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This case considers the CEO of a logistic company trying to form her own opinion about whether global warming is a real concern or simply a hoax. The case consists of two contradictory reports reviewing the existing evidences for global warming, from two scientific experts holding opposite views on the subject.

Two-sided marketplaces often risk disintermediation: Users may rely on the marketplace to find each other, but then perform related future transactions--or even the current transaction--without the platform's involvement and without paying any fees the platform may charge. This technical note assesses which marketplaces are most vulnerable to disintermediation, and offers a set of strategies marketplaces can implement in order to reduce their vulnerability.

Series of scenarios each presenting a situation that asks the student to decide how to proceed.

In 2016, after successfully turning around Finnish nonwovens manufacturer Suominen, CEO Nina Kopola faces a decision on the company's strategy moving forward.

Supplement to case IMD805. The case is set at a time when Bandhan, the largest microfinance institution (MFI) in India and the largest non-deposit taking MFI in the world, was about to embark on an organizational transformation that would convert it into a mainstream bank. In July 2013, supported by a Geneva-based investor, Bandhan had applied for a banking license to expand its operations by leveraging its network. And in May 2014 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had granted the license to Bandhan, making it the first MFI in the country to win a bank license, and also the youngest entity to be allowed to enter the banking space in India. Established in 2001 by Chandra Shekhar Ghosh to address the dual objective of poverty alleviation and empowerment of women, Bandhan had grown by 2013 to 2,016 branches across 22 states and union territories within India. With over 5 million borrowers and total outstanding loans of INR 57 billion (~US$1 billion), it had zero non-performing loans. Ghosh had ambitious growth plans focused on the rural sector. Bandhan seemed to have built the right capabilities to be successful as an MFI. The case allows for a rich discussion about the new capabilities that Bandhan would require as it shifted from pure MFI to banking entity and how it should go about acquiring those capabilities. Was it preparing well to deal with the challenge of entering, surviving and growing in the banking industry while continuing to serve and grow in the MFI space? Could it develop a unique and innovative model to help it straddle both worlds? With this license, Bandhan had been offered an opportunity to re-create the entire banking edifice in India. Participants have the opportunity to analyse the key issues in the case and attempt to answer the question playing on everyone's mind - how would Bandhan deliver on the goals of financial inclusion?

The case is set at a time when Bandhan, the largest microfinance institution (MFI) in India and the largest non-deposit taking MFI in the world, was about to embark on an organizational transformation that would convert it into a mainstream bank. In July 2013, supported by a Geneva-based investor, Bandhan had applied for a banking license to expand its operations by leveraging its network. And in May 2014 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had granted the license to Bandhan, making it the first MFI in the country to win a bank license, and also the youngest entity to be allowed to enter the banking space in India. Established in 2001 by Chandra Shekhar Ghosh to address the dual objective of poverty alleviation and empowerment of women, Bandhan had grown by 2013 to 2,016 branches across 22 states and union territories within India. With over 5 million borrowers and total outstanding loans of INR 57 billion (~US$1 billion), it had zero non-performing loans. Ghosh had ambitious growth plans focused on the rural sector. Bandhan seemed to have built the right capabilities to be successful as an MFI. The case allows for a rich discussion about the new capabilities that Bandhan would require as it shifted from pure MFI to banking entity and how it should go about acquiring those capabilities. Was it preparing well to deal with the challenge of entering, surviving and growing in the banking industry while continuing to serve and grow in the MFI space? Could it develop a unique and innovative model to help it straddle both worlds? With this license, Bandhan had been offered an opportunity to re-create the entire banking edifice in India. Participants have the opportunity to analyse the key issues in the case and attempt to answer the question playing on everyone's mind - how would Bandhan deliver on the goals of financial inclusion?

The Xiaomi case explores how this Chinese startup leveraged ubiquitous connectivity and open innovation to revolutionize the mobile phone industry in the global market. In less than five years it became the world's third largest mobile phone maker and second most valuable startup. This progress is even more dazzling considering the organization's business model, which differs considerably from traditional Chinese firms. Investors saw Xiaomi as social media giant capable of mobilizing an enormous fan base in its product development, like many Silicon Valley startups. Some even saw Xiaomi as marking a new wave of Chinese companies focused on developing new capabilities rather than manufacturing. Perhaps the strongest endorsement came from a former Android executive, Hugo Barra, who left Google to join Xiaomi in October 2013 to manage the company's international expansion. Xiaomi -which means "little rice or millet in Chinese, may not be that small after all. Learning objective: The case allows students to explore how ubiquitous connectivity and open innovation may take hold in the Chinese market, and how it might impact the global market place. The material in the case offers a multitude of options for deep dives into a variety of topics, eg: understanding how industries evolve and how profits can shift from one end of the value chain to another; demonstrating the importance of open innovation; illustrating the need to be adaptable to changing market conditions; etc.

