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The case is set the day after Grab Holdings ("Grab") announced the acquisition of its largest rival, Uber, on 26 March 2018, and traces back its evolution from a start-up struggling to gain traction in its target market to the region's first decacorn (start-up with $10 billion or more value). Within five years since its inception in 2012, Grab had established a wide-spanning footprint in 190 cities across eight countries of Southeast Asia. To keep pace with its growth, the company had moved its headquarters to Singapore in 2014. Commencing its debut in the Online-to-Offline (O2O) market with a prototype of its taxi-booking smartphone app in the company's hometown in Malaysia, Grab has come a long way. With its extensive range of personal transport service, the company has become synonymous with ride-hailing and has also forayed into other areas such as fintech and marketplace. Appropriately, in January 2016, the company rebranded itself to 'Grab', an umbrella under which all its services are now homed. When Uber, the US behemoth, flexed its muscles and posed a severe threat, Grab fought head-to-head and won over the giant by quickly altering its business model and adopting a hyper-local approach. Grab's focus on nurturing a congenial organisational culture, disruptive innovation, customer-centric services, and agility while fostering enterprising and innovative talent has helped to defend its position. While staying steady on its high-growth trajectory, Anthony Tan and Hooi Ling Tan, the founding CEO and the founding COO, respectively, want to fortify its competitive strength by enhancing its disruptive quotient while remaining entrenched in Grab's culture. How can they best go about doing so?

Part A. In November 2016, Gibran Huzaifah, CEO of Indonesian firm eFishery that sells automated fish feeders for fish farmers, ponders a strategic pivot in the business-from hardware to data services. While his engineers struggle to develop a fish activity sensor to improve efficiencies and drive sales, Gibran ponders the option to develop new products to help farmers predict harvest levels (Fishbiz), signal quality to lenders (FishFax), and deploy platforms for inputs (Marketplace) and outputs (eCosystem). In addition, he is also considering whether it may be smarter to develop autofeeders for shrimp farmers, a market that is more geographically dispersed but with higher purchasing power. Part A ends by asking which direction Gibran should take for 2017. Part B. It is February 2018, and eFishery has moved into making automated shrimp feeders. Gibran seeks a roadmap to land investment funding and sees two paths to pivot into a viable platform business: 1) The "High Road of Quality Hardware" seeks a strong foundation for Marketplace and appeals to the engineering team. The CEO worries the High Road may increase unit costs, swell a bloated balance sheet, slow sales, and reinforce the firm's self-identity as a slow-scaling hardware company. It means redoubling work on the fish sensor, working with an outside firm to build a water quality sensor, and developing a P2P protocol and new data station to help the feeders talk to each other and send data to the cloud. 2) The "Low Road of Bootstrapped Disruption" seeks to get FishBiz and FishFax to market. Some sales staff share Gibran's vision, but most employees are used to hardware. Data capabilities remain weak and only major reallocations of scarce resources will make the new products strong enough to drive adoption.

Part A. In November 2016, Gibran Huzaifah, CEO of Indonesian firm eFishery that sells automated fish feeders for fish farmers, ponders a strategic pivot in the business-from hardware to data services. While his engineers struggle to develop a fish activity sensor to improve efficiencies and drive sales, Gibran ponders the option to develop new products to help farmers predict harvest levels (Fishbiz), signal quality to lenders (FishFax), and deploy platforms for inputs (Marketplace) and outputs (eCosystem). In addition, he is also considering whether it may be smarter to develop autofeeders for shrimp farmers, a market that is more geographically dispersed but with higher purchasing power. Part A ends by asking which direction Gibran should take for 2017. Part B. It is February 2018, and eFishery has moved into making automated shrimp feeders. Gibran seeks a roadmap to land investment funding and sees two paths to pivot into a viable platform business: 1) The "High Road of Quality Hardware" seeks a strong foundation for Marketplace and appeals to the engineering team. The CEO worries the High Road may increase unit costs, swell a bloated balance sheet, slow sales, and reinforce the firm's self-identity as a slow-scaling hardware company. It means redoubling work on the fish sensor, working with an outside firm to build a water quality sensor, and developing a P2P protocol and new data station to help the feeders talk to each other and send data to the cloud. 2) The "Low Road of Bootstrapped Disruption" seeks to get FishBiz and FishFax to market. Some sales staff share Gibran's vision, but most employees are used to hardware. Data capabilities remain weak and only major reallocations of scarce resources will make the new products strong enough to drive adoption.

