個案總覽

Investigates the role of the private sector in improving the operating performance of a water utility. Compares the productivity of Water Supply Department and Macau's Water Supply Co. in supplying water to Hong Kong and Macau, respectively. Water service in Hong Kong is vertically separated into potable water supply, sewage treatment, and drainage, each carried out by different government departments. Identifies reasons for inefficiencies in Hong Kong's publicly owned water utility. Describes successful privatization experience for vertically integrated water utilities in the United Kingdom and other contractual models of water services provision in France and the United States. The findings provide a factual base for discussions on government policy and business strategy.

Cox Communications, the third largest U.S. cable television system operator, is confronting strategy decisions in mid-2004. Cox managers must decide whether to speed its deployment of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), which offers capital and operating costs savings compared to the traditional circuit-switched technologies Cox has used to offer phone service. Cox has had great success in attacking incumbent phone companies with bundles that include TV, high-speed Internet, and telephone services. However, VoIP deployment will be capital intensive, and Wall Street is pressuring Cox, like other cable operators, to deliver free cash flow. At the same time, cable operators have been losing market share to satellite TV providers, and Cox managers must decide whether to accelerate the capital-intensive deployment of digital video recorders (DVRs) to address this competitive threat. Can Cox afford to offer both VoIP and DVRs? A rewritten version of an earlier case.

In 2004, MySQL was a small, $10 million Scandinavian software company that seriously challenged the big three IT companies, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle, in their high-margin, $10 billion database business. A new phenomenon in the software industry--open source--provided ways for new entrants to challenge the incumbents and gain a foothold in a low-cost segment of the market. This case provides the opportunity to study the forces that would determine whether MySQL could change the database software category in the way Linux did for server operating system space. MySQL relied on a low-cost business model with a global, virtual organization, and the case frames the question of whether this innovative, Internet-based business model could be scaled into a large, profitable growth company. The case describes the open source software phenomenon through a specific case, MySQL, and the innovator's dilemma: MySQL gained a foothold by serving the needs of the growing Web services market that was ignored by the big three DBMS players. After the foothold was established, MySQL was in the position potentially to challenge every DBMS player in the market.

Scientific-Atlantia (S-A), a leading manufacturer of cable TV equipment, is confronting strategic challenges in mid-2004. For decades, cable operators have faced high switching costs that have locked them into exclusive supply relationships with either S-A or its somewhat larger rival, Motorola. S-A has developed technology that substantially reduces switching costs, and it is positioned to capture market share because it has an 18-month lead over Motorola in developing cable set-top boxes that incorporate digital video recorders (DVRs). Cable operators are eager to offer DVRs to stem subscriber losses to satellite TV. The case asks whether S-A should aggressively pursue opportunities to overlay its set-tops in cable systems that previously employed only Motorola gear. If so, to what extent should S-A subsidize cable operators' remaining switching costs? Are there risks in introducing more competition into what had previously been a stable duopoly? Also explores S-A's strategic options for dealing with a transition to all-digital television technology and consumers' growing demand for solutions for managing their digital media files (photos, music, etc.). Asks whether S-A should continue to offer an integrated, proprietary, end-to-end transmission solution or, instead, embrace a more open "ecosystem," relying to a greater extent on third-party software and hardware providers and offering solution elements on an unbundled basis. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

Examines the role of technology licensing in strategies for high-technology companies. In the 1990s, Rambus developed a revolutionary memory technology that would improve the ability of DRAMs to keep pace with ever-faster microprocessors. To commercialize the technology, Rambus licensed the technology to several DRAM vendors, who had to agree to allow Rambus to cross-license any improvements a licensee made to all other licensees. In its attempt to set the standard for the industry, Rambus faced competition from higher frequency versions of standard DRAMs; a consortium of DRAM manufacturers and systems companies, known as the SyncLink Consortium; and an alternative DRAM technology known as Double Data Rate SDRAM. Rambus' relationship with Intel, the dominant producer of microprocessors, didn't prove as successful as either party would have liked. Even more devastating to Rambus was its litigation with several of its customers, the DRAM vendors, and a suit by the Federal Trade Commission. Although most of the lawsuits against Rambus had been dropped in 2004, Rambus needed a new strategy to rebuild its business for the future.

