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In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the simulator let students explore horizontal differentiation with and without price setting, strategic complements and substitutes and their implications for commitment and for first-mover advantage, the effect of the number of competitors on the competitiveness of a market, capacity limitations and judo economics, natural monopoly and the effect of market size, technology choice as entry deterrence, endogenous economies of scale, and capacity limitation in commodity markets.

Gelfond knew little about the movie business when he and a partner acquired IMAX, back in 1994. At the time, most IMAX movies were nature documentaries, shown in the theaters of science museums, but he recognized that the entertainment experience the company provided had great potential. Figuring out how to move into mainstream markets turned out to be far more challenging than Gelfond had anticipated, however. The technology constraints of the pre-digital era and the cultural constraints of the Hollywood movie industry combined to slow IMAX's progress toward the successful business model it relies on today. At one point in 2001, the stock was trading at 55 cents a share, and some bondholders tried to force IMAX into bankruptcy. In 2006 Gelfond and his team actively tried to sell it. But doubts about its survival faded in 2009--particularly after the IMAX version of Avatar became a global phenomenon, bringing $250 million in revenue to the company.

The story of the PC industry has been etched in the minds of strategists as a template for how industries evolve in the knowledge economy. In the natural order of things, so the story goes, industries disaggregate as interfaces between various stages of the value chain become open and standardized, allowing value to migrate up or down the value chain. But value migration away from established players doesn't have to be inevitable, argue authors Michael Jacobides and John Paul MacDuffie. Auto manufacturers, for example, have kept a fairly constant share of their industry's total market capitalization despite much recourse to outsourcing and intense competition in the sector. Carmakers and other industry leaders like Apple and Google gain and hold on to strategic control and value in their industries in four key ways: (1) Controlling the assets least likely to be commoditized (and blocking others' efforts to do the same); (2) Serving as "guarantor of quality" to the end customer (including assuming responsibility for the entire product, even components made by suppliers); (3) Staying in close touch with changing customer needs (changes in the end consumer are often accompanied by shifts in who captures the most value in an industry); (4) Balancing the imperatives of growth and strategic control of the value chain. Through the lens of the auto industry, the authors look at how established players can defend value in their industries and how emerging players can change the competitive landscape to drive value their way.

An established rental car company acquires a car-sharing start-up and must decide whether to fully integrate it, to leave it as an independent unit, or to take a course somewhere in the middle. This fictional case study is written by Susan Fournier, Giana M. Eckhardt, and Fleura Bardhi, featuring expert commentary by Marc McCabe and Andre Haddad.

An established rental car company acquires a car-sharing start-up and must decide whether to fully integrate it, to leave it as an independent unit, or to take a course somewhere in the middle. This fictional case study is written by Susan Fournier, Giana M. Eckhardt, and Fleura Bardhi, featuring expert commentary by Marc McCabe and Andre Haddad.

An established rental car company acquires a car-sharing start-up and must decide whether to fully integrate it, to leave it as an independent unit, or to take a course somewhere in the middle. This fictional case study is written by Susan Fournier, Giana M. Eckhardt, and Fleura Bardhi, featuring expert commentary by Marc McCabe and Andre Haddad.

The case deals with Gilead Sciences, a bio-pharmaceutical company with several FDA approved HIV/AIDS drugs. In 2006, the company launched the Gilead Access Program to enhance access to HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries. In India, which also happened to be the largest producer of generic drugs, Gilead signed a voluntary licensing agreement for its drug, Viread, with 13 companies. By 2011, Mylan (previously known as Matrix Laboratories), one of the 13 Indian companies, had emerged as the leading supplier for Viread, with two-thirds of the global market. In order to accelerate its market reach, Gilead wanted to expand the scope of the agreement with four major Indian companies, including Mylan. Gregg Alton, Executive Vice President for Corporate and Medical Affairs, had to decide how he would convince his partners to come on board and how to execute the agreement.

