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In December 2007, Korean conglomerate Doosan acquired a portfolio of industrial portable power equipment from U.S. company Ingersoll Rand. The acquisitions, the largest ever done by a Korean company outside of Korea, were part of Doosan's strategy to become a global, full-line manufacturer and marketer of construction equipment. With market-leading products under the company's parent brand name throughout Asia, Doosan's senior management expected to re-brand the acquired products using the Doosan name. Stefan Brosick, Director of Global Product Strategy and an Ingersoll Rand veteran, wondered whether Doosan would benefit from an immediate re-branding or if other branding strategies might be more effective. Many key questions needed to be answered before the December 2008 long-range plan presentation: What effect might changing the brand name, built over 135 years, have on these products' market positions? In addition to the name, what other branding elements carried equity in the construction market? How would end users and distributors react to brand changes? How could negative reactions be minimized? And if Brosick proposed a phased brand transformation plan, how could he best position this strategy to senior management? Learning objectives: The case illustrates the strategic role of branding in business-to-business markets, the pressures managers encounter when facing new corporate brand mandates, and analyses needed to formulate and evaluate alternative branding strategies.

As Stefan Brosick, Director of Global Product Strategy wondered whether Doosan would benefit from an immediate re-branding, or if other branding strategies might be more effective, regional issues began to emerge. The challenge of selecting the optimal strategy (keep the IR brand, co-brand, extended retention, immediate re-brand) was compounded by international product and channel differences. These differences in turn affected key tactical branding decisions. Resolving these differences would impact not only which of the four brand transformation strategies to pursue but also whether they should be implemented globally or customized regionally. Learning objectives: The case illustrates the complexities of developing global branding strategies for companies with established lines of business throughout the world. Analyses of market similarities and differences for various branding elements can be conducted, leading to global standardization versus regional customization strategy decisions.

Luxottica, headquartered in Milan, Italy, was the largest eyewear company in the world with sales surpassing €5 billion in 2008. In June 2009, the CEO of Luxottica, met with his management team to review the company's growth strategy for the next five years. The objective was to take Luxottica to the next growth level. Should he stick to the same business model, or adopt a new one? Should he expand retail brand acquisitions? How should the large portfolio of brands be managed? Where should the geographic focus of the company be? Learning objectives: Global strategy, marketing and supply chain management.

In January 2008, Márcio Luiz Simões Utsch, president & CEO of Sâo Paulo Alpargatas S.A., and his management team are looking at how to turn Havaianas, a leading brand in rubber flip flops, into a major global brand. Learning objectives: The case looks at how a Brazilian footwear company is trying to build a global brand in a highly competitive industry.

February 2008. Lando Simonetti was enjoying the relative cool of his Cucha Cucha office in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, Argentina. It may have been cool, but definitely not quiet. His desire to always be in the middle of the action at the company also meant he had to live through the noise of the factory. This ability to stay in close contact with people and realities on the ground had been instrumental in building La Martina from a modest polo equipment provider to the premier polo brand in the world, with global sales in excess of US$200 million. La Martina was not about polo: it was polo. As an Argentinean of Italian origin, Lando could not have felt prouder to have conquered Europe. At 65, he had reached the pinnacle of the sport he loved so much. A few nagging questions lingered. The brand was being pushed more and more into fashion, a move he had strongly resisted so far. How would this affect its sustainability? La Martina had never been about fashion; it produced and sold functional polo equipment. Polo had become fashionable, and so had its products. Should he fight the trend or capitalize on it? What would that mean for the company? Fashion also meant growth. So far, he had stubbornly pursued only self-financed growth. Perhaps it was time to consider raising more capital. Learning objectives: Building a brand, managing growth, globalizing.

