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In November 1998, Steven Briggs was appointed CEO of the Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc. (NADII), a new research institute created under the corporate umbrella of Novartis AG. NADII had a mandate to jump-start Novartis's basic research program in plant genomics, and Briggs was considering the latest research proposal terms offered by the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Novartis was the finalist in an auction launched by the university in April 1998 to find a corporate partner with which it could establish a broad plant genomics research alliance. The arrangement was unprecedented and required a great deal of trust on the part of Novartis--trust that the Berkeley faculty could produce useful discoveries for the company's fledgling plant genomics initiative. On the surface it appeared that recent advances in the cost-intensive field of life sciences, combined with heated competition in the industry for leadership in biotechnology, had aligned the interests of the university and Novartis. Briggs was ready to approve the proposal. Before putting pen to paper, however, he considered the forces that had led to the historic agreement between Novartis and UC Berkeley, research findings, his firm's strategic choices, and academia's contribution to new discoveries.

The case describes the successful growth and internationalization strategy of Belgian Creyf's interim business (temporary labour services) after initial internationalization debacles, which nearly bankrupted the original family company. It describes the "not me too" strategy of this player in an industry increasingly dominated by a few large European and even world players. It subsequently raises the strategic and organisational issues the group is facing in dealing with this increasingly large and international portfolio of businesses in a market that is showing signs of the worst economic downturns in many years.

This case provides an opportunity to explore very simple job-order costing. It also provides a chance to discuss contribution analysis in the context of a pricing decision and the absorption of manufacturing overhead costs by the various jobs the company has under contract.

The Hong Kong brand Nin Jiom was popularly known in the territory by its flagship product Pei Pa Koa Cough Syrup. It was through the profitable mass selling of such an over-the-counter traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) that Nin Jiom thrived through decades of history. By the early 2000s, the rapidly modernizing consumer culture in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong government's new TCM policies required manufacturers of TCM products to adapt constantly to a changing business environment. Nin Jiom's attention to this earned it an annual turnover of several hundred million Hong Kong dollars by early 2000s. The company was able to continue expanding overseas and in mainland China. How did Nin Jiom's products fit in an era when the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong as well as western public paid more attention to TCM than before? How did the company manage to maintain its success as a TCM brand in modern Hong Kong?

Different organizational stakeholders, such as investors, customers, employees, and suppliers, actually have many shared needs and interests. Among other things, they all want companies to give them accurate information, show respect for their time, and be honest and forthright. Cultivating a stakeholder-friendly culture that is responsive to these common needs can be a source of competitive advantage for a firm. Examples of both friendly and unfriendly actions suggest a checklist that managers can use to improve their interactions with their important stakeholders.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

Spreadsheet supplement to case 304-075.

By June 2003, IBM had made significant progress in changing the way it managed new, emerging businesses. Describes the development of a separate management program at IBM designed to identify, fund, and shepherd new businesses through growth. Traces the history of the program, its evolution, and the current challenges senior management faces in scaling up the program.

The spate of corporate misdeeds revealed to the American public in 2001 to 2002 prompted corrective action in many quarters of the U.S. economy. The note summarizes some of the steps taken by lawmakers, regulators, law-enforcement officials, companies, investors, professional associations, and educators to restore public trust in U.S. capital markets and the U.S. system of corporate governance.

How do you deal with overly aggressive or excessively passive people? When should you push and when should you hang back? Should you ever show your anger, or is it wise to keep it inside or express it differently? The answers to these questions can mean the difference between derailing your career in management and going all the way to the top. If you learn what appropriately assertive behavior is and then practice ways of expressing yourself (when the occasion calls for it), your level of assertiveness will match the situation. This technical note examines interactions that fall on a continuum of assertiveness, from abusive to overly passive.

This case examines NBC's decision to bid on Major League Baseball's contract. The issues relate to the cost of the contract and whether it helps NBC meet both its profit targets and strategic goals. The case includes a pricing model to help the student determine whether to bid or not.

Richard Breeden proposed corporate governance reforms for MCI. Breeden is a former chairman of the SEC who was a court-appointed "corporate monitor" for the troubled company (formerly WorldCom). The company must adhere to the proposals unless excused by a court order.

