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Joneja Bright Steels Private Limited (JBS) was one of many major players in India's bright steel industry, serving almost every automobile manufacturer in Northern India. After the business launched in 2002, the automobile market expanded, leading JBS to an early strong position. But in fiscal year 2014/15, the company experienced working capital management issues. JBS considered using credit policies as a way of improving profitability-shifting from a strict credit policy of net 45 days to a flexible credit policy with a 2 per cent discount for accounts paid within 10 days (2/10 net 45 days). Should JBS implement a cash discount for fiscal year 2016/17? The discount could potentially increase the burden caused by already declining sales, but could also improve the company's cash position.

In late 2015, South African telecommunications giant MTN was fined US$5.2 billion by the Nigerian authorities for a mass of improperly registered subscribers—the largest fine of its kind ever imposed in the industry anywhere in the world. MTN was an emerging-market multinational corporation with a track record of successfully operating in some of the toughest, riskiest emerging markets. Thus, it was surprising that MTN had been unable to avoid a fine of this magnitude. Three factors had preceded the fine and changed the business environment in Nigeria leading up to 2015: the first was the war against the Boko Haram movement in Nigeria, which led security forces to demand the registration of prepaid phone cards; the second was the economic crisis caused by the impact of falling oil prices; and the third factor was a change in government. In light of these political risks and government regulations, how could MTN recover and move forward from this difficult situation?

Jiemo.net (Jiemo), an Internet-based study-abroad consultant agency headquartered in Dalian, China, began in 2010 by providing application support to customers who wished to apply to study abroad. In 2014, the company discovered that profit existed in providing services to students once they had been accepted to study abroad. Jiemo changed its traditional pricing model, used social media marketing, and collaborated with other agencies to establish an ecosystem for these students. The result was that Jiemo acquired customers by providing free Internet-based application support (“front end” services), and reaped profits by providing services that those customers needed once they were studying abroad (“back end” services). However, as Jiemo grew, the designed profit model was not supporting growth. Jiemo had to modify the model. Should it improve the back end services to reduce costs and gain more profit from existing customers, or explore the needs of potential customers and add new services?

In 2016, Chinese telecommunications equipment firm Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei) aspired to be the world’s top smartphone manufacturer. The company had identified German camera company Leica Camera AG (Leica) as a long-term partner to reinvent Huawei’s smartphone photography to beat an influx of domestic rivals and the market leaders, Apple and Samsung. The flagship dual camera smartphone that was co-engineered by Huawei and Leica, the P9, contained a camera module that was actually made by a Chinese manufacturer, Sunny Optical Technology Co., under Leica’s authorization. As a result, Huawei’s motives for the partnership with Leica were criticized as a quick fix to beat Apple in the dual camera market and repair negative publicity the company had suffered earlier. Was the long-term alliance really the best solution for both Huawei and Leica? Was it the right alliance in an emerging market?

In 2014, the owner of Shiva Tourist Dhaba, a highway restaurant specializing in authentic Indian cuisine, faced a pressing decision. The business had been successful since opening in 1995, but it now faced intense competition. The owner was working with a marketing research team in pursuit of two objectives: to gain insight into customer loyalty and to decide on his restaurant’s positioning strategy. After conducting a survey of restaurant customers, the marketing research team needed to determine the tool that would best analyze the data to help resolve the issues facing the restaurant owner.

In 2015, Corticeira Amorim, S.G.P.S., S.A. (Amorim), the world’s largest cork manufacturer, was facing multiple strategic dilemmas. After enjoying a near-monopoly in the wine stopper market for over 300 years, cork’s reputation had been damaged in the 20th century by concerns over “cork taint,” and the cork industry had been challenged by the resulting disruptive technologies of screw caps and synthetic corks. Amorim needed to rethink its core assumptions, including product design and supply chain strategy. The company had taken a new direction in the previous 15 years, and appeared to have regained a secure niche for the foreseeable future. The family-owned business was now emerging from its comeback and reviewing various strategic options to secure a sustainable future. Should Amorim rely more or less heavily on its wine stopper business in the future? Which form of competition should Amorim confront most directly? Should the company compete primarily based on cost or value?

CompuSoluciones, based in Guadalajara, Mexico, was a value-added distributor of information technology hardware, software, and services that grew from its origins as a reseller for Hewlett-Packard to become the second-largest distributor in Mexico. The company was best described as a collection of team-based businesses. It had 18 independent business units—each of which managed its own supply chain and produced its own profit-and-loss statements—and over 415 employees spread out over three offices. It was also governed by multiple consultative and representative boards. The company relied on the advice, insights, and experiences of these key advisory groups to improve the quality of its decision making and inform strategic decisions. At the same time, it had a policy to achieve consensus on major strategic decisions. In January 2017, the chairman of CompuSoluciones was reviewing his company’s corporate governance policies and practices. Given the independent nature of the individual business units, he wondered whether a consensus-based model of management was still the best way to lead the firm forward and whether the current corporate governance structure was optimal for managing this particular business.

