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When and how much risk to take? In October 2020, Ken Sweder, CEO of Individual FoodService ("IFS"), contemplated this question as he evaluated a proposal to acquire Brady Industries, a distributor of janitorial and sanitation products. Sweder and his private equity partners at Kelso & Company had been working hard to grow IFS, and now they had a unique opportunity to make a transformative acquisition. The deal had great potential and risks; it was unclear if this was the right time to make such a large, complex acquisition amid disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sweder needed to decide if he should recommend the transaction and, if so, how to set the right value creation plan for the combined company.

The case discusses the ESG strategy of Dollar Tree Inc., a U.S. Fortune 500 company in the deep discount retail industry and the shareholder pressure faced by the company. In 2022, the company faced a shareholder resolution from renowned shareholder advocacy group As You Sow for the company to better mitigate and report on the climate risks faced by the business. The resolution challenged the company to intensify its climate transition plans and adopt a "net-zero" emission goal. A 2020 shareholder resolution at the company by a different shareholder received record-breaking support that had already caused the company to revamp its sustainability initiatives. This case provides an overview of Dollar Tree's business, the recent landscape of sustainability reporting and shareholder ESG resolutions in the U.S., and the narrative of management opposition to the resolutions. Overall, the case captures the interactions between environmental shareholder activism, corporate management and those charged with governance, especially the board of directors. This case is useful for students to discuss recent trends of ESG-related shareholder activism, sustainability reporting especially related to environmental issues, climate governance and how companies are reacting to them.

In 2015, the top management of French tire-maker Michelin, was evaluating Michelin's approach to divesting its rubber plantations ten years after incorporating a novel strategy. In 2004, Michelin had a Brazilian rubber challenge. Its Bahía plantation had been hit with the South American Leaf Blight fungus, the same fungus that destroyed Henry Ford's dreams of industrializing rubber production, and the plantation's productivity had dropped. Bahía had to go. That much was clear. But how to do it? From the Michelin headquarters in Clermont-Ferrand, the rubber plantations of Bahía Brazil seemed half a world away. Still, Michelin, then led by Édouard Michelin, great-grandson of Michelin's founder, was founded with a deep belief in the importance of treating its employees and the environment fairly. Michelin embarked on an ambitious plan to divest the plantation while practicing corporate social accountability. However, in doing so, it had to understand the needs of its plantation workers, its environmental impact, while also considering its own needs as a business. Now, Michelin had to evaluate how well the company had done with its Bahía program, if there was anything that could be improved in its divestment process, and whether or not the plan, or elements of it, was something Michelin should consider using again in the future.

Many of the West's political problems in the Middle East and in Iran in particular can be traced to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh by military forces supported by the American CIA and the British MI6 in August 1953. Mossadegh, at the head of a newly-elected nationalist government, had nationalized the Iranian oil industry that had been controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), now known as BP. Since 1908, the AIOC had been producing enormous revenue for London, and control of Iranian oil was essential to the British Empire. In order to gain Washington's assent to the coup, the Americans had to be convinced that Mossadegh represented a geopolitical threat, not merely an economic one. Ever since, the overthrow of Mossadegh has been seen as evidence of the extent of the supposed neo-imperialist motivations of the West in the post-colonial world.

In January 2021, Jalila Mezni, cofounder and CEO of the SAH Group, was preparing to present the company's future growth plans to its board of directors. The Tunisian company was a leading producer and distributor of personal care and packaged hygiene products. In 2019, it expanded further by entering the detergents market. By 2020, the company employed over 4,500 people and had a presence in 20 African countries. The Lilas brand had become a household name in Tunisia, outperforming brands owned by global players like Procter and Gamble. In detergents, SAH was steadily gaining ground over multinational consumer goods companies like Unilever, Reckitt Benckiser, and Henkel. As Mezni looked ahead, she had to carefully evaluate three growth opportunities: introducing a range of kitchen cleaners, vertically integrating operations in the detergents business, and opening a subsidiary in Kenya. Which of these, if any, would be the right way forward for the SAH Group at this juncture?

People seldom know that the fashion and luxury industry has become an industry with high water pollution, raw material consumption, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Premium goods and sustainability seem contradictory, but Kering Group, one of the leading global luxury houses, has blazed the way for more than two decades. From the Chairman and CEO, and Sustainability Programme Director at headquarters to employees on each continent, sustainability was rooted in the mind of everyone at Kering. It evolved its strategies for environmental protection and social benefit issues by various means: the Group adjusted its organizational structure and set up a specific department with experts from different backgrounds. The Group also calibrated specific numbers to improve on operational efficiency and decrease pollution. More intriguingly, it diversified ways to achieve business objectives such as innovative initiatives like the "Kering Generation Award (K Gen)" and the measurement tool, "Environmental Profit & Loss (EP&L)". The K Gen in China aimed to gather critical players along the value chain within the luxury ecosystem while establishing an open platform to enhance awareness of corporate citizenship and environmental protection. EP&L measured Kering's ecological impacts, assessed raw materials used in production and designing, and directed the Group towards more sustainable sourcing solutions, innovative technologies, and new materials development. However, both innovative initiatives had their limitations. The cultural differences between East and West mean it is difficult to duplicate the western model in the eastern cultures. At the same time, any new management tool had to overcome organizational inertia and balance the interests of different stakeholders. Stakeholder management has thus become an inevitable issue. Internally, the Group had to balance corporate-level enforcement and brand-level autonomy. Externally, the Group had to engage with various

