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mGAMES is a manufacturer of game-based software for portable computers, PDAs, and cell phones. The company's new CEO was just informed of a potential hostile takeover of the company by a major PDA manufacturer. At the same time, he received a phone call from a senior executive at a Scandinavian telecommunications company expressing interest in forming a partnership. With all of this happening, the CEO faces growing pressure from the company's chairman to address ongoing performance problems. In a complex and changing environment, he must choose which customer group (traditional handheld gaming device manufacturers, telecom manufacturers, or PDA manufacturers) to focus on.

Sparta Glass Products has been losing significant market share over the last several quarters in the non-glare-glass market, with a price 10% above the competition. Lowering the price is under consideration. Unfortunately, fully allocated costs are such that the lower price results in a loss. Issues to be discussed and analyses to be conducted include the relevant costs for the decision and the reactions from competitors.

China's economic reform program has had many important impacts on business competition in the nation. In many industries, foreign competitors entered, making "strategic investments" that they believed would lose money for a significant period of time and then turn profitable. At the same time, many Chinese companies adapted to the new environment much quicker than many observers expected. Meanwhile, however, a regulatory and administrative system that created substantial uncertainty, links between the state and companies, bank lending that kept money-losing firms in business, and a rapidly changing and reforming economy made business competition in China different from business competition in many other places. This case provides vignettes of four industry sectors in China in which competition was already fierce on the eve of China's WTO accession, including beer, personal computers, steel, and television sets. The class discussion focuses on the nature of competition in the industries and the likely impact of full accession into the WTO on competition. Allows for a discussion of the nature of uncertainty in business and for the development of tools to generate scenarios about future competition in uncertain situations.

ING Group is one of the 10 largest financial services companies in the world. The president of ING Direct USA is considering adding e-brokering to the ING Direct portfolio. He must examine the company's overall strategy, marketing strategy, operations, information technology, and finances to help determine whether the company should grow its own e-brokerage or buy one of three potential e-brokerage targets.

In 2002, Nomura, though long the market leader in Japan, lacked global presence and was beset at home by strengthened local competitors, Wall Street firms that were taking the best deals, outdated systems, controls, and staff skills. Was Nomura still a player to fear? Could it be?

Merck has been approached by a small biotech research firm with the proposal that Merck buy the rights to a new drug that promises to treat obesity and lower cholesterol. The drug is in the middle of phase I of the FDA approval process. Pat Harlow, the chief licensing officer, has been leading Merck's investigation team. A meeting is scheduled for tomorrow at which Merck's response to the offer will be drafted.

At a time when companies are poised to seize the growth opportunities of a rebounding economy, many of them, whether they know it or not, face a growth crisis. Even during the boom years of the past decade, only a small fraction of companies enjoyed consistent double-digit revenue growth. And those that did often achieved it through short-term measures--such as mergers and inflated price increases--that don't provide the foundation for growth over the long term. But there is a way out of this predicament. The authors claim that companies can achieve sustained growth by leveraging their "hidden assets," a wide array of underused, intangible capabilities and advantages that most established companies already hold. To date, much of the research on intangible assets has centered on intellectual property and brand recognition. But in this article, the authors uncover a host of other assets that can help spark growth. They identify four major categories of hidden assets: customer relationships, strategic real estate, networks, and information. And they illustrate each with an example of a company that has creatively used its hidden assets to produce new sources of revenue. Executives have spent years learning to create growth using products, facilities, and working capital. But they should really focus on mobilizing their hidden assets to serve their customers' higher order needs--in other words, create offerings that make customers' lives easier, better, or less expensive. Making that shift in mindset isn't easy, admit the authors, but companies that do it may not only create meaningful new value for their customers but also produce double-digit revenue and earnings growth for investors.

Based on a survey of 317 firms and in-depth cases on 6 firms, this article examines the management of the most intangible asset of the firm--its knowledge. This article examines the sources, uses, and outcomes of knowledge and shows how successful firms acquire and absorb more information and know-how. More importantly, these firms have more effective decision-making processes that enable them both to create new knowledge and to apply this knowledge to generating more innovation in products and processes. Greater levels of innovation, in turn, lead to improved market and financial performance. This article identifies eight key lessons for knowledge managers and demonstrates how rather than attempting to manage knowledge, firms should measure the change in the innovative outputs that arise from their knowledge management strategies and practices.

Mergers that instantly boost earnings per share may gain favorable attention from Wall Street, but dilutive deals can outperform accretive deals in the long term because executives are pressed to rigorously analyze and execute on the promise of their acquisitions.

Hang Seng Bank is the second-largest locally incorporated bank and the fifth-largest public company in Hong Kong. Due to growing consumer demand, peer pressure, and pressure to improve profits, Hang Seng launched e-banking in August 2000. This case provides a study of why Hang Seng accelerated its online banking strategies, critical issues in its implementation of strategies, and how Hang Seng is differentiating its online banking from that of other banks. Hang Seng has been serving customers throughout Hong Kong since 1933; it has been regarded as a reliable and traditional community bank. Discusses how e-banking is helping Hang Seng to strengthen its new image as a contemporary and progressive bank. The case also presents the issue of how to measure the profitability of online banking and/or technology investment.

