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The Apple A and B cases provide two different perspectives on the evolution of the computer and electronics firm Apple and are designed to evoke debate about models of strategy, organization, and leadership. The A case presents the story of Apple from a hindsight rational analytic perspective in which students are able to apply a variety of models about strategy, organization, leadership, and innovation. The B case presents a more nuanced, critical account of Apple’s development, attributing some of its success to happenstance and good fortune, and also raises questions about Jobs’s leadership.

This case is a supplement to Apple A.

Pak Elektron Limited was a prominent manufacturer of consumer home appliances, large distribution and power transformers, and switch gears for power companies in Pakistan. From 2007, the company had started the process of changing the information systems of the company. These systems had become outdated as Microsoft withdrew its support of Visual FoxPro, the platform on which all systems had been developed. The company decided that a Tier 1 ERP (enterprise resource planning) system with strength in manufacturing modules would be suitable. An ERP system was then selected and a firm was appointed as implementer in December 2009. The case describes the issues surrounding the implementation, including many unexpected events. It presents the situation as of the fourth quarter of 2011, after Phase 1 of the implementation had finished in December 2010 and the company had decided in March 2011 to dispense with the services of the consulting firm supporting the implementation. Pak Elektron Limited was facing a liquidity crisis and had to save costs even though there was insufficient corporate knowledge of ERP procedures. The staff was not comfortable with the ERP system and would not let go of the legacy systems and, as such, the project was in trouble.

Medupi was the first baseload project in South Africa in 20 years. It would be the largest dry-cooled, coal-fired power station in the world and was being developed by Eskom, which generated 90 per cent of Southern Africa’s power, at an estimated cost of R125 billion. In spite of the worldwide concern about greener energy, coal remained the most popular power station fuel for South Africa, due to the country’s vast resources of 224 million tonnes annually. The new capacity that Medupi would offer was sorely needed.<br><br>It had been challenging to follow a project schedule that involved various suppliers providing different packages at different dates and that required accommodating several interfaces during both design and implementation. Due to the massive scale and complexity of the project, three companies had joined forces to tackle the job, namely Murray & Roberts, Aveng, and Concor. Murray & Roberts had appointed Coenie Vermaak as project director at Medupi and, at 34, he was the youngest project director in the group. The managers of the joint venture had realized quickly that this would be “a project like no other.” The three companies’ different ways of working necessitated much more integrated coordination. For instance, employees from the different parent organizations had different job descriptions, remuneration, benefits, structures, processes, and cultures. Medupi’s uniqueness provided an opportunity to be pioneers in the construction industry and to “reconstruct construction.” A culture of employee engagement and alignment was required.

On June 30, 2011, Research in Motion (RIM) co-CEOs Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis unexpectedly found themselves facing serious public scrutiny, not from competitors, market analysts, or consumers, but from one of their own senior executives. In an attempt to have their voice heard, an anonymous senior-level RIM employee addressed an open letter to both Balsillie and Lazaridis; however, the letter was sent to the online technology news provider Boy Genius Report (BGR). In a year during which RIM already faced pressures from a dwindling market share, failed product attempts, and a sinking stock price, Balsillie and Lazaridis needed to figure out how to respond to the claims of the letter publicly, but more importantly how to communicate to RIM employees internally.

This case is a supplement to Research in Motion: Sincerely, a RIM Employee (A).

Mike Lazaridis, co-CEO of Research in Motion (RIM), faced a situation of truly disastrous proportions. Earlier that week, service outages had started occurring on RIM’s popular BlackBerry smartphone devices, affecting over 30 million BlackBerry users globally. For a total of three days, RIM engineers worked around the clock to fix the widespread technical problems. However, with the company providing only brief comments to the public, many consumers and industry officials became increasingly frustrated. With the worldwide release of the new Apple iPhone 4S just days away, Lazaridis was presented with the additional challenge of how and if RIM should respond publicly to help restore consumer and market confidence.

This case is a supplement to Research in Motion: Blackberry Blackout (A).