The first part (A) of the case study refers to Asia Genomics Holdings, founded by Dr. Wong Mun Yew in 2014. Asia Genomics considered itself a pioneer in genetic testing in Asia with the aim of providing safe, accurate and timely genetic testing for people with regard to commonly occurring cancer, and foetal health conditions. The technology it used was brought over from the US. The tests were simple to administer, client samples were securely handled, and generated reports that would include recommendations for clients and their doctors on next steps after diagnosis. Part B of the case is about Imagene Labs, which was created in 2016 as a new sister entity under Asia Genomics Holdings to provide genetic testing for wellness in fitness, nutrition and skin. It operated independently from the Asia Genomics business that carried out genetic testing for cancer. The recommendations for clients would come with customised nutritional supplements or facial serums to target their specific genetic conditions. Clients who had tried the product were generally pleased with the depth of the report findings and the results of the customised products. Imagene Labs had been seeing relatively quick uptake of their products and interest in the consumer market. Although Asia Genomics and Imagene Labs had clear value propositions to offer their target markets, marketing was still the biggest challenge. Beyond that, both businesses had to plan a strategy for the development of their respective future business models. This case targets participants who are interested in understanding the organisational capabilities for implementing a business model in the healthcare industry. Participants can use the business model canvas to understand the integral components of a business model, and to innovate an existing business model.

The first part (A) of the case study refers to Asia Genomics Holdings, founded by Dr. Wong Mun Yew in 2014. Asia Genomics considered itself a pioneer in genetic testing in Asia with the aim of providing safe, accurate and timely genetic testing for people with regard to commonly occurring cancer, and foetal health conditions. The technology it used was brought over from the US. The tests were simple to administer, client samples were securely handled, and generated reports that would include recommendations for clients and their doctors on next steps after diagnosis. Part B of the case is about Imagene Labs, which was created in 2016 as a new sister entity under Asia Genomics Holdings to provide genetic testing for wellness in fitness, nutrition and skin. It operated independently from the Asia Genomics business that carried out genetic testing for cancer. The recommendations for clients would come with customised nutritional supplements or facial serums to target their specific genetic conditions. Clients who had tried the product were generally pleased with the depth of the report findings and the results of the customised products. Imagene Labs had been seeing relatively quick uptake of their products and interest in the consumer market. Although Asia Genomics and Imagene Labs had clear value propositions to offer their target markets, marketing was still the biggest challenge. Beyond that, both businesses had to plan a strategy for the development of their respective future business models. This case targets participants who are interested in understanding the organisational capabilities for implementing a business model in the healthcare industry. Participants can use the business model canvas to understand the integral components of a business model, and to innovate an existing business model.

Supplement to case SMU271. It was May 2016, and Desmond Lim, CEO and co-founder of QuikForce, a moving and logistics company based in Boston, U.S., had just concluded a five-hour long meeting with his team. QuikForce had been founded to simplify the stressful moving process for both the customer and movers, by acting as an intermediary that provided a technology platform which would pair potential customers with suitable moving companies based on their moving requirements. Ten months had flown by since the QuikForce website was first launched, and within two months of its launch, QuikForce was profitable. The meeting left two questions on Lim's mind. First, given QuikForce's initial success, should he begin to establish a presence in his home country, Singapore, or at least in Asia? The meeting with his team saw opinions split among three options-(a) broadening the service offerings in the company's existing U.S. locations (Boston, New York and Miami), (b) expanding to new cities in the U.S., or (c) pursuing expansion into Asia. Lim knew that a decision was looming. Second, was his present team the 'dream team' that would be able to take this company forward to the next level?

In 2015, Arnoud De Meyer, President of Singapore Management University initiated SMU-X. This unique programme made experiential learning accessible to undergraduate students, allowing them to gain exposure to real life work experience that could help improve their critical thinking, analytical and problem-solving skills. The key strength of the SMU-X initiative was that it had been thought through in great detail and was closely linked to the university's existing pedagogy to create a cohesive learning chain within the university. The pilot phase of the initiative was run for a year, and a lot of the hurdles that had initially seemed difficult to resolve were overcome during this phase. The general feedback from the pilot phase was quite positive and it was observed that this form of learning enhanced the learning value for students, faculty and other industry stakeholders. It was planned to roll out SMU-X across the entire SMU undergraduate cohort in 2016, and De Meyer was considering what would be the most effective mechanism to do so. This case provides the students with an opportunity to reflect on the elements that support the practice of innovation in an organisation, particularly in a service environment. It also enables students to learn about how an urban city university can create an environment for living and learning without the large campus living facilities of suburban universities. Finally, it allows students to visualise the considerations associated with scaling up a project operationally for an organisation-wide rollout.