Google's founders wrote "10 Things We Know To be True," a document detailing founding principles and values, early in the company's life. As the company expanded, added business units, and changed its name to Alphabet, were these principles and values still valid and relevant? If not, how should they be changed? This product can be used with the free Job Design Optimization Tool (JDOT), available at: hbsp.harvard.edu/jdot

This product can be used with the free Job Design Optimization Tool (JDOT), available at: hbsp.harvard.edu/jdot

This short note provides background and data on the growing role of corporate activists, especially in high technology industries.

In 2015, TiVo initiated a search for a new CEO. This case provides a profile of the CEO search and background on the company.

Monique Oxender, chief sustainability officer for Keurig Green Mountain Coffee, is carefully considering the criticism the company has received regarding its plastic K-Cups that deliver a single serving of coffee to consumers through the Keurig brewing system. Billions of the difficult-to-recycle K-Cup pods are ending up in landfills. Keurig Green Mountain has pledged to produce 100% recyclable K-Cups by 2020, but how will it achieve this goal? Oxender must address the environmental impact and public scrutiny of the company's signature product. However, she must find a way to overcome the inconsistent and sometimes inadequate recycling infrastructure in Keurig's markets. Students join Oxender in finding the best, workable solutions.

As Angela Laramie compiled her thirteenth annual report on sharps injuries (SIs) among hospital workers for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health's Occupational Health Surveillance Program, she noted that the prevalence of injuries had remained at the same level for six years in a row. From 2002 through 2009, the SI rates had trended downward as hospitals implemented sharps injury prevention plans, but starting in 2009, the decline in rates and number of sharps injuries appeared to have stalled. Angela hoped to evaluate the reasons for the apparent lack of progress over the last few years, and to reassess the state's approach: were the data they had been collecting adequate to meaningfully capture the sources and incidence of SIs in Massachusetts hospital workers? Did it clearly indicate where interventions should be targeted? Were there other data that could help her better understand the flat trend line? What did the data tell her, and what more should she know?

When Pure Storage did its IPO, in October 2015, the company was six years old and had completed six rounds of private funding. It could have gone public a year or so earlier, and the CEO realized that waiting entailed risks. In fact, the IPO market was cooling, and companies were pulling their offerings as a result. But staying private longer may have significant advantages as well. In retrospect, Dietzen believes that the timing worked out well for Pure. Among the factors that influenced the decision to wait: Sarbanes-Oxley has made it more expensive to be a public company; staying private would make it easier to fend off M&A interest; and the precedents set by Google and Facebook, which waited much longer than venture-backed companies have historically, drove a change in the conventional wisdom. Nevertheless, Pure's customers encouraged an IPO, because many of them preferred to do business with a public company, whose financials are available for scrutiny. In preparation for the offering, Pure gave employees flexibility with their stock options, expanded the board, and hired a strong CFO. Happily, in the months surrounding the IPO, two key competitors were distracted by internal events. Although the company's stock price has fluctuated, Dietzen says, today Pure is a fast-growing and healthy business.

The financial world set a record in 2015 for mergers and acquisitions. It's too soon to have data on how those deals will work out, but the signs are not promising. Last year Microsoft wrote off 96% of the value of the handset business it had acquired from Nokia in 2014 for $7.9 billion. The rule, confirmed by nearly all studies, remains true: M&A is a mug's game, in which some 70% to 90% of acquisitions are abysmal failures. The author has an explanation for this persistent failure and offers a way forward. Acquirers, he notes, tend to look at acquisitions as a way of obtaining value for themselves--access to a new market or capability. The trouble is, if you spot a valuable asset or capability in a company, others will too, and the value will be lost in a bidding war. But if you have something that will make the acquisition more competitive, the picture changes. As long as the acquired company is incapable of making that enhancement on its own or (ideally) with any other company, the buyer, rather than the seller, will earn the rewards. Martin describes four ways to enhance the competitiveness of a target: (1) Be a smarter provider of growth capital. (2) Provide better managerial oversight. (3) Transfer valuable skills to the acquisition. (4) Share valuable capabilities with the acquisition.

