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The two entrepreneurs met with Fabric Super-Store's executive management team to present an offer to purchase the Kitchener store and a right of first refusal (ROR) on a second, nearby location in Cambridge. Upon consideration and rejection of the ROR, management responded with an intriguing counter-offer in terms of a "vendor take-back" offer (VTB). Fabric Super-Store offered vendor financing terms over three years provided the entrepreneurs purchased both locations. Somewhat complicating their decision to buy was discovering that the Cambridge location had machinery much newer and larger than that in the Kitchener store. Should Cambridge be sold to another party, it could threaten the success of the Kitchener store. The entrepreneurs concluded that they would either need to buy both locations, or pass on the opportunity completely. What to do?

In 1982, Fadi Ghandour founded Aramex, a leading provider of logistics and transportation solutions with headquarters in Amman, Jordan. From its early inception, Ghandour strategically included principles and practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability in the company's culture in order to align business interests and competence with stakeholders' needs. The community and environment were regarded as key stakeholders driving Aramex to act as a responsible citizen. Since its inception, Aramex had been involved in sustainability activities grouped into six primary areas: education and youth empowerment; community development; entrepreneurship; sports; environment; and emergency relief. Committed to growth and opening new offices globally, Aramex faced the challenge of preserving CSR as an integral part of its expansion strategy. In late January 2011, Ghandour and Hattar began brainstorming ways to address the need to harmonize CSR and sustainability values and practices across operations and ensure that sustainability principles were firmly institutionalized across branches and subsidiaries.

In 1982, Fadi Ghandour founded Aramex, a leading provider of logistics and transportation solutions with headquarters in Amman, Jordan. From its early inception, Ghandour strategically included principles and practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability in the company’s culture in order to align business interests and competence with stakeholders’ needs. The community and environment were regarded as key stakeholders driving Aramex to act as a responsible citizen. Since its inception, Aramex had been involved in sustainability activities grouped into six primary areas: education and youth empowerment; community development; entrepreneurship; sports; environment; and emergency relief. Committed to growth and opening new offices globally, Aramex faced the challenge of preserving CSR as an integral part of its expansion strategy. In late January 2011, Ghandour and Hattar began brainstorming ways to address the need to harmonize CSR and sustainability values and practices across operations and ensure that sustainability principles were firmly institutionalized across branches and subsidiaries.

In 1995, the United Nations began to ease sanctions on Iraq in what was known as the “Oil for Food” program. One of the first companies to return to Iraq under the UN program was U.S.-based International Farm Equipment Co. (IFE). IFE had been an important supplier of agricultural equipment to Iraq until the Gulf War in 1990. Shortly after IFE established its Iraq office upon returning, the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture demanded a direct payment of 10 per cent of all future contracts. Several other companies had agreed to make the payments, including at least one prominent competitor of IFE. The payments would be classified as “post-sale commissions” and would be conducted through a third-party agent working on IFE’s behalf. IFE’s business manager for the Middle East needed to decide how to proceed.

The controller for Asis Electronics, a subsidiary of a European-based corporation, was concerned that Asis might have overcharged the U.S. Ministry of Defense in a contract for transmitters. However, Asis’s chief financial officer did not address the matter when he learned of it. After being asked to sign an annual compliance document related to anti-corruption practices, the controller needed to decide whether or not to report the irregularities through established “protected communications channels” that ensured confidentiality.

Impulsesoft Private Ltd (IS) was a Bangalore-based information technology that was engaged in developing Bluetooth (BT) middleware. The founders had wanted to build a software product out of India that targeted a global market. This desire was verbalized as an idea “to build a Sony or HP (Hewlett-Packard) out of India” and “build a world-class products company.” In its infancy, IS undertook different kinds of development projects for third parties and considered several other options until it discovered BT middleware as an area of focus. The company eventually became profitable, with 52 employees by 2005 and a branch office in Silicon Valley. Impulsesoft’s BT software was in 50 per cent of all BT stereo headphones being shipped at the time. The market for BT-embedded accessories grew rapidly, but chip manufacturers began to incorporate BT features in their chips and gave away the technology for free, and the long-term outlook for IS deteriorated. There were also doubts about the scalability of a technology licensing business model. At this juncture, the president and CEO of Impulsesoft received a proposal from the CEO of TEN Technology, a customer of IS and a $20 million company, suggesting a merger of the two companies. The CEO of Impulsesoft needed to make a decision.

The case is set in mid-2009, about six months before the scheduled worldwide launch of Microsoft Azure. The group director of cloud computing for Microsoft India was considering the pros and cons of launching Azure simultaneously in India with the rest of the world. Cloud computing was a paradigm shift in the information technology (IT) industry that fundamentally changed how software and services were delivered to an end-user’s desktop. Cloud computing enabled shared resources — software, hardware, and information — to be provided to consumers on demand, charging them based on usage. Azure was Microsoft’s offering in this space, providing software and infrastructure as a service, and was also a platform to develop new applications on a pay-per-use model. Microsoft had always made its products available to users in the traditional license model, and Azure would be a paradigm shift not only in terms of technology but also in terms of the business model.<br><br><br><br>The director had to decide whether the nascent Indian market was ready to adopt this new technology and business model, and which segments to target. There were many reasons why the Indian market looked very lucrative, including presence of a strong IT development community, increasing IT adoption across Indian industries, and presence of a very big potential customer base in terms of small and medium enterprises. Conversely, there were concerns such as poor current IT adoption, rampant piracy, low availability of infrastructure in India (such as electricity and broadband penetration), and the “do-it-for-me” attitude of Indian businesspeople, which meant significant initial costs in terms of time and effort required to increase awareness.

