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In January 2011, the group medical director of Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd (AHEL), India’s largest integrated health care provider in the private sector, is weighing his options in promoting clinical excellence among group hospitals. AHEL has been using a clinical scorecard, called ACE@25, as a tool to measure and monitor clinical excellence, which is becoming a source of differentiation in the Indian health care industry. ACE@25 measures 25 clinical parameters, benchmarked against the best hospitals globally, every month. The group medical director is wondering whether his role should be limited to monitoring clinical outcomes or whether, in order to drive clinical excellence, he should also prescribe the steps that the medical superintendents of individual hospitals should take in improving outcomes on their watch.

In December 2007, the management of Mercedes-Benz India (MBI), a fully owned subsidiary of Daimler AG, the 12th-largest automobile manufacturer in the world, has decided to relocate to a new facility near Pune in western India. In overseeing the installation of information technology (IT) infrastructure at the new premises, the company’s chief information officer (CIO) must deal with some managerial choices pertaining to IT architecture, IT tools, and IT skill sets of the company. Each choice involves several trade-offs. The CIO’s decision on each will have a major effect on the revenues, margins, and competitive positioning of MBI in the Indian automotive industry.

India’s largest domestic retail group, the Future Group, is pursuing a novel private-label strategy. In a country dominated by small-scale retailers, it is using its scale to launch private-label brands in several product categories. It is planning to delink these new offerings from the store brand and make them available through other retailers. Future Group hopes to derive most of its growth over the next few years from this initiative.<br><br><br><br>The case enables students to take on the role of the group’s brand advisor, and deal with some important questions: Will private-label brands erode customer loyalty or build it? Will they increase traffic to stores or cannibalize it? Will they add to the complexity of retailing or simplify it? More fundamentally, is the private-label brand strategy sustainable in the long run in the highly competitive Indian retail market?

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M) is a manufacturing leader in the utility vehicles (UVs) segment in the Indian automotive industry. Since 2004, M&M has been exporting UVs to South Africa, the only country in the African continent with a significant middle-class population. M&M has set up a fully owned subsidiary in South Africa, which enjoyed the growth wave in the South African automotive industry up to 2007, then fell into a three-year slump, largely as a result of a recession in the global automotive industry. Now on the verge of industry renewal in 2011, the subsidiary needs to plan its next steps. The case is positioned in May 2011, when M&M’s subsidiary must choose from four alternatives. M&M can continue with its prevailing business model of importing completely built units (CBUs) from its Indian operations to meet local demand while using South Africa as a re-export hub for the burgeoning markets in sub-Saharan Africa. It can also choose to collaborate with a local vendor to assemble vehicles locally from completely knocked down (CKD) components imported from India. Alternatively, M&M may choose to set up its own manufacturing facility in South Africa, like many of its competitors. Lastly, M&M can choose to wait and watch until it notes definitive signs of revived demand. The case provides an opportunity for students to examine each alternative and make a decision on M&M’s way forward in South Africa.

Various mergers and acquisitions in the Indian information technology (IT) sector had resulted in the newly formed Mahindra Satyam (Mahindra) and the recently appointed chief compliance officer (CCO) was to develop a corporate governance structure that would address and repair previous mismanagement of the company. The CCO also functioned as the chief operating officer (COO) with profit centre responsibility for business verticals. His largest task as the CCO was to restore trust in the company and solidify its future among various stakeholders by bringing back integrity and transparency to the business. The CCO had to consider several criteria: What should his priorities be? What processes could be developed that would ensure corporate governance? What were the metrics with which the company could track the progress in corporate governance?

From the perspectives of the senior executive of Mittal and the senior executive of Arcelor, this case looks at post-merger integration. As with many mergers, the ArcelorMittal merger was touted as a merger of equals. Unlike most, it was actually managed as such and it worked. The case series looks at three critical decision points (one for each case) and challenges that the two senior executives faced from the line organization during the execution of the integration. Also see supplemental cases ArcelorMittal (B), product #9B10M002 and ArcelorMittal (C), product #9B10M003.

