided to take and their personal decisions of whether or not to accept bonuses in 2009. Cote also discusses the challenges Honeywell faced implementing unpaid work leaves (furloughs) in different parts of the world and how he believes the choices they made during the recession positioned Honeywell to respond to the economic recovery.

In 2013, Progressive was the fourth largest player in the auto insurance market, having lost the third position to GEICO in 2008. As the industry shifted from agency to online sales, GEICO's direct selling model positioned it strongly for growth. Progressive's direct sales mix had increased from 36% of total sales in 2006 to 42% in 2012, well ahead of the industry average of around 25%. As a result, both Progressive and GEICO continued to gain ground on industry leaders, State Farm and Allstate, who sold less than 5% of their policies direct. In 2013, Progressive hoped to revolutionize the purchasing of auto insurance and to build its competitive position with Snapshot, a new usage-based pricing product. First introduced in 2011, Snapshot had low rates of adoption through 2012, but Progressive was redoubling its efforts in 2013 to educate consumers about the product's benefits, which included potential savings of as much as 30% for some drivers. Progressive was also intent on building share with customers who purchased multiple insurance policies since they tended to be more loyal and profitable. Whether these moves would be sufficient to catch up with GECIO was unclear, but they seemed to be working well against State Farm and Allstate.

The purpose of this note is to characterize the challenges entrepreneurs may face in creating a well-functioning ecosystem of users, and to equip entrepreneurs with tools to overcome these obstacles. The note is meant to accompany the final module of the "The Online Economy: Strategy and Entrepreneurship," an elective course taught at Harvard Business School. This is an abridgment of HBP 911066.

The case is about the emergence of the virtual contact centre, which employs a geographically dispersed workforce in the cloud. LiveOps' 'home-shore' business model combines the following innovations: (1) it allows agents to work when they choose to, but pays them only for the time they are serving customers, and (2) it is based on meritocracy, i.e., better performing agents get more work and are paid more. The virtual contact centre is evaluated against traditional contact centre solutions in the context of a relief operation helping storm evacuees connect with relatives in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

"With the publication of CK Prahalad's "The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid" (2005), the poor were suddenly seen as a potential market in the eyes of multinational corporations (MNCs). Although poor, the BOP is a large and growing market. The development community tends to focus on meeting the needs of the poorest of the poor (the 1 billion people who live on less than US$1 a day), but there is a larger segment of the low-income population, comprised of 3.8 billion people with incomes between $2 and $5 a day, that could be the focus of a market-oriented approach. They have no bank accounts, no access to modern financial services, no phones, are dependent on informal or subsistence livelihoods, and lack access to amenities and basic healthcare. Influenced by Prahalad's work, the top management at Novartis decided that it was time to seriously consider the pursuit of commercial opportunities among the world's poor. The case offers a description of the first steps to setting up the Arogya Parivar initiative by Novartis in India and raises strategic questions like how to improve its supply chain reliability, how to deal with the fact that many consumers were women and yet there were few female health educators, how to make the treatment affordable, whether to launch new brands of medicines for this segment, how to convince consumers to seek medical treatment and ensure compliance with the treatment protocol, etc., going forward. Please visit the dedicated case website http://cases.insead.edu/arogya-parivar/ (copy and paste the url into a browser) to access case videos and other support material."

Managing change is consistently ranked as one of the most critical and difficult tasks that leaders face. This note outlines the key choices that leaders must make when engineering change. It is organized into four sections, offering guidance on how to: 1) diagnose the need for change; 2) determine what sort of change is called for (e.g., radical or incremental); 3) develop a delivery strategy that fosters stakeholder buy-in; and, 4) evaluate impact. In addition to providing diagnostic frameworks for managing change, it offers a conceptual overview of both foundational and contemporary change management theory. Managers, instructors, and students of change management should find this note especially useful for discussing the core tenants of designing and implementing a change initiative.

Mobile Internet has imposed an increasing impact on traditional finance. Firstly, some financial business modules can be operated via mobile Internet, and the corresponding transaction cost is greatly reduced. For example, payment by traditional bank draft is replaced by Internet payment through Alipay (China) Network Technology Co., Ltd. Secondly, some financial businesses can be conducted through mobile Internet. For instance, Alibaba Group launched a microfinance program on the Internet. Thirdly, with the aid of mobile Internet, new financial products can be developed, and Yu'ebao in this case study is a kind of financial product based on mobile Internet.