To work effectively in the global business arena, managers need a strong set of intercultural management skills. When dealing with clients, co-workers, and other stakeholders at home or abroad, managers with cross-cultural competence have a distinct competitive advantage in the multicultural marketplace. Although generally accepted as a valuable asset for doing business, cross-cultural competence defies easy definition. This study attempts to conceptualize the complex term from the practitioner's point of view. What does cross-cultural competence mean to global managers? From their perspective, which aspects of culture do business people need to understand? From the universe of cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, and country-specific information, what should an executive, with limited time, focus on to develop a basic level of cultural competence? This study asked Mexican managers what they needed to know about culture to do business with the U.S. In the process, they consistently identified certain basic components of cultural competence. Responses were surprisingly similar among the managers, indicating they had a clear picture of which cultural essentials were most important for global executives to learn. The results of the study reveal a working definition of cultural competence for global managers. This research also provides trainers and business educators a content framework for a short-term training program, based on the global managers' perceptions of cross-cultural competence.

Managerial decisions and behaviors in the international business arena have ethical implications across cultures and countries. The need for ethics and core values in business practice has been heightened by continued business scandals and ethical managerial lapses that have violated public trust. Global businesses can offer practical guidance and set ethical examples for others to follow by establishing corporate values beyond written business codes. Four key work values (Honesty, Fairness, Concern of Others, and Achievement) known to be present in businesses across cultures, are put forth as a baseline start for multinational corporation leaders. Offered is a process for making the core values unique to an organization, and for adopting and training managers in the use of core values. Presented is evidence of managerial implementation of the core work values, and managers' alignment of work values with organizational strategies. By addressing the values and principles of their workplaces, international businesses can achieve cross-cultural ethical practices, managerial alignment, and global social responsibility.

Notwithstanding the professed intention of a party to an MOU, a "preliminary" agreement can have binding effect. This note explores the circumstances under which MOUs may give rise to binding and enforceable agreements.

During the summer of 1998, Bob Aston and his partners, all bankers, spent many days discussing their plans to start a bank in southeastern Virginia, United States. Deregulation was transforming the banking industry. In Virginia, mergers and acquisitions in the industry had led to the emergence of large banks that had headquarters in other states. Aston felt that banking as he knew it was disappearing. However, before they could start a bank, Aston and his partners faced many questions and decisions: How would they raise the capital? Who would the bank serve? How would they compete with the larger banks that had emerged due to the deregulation? <br><br><br><br>The decisions they made at the founding had a lasting effect on TowneBank. This became evident a decade later as financial institutions around the country experienced a severe crisis that was triggered by exposure to risky mortgages, while TowneBank remained relatively unscathed. However, the management team had to consider several issues as the crisis unfolded. Should they accept the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds that the U.S. Treasury had offered to banks (even those that were unlikely to fail and were adequately capitalized)? How could they ensure TowneBank’s growth? Should they acquire distressed banks in the local market?

November 29, 2010, was “Cyber Monday,” one of the busiest online shopping days of the year, with the potential to approach $1 billion in online sales in North America. The chief designer of fashion company Donna Karan New York (DKNY) was facing a difficult situation. On this particular Cyber Monday, activists for the animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) had posted simultaneous messages on DKNY’s Facebook page. Anyone viewing the page could not fail to discern the “DK Bunny Butcher” message. This action by PETA was the culmination of several years, beginning in 2005, of attempting to convince DKNY to stop using fur in its collections. This November 29 message was a sharp reminder to both DKNY and its Cyber Monday customers that, up to this point, the company had refused to stop using fur. It was available to be viewed by DKNY’s over 200,000 Facebook fans as well as millions of online Cyber Monday shoppers. The chief designer was unsure how to respond: on one hand was the desire to clearly explain the use of fur, but on the other was the desire to avoid escalating the publicity surrounding the matter. She needed an immediate strategy that would retain her brand’s image and protect future sales.

The owner of a large hardware, furniture, and building centre faced a dilemma regarding how to manage the upcoming wage review process. After two consecutive years of frozen wages, employees were impatient for financial progress, but there was no extra money in the budget. It was possible to pump savings from upcoming process improvement initiatives into wage increases. However, the owner had limited motivation to channel hard-won funds to underperforming employees. On the other hand, he was eager to reward the people who added value. Yet a plan that rewarded only some employees could result in an angry backlash. He had to decide if he wanted to divert the savings into compensation and, if so, he needed an effective distribution plan.