CompuSoluciones was a value-added distributor of information technology hardware, software, and services based in Guadalajara, Mexico. In 2016, the firm’s chief executive officer was aware that the company faced the threat of disintermediation as some of its vendors looked to sell directly to end-users. The industry in which CompuSoluciones competed was known for its rapid technological changes, which affected the design, supply, and price of products, and even the structure of the industry. As an intermediary in the business, CompuSoluciones was threatened by disintermediation, which was enabled by two new technologies: cloud computing and software as a service. If software vendors could interact directly with end-users, they would not need to pay intermediaries (resellers or wholesalers such as CompuSoluciones) to distribute their products. <br>CompuSoluciones’s chief executive officer needed to consider what the company could do in the next few months to prevent or slow the process of disintermediation or to participate in the industry in a different way. The decision would have significant implications for the firm’s business model.

In 2012, a real estate entrepreneur and his long-time friend and former neighbour, a police director, had enjoyed the profits of guanxi—a bilateral flow of personal favours—for many years. The use of guanxi in China had long been a core component of successful and sometimes illegal business. However, China’s new president had recently created a tough anti-corruption Disciplinary Committee. As a result, many respected citizens who had previously profited from corrupt practices were being exposed, prosecuted, and imprisoned. News was leaked about the city’s entire police force having enjoyed a six-day vacation in Bali at the expense of the police budget. The real estate entrepreneur and the police director were going to be questioned about their role in arranging this vacation. What should they do? Could they escape the consequences of their questionable business practices, or were they headed for a future in prison?

In 2012, a real estate entrepreneur and his long-time friend and former neighbour, a police director, had enjoyed the profits of "guanxi"-a bilateral flow of personal favours-for many years. The use of guanxi in China had long been a core component of successful and sometimes illegal business. However, China's new president had recently created a tough anti-corruption Disciplinary Committee. As a result, many respected citizens who had previously profited from corrupt practices were being exposed, prosecuted, and imprisoned. News was leaked about the city's entire police force having enjoyed a six-day vacation in Bali at the expense of the police budget. The real estate entrepreneur and the police director were going to be questioned about their role in arranging this vacation. What should they do? Could they escape the consequences of their questionable business practices, or were they headed for a future in prison?

This is Case A in a three case series. In December 2015, the managing director and chief executive officer of Sunitha Nath Boutiques in Bengaluru, discovered that her most trusted employee had abandoned and deceived her. She had recruited the employee as an intern and mentored him during his growth within the organization, eventually promoting him to the post of studio manager with complete power to run the business in her absence. But the employee had quit his job without giving any notice; stolen confidential information, designs, and documents relating to the business; and started his own competing design firm in Bengaluru. One of Sunitha Nath Boutiques’s important projects had been terminated by email a little while earlier, and the rumour was that her ex-employee was continuing to work on that project under his new design firm.<br><br>In this case, the managing director’s lawyer helped determine what had transpired, had taken steps to contain any further damage, and preserved relationships with clients and vendors. However, there were other matters to also consider. See 9B17M014 for Case B and 9B17M015 for Case C.

This is Case B in a three case series. In December 2015, the managing director and chief executive officer of Sunitha Nath Boutiques in Bengaluru, discovered that her most trusted employee had abandoned and deceived her. She had recruited the employee as an intern and mentored him during his growth within the organization, eventually promoting him to the post of studio manager with complete power to run the business in her absence. But the employee had quit his job without giving any notice; stolen confidential information, designs, and documents relating to the business; and started his own competing design firm in Bengaluru. One of Sunitha Nath Boutiques’s important projects had been terminated by email a little while earlier, and the rumour was that her ex-employee was continuing to work on that project under his new design firm.<br><br> In this case, the managing director and her lawyer reviewed the employment contract and determined what, if anything, might be done to prevent the ex-employee from using Sunitha Nath Boutique’s resources—knowledge, designs, clients, and employees—in a new competing business. See 9B17M013 for Case A and 9B17M015 for Case C.

This is Case C in a three-case series. In December 2015, the managing director and chief executive officer of Sunitha Nath Boutiques in Bengaluru, discovered that her most trusted employee had abandoned and deceived her. She had recruited the employee as an intern and mentored him during his growth within the organization, eventually promoting him to the post of studio manager with complete power to run the business in her absence. But the employee had quit his job without giving any notice; stolen confidential information, designs, and documents relating to the business; and started his own competing design firm in Bengaluru. One of Sunitha Nath Boutiques’s important projects had been terminated by email a little while earlier, and the rumour was that her ex-employee was continuing to work on that project under his new design firm.<br><br> In this case, the managing director and her lawyer reviewed the nature of confidential information and trade secrets. They also explored what intellectual property rights the managing director had and how she might prevent her ex-employee and others from misappropriating or stealing that information. See 9B17M013 for Case A and 9B17M014 for Case B.

