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The Port of Tauranga, located on the north island of New Zealand, was struggling against the Port of Auckland and not doing well financially. The case depicts the bold and dramatic steps during the 1990s to change the economic circumstances. Decisions were made that changed the rules of the game and, in so doing, made Tauranga a very successful and profitable enterprise. Capital investments and a total reframing of possibilities coupled with bold management execution transformed the port to a position of world-class performance.

This case examines the strategy implementation and risk management decisions at Sydney IVF, a research-based in vitro fertilization and stem cell company based in Australia. Drs. Robert Jansen and Jock Anderson, who co-founded Sydney IVF in 1986, developed novel technologies which they leveraged to carve a leadership role in the inherently risky artificial fertilization business. As the company grew, its executives grappled with managing the political, ethical and business risks associated with the contentious lab-based fertility field, instituting sophisticated safeguards such as an independent ethics committee and a "whistle blower" system for employees concerned with the company's practices. In less than two decades, Sydney IVF grew from just four employees to over 200, expanded internationally, and broadened its services to include prenatal screening for genetic diseases and DNA tests to determine lineage and paternity. In addition, the company launched a wholly-owned subsidiary, the Stem Cell Company. CEO Robert Jansen hoped to grow the Stem Cell Company, but faced many challenges, including the significant ethical risks, challenging regulatory environment, and uncertain future of the stem cell field. The case describes how Jansen safeguards against risk without stifling the innovative spirit necessary to commercialize stem cells.

The three cases in this series trace developments in the personal computer industry from its inception through 2006, making it possible to examine the issues of collaboration and competition as the value chain in the industry evolves. The A case looks at these tensions through the lens of the relationship between two for the industries' most successful firms-Compaq and Intel. As the A case describes, by the mid-1990s, Compaq was the world's largest PC manufacturer. Compaq's computers used Microsoft software and Intel processors. Compaq was Intel's largest customer and Intel was Compaq's largest supplier. Not surprisingly, then, it caused quite a stir when executives from Compaq and Intel entered into a heated public spat at a September 1994 European technology conference. See the B case (UV1012) and C case (UV1013).

The B case examines the shifting dynamics as Intel and Microsoft assert their dominance over the box makers. By 2001, Compaq was toppled as the world's largest PC maker. Intel remained the world's largest processor maker and Microsoft remained a software giant. But a company founded in 1984 by a University of Texas student had taken its place as a powerhouse in the "Wintel" value chain. That company was Dell. See the A case (UV1011) and C case (UV1013).

Dell clung to the top spot among PC makers in 2006, when it shipped just over 38 million computers-only about 20,000 more than rival Hewlett-Packard (HP), which acquired Compaq in 2001. HP also reported gains in the fast-growing laptop segment, mostly at the expense of Dell. After HP and Dell, the next three largest PC makers in 2006 were all based outside the United States: Lenovo of China (which purchased IBM's PC division in 2001), Acer of Taiwan, and Toshiba of Japan. Analysts observed that competitors had found ways to duplicate much of Dell's operations. See also the A and B cases (UV1011 and UV1012).

In 2008, executives at Microsoft must decide how to compete against Google in the market for Internet search and advertising. The case describes how Microsoft has responded to a set of competitive threats in the past; how Google has gained a dominant position in Internet search and advertising; and what Microsoft has done so far in its as-yet-unsuccessful effort to catch up with Google. The case then challenges students to construct a strategy that will allow Microsoft to achieve its objectives in the evolving market for search and advertising.

The Gucci Group had transformed itself into the world's third largest luxury retailer with multiple brands. The company had performed well even after the departure of star designer Tom Ford and former CEO Domenico De Sole. However, the challenging global economic times in 2009 raised the question whether it was time, again, to re-adjust Gucci's portfolio, especially as YSL continued to lose money.

After years of gaming console industry leadership, how should Sony respond to the overwhelming success of competitor Nintendo's user-friendly Wii over Sony's high-tech PlayStation 3? It was August 2008 and Kazuo Hirai, chief executive of Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. (SCEI), was contemplating questions from reporters about how Sony planned to respond to Nintendo's Wii console, which was dramatically leading Sony's PlayStation 3 and Microsoft's Xbox 360 consoles in sales. The Wii's supremacy was especially disconcerting to Hirai, given that Sony had dominated the videogame industry and largely defined its course since 1995. But the tables had turned dramatically in the current generation. Though the Wii was technologically much less advanced than were PS3 and Xbox 360, the Wii's ease of use, innovative motion-sensitive controller, and simple but fun games had made the console a hit with all demographics: nine to 65 years old, male and female. As a result, Nintendo had stolen a march on its two larger rivals by appealing to people who were traditionally not avid videogame users. Microsoft's and Sony's more powerful machines remained targeted at the traditional "core gamer" audience: 18-to-65-year-old males. Hirai was determined to restore that supremacy in the current generation or the next. He knew that whether or not he publicly defined SCEI's strategy as a response to Wii, he had to find a way for his company to deal with the new order of the videogame industry that Nintendo had created. In seeking to do so, Hirai might find guidance in the history of the industry, which had been marked by rapid and frequent changes of fortune.