A former software developer founded INK PPT in 2015 in Gurgaon, Haryana, India, after realizing that he enjoyed designing presentations. However, the market for developing corporate presentations was still in its nascent stage in India, and there was strong reluctance among organizations to outsource this work. The founder faced various hurdles growing his company, including the initial challenge of attracting customers. The situation became more challenging after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. During the resulting lockdowns, INK PPT's regular clients cut costs by reducing their presentation projects. As the pandemic continued, attracting new clients seemed almost impossible. The founder was told, both by friends and by a successful entrepreneur, that INK PPT was too far ahead of its time. The founder had to decide if he should continue to grow INK PPT, the start-up that he had devoted all his efforts in developing, or if it was time to move on to a new venture.

When it was founded in Hefei, China, in 2001, Jiujiu Xiyanghong Group (JX) started as a single private nursing home with fifty beds. Over its eighteen-year history, JX had maintained rapid growth; as of 2019 the company had 1,531 elderly people living in its facilities, and Xie Qiong estimated that elders residing at JX represented 36 per cent of all 4,205 people living in Hefei eldercare institutions. However, the Hefei eldercare market was witnessing rapid expansion from the entry of Chinese and foreign companies, state-owned enterprises, and investment funds. The founder wondered how JX should manage this situation.

In 2021, SunSource Energy was evaluating its growth strategy options. An entrepreneurial venture in the renewable energy sector, it was about to receive a second round of large funding. SunSource Energy had to decide whether it should exploit its expertise in India and other known locales, or whether it should explore new possibilities. It needed to apply organizational ambidexterity and a fresh approach to design thinking, especially during uncertain times in a global context. What strategy should the company use to leverage its new funding for growing the business?

In June 2021, as Toronto-based Flashfood Inc. (Flashfood) continued to grow dramatically, its founder and chief executive officer was facing critical questions about how to manage both the firm's mission and its business model. Flashfood partnered with grocery chains to sell near-expiry food to consumers via an app, and it had an expanding network of locations in Canada and the United States. The firm had a clear sustainability-driven objective: to reduce food waste and feed people more affordably. But how should the firm focus its ongoing investment and scarce resources-both strategically, in terms of market development and service offerings, and tactically, in terms of product pricing and app improvement? Could the firm achieve sustained success while avoiding any potential tendency to drift from that mission?

Affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated lockdowns, the management team at digital-first, Indian cosmetics brand SUGAR is deliberating over ways to respond to the new development in its influencer strategy. SUGAR grew into an INR 100-crore brand digitally by delivering content that was relevant to its young, urban customers in India through its Instagram page. Micro- and nano-influencers played a significant role in building its follower base of 1 million people. SUGAR was hungry for more. With the aim of becoming an INR 1,000-crore brand, the cosmetics firm began to expand its physical presence and grow in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities. As the team planned this expansion, the COVID-19 pandemic struck, and the associated lockdown, a measure to slow down the spread of the disease, relegated everyone indoors. Unexpectedly, SUGAR's beauty advisers transformed into employee influencers, attracting customers from Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities in India, while bringing in revenue through digital sales even when physical stores were shut. The company recognised using employee influencers as an opportunity to get new customers. However, the management team pondered over several questions. Did SUGAR have the resources to develop its employees as influencers? How would retailers respond if their sales employees focussed on online sales while manning physical counters? Would development of employee influencers dilute their existing influencer plan? The company had to also decide whether it would grow by focussing on traditional media and channels or by expanding its digital influencer plan.

Sweden's model of capitalism rests on a unique social contract, in which social welfare priorities can co-exist within a vibrant capitalist system. In 2022, however, contemporary pressures were growing on the traditional Swedish model, including mounting calls for privatization of the welfare system and political backlash surrounding the country's immigration policy. This case examines the long-term sustainability of the Swedish model, and the extent to which it is (or is not) transferrable to other political contexts and nation states.

This case describes Shentong Metro Group's ("Shentong Metro Group" or "the Group") strategic transformation ("Three Transformations"), focusing on its transit-oriented development (TOD) between 2009 and 2020. As the world's most extensive urban metro system ("Metro"), its strategic transformation grew from the strategic intent to contribute to Shanghai's vision of improving residents' quality of life while ensuring the Group's sustainable development. The Group successfully planned and implemented its TOD initiative, completing three projects between 2012 and 2019. However, as a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), the Group faced multiple challenges. First, conceptualizing and implementing the TOD initiative was not easy as Shentong Metro Group has to meet various social, financial, and operational goals. These goals were often vaguely defined (e.g., more environment friendly), while others were incompatible or even contradictory (e.g., increase employment while reducing costs). Second, the Group's core capabilities were in engineering, construction, and operational management of the Metro system. It lacked real estate development and management capabilities that were fundamental to the initiative. Third, the institutional environment and policies relating to TOD in Shanghai were underdeveloped and continually evolving. While the past TOD projects had, to some extent, overcome these challenges, the Group still faces many more ahead of future TOD projects. Some important questions include: What lessons could be gleaned from previous TOD projects? How should the Group fine-tune future TOD initiatives to realize the "Three Transformations?" How could it seize new opportunities based on Shanghai's urban development master plan?