From the perspectives of the senior executive of Mittal and the senior executive of Arcelor, this case looks at post-merger integration. As with many mergers, the ArcelorMittal merger was touted as a merger of equals. Unlike most, it was actually managed as such and it worked. The case series looks at three critical decision points (one for each case) and challenges that the two senior executives faced from the line organization during the execution of the integration. Also see ArcelorMittal (A), product #9B10M001 and ArcelorMittal (C), product #9B10M003.

From the perspectives of the senior executive of Mittal and the senior executive of Arcelor, this case looks at post-merger integration. As with many mergers, the ArcelorMittal merger was touted as a merger of equals. Unlike most, it was actually managed as such and it worked. The case series looks at three critical decision points (one for each case) and challenges that the two senior executives faced from the line organization during the execution of the integration. See ArcelorMittal (A), product #9B10M001 and ArcelorMittal (B), product #9B10M002.

The case presents the situation faced by the board of directors at Hydro One, a government-owned Canadian electric utility, as they discuss updating the current executive compensation packages because of the pending privatization of Hydro One. As a government owned enterprise, compensation was moderated by the job security and prospects of career advancement in the public sector, but the imminent privatization required the compensation system to be revisited. The case presents details of the current compensation system for Hydro One's key officers and the comparative data for their counterparts at similar firms. The case allows for discussion of the interplay between corporate governance processes, the corresponding responsibilities of directors and the decisions they make, in particular chief executive officer and executive compensation. The postscript to the case allows for a lively class room discussion of corporate governance, fiduciary responsibility and communication among major stakeholders.

In July 2009, General Motors Company (GM),the world's second largest automotive enterprise, has come out of a bankruptcy orchestrated by the U.S. federal government. Leaner and focused after a 40-day exercise, GM is still a long way from a full-fledged financial recovery. The company is under a mandate to concentrate first on its U.S. market. Its European subsidiary, which manufactures the Opel cars, has been struggling for nearly a decade. The business seems fundamentally sound. Opel requires capital infusion and managerial skills for which GM has been talking to potential investors, such as Fiat of Italy, BAIC of China, Magna of Canada and RHJI of Belgium. The board of GM has to decide whether GM should liquidate Opel, retain it within its fold or go for partial divestiture. In the event of a sale of stake, the board has to decide whom, from among those short-listed by the chief executive officer and his team, it should bring aboard. The case provides an opportunity for students to use available data and their judgment to choose a bidder who can drive shareholder value. It helps them deal with issues such as timing and biases in a typical retain/liquidate/divest decision and also whether a company should have, on the lines of a more common M&A strategy, an ongoing divestiture strategy.

In March 2007, the vice-chairman and managing director of Eureka Forbes Ltd. is reflecting upon 25 years of market leadership in the water purifier business in India, but is troubled by the very low penetration compared to potential. In 25 years, the company has undergone significant evolution in all of its key strategic levers - technology, brands and channels. Can the company use its vast market learning and experience to achieve a breakthrough in penetrating the mass market for water purifiers in India? Other external pressures also apply. With climate concerns reaching a crescendo globally, water sustainability issues are in the spotlight, especially in large and rapidly industrializing countries such as India. This presents both enormous challenges and opportunities for Eureka Forbes. The vice-chairman and managing director is looking to his top 150 managers who will assemble at the company's annual strategic planning meeting to come up with fresh market strategies.

Under pressure from the Rainforest Action Network to make their lending policies more sustainable, executives at the Royal Bank of Canada who deal with issues of corporate citizenship and sustainability must decide whether to continue financing companies involved in extracting oil from the tar sands of Alberta, Canada. The case asks students to consider the following questions: 1) Should banks lend to any business or industry the government deems to be sustainable? 2) What are the risks of lending to businesses some stakeholders deem unsustainable? 3) How should banks respond when pressured by an interest group? 4) How does a bank decide what is sustainable lending practice? The supplement B case RBC-Financing Oil Sands (B), product number 9B10M016, is also available.

Under pressure from the Rainforest Action Network to make their lending policies more sustainable, executives at the Royal Bank of Canada who deal with issues of corporate citizenship and sustainability must decide whether to continue financing companies involved in extracting oil from the tar sands of Alberta, Canada. The case asks students to consider the following questions: 1) Should banks lend to any business or industry the government deems to be sustainable? 2) What are the risks of lending to businesses some stakeholders deem unsustainable? 3) How should banks respond when pressured by an interest group? 4) How does a bank decide what is sustainable lending practice? This is a supplement to RBC-Financing Oil Sands (A), product number 9B10M015.

