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By January 2015, OJSC Transaero Airlines (Transaero) was the largest Russian open joint-stock airline and the second-largest airline carrier in Russia and Eastern Europe combined. Tracing its history back to 1990, Transaero was the safest airline in Russia and was ranked 17th in the world in 2015 in terms of safety. In September 2015, the public learned that Transaero had serious financial troubles, which could lead to bankruptcy for the firm. The news came as a shock because Transaero had demonstrated a stable performance accompanied by sound financial results for many years. The 2015 news revealed that Transaero was unable to service its debt of US$4 billion, including the company’s lease obligations. Was it possible for the safest, second-largest Russian airline company to avoid bankruptcy?

In 2015, Cerana Beverages Pvt. Ltd. launched Bira 91 (Bira), India’s first handcrafted beer. It was introduced to fill a gap in the market between Indian brands and expensive imported beers. The handcrafted beer was priced lower than several premium beers but was more expensive than the market leaders. This allowed Bira to develop price leadership in the premium beer segment. By setting a new price range, Bira executed “high quality, low price” appeal and became capable of influencing customer product evaluations. With its intention to replicate this pricing strategy in its global expansion, now Bira would have to successfully design a proactive strategy to meet the associated challenges.

Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (Jio) launched JioMoney, a mobile wallet (m-wallet) service, in May 2016. Jio was a new entrant in a market populated by established services. Six months later, when the government of India announced demonetization of two high-value currency notes, India’s cash-driven economy was pushed toward digital payments, providing Jio and its competitors with an opportunity. Jio had advanced technology supporting its service. But to leverage the opportunity and its technology, Jio would have to access the 72.2 per cent of India’s population that lived in rural areas. Many of these people did not have bank accounts, and most of them had no experience with digital transactions. Further, despite the availability of the latest 4G cellular technology—which was necessary for successful digital money transfers—a great number of people in India still used phones that were two generations older and unable to take advantage of the m-wallet industry. How could JioMoney overcome the challenges to take advantage of the opportunities?

TCNS Clothing Company Limited (TCNS), the owner of women’s fusion-wear brands W, Weve, Aurelia, and Wishful, had built up a strong retail brand presence in India since its founding in 2002. By 2017, its product innovation, proactive customer need fulfillment, and extensive retail reach had enabled it to grow into a ₹11.5 billion company. The W brand had been building its online presence, but this was still contributing only single-digit shares to sales. Faced with issues of declining loyalty and increasing expectations of digitally influenced consumers, retailers in India were moving toward omni-channel strategies. In early 2018, this seemed to have become an imperative for W as well. Was it now time for W to pursue an omni-channel retail strategy to offer its customers an unbeatable experience? An infusion of funds from two major investors had given the company significant financial muscle to pursue aggressive marketing. Yet, the challenges of going omni-channel were considerable. How should W proceed?

In June 2016, Indian e-commerce giant Flipkart Private Limited (Flipkart) faced a common issue among online retailers: the firm needed to optimize its product return rates to reduce losses caused by returns. Accordingly, Flipkart changed its return policy, including raising the commission fees charged to sellers by an average of 5 per cent. Many sellers resented the policy change, and more than 1,800 led an online protest against Flipkart, which was unprecedented in India. These sellers made their accounts inactive and removed the product listings for nearly 1 million product units. Seeing an opportunity, Amazon India decreased its commissions on various product categories by 2–7 per cent to lure disgruntled sellers to its platform. While its competitors experienced rapid growth, Flipkart struggled to keep the market share it had acquired so far. The company experienced a massive drop in its valuation during fiscal year 2015–16, and had not registered any profit since its inception in 2007. Flipkart had to reduce its losses resulting from a high number of returns without displeasing both of its key stakeholders—sellers and customers.

Working the night shift to accommodate the time difference with U.S. customers was a well-known call-centre practice in India, and staffing the graveyard shift was challenging. In 2016, one of Diglot Capital Management (DCM)'s vice-presidents faced a challenge that most leaders did not have to contend with: DCM's employees were avoiding working the night shift or quitting altogether because they believed the workplace was haunted. The employees' superstitions, rooted in cultural and religious beliefs, were creating a serious decline in productivity; thus, jeopardizing the company's partnership with an American firm. The situation was troubling the vice-president and totally bewildering the American manager, who demanded that DCM's employees be disciplined. The vice-president was at risk of losing most of his workforce. Was there a way he could keep all stakeholders happy?

Muskaan, a social enterprise based in Delhi, India, trained adults with intellectual disabilities to help bring them closer to mainstream society. The organization firmly believed that the “human mind is designed for learning,” and that everyone, including those with intellectual and developmental disabilities, had the potential to succeed in doing great things in life. Muskaan had two revenue sources: grants, and income from the sale of goods produced by intellectually disabled craftspeople. In 2016, more than 11,000 Indian non-governmental organizations lost their licenses to receive foreign funding. Dr. Shanti Auluck, Muskaan’s founder, worried that the funding needed for her business model might also soon dry up. To survive, grow, and ensure the sustainability of her social enterprise, Auluck had to change her business model and prepare a new business plan.