Yolk-ay, a United Arab Emirates restaurant chain specializing in traditional Indian egg dishes, recently opened its eighth location in 10 years--but turnover is flat, and competitors are gaining market share. Should Yolk-ay go after new customers by adding vegetarian and chicken dishes to the menu? Or stick to what it's known for rather than risk diluting its brand identity? The chain's father-son owners are on opposite sides of the issue. This case includes expert commentary from Rajiv Meherish, the founder of the Dubai-based restaurant group Raju Omlet, and Anthony Ackil, a cofounder of the U.S. fast-casual chain b.good.

Yolk-ay, a United Arab Emirates restaurant chain specializing in traditional Indian egg dishes, recently opened its eighth location in 10 years--but turnover is flat, and competitors are gaining market share. Should Yolk-ay go after new customers by adding vegetarian and chicken dishes to the menu? Or stick to what it's known for rather than risk diluting its brand identity? The chain's father-son owners are on opposite sides of the issue. This case includes expert commentary from Rajiv Meherish, the founder of the Dubai-based restaurant group Raju Omlet, and Anthony Ackil, a cofounder of the U.S. fast-casual chain b.good.

Yolk-ay, a United Arab Emirates restaurant chain specializing in traditional Indian egg dishes, recently opened its eighth location in 10 years--but turnover is flat, and competitors are gaining market share. Should Yolk-ay go after new customers by adding vegetarian and chicken dishes to the menu? Or stick to what it's known for rather than risk diluting its brand identity? The chain's father-son owners are on opposite sides of the issue. This case includes expert commentary from Rajiv Meherish, the founder of the Dubai-based restaurant group Raju Omlet, and Anthony Ackil, a cofounder of the U.S. fast-casual chain b.good.

In April 2012, Karen Oldfield, President and Chief Executive Officer of Halifax Port Authority (HPA), was considering urgently needed action on the disposition of the financially troubled Halifax Seaport Farmers' Market (HSFM). One of 18 Canada Port Authorities, HPA's mandate was to "develop, market, and manage its assets in order to foster and promote trade and transportation." The organization exercised management authority over Halifax Harbour and 258 acres of adjacent federal land and HPA-owned facilities. Its lines of business encompassed cargo handling, cruise, and real estate operations. HPA had launched a Seaport Redevelopment Plan in 2005. An integral component of that plan was the establishment in 2010 of a six-day-a-week HSFM that would service the cruise trade and provide the local community with a gathering place. The market was operated by the City Market of Halifax Cooperative Ltd. (CMHC), which leased the property from HPA. By 2012, CMHC revenues were failing to support operating expenses and debt. Current obligations that totaled $732,436 were past due. A consultant concluded that the performance failure was due to a high debt load, governance and management problems, an unclear identity, construction flaws, and insufficient revenue on weekdays. It was clear that without intervention, HSFM would fail soon. Should HPA allow the market to fail and put the property up for lease? Should the organization continue providing financial and management support to the current tenant? Should it endeavor to find another organization to operate the market? Or should it commit to operating the market, even though HPA did not normally operate the facilities it governed?

Billy Cordasco, as President of Babbitt Ranches, was looking for alternatives to his current business model, where calves were born on the ranch, kept on the range for over a year, and then sold on the hoof at the market price. Interest in alternatives to the grain-fed beef offerings of supermarkets was growing. Health and sustainability issues had increased the popularity of grass-fed beef. Beef production and sales were generally low margin businesses, but if consumers were willing to pay a premium price for sustainable grass-fed beef, it might be possible for Babbitt Ranches to respond to the consumer need and increase the firm's bottom line at the same time. Because of Babbitt Ranches' financial resources, size, and reputation, numerous business model options existed. Billy needed to brainstorm which business models made sense for Babbitt Ranches. Presented with information necessary to understand the complex beef value chain, financial data on different value chain functions, and several options that were previously considered by Babbitt Ranches, Billy was able to both quantitatively and qualitatively the evaluate taking over one or more of the following functions: slaughter, hanging, processing, distribution, wholesale and/or retail sales. Under consideration was Babbitt Ranches' ability to acquire or develop the necessary resources for a new business model. Recognizing the opportunity presented by the increasing demand for grass-fed beef and the challenge of a complex beef value chain, Billy's goal was to limit the number of business model options to those that were feasible so he could put additional resources toward due diligence on a reasonable set of models.