In 2009, Parle Products Pvt. Limited (Parle), a leading Indian biscuit manufacturer, had the distinction of producing the largest selling glucose biscuit brand by volume in the world, the Parle-G. Parle-G biscuits sold for approximately US$1 per kilogram and as very few processed and ready-to-eat foods were available at this price point, Parle-G was strongly associated with offering value for money (VFM). A looming problem in this brand category for Parle was that the input prices of two major raw materials for the Parle-G biscuits (which together accounted for 55 per cent of their input costs) had risen enough in the past 18 months to decrease margins from 15 per cent to less than 10 per cent. Pressure to restore margins led Parle to consider a price increase yet a previous attempt had caused dramatic reduction in sales. Parle subsequently addressed rising input costs by reducing the weight of the package, franchising production, reducing supply chain costs and reducing packaging costs. Parle could not ignore the deeply entrenched perception of VFM when devising both short- and long-term marketing plans to retain Parle-G's success in the marketplace. These plans needed to address segmentation, positioning and changing Indian demographics when considering a potential price increase for Parle-G biscuits.

In late 2006, the four partners of Oncidium Business Consulting disagree on a number of questions, such as the firm's future direction, the responsibilities of each partner and how profits are to be divided. The A1 case, 9B09D015, takes the viewpoint of the founding partner and majority holder of the firm's shares. The A2 case, 9B09D016, looks at the situation from the position of one of the minority partners.

In late 2006, the four partners of Oncidium Business Consulting disagree on a number of questions, such as the firm's future direction, the responsibilities of each partner and how profits are to be divided. The A1 case, 9B09D015, takes the viewpoint of the founding partner and majority holder of the firm's shares. The A2 case, 9B09D016, looks at the situation from the position of one of the minority partners.

In September 2009, the president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Rona Inc. was reviewing the company's progress in relation to the ongoing economic recession. Rona was the largest retailer of hardlines in Canada. Rona had noticed definitive signs of slowdown in the third quarter of 2007 and had launched Strategic Plan 2008 - 2011 as a response. The two-phase program was nearing the completion of its first phase of Productivity, Efficiency and Profitability (PEP) and was gearing up for the 24 month-long Recovery Program. The Strategic Plan had been tweaked since its launch, all with a view towards strengthening the core platform. The objective of the Recovery Plan was to restore focus on growth vectors from which the company had become distracted. On the eve of commencement of the Recovery Plan, the CEO began to wonder if Rona was ready to act on increasing sales, recruiting independents, constructing new stores and pursuing acquisitions. Or was it necessary to redesign and relaunch the PEP program, thus deferring the Recovery Plan?

Excel spreadsheet for instructors.

Beck Taxi is Toronto's leading cab brokerage. In May 2009, the company's chief executive officer (CEO) is wondering whether the company could change the radio fee for the limited duration of summer, usually a lean season for the cab trade. The fee, paid by drivers for the dispatch service connecting them to customers in waiting, has not been increased in over a decade. That is enough reason to go for a straight upward revision on a permanent basis. The CEO is also considering introducing a variable component to pricing - a novelty in the cab trade. There are several forces at stake in the trade and any decision by Beck Taxi, as the market leader, will shake it up. Status quo is therefore an option in its own right for the CEO. The case provides the background against which the CEO will have to make a call on pricing Beck's service.

A month after Best Buy Inc. (Best Buy), the largest retailer of consumer electronics in the United States, acquired Five Star, the third largest retailer of appliances and consumer electronics in China in May 2006, the management of Best Buy is weighing in on a branding option. Should Five Star lose its identity and be marketed as Best Buy? Or should Best Buy retain the Five Star brand and let the two brands compete with each other in the Chinese market? The option has a sense of déjà vu because, when it first stepped out of its home turf in January of 2002 by acquiring Future Shop, the largest consumer electronics retailer in Canada, Best Buy was facing a similar dilemma. The company had decided, at the time, in favour of dual brand strategy. It had worked. There was no evidence of cannibalization, the single largest risk in dual branding. Best Buy and Future Shop had both grown together as independent brands in Canada. But, does dual brand strategy work in the vastly different retail environment of China?