It is August 1, 2015, and the 32nd InnovAstra Convention, an annual competition meant to showcase and recognise the innovation achievements of individuals, teams and business units in the Indonesian conglomerate PT Astra International Tbk (Astra), was just a fortnight away. Ekuslie Goestiandi is the head of the Corporate Centre that organises the InnovAstra Convention, and manages development programmes for facilitators to promote InnovAstra's standards and values in the company. Astra's employees have been inculcated with a spirit of striving towards continuous innovation from very early on in the company's history. Over the past two decades, Astra has expanded the scope of innovation across all group companies to encompass all employees, including the top management. Despite initiatives such as the InnovAstra Convention, Astra's leadership team is aware that much more is needed to be done for the group to successfully manage the challenges of the future. The business climate in Indonesia is expected to become far more volatile and demanding, influenced by intensified competition and rapid technological advances. In addition, the younger generation of employees and consumers will have different sets of needs and preferences that need to be understood and met. To manage these challenges, Astra has to plan for the 'next level of innovation' in the company, and that requires clear direction from the top. A key element of Astra's future direction is establishing a "synergistic business chain" that enables different activities within each business and across businesses to become mutually supportive. The question Ekuslie is mulling over is: what would it take to bring Astra to the next level of innovative capability?

In early 2009, Shailesh Naik founded MatchMove, a Singapore-based online entertainment service provider. Naik and his business partner had identified a gap in the Asian online gaming market and their vision was to plug this gap with a company-specific platform that incorporated casual gaming, social networking and e-commerce capabilities. MatchMove signed up global technology giant Yahoo! as its first large client. The company also contracted with game developers to create its own store of quality games that it could offer to its clients. MatchMove's key value proposition was to act as a conduit between game companies with a high content and low web traffic profile, as well as companies like Yahoo! and Microsoft with a high traffic and limited content profile. It eventually visualised itself as a closed e-commerce system to accept payments for services on its clients' websites, as well as an open payments portal for all users for multiple merchants. By 2012, MatchMove had further ventured into 'gamification', a domain related to its core business. Fast-forwarding to January 2014, Naik sees an opportunity in the market to create the next technological disruption to e-commerce. His vision is that of an open network which taps into the current trend of catering to the 'unbanked' and 'un-carded'. Will this work? Can he do it alone, or should he look for a partner? How should MatchMove evolve its business model to seize this next big opportunity?

It was May 2016, and Desmond Lim, CEO and co-founder of QuikForce, a moving and logistics company based in Boston, U.S., had just concluded a five-hour long meeting with his team. QuikForce had been founded to simplify the stressful moving process for both the customer and movers, by acting as an intermediary that provided a technology platform which would pair potential customers with suitable moving companies based on their moving requirements. Ten months had flown by since the QuikForce website was first launched, and within two months of its launch, QuikForce was profitable. The meeting left two questions on Lim's mind. First, given QuikForce's initial success, should he begin to establish a presence in his home country, Singapore, or at least in Asia? The meeting with his team saw opinions split among three options-(a) broadening the service offerings in the company's existing U.S. locations (Boston, New York and Miami), (b) expanding to new cities in the U.S., or (c) pursuing expansion into Asia. Lim knew that a decision was looming. Second, was his present team the 'dream team' that would be able to take this company forward to the next level?