In July 2018, the chief executive officer of Tiktauli De Corps (TDC) was thinking about the branding strategy of the company. Founded in India in August 2012 as a casual wear apparel brand, TDC had grown rapidly. The company featured three main business lines: electronic dance music fashion apparel and accessories; sports gear; and affordable fashion wear. The company had adopted a house of brands strategy for its three brands: TDC, Fieldgear, and Koolho. After six years, one of the three brands had started generating profits, but none had achieved recognition outside a niche circle. However, confident that the various brands were aligned with TDC’s vision, and encouraged by the company’s success, the chief executive officer was considering expanding into international markets. Because of limited access to funds, synergy among the company’s house brands, and the impact of macro-environmental factors on his growth plans, he had to choose the best branding strategy for the company’s future.

On August 31, 2016, a well-respected and highly influential cultural broadcaster and entrepreneur in Colombia was the subject of a fake news attack. A message started spreading over the WhatsApp messaging service wrongfully attributing to her a vociferous statement opposing the Colombian peace-making process. On September 2, 2016, she produced a disconfirming video, in which she made it clear that the statement was not written by her; that it did not represent her views; and that, contrary to what the statement said, she supported peace efforts. The video was posted on her official Facebook and Twitter accounts, and echoed by mainstream media. Unfortunately, the attack did not stop there. On several occasions between 2016 and 2017, the message was put in circulation again. The timing seemed connected to milestones in Colombia’s peace process. In February 2018, three months before the presidential elections in the country, the message started to circulate again. The entrepreneur wondered if there was anything else she could do to prevent further damage to both public opinion and her own reputation.

This article investigates responses of the international and domestic (South Korean) publics to one of the most hotly debated corporate scandals in recent years: Korean Air's so-called nut rage incident. By analyzing both international and domestic media coverage of the occurrence, we reveal contrasting interpretations between the two. Whereas the South Korean public tends to generate intense debates addressing a lack of ethics in Korean Air's public communication following the incident, international public criticism is dominated by questions regarding South Korea's chronic chaebol system and its negative image in relation to South Korea's unique institutional context. Korean Air's incongruent notice of the employee as a key stakeholder is also discussed in the international media. Our research findings indicate how, rather than focusing on legal responsibility, the normative attitude of businesses toward stakeholder pressures is crucial as a means of escaping legitimacy-threatening events. The results of this study demonstrate how public responses to a single incident are diverse in global society and offer new insights regarding the importance of ethics in management leadership and public communication after a crisis incident.

In January 2017, the owner of Exotic Caribbean Mountain Pride Ltd., based in Trinidad and Tobago, was trying to decide on a strategy to ensure the continued growth of her business in the face of increased competition from other local manufacturers. She wondered whether the timing was right to expand operations and enter the export market. The growing demand for her chocolate products also made her question whether she should increase her prices. The entry of her two daughters into the family business further complicated her decision-making. She wanted them to become more involved in running the business, but she was having difficulty adopting a less active role in the business.

Sekar Group (Sekar), based in Surabaya, Indonesia, started in 1966 as a small business purchasing fish and shrimp. Led by its founder Harry Susilo, Sekar grew into a large holding company with several business divisions in the global market. Sekar's achievements were closely linked to Susilo’s moral leadership, which was greatly influenced by Eastern culture. As the eldest of a large family, Susilo had cared for his siblings as his own children. Some of these siblings were involved with Sekar, and the last of them was preparing to retire. Susilo, as the company’s patriarch, was facing the challenge of ensuring lasting success. A new leader from the next generation needed to be chosen to assume Susilo’s moral leadership and to sustain family business management and corporate ethics. Who should become the new leader and how would Susilo pass down his ethical framework to a generation largely raised with Western values?

In May 2017, IKEA India’s chief executive officer (CEO) was facing a dilemma. The company had decided to start its business operations in India by opening an experience centre in Hyderabad in November 2018, followed by furniture retail outlets across India by 2025. Key target segments were young, middle-class price-conscious consumers. IKEA India aimed to sell its products at a low price, aligning with its vision. However, the CEO was challenged with developing a strategy for business growth at a time when major global retailers were going bankrupt. He needed to figure out the appropriate pricing and supply chain strategy for India’s complex and diverse environment, while offering value to consumers.

In 2014, recognizing that their leadership in the online media market was weakening, eight Korean television broadcasters severed their ties with YouTube and formed Smart Media Representative Co. Ltd. (SMR), an alliance to collectively distribute online television content and advertising on behalf of the broadcasters. SMR changed the nature of the online video market in Korea. The rights to advertising sales, programming, and distribution that were previously transferred to the platforms were retained by the broadcasters. The nature of distribution also changed to use a format that allowed the broadcasters to package their content and advertisements as one. The profit sharing from advertisements also changed, with broadcasters realizing a substantial increase. The structure had worked well and had been lucrative for the broadcasters and the Korean platform companies that partnered with SMR; however, in 2016, as SMR prepared to re-contract with the stakeholders, the varying goals of the stakeholders threatened to disrupt the structure. What did SMR need to do to maintain these fragile relationships and continue to grow?

