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In late 2012, the owner of the Ratnagiri Alphonso Orchard considered whether or not to purchase information from a climatology firm regarding the probability of unseasonable rains that could damage some or all of his family’s mango harvest. The owner needed to decide whether or not he should lease the orchard to a fruit merchant or keep the orchard for his family to harvest, despite the possibility of rain. Would the climatology firm provide helpful information, or should he make an independent decision? Regardless of whether he purchased information from the climatology firm, what was the best informed decision he could make?

In 2015, Britannia Industries — India’s most recognized biscuit brand — had overtaken Parle as the market leader in the biscuit (cookie) category and faced stiff competition from Parle, ITC’s Sunfeast, and many regional competitors. Britannia had to devise a strategy that would allow it to further consolidate its leadership position without losing market share; increasing the price alone was not an option in this highly competitive market. What could Britannia do to remain India’s number-one biscuit maker? How could it stay ahead of its rivals in the area of product innovation? In a market swamped with near-identical product packaging, it had to devise a strategy that would help it avoid an identity crisis and make it the consumer’s first choice. The company’s senior management needed to chart a clear roadmap for the future.

By 2014, the Walton Group, an electrical goods manufacturer based in Bangladesh, sold its products in over 20 different countries. A decision to utilize the advantages of low labour costs in the company’s home country was made in the early 2000s, which led to an increase in value and permitted rapid international expansion. To achieve Walton’s mission of “Walton at every home,” the company established various specialized support units both inside and outside of Bangladesh. Government tax incentives in Bangladesh had boosted Walton’s cost competitiveness, but how else could Walton compete with other international brands to achieve is goals and become a household name worldwide?

Building networks is widely encouraged as a means to improving productivity and profits. But does having an extensive list of contacts really result in better performance for an organization? When looking at the data-rich world of the National Basketball Association (NBA), the answer is no. The author’s research examined every NBA player transaction from 1977 to 2010 and worked out which managers used their contacts to sign players and which managers didn’t. Teams that used their manager’s contacts to sign players performed five per cent worse than those that didn’t, and that was after factoring in the quality of the team, club budgets, and a host of other influences. Indeed, while relying on contacts saves time and money in the short term, it can be seriously harmful on and off the basketball court. When entering a business transaction, managers must objectively seek the best people for the job, keeping the long-term interests of the firm in mind. That means being able to weigh their contacts against outside candidates in every situation. Building in time for a proper tendering process often saves on costs in the long run by producing better outcomes for the company. If a firm finds its managers relying on contacts to save on search costs, it must assess this situation. Monitoring how managers use their contacts may cost time and money, but it can also mean the difference between being a market champion or just an also-ran.

The Royal Harbour Resort & Spa was a large hotel and spa with over 300 employees. In December 2010, the human resources manager was advised by the general manager that headquarters had ordered an immediate restructuring due to a decline in the hospitality industry, especially in the luxury hotel sector. The human resources manager was advised that she had to terminate the employment of their banquet manager — an employee of over 17 years. The human resources manager was instructed to prepare the severance letter by the following day and meet with the banquet manager on Monday to finalize the termination.

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Jumbo Group Ltd. (Jumbo) was among Singapore’s leading food and beverage establishments. Founded in 1987, the group consisted of eight brands and operated 16 outlets—14 in Singapore and two in China. On October 28, 2015, Jumbo announced its initial public offering (IPO) of SG$22.06 million, consisting of two million retail shares and 86.23 million placement shares at SG$0.25 each. In this highly competitive market, the company’s chief executive officer and chairman was motivated to list Jumbo so it would have a bigger platform and better exposure to grow faster. He hoped a softer IPO market would attract more long-term investors. Jumbo was clearly profitable, but based on its past financial performance, what would be a reasonable valuation for each of its shares? The case covers valuation using the discounted cash flow model, weighted average cost of capital, discounted dividend model, and relative valuation, as well as the computation of underpricing.

In March 2016, Eveready Industries India Limited (Eveready) announced its intention to venture into the consumer-appliance segment. Eveready was the market leader in the batteries segment in India, with a market share of more than 50 per cent. The company’s portfolio comprised dry-cell batteries, flashlights, packet tea, compact fluorescent lamps, and LEDs. Eveready was readying itself to take on the giants of home appliances in India. With India’s home-appliances industry still underpenetrated, was Eveready’s entry into this segment timely? If yes, what strategic capabilities could it leverage? How should it then differentiate itself at a time when the market was saturated with multilevel segmentation? What could be the possible obstacles to Eveready’s success in the consumer-appliance industry?

In 2008, a retired farmer from Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, was facing a challenging investment decision. He had recently met with a real estate investment representative about an opportunity near Edmonton, Alberta. The farmer understood land, but investing in real estate was new for him. The 11 per cent bond return that the representative enthusiastically described made the opportunity seem very appealing. On the other hand though, the farmer wondered if the return was too good to be true. On his farm equipment, a flashing red light usually meant something had gone wrong or was about to go wrong. Thinking about the investment, the farmer felt like a red warning light was flashing in his mind—something was not quite right. But perhaps his concern was unfounded. Should he make the investment?

In the spring of 2012, a U.S. Internet, cable television, and telephone service provider—owned by a private equity group—approached a bank holding company to participate as a co-manager in a highly leveraged transaction in the cable industry. The transaction was the buyout of a smaller publicly traded cable company. The deal would require additional equity investment from the private equity group and a restructuring of the debt of both companies. Although the involved companies' management teams were excited about the opportunity, they knew that executing the deal would not be easy; the level of leverage would be the highest of any deal in the cable industry—or any industry—since before the 2007 economic downturn.

The senior director of marketing for Strength Pharma, an Indian sports nutrition company, was managing the November 2016 launch of the company’s whey protein supplement, Muscle-RDX. This product would be the first protein supplement approved by the Food Safety and Standard Authority of India for athletes who participated in high-endurance sports. Muscle-RDX would provide a domestic option for Indian athletes who competed in these sports and who wanted to purchase affordable supplements that delivered effective results. However, before the product launch, the senior director of marketing needed to develop demand forecasts, which would determine the most appropriate pricing strategy and package size for the new product.

In early 2016, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Allergan South Africa had been leading his team through changes resulting from a number of mergers over the past four years. Allergan Inc. (Allergan) had been the third-largest generic drug maker in the United States after it combined with Actavis plc in 2015, and the company was depicted as an example of “merger mania” in the pharmaceutical sector. Operating in 40 countries, Allergan had gone through a total of five mergers between 2012 and 2015—a period that had included a hostile takeover bid, cost cutting exercises, and, eventually, an acquisition. The CEO at Allergan South Africa had been working with his human resources director to build a “supertribe” culture in response to the changes. Now, faced with the challenge of yet another anticipated merger, some of the executive team had resigned, unwilling to go through the turmoil of more acquisitions. How could the CEO keep his people engaged at the regional division? What leadership style would enable him to effectively make the needed changes?

In October 2014, the chief operating officer of ABC Shipyard was trying to decide how to respond to a request from a renowned marine logistics company for five large naval bulk carriers. The shipyard could manufacture the ships, but with its current layout and throughput, the ships could not be completed within the requested two-year delivery time. A modular approach was necessary to build large and complex products such as ships, complicating the required flow of material between the shops and affecting the spatial resources needed. Could ABC Shipyard’s existing facility layout be improved, and would the change increase throughput, allowing the new ships to be built within the required two years?

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