The case is set in May 2015 in Singapore, the regional headquarters of the UK-based travel metasearch firm, Skyscanner. After a successful launch as a start-up followed by a period of rapid expansion, the company is now facing the challenge of growth in Asia. In 2011, Skyscanner opened its regional headquarters for Asia in Singapore. The tech-savvy customers in Asia were gradually beginning to discover the Skyscanner service, but their behaviour in using the site was different from that of customers in Western markets. Many users were accessing the site through mobile devices and linking from social media sites, while Western market customers were traditionally searching from a computer using the Google search engine. Skyscanner traditionally worked closely with partners such as airlines and online travel agents to provide information, advertising, and data services. To help attract partners, Skyscanner allowed the partner to "own" the customer, by passing the consumer through to the partner site to complete the transaction. The partners got paid for click-through traffic or from advertising on the Skyscanner website. By May 2015, Skyscanner had created local websites for 14 countries in Asia Pacific, but the challenge was to scale up the business and get more customers using the site by meeting localised needs. How should it further adapt its local offerings and marketing strategies more effectively to better connect to the in-country users in Asia? How should Skyscanner change its internal organisation to be more nimble to respond to the market? This case targets participants who are interested in understanding the challenges associated with adapting an organisation and its business model for local market needs. The case is designed for use in postgraduate and executive education classes. It allows participants to better understand the Asian context and the challenges of growing a multi-national business in Asia.

It was 30 December 2012, and Lee Kian Soon, the founder of Ezra Holdings Limited (Ezra), a Singapore-headquartered offshore oil and gas services company, was stepping down after 20 years as Executive Chairman of the company. Having been at the helm of the company for two decades, Lee had been instrumental in leading the business development, strategic planning and overall vision of the company. In 1992, Ezra had started off as a subcontractor in shipyards, and by 2012, had grown to become a US$984.2 million group in revenue, with activities encompassing marine and offshore support services and subsea construction. Although Ezra was a family-owned business, Lee was convinced that to enter the global stage and achieve its goals of internationalisation beyond the Asia-Pacific, the company would need someone with an experienced background who could provide the required leadership. On 31 December 2012, Ezra appointed an external candidate, Koh Poh Tiong, as the Chairman of its Board. Lee's son, Lionel, who had been with the company for ten years, remained as Ezra's Managing Director. Lee wondered if he was making the right move in appointing an external successor to the role of Chairman, and what were the implications of choosing an external successor for the company.

Supplement to case SMU418. In 2011, Mikkel Larsen, Managing Director, Head of Tax & Accounting Policy, Group Finance at DBS Bank mooted the idea of DBS adopting an integrated reporting approach. He was convinced that this was a more holistic way of reporting on the bank's business strategy and activities, linking each of them clearly to the financial and non-financial impact it would have on its stakeholders. In 2012, when DBS adopted the integrated reporting approach, it was the first listed company in Southeast Asia to do so. The report had been well-received and garnered considerable attention from the external parties such as research analysts and the media. Based on feedback from DBS's stakeholders, DBS incorporated changes that would make the 2013 IR more user-friendly and meaningful for its stakeholders. Larsen was, in May 2014, looking over the 2013 report, recognising that there was always room for improvement. For instance, in preparation for the following years' annual reports, further enhancements, could include defining 'materiality', increasing stakeholder outreach, and reporting 'outcomes' as compared to 'outputs'.

Part (A) of the case is about how Shashank Nigam, CEO of SimpliFlying Pte Ltd, a company based in Singapore, searches for the corporate strategy and vision for his company. SimpliFlying was founded in March 2008, and was originally a blog, which commented on issues in marketing aviation. After thinking about how he could find a niche for his business, Nigam decided to sell his company's services by combining the three pillars of aviation, marketing and technology through social media. However, he recognised that he still needed to decide on the long-term positioning of the company - should SimpliFyling focus on strategy consulting, or strategy execution (agency) work, or both. At the same time, Nigam's company was also receiving calls from hotels to help them with branding projects. In the end, Nigam decides that the company should handle business that was related to aviation strategy only. Part (B) of the case covers a specific project that SimpliFlying is handling. By November 2011, SimpliFlying had developed into a reputed aviation market strategy consulting and training firm. Estonian Airline's social media loyalty programme was not only SimpliFlying's second major airline project, but also the first airline loyalty programme in the world to be driven purely by social media. Despite the challenging timeline - only eight weeks from conceptualisation to launch - SimpliFlying had managed to deliver beyond expectations. However, Nigam had to consider if the approach he had used was the best way to implement bigger projects going forward.