Established in 2013, Glints was an online job search service for new graduates, marketing itself as “LinkedIn for youth.” The Singapore-based company was founded by three 21-year-olds who chose to put their university education on hold and forfeit their scholarships in order to pursue their entrepreneurial ambitions. Using the lean start-up approach, Glints pivoted its business model several times before finding a suitable position in a resegmented job-search market. As a young company, Glints’ biggest challenge was growth. Having raised seed capital of SG$475,000 from its investors, Glints was expected to sustain its exponential growth in revenue base and the number of subscribers. Its young co-founders had to identify ways to make that growth happen.

In May 2013, iGATE Corporation suffered a major blow after terminating its president and chief executive officer, Phaneesh Murthy, as a result of allegations of sexual harassment. Murthy had previously been forced to step down from Infosys Limited for similar reasons. After Murthy’s unceremonious exit, iGATE struggled to fill its top leadership position. Finally, in September 2013, a new chief executive took over and outlined a plan of action that differed completely from his predecessor’s strategy. However, the company, which had been poised to achieve big ambitions, had lost momentum and appeared directionless. Had iGATE made a mistake by hiring Murthy as its top executive just 18 months after he had been fired from Infosys? Why did iGATE not conduct due diligence on its talent acquisition and management, especially for the critical position of chief executive officer? How could other organizations turn around a position of vulnerability to become resilient?

In June 2016, the founder and chief executive officer of Parentune.com, a rapidly growing online parents’ community based in Gurgaon, India, was feeling the pressure of keeping his parenting support service relevant to the changing needs of millennial parents. Parentune.com supported parents at all stages of parenting by networking parents and experts. Since Parentune.com launched in November 2012, more than one million parents had become members of the community, with another 6,000 added every month. Parentune.com was trusted by parents for its personalized, validated, and state-of-the-art parenting resources. However, many similar platforms began entering the niche segment of digital parenting services, capitalizing on growing Internet reach and social media penetration. In the wake of evolving parenting needs and mounting competition from look-alike platforms, Parentune.com needed to evaluate its plan for continuous improvement in its service delivery.

In 2016, a personal threat was made against the managing director of Multistrada Agro International, an Indonesian industrial forestry firm. The permits for the firm’s new rubber plantation overlapped with an existing palm oil plantation and the activities of local villagers, and also drew concern from outsiders who claimed to have rights over the land or wished to protect the environment. In sum, the venture altered the delicate balance of conflicting local interests. The managing director knew that unless she managed to work with local stakeholders, she would never be able to successfully operate large-scale rubber plantations. How should she handle this latest threat? What tactics could she use to deal with a variety of stakeholders with divergent interests?

Château Qanafar was a small Lebanese winery, operating as a family business since its inception in 2005. By 2015, Château Qanafar had managed to produce one of the best wines of the Middle East and obtain international acclaim. However, despite this success, the company’s founder understood that the general business environment in Lebanon was characterized by many uncertainties related to a weak institutional environment and high political and economic risk. Moreover, Lebanon represented a very small domestic market for wine producers. Château Qanafar’s capability to produce well-crafted boutique wine would not be enough to ensure its success in the market. Its founder was also looking to transfer leadership to the next generation of the family. How could the business sustain and grow its operations in the future?

Leader Healthcare India (LHC) was a medical devices importer firm that dealt primarily in respiratory and anesthetic devices. The company imported medical devices from U.S. manufacturers and, for the most part, performed its own marketing, sales, and service activities. In 2016, the director of LHC was concerned about LHC’s multiple failed efforts at market expansion. The company wanted to grow, but its attempts had been unsuccessful. Lack of highly trained personnel, supervisory control, and sufficient financial resources had been the key reasons for the failure. Market expansion was even more critical as LHC wanted to launch a 24/7 service in the respiratory devices business, and success with this service depended on the size of LHC’s existing customer base. How could LHC grow?

Cembrit Holding A/S (Cembrit), the second-largest producer of fibre cement products in Europe, had experienced a period of restructuring, acquisitions, and consolidation as a result of having acquired fibre cement companies involved in production, sales, and distribution throughout Europe and closing down its own production in Denmark. After years of restructuring and struggling, growth had finally picked up, with turnover reaching an average of 11 per cent per year between 2003 and 2007. As of 2008, however, Cembrit faced numerous challenges: building and strengthening its new corporate identity; repositioning itself in the market; identifying opportunities for organic growth; transitioning to asbestos-free production; and determining its future within its parent company. How it addressed these challenges would affect Cembrit’s future well beyond 2008, including whether it would be retained or divested by its parent company.