This case examines the decision of Alibaba Group to diversify from an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange (Alibaba.com) into a B2C and C2C exchange (Taobao.com) for Chinese retailers and consumers. In China, Taobao had managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world's largest consumer marketplace. However, the company had little revenue because it offered services free of charge. How could Taobao best monetize its services without attracting a new set of competitors?

In 2008, concert producer and promoter Live Nation, faces a decision about its strategy in light of the tumultuous changes in the music industry and the increasing power of the major artists. As the music business once again recreates itself in response to new technologies and consumer needs, this major player is considering focusing on its principal business of concert booking and related revenue, or moving forward with its efforts to take advantage of new opportunities in the music industry by forging comprehensive, and often expensive, relationships with artists and other clients.

The case discusses the story of Nissan's miraculous turnaround after Renault decided to invest in the company. The automobile industry had just begun another wave of consolidation, and many industry leaders believed that size was crucial for survival. This conclusion led to several mergers and acquisitions that produced varying results. The deal concluded between Renault and Nissan was remarkable because it was not billed or designed as an acquisition or even a joint venture. It was structured as an alliance, emphasizing the fact that both companies would have their own separate identities in the marketplace and separate executive committees that would run their strategy. However, the benefits were expected to originate in cross-company synergies, ranging from design to manufacturing and logistics to R&D. The case offers a rich description of the critical competitive elements that characterized the industry at the time the deal was signed. It also provides a good background on the strengths and weaknesses associated with each of the two companies before getting into the details associated with creating the turnaround plan and its implementation. The study paints a very good picture of the internal challenges that Carlos Ghosn, the incoming leader from Renault, faced in implementing the significant changes that were called for. It particularly emphasizes people-related issues such as performance management, creating change in a tradition-bound culture, the weight of administrative heritage and its impact on performance management, and other related issues. Given the global nature of the setting, the cross-cultural angles provide additional insights into the challenges leaders face when given a mandate for change. The case ends with a description of Renault and Nissan, both of which reported poor performance in late 2007. Ghosn had been at the helm of both firms for some time already, and was finding it difficult to sustain the momentum behind the change.

Robert D. Walter built Cardinal Health into the most valuable company in the U.S. health care services industry and the world's largest distributor of healthcare products. With revenues of $81 billion in 2006, was ranked Number 19 on the Fortune 500 list, and owned a third of the drug distribution business. Walter began this evolution with Cardinal Foods, but realized that this company would never be a big player in the food business given the presence of large, powerful incumbents. Through a series of acquisitions, Walter repositioned the company into the pharmaceutical distribution industry. Cardinal Health was one of a handful of large U.S. companies that had achieved earnings-per-share growth in excess of 20 percent for 15 years straight. Nevertheless, Wall Street was questioning whether Cardinal Health could continue to grow at this remarkable rate through acquisitions. This general doubt, coupled with questionable "stock crushing" accounting practices among wholesalers, including one of their own suppliers, was weighing down Cardinal's stock price despite their continued earnings growth. Cardinal Health, the merger and acquisition juggernaut, had hit an earnings speed bump. In October 2003, Cardinal Health disclosed that the SEC had launched an inquiry into questionable accounting practices in 2000 and 2001 in which Cardinal Health allegedly recognized $22 million in gains from litigation settlements before they were finalized. In May 2004, the SEC inquiry was converted into a formal investigation. It was July 2004 before Cardinal announced that their 2004 earnings, which had been predicted by the company to reach the "mid-teens or better," would only be 11 percent higher than the previous year. In July 2007, Cardinal announced that it had reached a final settlement with the SEC of $35 million, concluding an investigation into the company's historical financial reporting and disclosures from 2000 to 2004.