Sheng Siong was the third-largest supermarket chain in Singapore. Its chief executive officer co-founded it with his two brothers in 1985. Sheng Siong's business model was well suited to cater to the price-sensitive and more traditional customer segment in Singapore, with a dominant presence in suburban areas called "heartlands." It also had a unique corporate philosophy, which was influenced by the personal values of its founding family. However, the market became increasingly saturated, competitors were aggressive and costs were rising. The key question was whether Sheng Siong's original competitive advantage was sustainable and how it could grow.

A small Danish design company seeks to collaborate with its largest supplier in Thailand in order to improve health, safety and environmental conditions, as well as labour standards, as a core element of complying with the UN Global Compact principles. The company takes its corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda seriously and has developed a new standard for CSR in its supplier factories that is implemented and audited by a non-governmental organization. New challenges emerge as attention shifts to the certification of production inputs such as wood. Although Western small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face pressures to audit their suppliers in developing countries, these SMEs often lack the financial and political resources to change behaviours in supplier factories. The firm's quality manager must evaluate its sustainability approach. How much leverage can a small company expect to have with its suppliers? Furthermore, is the cost of auditing suppliers in a country such as Thailand too high?

By 2013, the Indian Metal Company, headquartered in Metconagar in eastern India, had been a leading metallurgical company in India for 100 years. While it had ambitious expansion plans, both at home and abroad, it was bedeviled by an increasing attrition of professionals and difficulty in attracting candidates from premier educational institutions. This shortage of talent could jeopardize the company's investments. The chief executive officer convened an urgent meeting of senior executives to discuss the problem and explore possible solutions. The meeting ended in a confusing barrage of views and counterviews. A committee was appointed to synthesize the competing views and prepare a master plan for talent management. It began its work by reviewing past data related to attrition and holding discussions with small groups of young professionals. The time had now come to prepare its report and recommendations.

In order to resolve severe water management problems in Metro Manila, the Government of Philippines began rolling out a privatisation scheme in 1995 with the objective to provide piped water to everyone in the city with regular 24-hour access. The scheme aimed to auction off service provision of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS), a government agency that handled all water and sewage services, through two 25-year concession agreements that divided Metro Manila into East and West. On August 1, 1997, Manila Water won the East Concession. By 2013, after 16 years of management and operations, Manila Water had more than doubled their customer base and achieved 24-hour access to safe and affordable piped water to 99 percent of its distribution network in the East Concession, whereas before just two-thirds had any access at all and only 26 percent had regular 24-hour access. Moreover, system leakage and pilferage were improved from 63 percent to 12 percent water loss. To come so far, Manila Water had to overcome both internal and external challenges. Internally, the company had to transform its highly centralised organisational structure and bureaucratic culture into a de-centralised one where actions could be undertaken through bottom-to-top directives. Human capital and leadership development, as well as putting in place the right incentives, were key to accomplishing this objective. Externally, Manila Water had to address environmental, socio-economic and political challenges. In this regard, tri-sector engagement between government, business and civil society was essential. Moreover, the company had to seek out new business and a means to sustainable growth if it were to stay relevant in the future.

Four years into a five-year contract with General Motors to be the exclusive website vendor to its U.S. network of more than 4,000 dealers, CDK Digital faced a crucial contract renewal at the end of 2012. The case follows Melissa McCann, director of strategic marketing, and Chris Reed, CMO, as they prepared for a critical meeting in July 2011: a presentation to the customer relationship management (CRM) subcommittee of the Chevrolet dealer council. Although GM dealers, like all auto dealers in the United States, were independent franchisees, GM saw the renewal of CDK Digital's exclusive contract as a collaborative decision between dealers and GM. According to Ed Vogt, GM's executive in charge of the renewal, if the dealer councils said no, the contract would not be renewed. This case challenges students to use CDK's big data and analytics capabilities to address the inherent conflict between dealers and manufacturers: when marketing to potential customers, manufacturers wanted consistency across dealer websites to maximize sales of their targeted brands, while dealers wanted flexibility to sell what they had in inventory.