Margaret Linnane had just arrived home from a funders’ meeting where she had been asked questions that nearly challenged the very purpose of her nonprofit organization, Rollins College Philanthropy and Nonprofit Leadership Center (PNLC). She had been unprepared for the tough questions the funders had asked and she knew that she would need to be much better prepared for the next meeting in one month. She needed answers to the funders’ questions in four short weeks, so Linnane and the PNLC staff put other efforts on hold while they worked intensely to prepare. They gathered all the documents on the PNLC’s mission, vision, and strategic plan. They needed to determine what information to compile to convince the funders that the PNLC’s services (such as networking among established chief executive officers and foundation directors, and introducing newcomers to the nonprofit community) contributed to the professionalization of nonprofit leaders and organizations while addressing critical community issues — even if such services had not yet generated any revenue. What outcome measures were appropriate for assessing the success of non-income-generating activities such as networking? To start to search for answers to such questions, Linnane decided to review PNLC’s performance from the last two years and build a strategy for 2011-2012. Time was of the essence because without the support of funders, PNLC would be hard-pressed to continue offering its well-established networking activities.

Marco Polo Marine (MPM) Ltd was a medium-sized Singaporean shipping company listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange that was involved in regional shipping and shipbuilding. The company was part of a larger Indonesian family business group, and had been built from scratch by the CEO. MPM had started off providing barges to transport sand and mining products, initially for the group’s mining operations, but increasingly for third parties. It subsequently entered the shipbuilding industry by establishing a shipyard in Batam, Indonesia, an island near Singapore. As a next step to grow the company, the CEO intended to become an international player in the much more sophisticated offshore marine services sector, but he had yet to decide what strategy to take to achieve it. The case allows students to analyze a global industry and present recommendations to the CEO for positioning the company within this industry. MPM is an example of an aspiring emerging market multinational, and the case discusses the challenges such companies face in catching up with more advanced incumbents in global industries. In order to penetrate the offshore marine services sector, decisions were required as to what types of vessels to build or buy, which countries to target, and how to enter this market given financial constraints and limited technical expertise.

El Mawardy Jewelry was an Egyptian jewelry company located in Cairo, Egypt. The company was able to attract many customers due to its variety of designs, high-quality products, and competitive prices. The friendly atmosphere and customized services provided by the salespeople helped the company gain a competitive advantage. The Mawardy family was able to build on its success and open different stores across Egypt. In 2009, the financial crisis hit Egypt and many businesses were negatively affected. Faced with this challenge and a goal to go international, the Mawardy family considered different possibilities. The company had many options, but decided to focus on Qatar and the United Kingdom. It needed to decide whether it was better to expand now or later. It also needed to consider where to expand first — Qatar or the United Kingdom.

Marco Polo Marine (MPM) Ltd is a medium-sized Singaporean shipping company listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, involved in regional shipping and shipbuilding. The company was part of a larger Indonesian family business group, and had been built from scratch by the CEO, the heir to the group. MPM had started off providing barges to transport mining products and sand, initially for the group's mining operations, but increasingly for third parties. It subsequently entered the shipbuilding industry by establishing a shipyard in Batam, Indonesia, an island near Singapore. As a next step to grow the company, the CEO intended to become an international player in the much more sophisticated offshore marine services sector, but he had yet to decide what strategy to take to achieve it. The case study allows students to analyze a global industry and present recommendations to the CEO for positioning the company within this industry. As a company from an emerging market, MPM is an example of an aspiring "emerging market multinational" and the case discusses the challenges such companies face in catching up with more advanced incumbents in global industries. In order to penetrate this market, decisions are required as to what types of vessels to build or buy, which countries to target and how to enter this market given financial constraints and limited technical expertise.

Ornge’s management team is taking a look at its helicopter service contract, which accounts for 42 per cent of its annual costs. The firm is a not-for-profit organization tasked with providing air and ground ambulance services for Ontario, Canada. In the past, Ornge has subcontracted helicopter service to a service provider. But an analysis conducted within Ornge suggests that owning the helicopters might save the firm a lot of money. Any savings could be reinvested, allowing Ornge to respond to more service calls per year. There are benefits and drawbacks to each of the options facing Ornge, and Dr. Christopher Massa and his team are trying to determine which option makes the most sense for the firm.

Barrick Gold, the largest gold producer in the world, has taken steps to eliminate its longstanding gold hedging program. In its early years, Barrick’s hedging program was a key factor allowing the firm to grow amid falling gold prices. But Barrick’s management team faced questions about its hedging program when gold prices started to rise in the 2000s. The case allows students to review Barrick’s hedging program and consider the impact of its decision not to hedge going forward.

A consumer goods analyst has been asked to understand the governance structure and various risks facing Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA, a Swiss-based luxury goods conglomerate. Richemont has emerged as one of the premier luxury brand houses in the world and is controlled by a single person, Johann Rupert. The case describes the development of Richemont and provides information on various aspects of the firm, including its many luxury brand houses, management’s preferences, and competitor information with which to conduct a comparator analysis.