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In 2012, Germany-based Putzmeister was acquired by China-based SANY, the largest concrete machinery manufacturer in the world. By early 2015, the degree and extent of integration was still incomplete, which put pressure on SANY’s management. SANY focused mainly on the Chinese domestic market, whereas Putzmeister had an established brand and good experience in international markets. Should the acquisition integration focus only on Putzmeister, or should it be tied more closely to SANY’s strategic renewal? SANY and Putzmeister had launched a “double-brand strategy” in specific markets, but was it the appropriate strategy?

In June 2014, Hisense of China and Hitachi of Japan were considering whether their 11-year-old joint venture (JV) should once again assume responsibility for its international sales. After developing a solid central air-conditioner market share in China, in 2009, the JV began to sell in various overseas regions but struggled. In April 2012, the partners agreed to have a Hisense subsidiary (the HIMC) assume full responsibility for selling the JV’s products overseas. However, over the next two years, HIMC’s performance in selling the JV’s products overseas was unsatisfactory. In response, the partners began to discuss whether they should have the JV sell its own products again overseas. Of immediate interest was the Southeast Asian market. This case can be used with Hisense-Hitachi Joint Venture (B): Expanding in Southeast Asia, 9B16M220

In June 2014, Hisense of China and Hitachi of Japan were considering whether their 11-year-old joint venture (JV) should once again assume responsibility for its international sales. After developing a solid central air-conditioner market share in China, in 2009, the JV began to sell in various overseas regions but struggled. In April 2012, the partners agreed to have a Hisense subsidiary (the HIMC) assume full responsibility for selling the JV's products overseas. However, over the next two years, HIMC's performance in selling the JV's products overseas was unsatisfactory. In response, the partners began to discuss whether they should have the JV sell its own products again overseas. Of immediate interest was the Southeast Asian market.

By September 2015, Deep Roots Distillery (DRD) had been operating for 22 months. While starting up had taken a little longer than originally estimated, material progress was now evident. By November 2015, the company expected to have six of its products (either spirits or liqueurs) available in the Prince Edward Island liquor store outlets. However, numerous questions remained for DRD’s owner and his small, family-run business. Given capital and resource constraints, how could DRD grow into a competitive business? How should time be allocated between research and development, production, marketing, and administration? Would the start-up’s current product/market strategy allow it to achieve its goals? If not, which expansion route should DRD take?

This case is about a small American auto parts producer trying to diversify its way out of dependence on the major automakers in 2013. A promising new product is developed and the company gets a chance to license it to a Scottish manufacturer. The issue of whether to license or go it alone in international markets is central to the case. A full class sequel to this case is available, titled Cameron Auto Parts: Joint Ventures, Licensing or Exporting, 9B16M044.

In 2015, two years after signing a license agreement in the United Kingdom, Cameron Auto Parts (Cameron) now faces an opportunity to establish with another firm a joint venture in France for the European market. However, the prospect upsets the U.K. licensee who is clearly doing very well, and who even wants Cameron to consider joint venturing with him in Australia. The case ends with Cameron, run off its feet in North America, trying to decide whether to enter Europe via licensing, joint venture or direct investment. (This case is a sequel to Cameron Auto Parts: Early Internationalization, case (9B16M043).

Supplement for Cameron Auto Parts (A), case W16156.

This case is about a small American auto parts producer trying to diversify its way out of dependence on the major automakers. A promising new product is developed and the company gets a chance to license it to a Scottish manufacturer. The issue of whether to license or go it alone in international markets is central to the case. A sequel to this case is available, titled Cameron Auto Parts (B).

By September 2015, Deep Roots Distillery (DRD) had been operating for 22 months. While starting up had taken a little longer than originally estimated, material progress was now evident. By November 2015, the company expected to have six of its products (either spirits or liqueurs) available in the Prince Edward Island liquor store outlets. However, numerous questions remained for DRD's owner and his small, family-run business. Given capital and resource constraints, how could DRD grow into a competitive business? How should time be allocated between research and development, production, marketing, and administration? Would the start-up's current product/market strategy allow it to achieve its goals? If not, which expansion route should DRD take?