Imitation exerts enormous influence over society--and business and finance in particular. And its influence has grown as the avenues by which people imitate--and are imitated--have multiplied and the process has gotten faster. Thousands of communications channels make it possible for virtually anyone in the developed world to know, almost instantaneously, what others do, think, believe, claim, or predict. More significantly, we can and do act upon such knowledge. The resulting fads and fashions, bubbles, and crashes are ever more frequent, severe, and complex. The information age has cast up more than its share of paradoxes, including this one: When information is plentiful, we often use it not to make better decisions but to imitate others--and their mistakes. In consumer purchases, financial markets, and corporate strategy, what others do matters more to us than the facts. When there's too much information, imitation becomes a convenient heuristic. This is the basis for a self-referential society. Imitation has its virtues, but it also promotes instability and unpredictability. That's because, by definition a multiplier, it can swell a single opinion into a mass movement or catapult the smallest player to the forefront of a market. Mastering the dynamics of self-reference won't ensure mastery of its consequences. But businesses that understand how imitation works can at least attempt to gird themselves against its worst effects--by accounting for it in their forecasts and risk management plans, by becoming more sensitive to unexpectedly changing circumstances, and by avoiding mindless imitation of other companies' moves.

The U.S. health care system is in bad shape. Medical services are restricted or rationed, many patients receive poor care, and high rates of preventable medical error persist. There are wide and inexplicable differences in costs and quality among providers and across geographic areas. In well-functioning, competitive markets, such outcomes would be inconceivable. In health care, these results are intolerable. Competition in health care needs to change, say the authors. It currently operates at the wrong level. Payers, health plans, providers, physicians, and others in the system wrangle over the wrong things, in the wrong locations, and at the wrong times. System participants divide value instead of creating it. (And in some instances, they destroy it.) They shift costs onto one another, restrict access to care, stifle innovation, and hoard information--all without truly benefiting patients. This form of zero-sum competition must be replaced by competition at the level of preventing, diagnosing, and treating individual conditions and diseases. Among the authors' well-researched recommendations for reform: Standardized information about individual diseases and treatments should be collected and disseminated widely so patients can make informed choices about their care. Payers, providers, and health plans should establish transparent billing and pricing mechanisms to reduce cost shifting, confusion, pricing discrimination, and other inefficiencies in the system. And health care providers should be experts in certain conditions and treatments rather than try to be all things to all people. U.S. employers can also play a big role in reform by changing how they manage their health benefits.

Of late, offshoring and outsourcing have become political hot buttons--they have been conflated to mean that high-paying, white-collar jobs have been handed to well-trained but less expensive workers in India and other locales. The brouhaha over the loss of service jobs, which currently account for over 80% of private sector employment in the United States, is not merely an American phenomenon. The fact is that service sector jobs in all developed countries are at risk. Regardless of what the politicians now say, worry focused on offshoring and outsourcing misses the point, the author argues. We are in the middle of a fundamental change, which is that services are being industrialized. Three factors in particular are combining with outsourcing and offshoring to drive that transformation: The first is increasing global competition, where just as with manufactured goods in the recent past, foreign companies are offering more services in the United States, taking market share from U.S. companies. The second is automation: New hardware and software systems that take care of backroom and front-office tasks such as counter operations, security, billing, and order taking are allowing firms to dispense with clerical, accounting, and other staff positions. The third is self-service. Why use a travel agent when you can book your own flight, hotel, and rental car online? As these forces combine to sweep across the service sector, executives of all stripes must start thinking about arming and defending themselves, just as their manufacturing cousins did a generation ago. This will demand proactive and far-reaching changes, including focusing specifically on customer preference, quality, and technological interfaces; rewiring strategy to find new value from existing and unfamiliar sources; deintegrating and radically reassembling operational processes; and restructuring the organization to accommodate new kinds of work and skills.