On the morning of September 19, 2011, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the online movie provider Netflix Incorporated became witness to growing public discontent and media criticism directed at the company. The previous evening, the CEO had announced on the company blog that Netflix would be splitting into two separate entities. With the proposed change, the Netflix DVD-by-mail service would be spun out and renamed Qwikster. The move would leave the Netflix brand to focus on offering online streamed entertainment. This was not the first time Netflix had caused large-scale consumer frustration, as a few months earlier in July 2011 the company had announced it would be increasing rates by as much as 60 per cent. The result was a loss of over one million Netflix subscribers by September 2011, representing the first time the company had ever lost subscribers from one quarter to the next. Although the split into two separate entities could be seen as a good business strategy, Netflix did not follow through with a well-developed communication plan. Moving forward, both Netflix and Qwikster had come to represent an unfortunate dichotomy, and Netflix’s management was in desperate need to develop better communications with disgruntled consumers or risk losing additional subscribers and lucrative profits to a number of growing competitors.

The world had changed as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Canada was engaged in the Afghanistan War, and the first casualties were being felt. It was November 28, 2005, as Rene LaRose, the director general of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto, sat in his office preparing for an all-staff briefing the following day. He knew that for his research institute to remain relevant and be a major contributor to the emerging needs of the Canadian Forces and national security in this rapidly changing landscape, a major transformation of his centre was required. The Canadian Forces was undergoing its own metamorphosis under its new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, and DRDC Toronto needed to be in synch with this development. LaRose had spent several years trying to convey the message that profound changes at DRDC Toronto were needed — changes that were as much cultural as they were structural. The sense of urgency was now acute with Canada at war, and DRDC Toronto was poised to embark on a major organizational alignment program.

This case is a supplement to Defence Research and Development Canada — Toronto (A): The Organizational Alignment Program.

Nordea Bank had emerged as the largest financial group in the Nordic region. As part of its consolidated approach, Nordea’s top management had made the strategic decision to outsource a number of the company’s peripheral activities, such as catering, security, and cleaning, in order to focus on the core business of banking. In Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, some services had been outsourced to one of the leaders in the facility management (FM) market, the global service provider ISS. The relationship between Nordea and ISS on the delivery of facility services had a long history, but a new contract was successfully concluded by the end of 2010. Consequently, ISS was chosen as Nordea’s FM partner and would continually be providing Nordea with a scope of supportive services across 20 locations in the Nordic region. From 2010 and onwards, a significant switch was made to an output-based focus in the contract, where it was the quality of the delivered services that was specified rather than how to achieve this level of quality, i.e. the input. The change to an output-based contract was seen as a new beginning of a relationship that required significant changes on both sides in terms of mentality, organization, governance structures, and adjustments of expectations. Both the view of the customer (Nordea) and the supplier (ISS) are presented and contrasted in the case.

The case traces the milestones of a 26-year history of a social entrepreneur creating a social enterprise, Madras Craft Foundation (MCF). The story leads up to a three-decade retrospective on the role social ventures play in our lives. Based on the entrepreneur’s critical reflection, the case shows how the paths of the social entrepreneur and the social enterprise became closely interwoven. After MCF had been self-sufficient for three years, the success of the social venture precipitated a crisis as to who could succeed the founding social entrepreneur, whose love for South India’s arts, crafts, and culture had become inseparable from MCF and its best-known offering, Dakshina Chitra. The case details MCF’s revenue-generation model and shows the interdependence between the social entrepreneur and the social enterprise — their “co-becoming” over almost three decades. The analysis makes apparent links between the founder and her venture, and challenges the divide between social entrepreneur and social enterprise. It also provides an opportunity to discuss what is alike or different in social entrepreneurship and traditional entrepreneurship.

Sitara was a village in India whose local governing body had 15 members headed by the gram-pradhan. In 2011, the gram-pradhan had approved a project for renovation of a large village pond as per the directives of the central government’s MNREGA scheme. However, on starting the excavation work at the project site, it was found that the area was extremely marshy. Manual labourers turned up at the site everyday but declined to work in life-threatening conditions. MNREGA prohibited the use of machines except in the case of extraordinary circumstances without exactly defining what such circumstances might be. Thus, the gram-pradhan was forced to pay labour fees for no work. The case is set at this juncture, where a solution must be found. Part A illustrates how the Indian style of management that relies on competencies such as jugaad (creative improvisation), innovation, and resourcefulness leads to talent management and capability-building even at the bottom of the pyramid. Part B brings forth the trade-off between the management practice of jugaad and management through “systematic innovation.” Part C sheds light on the public policy approach of examining the whole situation. The case also explores the competencies needed for the effective functioning of social and commercial institutions in the Indian context.