Capitalizing on low-cost manufacturing in China, Bally Wedding Dress Company (Bally) had grown quickly by exporting inexpensive wedding dresses to customers in Western countries. However, due to a rise in labour costs, currency appreciation, and increased prices of raw materials, the low-cost advantage in the manufacturing industry had by 2014 been seriously eroded. Competition had intensified together with a shortage in qualified labour. As both the sales volume and turnover decreased, Bally had to consider how to survive. The crisis that it faced represented a common issue for many Chinese manufacturing enterprises.

Capitalizing on low-cost manufacturing in China, Bally Wedding Dress Company (Bally) had grown quickly by exporting inexpensive wedding dresses to customers in Western countries. However, due to a rise in labour costs, currency appreciation, and increased prices of raw materials, the low-cost advantage in the manufacturing industry had by 2014 been seriously eroded. Competition had intensified together with a shortage in qualified labour. As both the sales volume and turnover decreased, Bally had to consider how to survive. The crisis that it faced represented a common issue for many Chinese manufacturing enterprises.

In March 2015, the managing director of VariCut Electronics Component Company in Shanghai, China, was contemplating whether the company should shift its business focus from label printing to label printers. Because of fierce competition and a slowdown in the company's 12-year-old label manufacturing business, the company was finding its competitive advantage hard to sustain. In contrast, the company's emerging business of producing label printers had been doing well, with 30 per cent annual growth. Although the label manufacturing business had begun to struggle, it was still the main source of company revenue (80 per cent). It was uncertain whether the company's survival and growth could be sustained if it decided to give up the label manufacturing business in order to focus on label printers. Should the company give up the label manufacturing business to make way for the label printer business? Or should it consolidate the two businesses and transition to the label printer business gradually?

In March 2015, the managing director of VariCut Electronics Component Company in Shanghai, China, was contemplating whether the company should shift its business focus from label printing to label printers. Because of fierce competition and a slowdown in the company's 12-year-old label manufacturing business, the company was finding its competitive advantage hard to sustain. In contrast, the company's emerging business of producing label printers had been doing well, with 30 per cent annual growth. Although the label manufacturing business had begun to struggle, it was still the main source of company revenue (80 per cent). It was uncertain whether the company's survival and growth could be sustained if it decided to give up the label manufacturing business in order to focus on label printers. Should the company give up the label manufacturing business to make way for the label printer business? Or should it consolidate the two businesses and transition to the label printer business gradually?

This case presents the perspective of a Malaysian company, Nora Bhd, which was in the process of trying to establish a telecommunications joint venture with a Finnish firm, Sakari Oy. Negotiations have broken down between the firms, and students are asked to try to restructure a win-win deal. The case examines some of the most common issues involved in partner selection and design in international joint ventures.

This case presents the perspective of a Malaysian company, Nora Bhd, which was in the process of trying to establish a telecommunications joint venture with a Finnish firm, Sakari Oy. Negotiations have broken down between the firms, and students are asked to try to restructure a win-win deal. The case examines some of the most common issues involved in partner selection and design in international joint ventures.

In 2015, the vice-president of international operations must decide whether to continue to operate or abandon the company's Nigerian joint venture. Although the expatriate general manager of the Nigerian operation has delivered a very pessimistic report, Larson's own hunch was to stay in that country. Maintaining the operation was complicated by problems in staffing, a joint venture partner with divergent views, and increasing costs of doing business in Nigeria. If Larson decides to maintain the existing operation, the issues with its local partner and staffing problems (especially in terms of the joint venture general manager) have to be addressed.

A North America-based representative of a major European airline has just received a letter from an unhappy customer detailing a very large number of service problems. A quick check had revealed that this premium-paying customer's complaints were all valid. A meeting is planned with the customer. Before this, the airline representative must decide (A) what to say in response, and (B) what, if any, compensation should be offered. Internally, there was a need (C) to resolve what their organization should learn from this experience, both from a subsidiary and parent company perspective, and the implications on their participation in the Crown Alliance. This case raises many important questions regarding service recovery, communications, and non-equity alliances.

The vice-president of international operations must decide whether to continue to operate or abandon the company's Nigerian joint venture. Although the expatriate general manager of the Nigerian operation has delivered a very pessimistic report, Larson's own hunch was to stay in that country. Maintaining the operation was complicated by problems in staffing, a joint venture partner with divergent views, and increasing costs of doing business in Nigeria. If Larson decides to maintain the existing operation, the issues with its local partner and staffing problems (especially in terms of the joint venture general manager) have to be addressed.

Spreadsheet supplement for W15058.

Excel spreadsheets for students.