March 2008. Lando Simonetti, founder and CEO of La Martina was pacing around his office in the Buenos Aires suburbs. Not so long ago, the offer that had just landed in his in-box would have been relegated to the trash bin within seconds. He had always been fervently committed to the independence of his firm - independence from investors, boards of directors, banks and politicians. From a local polo equipment producer, La Martina had become one of the most recognized global brand names in polo and fashion alike. He would have preferred to stay true to the brand's DNA, rooted in the estancia lifestyle and the polo game, delivering functional polo equipment. But that no longer seemed possible since the fashion industry had discovered the brand and transformed it into a fashion icon. This time the offer was different. It came from Tribeca Partners, a reputed South American private equity firm in Bogotá that had developed a serious fashion specialty. It had recently concluded its first deal in Argentina, acquiring one of La Martina's local competitors, Etiqueta Negra, with a view to taking it global. The company clearly knew about fashion and Argentina was on its radar screen. The offer was rock solid, valuing the company at close to three times sales and ten times EBIT. Was it time to let go? Learning objectives: Discuss exit planning, harvesting, private equity, growth management, and the fashion industry.

In early 2005, Jean-Claude Biver, the new CEO of Hublot, a leading Swiss watch manufacturer, had to come up with a new strategy to eliminate the company's financial losses and revitalize a declining brand. With a turnover of roughly US$ 26 million, Hublot had lost US$ 2.6 million over the past 12 months as some competitors had rapidly imitated some of the brand's unique features in their own products.

The management of McDonald's Argentina faces a communications crisis: A controversial TV program urges consumers to stop visiting McDonald's stores and refrain from eating McPollo (McChicken) burgers following an official announcement that potentially harmful bacteria had been found in these chicken products. Although the McDonald's management believes that the information is probably unfounded, it is 100% committed to doing the right thing. This case looks at how companies may find themselves victims of unexpected events. In the name of a political cause or for "convenient personal" reasons, smart but unscrupulous customers may challenge leading corporations and the trust that other consumers had put in their hands. Corporate damage can be significant. Consequently, communicating effectively in times of crisis is absolutely key. The objective is to learn best practices for crisis management, how companies can prepare themselves to limit the potential damage, how to act and react and what are the "dos and don'ts" when facing this kind of situation.

Pramtex, an Australian company established in 1985, was one of the emerging star players in optical disk production equipment. Known for its high-quality products, the company had a solid presence in all key Asian markets. So far, Pramtex had stayed ahead of its competitors by concentrating on production line technology for emerging disk formats. However, the company was becoming increasingly vulnerable to competition as the industry matured. John Reef, product manager at Pramtex, had reason for concern when he learned that one of their major Japanese customers, Kimura K.K., had decided against purchasing three machines from Pramtex for a new factory in Taiwan. This was the second Japanese customer Pramtex had lost in a single week.

The year 1998 was an excellent one for Toyota in Europe: The company posted record sales in 10 European countries and had topped Nissan's sales in Europe for the first time ever. However, on a global scale, the European market was still a weak spot for Toyota. The market share in Western Europe stood at only 3%, whereas the company had secured over 10% in other international markets such as the United States. Early 1999 marked a turning point and Toyota publicly announced its goal to raise the European market share to 5% by the year 2005. However, many executives considered the different positioning and perception of the Toyota brand across Europe as a main obstacle to growth. The new president of Toyota Europe had to decide whether there was a need to reposition the brand. If yes, should he recommend a unified brand image within Europe. How could this be achieved? Provides data on the European market for automobiles, customer segments, and positioning of Toyota vs. the competition. Also outlines the intricacies of growing a business by making bold changes to the positioning of products and brands.

A new product combining windsurfing and skiing runs into trouble during its first year of worldwide sales. A group of MBA students studies the problem and collects market data. The product's inventor is left with the task of taking action to save the invention from imminent disaster. What should he do?

In response to being challenged in its home market by a smaller rival, Kirin Brewery, Japan's leading brewer, rejuvenated its lager beer and launched three new products, including a dry beer to compete with Asahi Breweries' enormously successful Super Dry. Shortly after launch of Kirin Dry, two other major Japanese brewers also introduced dry beers. Kirin executives must now develop a strategy for the 1989 beer season.