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Covers the history of portfolio planning at CIBA-GEIGY, a leading Swiss chemical and pharmaceutical company, beginning with the introduction of the process in the mid-1980s. The discussion extends to the application of portfolio planning techniques to a specific investment proposal: the comprehensive modernization of a plant dedicated to the production of high-quality specialty pigments.

Updates Apple Computer--1992. Summarizes the key strategic actions from 1992 to 1995 regarding PCs, the PowerMac, multimedia, OS licensing, and alliances with IBM.

Updates Apple Computer--1992. Summarizes the key strategic actions of Compaq, Intel, and Microsoft.

Increasingly, senior executives who wish to expand their company's product, geographic, or customer reach consider alliances to be the strategic vehicle of choice. In the past five years, the number of domestic and cross-border alliances has grown by more than 25% annually. But the term alliance can be deceptive: in many cases, it really means an eventual transfer of ownership. The median life span for alliances is only about seven years, and nearly 80% of joint ventures end in a sale by one of the partners. Based on the author's experience with more than 200 alliances in various stages, they have developed a way for managers to diagnose whether an alliance is likely to lead to a sale and to devise an appropriate strategy--to assess bargaining positions and the risks of unplanned outcomes, and to plan for the partnership's evolution. They distinguish six types of alliances based on their probable outcomes: collisions between competitors, alliances of the weak, disguised sales, bootstrap alliances, evolutions to a sale, and alliances of complementary equals.

In 1994, both United Airlines and Continental Airlines launched low-cost airlines-within-an-airline to compete with Southwest Airlines. From 1991 to 1993, Southwest had increased its market share of the critical West Coast market from 26% to 45%. Considers how Southwest had developed a sustainable competitive advantage and emphasizes the role of human resources as a lever for the successful implementation of strategy. Asks whether competitors can successfully imitate the Southwest approach.

An abstract is not available for this product.

At first glance, Greater Boston Rehabilitation Services appeared to be in excellent financial shape in the spring of 1991, when Terry Ann Lunt was named its new executive director. A mix of government grants and work contracts with local businesses seemed to protect this 20-year-old organization, based in the hope that work could be a form of therapy for the mildly mentally ill, from the vagaries of public budget changes. Soon after her arrival, however, Lunt found that, unknown to the board that had hired her, three of the group's four sources of income were in jeopardy, that accounting records were, at best, haphazard, and employees were deeply confused as to the mission of the organization.

When is a product ready for the market? In this case, engineers present a prototype medical device product to the CEO for approval. The product, developed under a tight deadline, is essentially identical to the main competitor's product, but that competitor is temporarily off the market due to regulatory problems. The CEO must decide whether to take the product quickly to market to take advantage of the window of opportunity, or to send the engineers back to the lab to develop a more distinctive product that could differentiate Zoll more in the long term.

Supplements the (A) case.

Supplements the (A) case.

This case follows the development of a firm's first product, the public presentation of research results, and the stock market reactions. In spite of successful research, the stock price falls dramatically. Asks why this happened, how concerned the CEO should be, whether management could have prevented it, and what the firm should do now.

Structure follows strategy; and systems support structure. In the high-growth environment of post-World War II, a management doctrine rose up around these two aphorisms. But today the business environment has changed. A change in management doctrine is needed to match this new landscape. After 5 years researching 20 leading European, U.S., and Japanese companies, the authors concluded that senior managers must change their own priorities and way of thinking. Beyond designing corporate strategy, they must shape a shared institutional purpose. They must expand their focus from devising formal structures to developing organizational processes. And more than just managing systems, they must develop people. Top management's role in the companies researched already reflects the changes the authors prescribe. Consequently, 3M has managed to retain an entrepreneurial spirit despite its $14 billion bulk. ABB transformed two "also-ran" companies into the leading competitors in the global power-equipment industry. And companies like AT&T, Royal Dutch/Shell, Intel, Andersen Consulting, Kao, and Corning are doing well despite what some predicted as the inevitable decline of large corporations.

Merck's acquisition of Medco Containment Services in November 1993 set off a wave of controversial mergers between pharmaceutical companies and prescription-benefits-management companies. Drug-company executives argue that PBMs can provide valuable information about the way drugs are prescribed and used. But critics of the mergers question the PBMs' practice of offering incentives to retail pharmacists who persuade physicians to prescribe certain drugs. Critics also speculate that aggressive growth of acquired PBMs contributes to price competition, which may decrease profits and incentives for new-drug research. The PBM acquisitions are attempts to confront profound changes in the industry, but does ownership of PBMs create competitive advantage? Proponents of the mergers argue that a PBM can provide a pharmaceutical company with superior information, better access to customers, and the opportunity to introduce new products, such as capitation and disease management. But before drug companies can fully exploit the potential of alliances with PBMs, they face enormous challenges, including an environment that may favor less investment in R&D and important ethical and legal questions.

