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In Chapter 3, Competitive Intelligence and the Sales Organization (36 pages), the author explains how an organization should enable competitive intelligence gathering among sales people. He contrasts motivation versus attitude, exploring fundamental aspects of each, and presents three elements of successful intelligence gathering: an eagerness to seek out information, the perceived value of timely information sharing, and the perceived value of a casting a wide net for information. The author outlines the individual, organizational, and environmental factors that influence a sales person's information gathering activities. He offers insight into how leaders can manage these factors to influence both motivation and attitude, and improve sales performance.

In Chapter 4, Competitive Intelligence Acquisition, Management, and Sales Ethics (24 pages), the author reviews field investigation strategies for sales people and organizational systems for information. The author explains that sales people gain market insight by developing a network and drawing out information, and notes key elements in training and coaching for these skills. He considers three ways in which salespeople gather data: being given information, asking for information, or investigating and finding information. He explains that the organization is responsible for gathering, consolidating, and processing information and offers practical guidance for each step of the process. He outlines specific questions and processes for collecting and communicating information within an organization. He concludes with considerations of the importance of setting rules around ethical information gathering.

Sales leaders have long fixated on process discipline, monitoring reps' conformance to "optimal" behaviors and their performance of specified activities. Recently, however, this sales machine has stalled. The approaches that once led to predictable progress in a sale do not work with today's customers, who are empowered with more information than ever before. The new environment favors creative and adaptable sellers who challenge customers with disruptive insights into their business--and offer unexpected solutions. Such "insight selling" gives reps latitude to discover what the customer has already concluded about its needs and the available solutions, determine who the decision makers are, look for signals that the customer is receptive to a new insight about its business, and then figure out how best to proceed. A study of 2,500 B2B sales professionals found that most organizations, despite faltering sales performance, still have a climate that emphasizes compliance rather than judgment. To create a judgment-oriented sales climate, managers must serve as connectors within and beyond their teams, providing a continual flow of information that supports reps as they exercise their judgment on individual deals. These managers must also focus on the long term, monitoring customers' behaviors and directing reps' creativity and critical thinking to the most promising opportunities. And they need to hire professionals--not necessarily those with sales backgrounds--who can thrive in the new climate.

Outotec was a market leader in providing mining solutions to large mining companies. The company's specialization and proprietary technology created value for its customers and helped the firm differentiate from its competitors. Yet, Outotec was not pricing or marketing its solutions in a way that took advantage of its distinct capabilities and value-add. Outotec used a cost-based (inside/out) pricing policy, which was the industry norm. As a result, operating profit was only 8% of sales and the CEO had promised the investment community improvements above 10%. Outotec wanted to move from a cost-based (inside/out) to a value-based (outside/in) pricing and selling model to capture more profitable revenues and meet profitability targets the CEO announced to investors. But there were several challenges to this, which the case highlights for students to discuss and debate.

Outotec was a market leader in providing mining solutions to large mining companies. The company's specialization and proprietary technology created value for its customers and helped the firm differentiate from its competitors. Yet, Outotec was not pricing or marketing its solutions in a way that took advantage of its distinct capabilities and value-add. Outotec used a cost-based (inside/out) pricing policy, which was the industry norm. As a result, operating profit was only 8% of sales and the CEO had promised the investment community improvements above 10%. Outotec wanted to move from a cost-based (inside/out) to a value-based (outside/in) pricing and selling model to capture more profitable revenues and meet profitability targets the CEO announced to investors. But there were several challenges to this, which the case highlights for students to discuss and debate.

A series of studies reveals that the warning labels added to risky products can make those products more appealing to consumers. The mere inclusion of a warning builds trust, because consumers feel that the seller is being honest--and over time that trust becomes more prominent, while the substance of the warning fades.

The dawning of the 21st century brought a wave of research into the phenomenon of sales force automation (SFA)--technology tools aimed at enabling sales organizations to better practice customer relationship management. While the academic literature has offered great insight into how an organization can increase the likelihood that its sales force will adopt a new technology system, a great majority of research stops there. This is unfortunate in that companies mistakenly infer that use of an SFA system is the major hurdle and that simply motivating SFA use will be the key to unlocking improved performance. However, this is often not the case; many organizations are able to get their sales force to use an SFA system but do not see improvements in performance. After briefly providing an overview of the factors affecting SFA use, this research provides insight into why use alone may not contribute to long-term improvements in a firm's sales performance. Key empirical findings and theoretical arguments from the extant literature are considered, and a list of best practices is offered here to help managers bridge the gap between SFA use and improved sales effectiveness and efficiency.