Part (A) of the case is about how Shashank Nigam, CEO of SimpliFlying Pte Ltd, a company based in Singapore, searches for the corporate strategy and vision for his company. SimpliFlying was founded in March 2008, and was originally a blog which commented on issues in marketing aviation. After thinking about how he could find a niche for his business, Nigam decided to sell his company's services by combining the three pillars of aviation, marketing and technology through social media. However, he recognised that he still needed to decide on the long-term positioning of the company - should SimpliFlying focus on strategy consulting, strategy execution (agency) work, or both? At the same time, Nigam's company was also receiving calls from hotels to help them with branding projects. Nigam needed to make a decision.

This case is set in July 2013, shortly after the launch of Surf Air, an all-you-can-fly subscription airline based in California. Wade Eyerly, the CEO of Surf Air, has to decide if the business model is sustainable, and also if Surf Air could be expanded to other locations. Three directional trends are predominant in the domestic airline industry in the US - consolidation of airlines, operational discipline and cost-cutting, and an unbundling of services to create ancillary revenue streams. Customers are struggling as shrinking hubs or cancelled point-to-point routes result in more flight connections, and higher costs to reach their destinations. Surf Air is introduced in the California region to address the above issues, by providing frequent business travellers an affordable option through a monthly subscription. The airline commences operations with six-seater Pilatus PC-12 jets serving two secondary airports in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area; and this is shortly followed by another service to Santa Barbara. Eyerly notes that the months leading up to the launch of Surf Air have brought about high expectations from his investors and the media. Would the all-you-can-fly model of Surf Air prove to be sustainable? Where could Surf Air expand to next?

In 2011, Mikkel Larsen, Managing Director, Head of Tax & Accounting Policy, Group Finance at DBS Bank mooted the idea of DBS adopting an integrated reporting approach. He was convinced that this was a more holistic way of reporting on the bank's business strategy and activities, linking each of them clearly to the financial and non-financial impact it would have on its stakeholders. In 2012, when DBS adopted the integrated reporting approach, it was the first listed company in Southeast Asia to do so. The report had been well-received and garnered considerable attention from the external parties such as research analysts and the media. Based on feedback from DBS's stakeholders, DBS incorporated changes that would make the 2013 IR more user-friendly and meaningful for its stakeholders. Larsen was, in May 2014, looking over the 2013 report, recognising that there was always room for improvement. For instance, in preparation for the following years' annual reports, further enhancements, could include defining 'materiality', increasing stakeholder outreach, and reporting 'outcomes' as compared to 'outputs'.

It is August 2014, and the Citibank conference on leadership and development has just concluded. Immediately after, Sara Roberts, Talent Head of Citigroup Asia Pacific, and Anuranjita Kumar, Chief Human Resource Officer (CHRO) of Citigroup South Asia, discuss a pressing issue: how talent and development programmes at Citibank India could evolve to cultivate the bank's future leaders.

Part (A) of the case is about how Shashank Nigam, CEO of SimpliFlying Pte Ltd, a company based in Singapore, searches for the corporate strategy and vision for his company. SimpliFlying was founded in March 2008, and was originally a blog, which commented on issues in marketing aviation. After thinking about how he could find a niche for his business, Nigam decided to sell his company's services by combining the three pillars of aviation, marketing and technology through social media. However, he recognised that he still needed to decide on the long-term positioning of the company - should SimpliFyling focus on strategy consulting, or strategy execution (agency) work, or both. At the same time, Nigam's company was also receiving calls from hotels to help them with branding projects. In the end, Nigam decides that the company should handle business that was related to aviation strategy only. Part (B) of the case covers a specific project that SimpliFlying is handling. By November 2011, SimpliFlying had developed into a reputed aviation market strategy consulting and training firm. Estonian Airline's social media loyalty programme was not only SimpliFlying's second major airline project, but also the first airline loyalty programme in the world to be driven purely by social media. Despite the challenging timeline - only eight weeks from conceptualisation to launch - SimpliFlying had managed to deliver beyond expectations. However, Nigam had to consider if the approach he had used was the best way to implement bigger projects going forward.

Part (B) of the case covers a specific project that SimpliFlying is handling. By November 2011, SimpliFlying had developed into a reputed aviation marketing strategy consulting and training firm. Estonian Airline's social media loyalty programme was not only SimpliFlying's second major airline project, but also the first airline loyalty programme in the world to be driven purely by social media. Despite the challenging timeline - only eight weeks from conceptualisation to launch - SimpliFlying had managed to deliver beyond expectations. However, Nigam had to consider if the approach he had used was the best way to implement bigger projects going forward.