The case traces the journey of an Indian pharmaceutical firm, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, which had traditionally focused on generic drugs, into the area of discovery research. After India entered the global product patent system with the signing of the WTO TRIPs agreement in 1994, a number of Indian companies sought to move into discovery research. Glenmark invested heavily in developing its capabilities to undertake high-risk pharmaceutical research, and within three years developed several promising molecules. The company signed out-licensing agreements for the molecules with international companies two agreements with U.S.-based Eli Lilly and Company and one each with U.S.-based Forest Laboratories and Germany-based Merck KGaA. The case takes students back to 2008, one of the most critical periods in the company's evolution. Three of Glenmark's four drug development projects have failed and the fourth is showing signs of failure. The company's stock price has plummeted and the management is under pressure from financial analysts to drop discovery research and focus on what they had always done best generics. The case puts participants in the chair of Glenmark's CEO Glenn Saldanha, who must, amid the building pressure and resource constraints on the company, develop a future plan of action for its R&D. To be or not to be the innovation company? That is the question before Saldanha and the class.

The case traces the journey of an Indian pharmaceutical firm, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, which had traditionally focused on generic drugs, into the area of discovery research. After India entered the global product patent system with the signing of the WTO TRIPs agreement in 1994, a number of Indian companies sought to move into discovery research. Glenmark invested heavily in developing its capabilities to undertake high-risk pharmaceutical research, and within three years, developed several promising molecules. The company signed out-licensing agreements for the molecules with international companies two agreements with U.S.-based Eli Lilly and Company and one each with U.S.-based Forest Laboratories and Germany-based Merck KGaA. The case takes students back to 2008, one of the most critical periods in the company's evolution. Three of Glenmark's four drug development projects have failed and the fourth is showing signs of failure. The company's stock price has plummeted and the management is under pressure from financial analysts to drop discovery research and focus on what they had always done best generics. The case puts participants in the chair of Glenmark's CEO Glenn Saldanha, who must, amid the building pressure and resource constraints on the company, develop a future plan of action for its R&D. To be or not to be the innovation company? That is the question before Saldanha, and the class.

James White, the new CEO of Jamba Juice, has successfully averted bankruptcy and must now decide the future path for Jamba Juice, the leader in the smoothie and fresh bar industry. This two part case presents the various strategic options White is considering. It then asks participants to determine the best strategic path and how this path should be specifically implemented. The follow on (B) case describes what White actually did and presents the results.

James White, the new CEO of Jamba Juice, has successfully averted bankruptcy and must now decide the future path for Jamba Juice, the leader in the smoothie and fresh bar industry. This two part case presents the various strategic options White is considering. It then asks participants to determine the best strategic path and how this path should be specifically implemented. The follow on B case describes what White actually did and presents the results.

In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and without price setting, strategic complements and substitutes and their implications for commitment and for first-mover advantage, the effect of the number of competitors on the competitiveness of a market, capacity limitations and judo economics, natural monopoly and the effect of market size, technology choice as entry deterrence, endogenous economies of scale, and capacity limitation in commodity markets. It can be used to introduce these concepts without necessarily relying on a lot of math or as an intuitive complement to a more mathematical exposition.

The framework of strategic complements and substitutes can help companies anticipate competitors' responses. It is particularly helpful in deciding on price- or capacity-commitments (or pre-emption), but it can provide more general guidance for analyzing the potential impact of commitments and pre-emption.

The case discusses the economic development of Estonia, covering specifically the period from regaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 until 2015. It tracks the process from the initial transition towards a market economy to becoming an EU member country, including the 2007 crisis and the government's response to it. The overall performance of the economy, the profile of its key clusters, and the quality of its business environment in 2015 are discussed. The case provides the background for an analysis of policy reforms in a transition economy, the role of legacy and geographical neighborhood for economic development, the implications of EU membership for an EU member country, and the relationship between microeconomic reforms and macroeconomic crisis.

In 2000, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) was the second-largest and most global player in the fashion retail business. It operated 682 stores, 80% of them outside its home country of Sweden, and achieved revenues of $3.0 billion and operating profits of $375 million. In 1999, when H&M announced plans to enter the U.S., sales had grown 20% per year and operating profits, 30%, for a decade. After the August announcement of U.S. expansion plans, its share price hit a record $35 (a P/E of over 90). But the new millennium brought challenges and uncertainty. In March 2000, the first nonfamily CEO, Fabian Mansson, resigned after only two years at the helm and the company issued a profits warning. In September 2000, H&M's share price closed at $18.68, a fall of nearly 50% from the prior year. Meanwhile Gap, the world's leading fashion retailer with revenues of $13.7 billion, was adding 600 stores a year and expanding into Europe from its U.S. base. Rolf Erikson, Masson's replacement, impressed few analysts and questions lingered about H&M's ability to maintain its rate of expansion. What did new CEO Rolf Erikson need to do to avert the threat from Gap and restore the company's fortunes?