Daktronics Corporation made score boards and large displays for sports venues. The company had been the "Cadillac" of the industry and commanded nearly 70 percent share of the college and professional sports venue market for large displays. Recently, however, increasingly complex, technological installations and maturing manufacturing processes and sourcing had enabled new players to enter the market. Further, buyers in the large sports venue market had been including consulting firms in the decision process. Where Daktronics had often been the unchallenged choice, they were now being challenged by greater competition and channel influences that threatened both share of market and gross margins. Jay Parker, Daktronics Sales Manager for Large Sports Venues, was trying to understand the new market realities and devise an approach that would maintain Daktronics' market leadership and profits.

Companies have long emphasized touchpoints--the many critical moments when customers interact with the organization on their way to purchase and after. But this focus can create a distorted picture, suggesting that customers are happier with the company than they actually are. And it distracts from the more important picture: the customer's end-to-end experience. In their research, the authors--partners at McKinsey--have found that organizations able to skillfully manage the entire customer journey reap enormous benefits: enhanced customer satisfaction, reduced churn, increased revenue, and greater employee satisfaction. To realize these benefits, companies need to embed customer journeys into their operating models in four ways. They must identify key journeys, understand how they are performing in each, redesign and support those journeys, and change mind-sets to sustain the initiatives at scale. Journey-based transformations may take years to perfect. But they create a culture that engages the organization across functions and from top to bottom. It's a culture that's hard to build otherwise, and a true competitive advantage goes to companies that get it right.

Scoot is a new subsidiary airline of the Singapore Airlines Group (SIA) launched in November 2011. It is a low-cost, medium to long-haul carrier that is independently operated and based out of Changi Airport in Singapore. The low-cost carrier model is thriving as income levels continue to rise throughout the Asia-Pacific region, where more people are travelling by air for the first time. However, this phenomenon has led the airline industry to experience commoditisation and greater price-based competition. Full-service Singapore Airlines - an established premium brand with a long history - has a business model inappropriate for this kind of environment. Scoot's raison d'être is to take advantage of opportunities in the rapidly growing budget-travel segment. Campbell Wilson, a 17-year veteran of Singapore Airlines, is seconded as CEO to startup Scoot. In the year following the launch, criticisms of the new airline begin to appear. In October 2012, an editorial in a prominent publication claims that Scoot will contaminate the Singapore Airlines brand and cannabalise sales. How should Wilson address these claims?

Firms must allocate some minimum amount of value to stakeholders in order to retain access to the resources they provide. Stakeholder theory suggests managers optimize firm-level performance by allocating more than this minimum amount. However, how much is too much? This article addresses the misleading notion that more is always better when it comes to the treatment of stakeholders and, in doing so, provides needed refinement of the boundary of stakeholder theory's predictions. The upside for managers is guidance in distinguishing between the types of value-allocating behaviors that will lead to greater value creation in their firms and actions that are likely to reduce value overall.

Salesmanship is central to a start-up's success, but many entrepreneurs ignore this simple fact. They may believe that their idea will sell itself or that there's no point visiting a prospective customer without a finished product in hand. Those who search for sales advice find mostly tools and techniques for established companies. In a study of 120 entrepreneurs in six countries, more than half fully developed their products before getting feedback from potential buyers. Looking back, most said that was a mistake. Those who did start selling early did not spend enough time listening to prospects' reactions. Other mistakes included offering discounts to close initial deals, making early sales to family and friends, and failing to choose first customers strategically. When they did go on sales calls, the entrepreneurs fielded tough questions about the efficacy of their products, their credibility and experience, the size of their companies, their prices, and the cost of switching to an unproven offering. A sales model geared to entrepreneurs accounts for the fact that information gleaned during the sales process can be crucial in designing (or redesigning) the product itself. The model calls for meeting with prospects as soon as an idea is conceived to learn if it has broad appeal. The answer to that question determines whether the entrepreneurs jettison the idea, return to the drawing board, or proceed to prototype development and further testing with potential customers.