In 2001, Citibank's Cash and Trade Group division transformed itself into an e-business, with the strategic intent of converting traditional money management business into an e-business framework. This case discusses how Citibank is using its traditional assets and integrating Internet initiatives into its e-business strategy to create sustainable competitive advantages. Competition in the cash and trade business is becoming intense and a new breed of competent and aggressive competitors is vying for the market, including technology companies interested in B2B e-payment. Citibank is responding to the competition by continually evolving its e-business strategy--connect, transform, extend. Also looks into the challenges that Citibank e-Business Group is facing in developing a single global web platform for the corporate market. The focus is on how Citibank is developing an e-business product that would serve the highly segmented market and how to encourage these markets to use a global single platform online. At one end of the spectrum are multinationals and top-level domestic corporates that operate sophisticated treasuries, and at the other end are companies and small- and medium-size businesses that are not yet ready to upgrade and transform their systems.

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.

The most successful private-equity firms regularly spearhead dramatic business transformations, creating exceptional returns for their investors. To understand how those firms do it, the authors studied more than 2,000 PE transactions over the past 10 years and discovered that the top performers' success stems from the rigor with which they manage their businesses. This article describes the 4 management disciplines vital to the success of the best PE firms. First, for each business, they define an investment thesis: a brief, clear statement of how to make the business more valuable within 3 to 5 years. The thesis, which guides all actions by the company, usually focuses on growth. PE firms know that the demonstration of a path to strong growth produces the big returns on investment. Second, they don't measure too much. They zero in on a few financial indicators that most clearly reveal the business's progress in increasing its value. They watch cash more closely than earnings and tailor performance measures to each business, rather than impose 1 set of measures across their entire portfolio. Third, they work their balance sheets, mining undervalued assets, turning fixed assets into sources of financing, and aggressively managing their physical capital. Last, they make the center the shareholder. Corporate staffs in PE firms make unsentimental investment decisions, buying and selling businesses when the price is right and bringing in new management when performance falters. These firms also keep their corporate centers extremely lean. By adopting these four disciplines, executives at public companies should be able to reap significantly greater returns from their own business units.

Performance Indicator is a start-up that holds patents on the use of color-change technology to indicate when golf balls have been damaged by exposure to water. Because golfers put two to five used golf balls into play for every one new ball they buy, the used golf ball market cuts severely into the sales of manufacturers. Performance Indicator's technology would dramatically curtail the availability of used balls, doubling or tripling the size of the market for new golf balls. At the time of the case, the founders have been pursuing this idea full time for five years, but have yet to convince any manufacturers to license their technology.

In 2000, Samsung Electronics was the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductor memory chips. Its main line of business was the manufacture of DRAM chips, but worldwide demand had plummeted. Moreover, Intel, the world's largest producer of microprocessors, had formed an alliance with Rambus, a memory design company, to develop a new super-high-speed DRAM design that would represent a new industry standard. Senior management at Samsung faced fundamental strategic issues: Should it continue to invest in the high-risk DRAM business alone, and could Samsung be a market leader by itself? Should it be steadfast in its opposition to the alternative standard, which represented new opportunities? If it adopted the Rambus design, how many resources should be devoted to the manufacture of Rambus chips? Diversification out of the volatile memory business was a key strategic issue and represented one possible means for reducing Samsung's vulnerability to industrywide downturns, but Samsung's past efforts to expand its nonmemory business had met with only limited success. This case provides the background to the issues Samsung faced as it debated how to meet these challenges while remaining a leading player in the semiconductor industry.

Understand how your industry relates to overall stock-market cycles, and you'll have a powerful tool for shaping strategy.

Although most companies dedicate considerable time and attention to acquiring and creating businesses, few devote much effort to divestitures. But regularly divesting businesses--even good, healthy ones--ensures that remaining units reach their potential and that the overall company grows stronger. Drawing on extensive research into corporate performance over the last decade, McKinsey consultants Lee Dranikoff, Tim Koller, and Antoon Schneider show that an active divestiture strategy is essential to a corporation's long-term health and profitability. In particular, they say that companies that actively manage their businesses through acquisitions and divestitures create substantially more shareholder value than those that passively hold on to their businesses. Therefore, companies should avoid making divestitures only in response to pressure and instead make them part of a well-thought-out strategy. This article presents a five-step process for doing just that: prepare the organization, identify the best candidates for divestiture, execute the best deal, communicate the decision, and create new businesses. As the fifth step suggests, divestiture is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to a larger end: building a company that can grow and prosper over the long haul.

"Business model" was one of the great buzzwords of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, Wal-Mart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.

The president and chief executive officer of a large food manufacturer is preparing his company's strategic agenda for the next five years. One of the top five food manufacturers in Canada, the company went public and restructured its management team six years ago. The efforts were successful, resulting in an increase in the company's market share. Recent food industry trends, however, added "box" stores and private label brands to the domestic competition. At the same time, the terms of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement are expected to abolish food-related tariffs within two years, opening up competition from across the border. Although the company has experienced success in the past five years, the president and CEO needs a strategic plan that will take the company to the next level.