One of the profound consequences of the ongoing information revolution is its influence on how economic value is created and extracted. Specifically, when buyer-seller transactions occur in an information-defined arena, that information is more easily accessed and absorbed, and arranged and priced in different ways. Most important, the information about a product or service can be separated from the product or service itself. In some cases, the information can become as critical as the actual product or service in terms of its effect on a company's profits. As a result, information-defined transactions--or value creation and extraction in the marketspace--create new ways of thinking about making money and thus a new value proposition. Today both marketplace and marketspace transactions are occurring. The authors have researched how companies work marketplace and marketspace to their best advantage. These companies' experiences provide a useful backdrop for thinking about the marketspace and suggest a strategic model for maximizing opportunities in this emerging area.

On November 1, 1994, P. Roy Vagelos retired after nearly 20 years at Merck. As head of the research labs from 1975 to 1985 and then as CEO, Vagelos turned Merck into a pharmaceutical powerhouse through a series of breakthrough drugs. More recently, Vagelos shocked this once conservative corner of the medical industry with Merck's acquisition of the prescription-benefits-management company (PBM) Medco Containment Services, which provides prescription drugs to HMOs and employees of large corporations. Merck's acquisition of Medco represents a $6.6 billion bet on where the future of the pharmaceutical industry lies. In today's managed-care environment, Vagelos argues, the company that best controls the information flow from doctor to patient to pharmacist to plan sponsor has the greatest chance of succeeding. Medco has information on 38 million patients, which allows Merck to learn a lot more about how its drugs are prescribed and used and, ultimately, how effective they are in fighting disease.

How should a company behave in a "multifaceted relationship," when a supplier, customer, or partner is also a competitor? This dilemma is faced by a growing number of firms, especially in high-technology and global industries. Aside from technology and globalization, trends in regulation, diversification, product characteristics, and outsourcing often lead to these multifaceted relationships. What are the methods for managing them? One response is "stay away or get out," but avoiding or exiting complicated relationships can be costly. Another method is to "divide and conquer"; by carefully partitioning the separate modes of interaction with the other firm, the company can act as if the multifaceted relationship does not exist. An alternative approach is to "centralize intelligence," either by having different departments or divisions that interact with the competitor keep each other informed, or by creating a task force or committee whose function is to pool all information about the relationship. It is simplistic to urge all firms to launch blithely into multifaceted relationships; but when such relationships are inevitable, companies that learn to live with and benefit from them can stake out a better position for the future.

In the last 10 years, products have proliferated in every category of consumer goods and services, and the deluge shows few signs of letting up. Most companies are pursuing product expansion strategies--in particular, line extensions--full steam ahead. But more and more evidence is indicating the pitfalls of such aggressive tactics. The strategic role of each product becomes muddled when a line is oversegmented. Also, a company that extends its line risks undermining brand loyalty. Some companies, such as Procter & Gamble, Chrysler, and a leading U.S. snack foods company, have discovered that a carefully focused and well-managed line can increase profits and sales volume. John A. Quelch and David Kenny describe how marketing managers can sharpen their product-line strategies by improving cost accounting, allocating resources to popular products, researching consumer behavior, coordinating marketing efforts, working with channel partners, and fostering a climate in which product-line deletions are not only accepted but also encouraged.

In "Making Competition in Health Care Work" (July-August 1994), Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, Michael E. Porter, and Gregory B. Brown ask a question that has been absent from the national debate on health care reform: How can the United States achieve sustained cost reductions while at the same time maintaining quality of care? The authors argue that innovation driven by rigorous competition is the key to successful reform. A lasting cure for health care in the United States should include four basic elements: Corrected incentives to spur productive competition, universal insurance to secure economic efficiency, relevant information to ensure meaningful choice, and innovation to guarantee dynamic improvement. In this issue's Perspectives section, eleven experts examine the current state of the health care system and offer their views on the shape that reform should take.

Saturn was General Motors' (GM) response to Japanese companies' dominance of the small car market during the mid-1980s. In the three-and-a-half years since its first sedan rolled off the assembly line, the Saturn Corp. had accumulated an impressive list of achievements. In April, 1994 Saturn's top management team met with GM's leadership to discuss the subsidiary's business plan. As Saturn's president reflected on the company's future and on his experience at GM, he felt confident that the executive committee would approve expansion if the Saturn team showed that it had achieved a sustainable position. Illustrates strategic analysis of sustainable competitive advantage.

In the Spring of 1994, Saturn Corp. was setting sales records by attracting more than 25,000 buyers per month. Saturn officials believed there was a long-term opportunity to sell 400,000 to 500,000 cars per year in the United States and selected international markets. Saturn managers had been reviewing options for a second assembly plant (known as "Module II") with General Motors (GM) since the beginning of the year. One possibility was to expand capacity at Saturn's existing production facility in Spring Hill, Tennessee. A second set of options involved refitting one of several plants that had been mothballed or was scheduled to close shortly.