Companies work hard to persuade their customers to buy additional products. But a sizable segment of cross-buying customers are unprofitable, and the more they buy, the more companies lose. It's important to identify and neutralize the impact of these profit-destroying customers.

Research on the variables that affect whether employees "get" and execute company strategy. The biggest factor is communication from top management all the way down through the organization.

This case concerns the bonus structure for a representative sales team. Pharma Talent, a contract sales company for pharmaceutical companies across Canada, promised its clients that its representatives would drive sales at a lower cost than what the client would incur if it had its own sales force. Historically, it had contracts with products that targeted physicians (e.g., prescription drugs or medical devices); however, a new contract in Ontario involved an over-the-counter (OTC) product. Pharma Talent currently had a pay-for-performance bonus structure that had already been revised three times. Nevertheless, due to the structure of the different territories in Ontario, many sales team members thought the bonus was unfair and very discouraging, while its pay-for-performance structure did not meet the clients' needs.

In recent decades sales reps have become adept at discovering customers' needs and selling them "solutions." This worked because customers didn't know how to solve their own problems. But the world of B2B selling has changed: Companies today can readily define their own solutions and force suppliers into a price-driven bake-off. There's some good news, though, according to the authors, all directors at Corporate Executive Board. A select group of reps are flourishing in this environment--and lessons from the playbook they've devised can help other reps and organizations boost their performance. These star reps look for different sorts of organizations, targeting ones with emerging rather than established demand. Instead of waiting for the customer to identify a problem the supplier can solve, they engage early on and offer provocative ideas about what the customer should do. They seek out a different set of stakeholders, preferring skeptical change agents over friendly informants, and they coach those change agents on how to buy rather than quizzing them about their company's purchasing process. High-performing reps are still selling solutions--but more broadly, they're selling insights. And in this new world, that makes the difference between a pitch that goes nowhere and one that secures the customer's business.

No sales force consists entirely of stars; sales staffs are usually made up mainly of solid performers, with smaller groups of laggards and rainmakers. Though most compensation plans approach these three groups as if they were the same, research shows that each is motivated by something different. By accounting for those differences in their incentive programs, companies can coax better performance from all their salespeople. As the largest cadre, core performers typically represent the greatest opportunity, but they're often ignored by incentive plans. Contests with prizes that vary in nature and value (and don't all go to stars) will inspire them to ramp up their efforts, and tiered targets will guide them up the performance curve. Laggards need quarterly bonuses to stay on track; when they have only annual bonuses, their revenues will drop 10%, studies show. This group is also motivated by social pressure--especially from new talent on the sales bench. Stars tend to get the most attention in comp plans, but companies often go astray by capping their commissions to control costs. If firms instead remove commission ceilings and pay extra for overachievement, they'll see the sales needle really jump. The key is to treat sales compensation not as an expense to rein in but as a portfolio of investments to manage. Companies that do this will be rewarded with much higher returns.

Best-selling author and behavioral science and business thinker Daniel Pink writes in this essay that as sales becomes less formulaic and more about creative knowledge work, extrinsic motivators--commissions and bonuses--are becoming less relevant. The new breed of inventive, insight-selling reps wants challenging, meaningful, intrinsically rewarding work. Dan suggests that having reps work on commission may actually undermine performance--and he proposes that some firms eliminate commissions altogether.

Sophisticated sales organizations now have the ability to combine, sift, and sort vast troves of data to develop highly efficient strategies for selling into micromarkets. While B2C companies are typically adept at mining the petabytes of transactional and other purchasing data that consumers generate as they interact online, B2B sales organizations have only recently begun to use big data to both inform overall strategy and tailor sales pitches for specific customers in real time. Micromarket analyses involve five steps: defining the optimal micromarket size; determining the growth potential for each; gauging market share in each; understanding the causes of variation in market share across them; and prioritizing high-potential markets to focus on. Exploiting new-growth hot spots will be successful only if salespeople have a solid understanding of how micromarkets work and the simple tools for selling into them. Sales leaders must coach their teams in developing sales "plays" for groups of structurally similar micromarkets. That requires cross-functional collaboration--in particular, between sales and marketing. To sustain early wins, companies also need to change their approach to sales force management in three ways: They must rethink performance management, open new channels between sales and marketing, and invest in talent development.