From the financial crisis to recent environmental disasters, willful blindness is a widespread problem with systemic and cultural causes. In charting the phenomenon, this article begins by examining power. Leaders often inhabit a “bubble” of power and, when confronted by risky situations, think in abstract terms and demonstrate a level of self-certainty that is removed from reality. Money exacerbates power and leads to decisions that are concerned only with profit, which can lead to reckless outsourcing and lack of accountability. Employees would often rather be wrong than alone, and they fear retribution if they articulate problems to their leaders. Many employees, in fact, do not believe executives who claim that they want to hear the bad news along with the good. As this article reveals, groupthink can be a barrier to progress and the greatest single cause of willful blindness may be the most basic — to build a sense of self-worth, leaders are often surrounded by people and data that confirm their beliefs.

The case focuses on an agricultural institute, the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT), part of an international agricultural research consortium. Since its inception in 1972, ICRISAT had been a premier agricultural research institute with substiantial international and Indian funding. However, mismanagement and lack of initiative of senior leadership had resulted in multiple crises in organizational functioning and reduced funding by donors. In addition, ICRISAT had to cope with an unfortunate series of leadership changes. In the midst of the decline in staff morale and other daunting challenges, Dr. William Dar joined the institute as the director general. The case describes the various issues faced by Philippine-born Dar when he took over. It also discusses his previous stints in various roles and the style of leadership he displayed during those tenures. The case concludes by presenting the problem of revival of ICRISAT, including reinforcing its research focus.

This six-part video case series features social entrepreneur Craig Kielburger as he faces pivotal moments in his life and the remarkable evolution of his organization. The primary dilemmas are strategic in nature and their solutions rely on leadership and social entrepreneurship. Students assume the role of Craig Kielburger in each case, which begins with a video set-up, followed by a short one- or two-page case and a discussion, and concludes with Craig describing what happened in a video clip. (This product consists of one of the six cases. Use product #9B12M031B to order the remaining five cases.)

Dialogue in the Dark Hong Kong Limited (DiD HK) is a social enterprise founded in August 2008 that uses exhibitions and workshops to raise the public’s awareness of the disadvantaged and provide jobs for the blind. It also aims to achieve financial success and sustainability, and provide dividend payouts to investors. In the first two years of operation, DiD HK’s innovations attracted many participants and created jobs for visually impaired employees. It made progress toward a breakeven in 2010 through its unique ownership and business models; the start-up team invented many new programs unheard of in other franchises.<br><br>Although DiD has franchises all over the world, none of them are sustainable and successful. Geared toward expanding to other parts of Asia, DiD HK is not without its problems. Its product range and market have room for improvement, and there is a lack of repeat visits to the exhibition. DiD HK also needs further financial capital, human resources, and other resources. Thus, it is imperative for management to review its strategies, and find ways to sustain its expansion and financial performance. If DiD HK can overcome these challenges, it may serve as a role-model social enterprise not just in Hong Kong, but also in other parts of the world.

Clarke, a mosquito abatement company seen as having a core business that is environmentally harmful by its very nature — selling pesticides — faces unique challenges in its transformation into a sustainable enterprise. Should it shift its focus entirely towards offering “green” pesticides and risk losing some of its customers, or should it keep offering its less expensive, more toxic products? This case shows how even when innovation leads to new green products, processes, technologies, and business models, the leadership of a company must cope with the daunting task of engaging employees and customers in the idea that green can be effective and profitable.

This case is about a software development company, Telerik, which was based in Bulgaria and had international offices. The company was founded in 2002 and had become a world leader in user interface (UI) components for Microsoft’s .NET framework. It was still managed by its original four founders and had grown to 400 employees. In 2006, in response to fast growth and to retain its rapid development product process, Telerik adopted agile development, which was a values-driven process that included decentralization, rapid development cycles, intense customer service, teamwork, and face-to-face communication. <br><br> Telerik had moved into a new and modern building and its physical environment was designed specifically to facilitate agile development. The company’s management style was informal, hands-on, consultative, and development-driven, with a youth-focused culture. Its recent innovations in benefits, including concierge services and stock options, had given Telerik an edge in human capital with an employee turnover rate of under five per cent. The founders’ success was based upon the rapid deployment of committed human capital in a culture of teamwork and custom. They were excited about the growth of Telerik, but wondered how the company could continue to be successful and innovate.