In January 2017, Groupe PSA (PSA), the France-based automobile manufacturer known for its brands Peugeot, Citroën, and DS Automobiles, announced its partnership with the Indian conglomerate CK Birla Group, which would enable the company to re-enter India after having left in 2012. PSA had entered India twice before, through a joint venture with Premier Automobile Limited in 1994 and again in 2011, but both times had been unsuccessful due to production losses, labour unrest, and pressures related to the financial crisis in Europe. The Indian automobile industry was one of the largest in the world. It contributed 7.1 per cent of India's gross domestic product in 2017 and was expected to contribute 12 per cent by 2026. All major automobile manufacturers had set up base in India, and to be truly global, PSA also needed a presence in India. In its previous attempts, PSA had suffered and failed to build its brand. The re-entry decision therefore raised many questions: Was a joint venture the right entry method, or would an Indian subsidiary have been better? Which segments should PSA target? What should it do with the Ambassador brand it had acquired from CK Birla Group in 2017?

In 2014, recognizing that their leadership in the online media market was weakening, eight Korean television broadcasters severed their ties with YouTube and formed Smart Media Representative Co. Ltd. (SMR), an alliance to collectively distribute online television content and advertising on behalf of the broadcasters. SMR changed the nature of the online video market in Korea. The rights to advertising sales, programming, and distribution that were previously transferred to the platforms were retained by the broadcasters. The nature of distribution also changed to use a format that allowed the broadcasters to package their content and advertisements as one. The profit sharing from advertisements also changed, with broadcasters realizing a substantial increase. The structure had worked well and had been lucrative for the broadcasters and the Korean platform companies that partnered with SMR; however, in 2016, as SMR prepared to re-contract with the stakeholders, the varying goals of the stakeholders threatened to disrupt the structure. What did SMR need to do to maintain these fragile relationships and continue to grow?

On December 19, 2002, the board of directors of the Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) was contemplating the approval of the company’s 2003 foreign exchange strategy to manage long-term currency risk exposure in the utility’s U.S. dollar debt. SaskPower had borrowed extensively in the early 1990s, with maturities ranging from 10 to 30 years. The U.S. dollar exchange rate against the Canadian dollar had since increased, thereby increasing the effective burden of the debt and reducing the utility’s net income. A change in accounting practices implemented in 2001 required SaskPower to recognize as a gain or a loss in the current year any translation differences in the value of its outstanding U.S. dollar debt resulting from fluctuations in the exchange rate during the year. This policy change led to a significant reduction in net income in 2001, followed by a significant increase during the first eight months of 2002. The volatility in earnings had complicated the task of setting rates for electricity and had proved politically difficult to justify. In late 2002, SaskPower had to decide whether and how to hedge its currency exposure in outstanding U.S. dollar debt.

In January 2017, Groupe PSA (PSA), the France-based automobile manufacturer known for its brands Peugeot, Citroën, and DS Automobiles, announced its partnership with the Indian conglomerate CK Birla Group, which would enable the company to re-enter India after having left in 2012. PSA had entered India twice before, through a joint venture with Premier Automobile Limited in 1994 and again in 2011, but both times had been unsuccessful due to production losses, labour unrest, and pressures related to the financial crisis in Europe. The Indian automobile industry was one of the largest in the world. It contributed 7.1 per cent of India's gross domestic product in 2017 and was expected to contribute 12 per cent by 2026. All major automobile manufacturers had set up base in India, and to be truly global, PSA also needed a presence in India. In its previous attempts, PSA had suffered and failed to build its brand. The re-entry decision therefore raised many questions: Was a joint venture the right entry method, or would an Indian subsidiary have been better? Which segments should PSA target? What should it do with the Ambassador brand it had acquired from CK Birla Group in 2017?

In March 2017, a training manager at IndCo, a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate, faced a pressing problem. She had been asked by one of IndCo’s general managers to design and implement a customized training program on strategic thinking for his departmental team. Because she had prior commitments and had never conducted a training module on this topic before, the training manager sought to outsource the program to an external expert–a professor from a reputable business school. Although this arrangement seemed promising, the professor’s training proposal presented certain challenges, including cost and availability. The training manager needed to assess whether the proposal met IndCo’s requirements, and whether she had made the right decision in outsourcing this task. She had to choose her next steps very carefully to avoid displeasing any of the involved parties, while also satisfying IndCo’s budget constraints and ensuring the ultimate delivery of a high-quality training program.

On September 15, 2014, the chief executive officer and the vice-president of the start-up Phenicoptere Ltd. were heading home to Poland. They were returning from a meeting with Armelle S.A. in Marseille, France about selling their innovative product—a makeup-removal glove called GLOV, in Armelle S.A.’s global retail chain. “Isn’t it exciting?” asked the chief executive officer, how often does such a small firm get a chance to talk to the buyers of a global retail chain?” The vice-president of the company was not so enthusiastic. “It’s great we could talk to them,” she said. “But I’m not sure if this partnership is such a good idea. And I don’t only mean the exclusivity terms. There is also something else. We can’t afford to wait another year to start selling internationally.” The two entrepreneurs sat back and wondered whether partnering with Armelle S.A. was the best way to take Phenicoptere Ltd. global.