New York's public parks, brought to their magnificent peak by the legendary Parks Commissioner Robert Moses in the mid-20th-century heyday of direct government activism, were in disarray in a new era of public-sector austerity. As the City's hard-pressed government found itself short of money and manpower the parks-from the iconic Central Park to neighborhood playgrounds-grew dingy and dangerous. With few other options, park officials began experimenting in the 1980s with a new approach: Shifting responsibilities to the private sector. By 2003 this "partnership" strategy had become the linchpin of the park system. Private organizations-ranging from sophisticated organizations funded by New York's rich and famous to informal networks of neighborhood volunteers-had taken on major roles in maintaining, upgrading, and day-to-day management of the City's park system. Commission Adrian Benepe, though a veteran Parks Department employee deeply committed to public service, had contributed to the development of the partnership approach throughout his career. But as he was promoted to the top job, he faced the challenge of pursuing a complex mission when much of the essential capacity was subject to his influence but by no means under his control. Attending fundraisers, massaging donors' egos, and motivating volunteers-rather than the direct exercise of authority-are Benepe's most important management tools. HKS Case Number 1743.0

Syndication feeds--customized information streams distributed over the Internet in real time--are proliferating fast. If you don't start syndicating soon, you'll be marked as unresponsive and retrograde.

Socially responsible supply-chain management should be more than a PR gesture. Starbucks has made its social compliance programs part of its strategy by explicitly tying them to plans for corporate growth.

Eli Lilly and Company is a leading U.S. pharmaceutical company. The new president of intercontinental operations was re-evaluating all of the company's divisions, including the joint venture with Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, one of India's largest pharmaceutical companies. This joint venture had run smoothly for a number of years despite their difference in focus, but recently Ranbaxy had been experiencing cash flow difficulties due to its network of international sales. In addition, the Indian government was changing regulations for businesses in India, and joining the World Trade Organization would have an effect on India's chemical and drug regulations. The president must determine if this international joint venture still fits Eli Lilly's strategic objectives.

Explores the role of intellectual property in firms' strategies. Explains the legal and strategic differences between patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets and explores the multiple ways firms use these different legal protections to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace.

Bombardier Transportation, one of the world's largest manufacturers of passenger rail cars, has successfully negotiated the purchase of Adtranz, a large European manufacturer of rail equipment. The newly appointed CEO was brought in to manage the acquisition. The new CEO faces many challenges, including decisions about the pace of integration, location of headquarters, organization structure, personnel retention, and personal management style.

Prudential Insurance Co. attempted to diversify into financial services by building an investment banking franchise. Prudential's initial foray into the industry was its acquisition of The Bache Group in 1982. In 2000, the company decided to exit investment banking. The firm adopted various strategic positions and human resource management strategies during the 18 years it struggled to compete successfully against prestigious incumbents. Although Prudential's efforts to establish a top-tier investment bank ultimately failed, other firms did succeed in this endeavor.

Although all companies would like a better corporate reputation, many are not sure what it takes to create a good reputation and others are not sure that they should use their good reputation to compete in their various markets. Mimicking the behavior of respected companies does not provide a reliable resolution to these dilemmas. Presents a framework to help managers create a better corporate reputation for their organizations and assist them in deciding whether to use this as a primary basis for competition. Also exposes some of the main costs for an organization that decides to compete on its corporate reputation.

It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study in R0405A and R0405Z are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at UC Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study in R0405A and R0405Z are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at UC Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

On the basis of its innovative medical device for treating sleep apnea, CEO Peter Farrell has made Australian-born ResMed a successful global company. But the company is struggling to implement a strategy to expand the device from its focused core market to a much broader market for sufferers of stroke and congestive heart failure-an approach that involves an entirely different business model to sell modified products through new channels. This challenge is exacerbated by an organization in which the key R&D and manufacturing resources are located in Australia while the major markets are in the United States and Europe. At the conclusion of the case, Farrell must decide what action to take on several fronts. Strategically, he must decide whether to continue pursuing this five-year-old market expansion initiative; organizationally, he must decide whether the locus of initiative should be moved from Australia to Germany, the most promising market for the stroke and CHF application; and managerially, he must decide how to deal with the management team that has struggled with this new initiative for so long.