"In 2012, Hennes & Maurtiz (H&M) was the second-largest specialty apparel retailer in the world. Sales for fiscal 2012 were $18.1 billion and operating profits were $3.3 billion. H&M operated 2,776 stores, 93% of them outside its home base of Sweden. Over the past decade, H&M had passed Gap in sales, but the company had failed to keep up with Inditex's growth and its Spanish rival had larger sales and greater profitability than H&M. H&M had also lagged behind Inditex in supply pipeline speed, brand diversification, online retail presence, and expansion into China. Meanwhile, the world's leading hypermarket chains, including Wal-Mart and Tesco, were making significant headway in apparel and challenge H&M's basic clothing segment.<br> In 2012, CEO Karl-Johan Persson, grandson of the company's founder Erling Persson, promised increased expansion into underdeveloped markets, a stronger push to online retailing, and the launch of a major new retail brand. Whether Persson's plans were enough to catch up with Inditex remained to be seen."

For Feike Sijbesma, CEO of Royal DSM since 2007, rapid changes were normal as major trends were playing out. Global population swelled, the balance of wealth shifted, often increasing disparities and inequalities, while human beings remained hooked on using more resources than the planet could handle or replace. As early as 2010, DSM formulated a strategy to build on its strength in Life and Materials Sciences, capitalizing on what it saw as the most promising global megatrends, notably health & wellness, global shifts and energy & climate change. At DSM, sustainability went way beyond complying with laws and regulations: It was a key driver for innovation and a core value for the firm. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 and the ensuing recession, cost concerns came back to the forefront, pushing the sustainability agenda to the back. The sense of urgency on environmental and social issues was gone, so how could you convince people a totally different approach to doing business was needed? Could sustainability really be turned into an effective driver for innovation and ultimately improve a company's profitability? Were the three bottom lines - financial, social and environmental - really mutually self-reinforcing, instead of mutually exclusive? Proving the case to some still-reluctant financial investors could prove difficult. For DSM, the ultimate challenge to its broad-based sustainability agenda was quite clear: Could a case be made for sustainability as a key driver of value creation over the long term? Learning objectives: Sustainability as driver of innovation and growth, CSR in action, corporate venturing, sustainability strategies, growth management, portfolio management.

In 2000, Inditex was one of the largest specialty apparel retailers in the world, with $2.4 billion in sales from 1,080 stores across 33 countries. Zara, Inditex's main brand, produced popular designer items at a fraction of design-house prices and could push an item from design to display in less than two weeks. This left most other fashion retailers, who took between 9-12 months for this process, far behind. However, Inditex was still only one-sixth the size of the world's largest specialty retailer, US-based Gap, and two-thirds the size of its Swedish rival, H&M. Amancio Ortega, Inditex's notoriously private Chairman and founder, was committed to challenging these industry leaders. This expansion required more capital and, in July 2000, the company announced it would IPO in 2001. There was also the question of a new management team to take the company forward. Ortega was approaching retirement as was the CEO, José Maria Castellano. The first attempt to find a younger CEO had failed. Hopefully, an IPO would attract a new management team that could maintain Inditex's rapid expansion.

In the 11 years since its public offering, Inditex and its flagship brand, Zara, had expanded into 86 countries, achieved $21.6 billion in revenue, and become the largest specialty apparel retailer in the world. In marked contrast to the general malaise of the Bolsa de Madrid, Inditex's share price tripled from 2008 to 2012 and traded at 25 times expected 2013 earnings, a 15% premium over Swedish rival, H&M. From 1,080 stores in 2000, it had expanded to 6,009 locations while sales and operating profits grew 25% p.a over this period. It had also established online stores across 23 different markets, with plans for launches in Russia and Canada during 2013, and it managed eight different brands. CEO Pablo Isla remained confident of future success and anticipated store expansion would continue growing at 8%-10% per year for the next three to five years. How could Inditex best maintain its strong growth and fend off competition?

This case on Tally Solutions Pvt. Ltd. traces the evolution of the firm and highlights how the product has evolved from a ubiquitous accounting software into an all-encompassing platform, with the launch of Tally.ERP.9. The case is poised at a time when the company has to consciously make the shift from being a product sales and service company to repositioning itself into an enterprise software company (with the product still being sold in the shrink-wrapped form), and therefore begin encountering the forces of network effects and platform dynamics.