The sequel (1740.1) describes the emergence of a high-profile public lobbying effort called Save AmeriCorps. It details the full-court press effort-including the use of national and local media, political contacts of board members, and a range of public events-meant to convince Congressional appropriators to approve an emergency supplemental budget which would include additional funds for Americorps grants. Finally, the fact that the Coalition's effort falls short, at least in the near-term, raises questions about the long-term impact of such lobbying-as well as the more fundamental question about whether it makes sense for volunteers and nonprofit organizations to look to government for salaries and operating funds. HKS Case Number 1740.1

The (B) case, details the decisions which the Corporation for National and Community Service made as to how best to estimate the funding needs for the Trust. The (B) case (1740.0), however, goes on to frame political questions which develop when the National Service Trust is judged to be "under-funded". Specifically, it frames the question of whether and how organizations which receive federal grants to hire AmeriCorps "volunteers" should organize to resist budget reductions which appear to be in the offing as a result of the financial problems of the Trust. A field which had been relatively unorganized and, indeed, was notable for factions (eg. national versus local) and competing interests, must decide whether to seek to create a united front to lobby for higher funding. The case describes the range of obstacles to the construction of such a political coalition and raises questions both about the logistics and the wisdom of doing so. HKS Case Number 1740.0

The (A) case (1739.0) focuses on the early years of the program in the 1990s, providing a definitive account--based on interviews with those who drafted the authorizing legislation--on how the program was conceived and structured and how it gained Congressional approval, including the political reasons for directing some AmeriCorps grants to large, multi-state "national direct" organizations such as Teach for America, and others to small, local organizations funded through state "service commissions". Ultimately, the case narrows its focus to the public financial management question about how to fund a special trust fund from which education awards for AmeriCorps members are paid. The case raises the question of how to fund the National Service Education Trustthe mismanagement of which comes to spark the 2002-2003 budget crisis affecting the entire programin a way that is both prudential but not overly expensive. In combination with the beginning the of the (B) case, this case can be used to discuss estimation models for funding a wide variety of public benefits, including such analogues as public pension systems such as the US social security system. HKS Case Number 1739.0

Ask most managers what gets in the way of their success, and you'll hear the familiar litany of complaints: Not enough time. Limited resources. No clear sense of how their work fits into the grand corporate scheme. These are, for the most part, excuses. What really gets in the way of managers' success is fear of making their own decisions and acting accordingly. Managers must overcome the psychological desire to be indispensable. In this article, the authors demonstrate how managers can become more productive by learning to manage demands, generate resources, and recognize and exploit alternatives. To win the support they want, managers must develop a long-term strategy and pursue their goals slowly, steadily, and strategically. To expand the range of opportunities, for their companies and themselves, managers must scan the environment for possible obstacles and search for ways around them. Fully 90% of the executives the authors have studied over the past few years wasted their time and frittered away their productivity, despite having well-defined projects, goals, and the necessary knowledge to get their jobs done. Such managers remain trapped in inefficiency because they assume they do not have enough personal discretion or control. They forget how to take initiative-the most essential quality of any truly successful manager. Effective managers, by contrast, are purposeful corporate entrepreneurs who take charge of their jobs by developing trust in their own judgment and adopting long-term, big-picture views to fulfill personal goals that match those of the organization.

Global Transfer of Best Practices Carlos Camarero led Rank Xerox's Wave C initiative. Wave I (to improve revenues) was successful and Wave II (to redefine sales processes) was disappointing. Carlos prepared to discuss with Rank Xerox's Managing Directior (Bernard Fournier) Wave I's success, Wave II's failure, and lessons learned about best-practice transfer.

Fournier rejected Carlos' request to re-implement Wave II. Carlos visited Colombia and Dubai to determine whether to apply their telephone selling approach ("Telemarketing") elsewhere. Carlos had to decide whether to tell Fournier of Dubai's revolutionary tool that could transform Rank Xerox's sales operations or put the idea aside.

Carlos obtained Fournier's approval to implement "Telesales" (i.e., Carlos's renamed version of Dubai's Telemarketing). Telesales was successful within a year of launch. Success factors were: project's IT aspect; salespeople's acceptance of using computers; salespeople not resisting potential added control of Telesales; and offering of a complete package.