In 2009, Gazprom was widely believed to be among the most influential companies in the global oil and gas business. It had grown from its early days as an experiment in privatization of oil and gas following the rapid breakup of the Soviet Union. The case documents the growth strategies that the company has followed, its global aspirations, and the impact of its political lineage. The case offers a rich mix of insights into the contextual forces at work in shaping the destiny of Gazprom, the political pressures it faces as Russia's largest company, and its stutter-step approach to globalization. The material in the case allows for a comprehensive analysis and discussion on central themes such as the origin of competitive advantage for NOCs (National Oil Companies), the unique governance conflicts that they have to navigate in setting strategic direction, and the viability of their globalization strategies.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Although top managers must project an image of professionalism and strength, they still require networks of individuals they can trust. The development of trust depends on the degree to which the executives perceive the presence of three critical attributes -- ability, benevolence and integrity -- within their support networks, and on their ability to match these qualities with the type of support they are seeking in any particular situation. We model the support being sought as having high or low informational complexity and high or low emotional demand. The combinations correspond to four types of support requested: raw information (low, low), actionable advice (high, low), emotional support (low, high), and strategic or political help (high, high). Meanwhile, the three critical attributes (each with either a high or low rating) translate into eight kinds of support providers: Trustworthy Partner, Harsh Truthteller, Moral Compass, Loyal Supporter, Star Player, Average Joe, Dealmaker and Cheerleader. Executives in need of actionable advice will most often turn to Trustworthy Partners or Harsh Truthtellers, given their high levels of ability and integrity. For strategic or political help, Trustworthy Partners will be sought because of their high levels of ability, benevolence and integrity. Seekers of emotional support will look to Loyal Supporters and Trustworthy Partners because they offer high levels of benevolence and integrity. And when the three facets of trust are less critical, executives will be willing to go to virtually any of their contacts for raw information, though most often they seek out Average Joes. These and other matches were observed, useful data was gathered and valuable insights were obtained when we tested our model on vice presidents, directors, general managers and other executives at a Fortune 50 technology firm.

For competitive advantage in the 21st century, firms must be able to access and balance both the science of business and the art of business. Knowledge advances along four categories: from mystery to heuristic to algorithm to code, described here. Today's businesses can create value in two fundamental ways: first, by operating a business within a single knowledge category; i.e. either by running a heuristic, an algorithm, or code; and second, by instigating a progression along the sequence of knowledge from mystery to heuristic, heuristic to algorithm or algorithm to code. Doing both concurrently is critical to a modern organization's success.

Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences (2001) Michael Spence discusses his latest initiative, the Commission on Growth and Development, which has set out to tackle some of the world's 'wicked problems' by focusing on growth in developing nations. The Commission was brought together by a belief that the world's challenges - poverty, the environment, misunderstandings between nations, vast differences in living standards across countries - are best met in conditions of rising prosperity and expanding economic opportunities. He explains why the Commission is focusing on growth -- not because it is the final goal, but because it enables so many things that people care about: poverty reduction, productive employment, education, health and the opportunity to be creative.

We expect to find artistry in the fine arts, but artistry is possible in a wide variety of fields, from sports to management. Artistry can occur whenever both the end result and the means of getting there are open to shaping by the practitioner. For example, like an artist, a corporate strategist has the opportunity to define both where he or she wants to go and how best to get there. The successful results of artistic efforts are the memorable performances, breakthrough products and revolutionary advancements in thinking that display the captivating and special qualities that we associate with artistry. The author defines three elements of a personal knowledge system and how they can lead to artistry. In the end, she argues, if the situations you face are filled with uncertainty, surprises and complexity, working towards artistry is a choice limited only by your appetite for the implications of this choice.

In this interview with CogNexus Institute founder Jeff Conklin, he explains how our education and experience have prepared us to see and solve 'tame' problems, and why as a result, 'wicked problems' sneak up on us and create chaos. Conklin describes how organizations must embrace the fact that there are two distinct aspects of strategic projects - problem understanding and solution formulation. In each phase, different kinds of conversations must be woven together from beginning to end. He explains the concept of 'shared understanding' and why it is so critical to solving complex problems. At the heart of this new understanding of organizational life is the recognition that project work is fundamentally social, and that communication among stakeholders must be managed and nurtured in order for a social network to cohere into a functioning entity.

As the 21st century unfolds, lone creators of new ideas are increasingly rare, as teams and larger groups within organizations become the dominant mode through which progress is made in much of the world. Appropriately, management scholars have been turning their attention to organizational creativity. One such form of creativity, 'improvisational creativity' involves simultaneously identifying new challenges and generating responses with little or no time to prepare. To facilitate improvisational creativity, one must acquire the expertise to operate fluently in a domain without also acquiring the lack of novelty that often accompanies increased expertise.