The success of Antiga Confeitaria de Belém had been built around the uniqueness of its signature product. Many comparable custard cakes, known as pastéis de nata, were available, but the bakery had established its Pastel de Belém as a distinct product with the power to attract tourists from all over the world. The Pastel de Belém stood out because its recipe had been a well-kept secret for decades. The 2020 COVID-19 crisis propelled Antiga Confeitaria de Belém to try new ways of selling its product outside of its single shop location, and this experiment could trigger new business opportunities. Now, the strategic challenge for the bakery's chief executive officer was to assess whether the exclusive nature of the Pastel de Belém allowed for new business development.

This case is used to demonstrate the implementation of the residual income (RI) model using mid-cap SGX-listed firm Sheng Siong. Students are provided with basic financial statements and forecast assumptions. They are to use the data to construct the condensed financial statements and to derive the equity valuation as at the beginning of 2022 using the RI model and discounted cash flow (DCF) model. The case is useful for students to learn the mechanics of the RI and DCF model. The case can be done either as an in-class workshop/exercise or as an out-of-class assignment.

This case is based on the real-life experiences of Matt Miner, who completed his MBA at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business in 2009. After completing his degree, Miner realized that he and his growing family needed to prepare better financially for life post-MBA. This realization prompted him to pursue a program of household savings that would allow his family to be debt-free within five years. The case provides a short narrative along with exhibits containing quantitative information and assumptions. Students can work with the information and assumptions to address whether the Miner family could be debt-free within five years, even in the face of significant debt accumulated in the pursuit of Miner's MBA degree. Miner and his wife are contemplating significant household budgetary changes at the end of the third calendar quarter of 2010. The case is motivated by management accounting student anecdotes over many years, where the students claim to learn critical financial concepts in the course, yet they do not fully apply their learning to their personal lives. It also introduces a brief connection of management accounting to behavioral economics, specifically the literature on behavioral nudging via meaningful metrics that capture obscure information.

In the summer of 2019, notable track and field athlete Gwen Berry was representing Team USA at the Pan American Games in Peru when, having won the hammer throw-her specialty-she stood anxiously on the podium for the medal ceremony as the United States national anthem began to play. As she thought about both her own challenging upbringing and the social and racial injustice in the United States, exemplified by a recent encounter she'd had with a suffering homeless person, Berry wanted to make a gesture of protest. To do so, however, was against the International Olympic Committee's (IOC's) Rule 50, which prohibited protest in many sports venues, and would no doubt result in Berry's being disciplined at best, and perhaps even prohibited from further competition at worst. She was torn between making a statement there on the podium and the possible consequences and harm to her athletic career that might ensue if she did. This case pairs well with a technical note about the IOC's Rule 50, ""The United States Olympic Committee and Rule 50 in the 21st Century"" (UVA-E-0478).

FunctionFox Systems Inc. (FunctionFox) was a small company headquartered in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, specializing in project management and timesheet tracking software. Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing restrictions, FunctionFox decided to move to 100 per cent remote work in late 2020 and sold the building where its office had been located. In early 2022, when the pandemic appeared to be subsiding, the president of FunctionFox was considering whether the company should continue with fully remote work, return to in-person work, or find a hybrid mode. She had to consider the pros and cons of each alternative and prepare a recommendation for her colleagues.

This case focuses on the experience of a newly hired procurement manager who wanted to turn around the inventory management system at an oil and gas drilling contractor company-a step that seemed imminent. The case walks students through the inventory management process of a typical oil and gas drilling contractor to eliminate inefficiencies. By studying this case, students will realize the importance of efficient inventory management for the profitability of the company, identify inefficiencies in the existing inventory management process, learn the complexities involved in the inventory management process, and come up with their own optimum solutions.

As co-founders of home nursing company Buurtzorg, Jos de Blok and Gonnie Kronenberg prized both self-management and organizational learning. Buurtzorg's 10,000 nurses across 950 neighborhood nursing teams in the Netherlands were empowered to manage themselves, both in terms of client care and team management. In its 16 years of existence, that had made Buurtzorg highly successful and had made its model attractive both for other Dutch companies and internationally. Yet because neighborhood teams managed themselves, so much of what they learned remained in the team. While nurses would sometimes try to spread such solutions to peer nursing teams, such as through calls/texts or the compan's internal social network BuurtzorgWeb, there was no holistic, top-down process for reviewing and disseminating best practices across all nursing teams-in part because Buurtzorg had been designed to avoid such hierarchical, top-down management in favor of a more flat, nimble, and minimally bureaucratic organization. They attributed much of the company's success (in terms of high client satisfaction and low employee turnover) to that model. But as the Dutch population aged and the country faced an increasingly dire nursing shortage, nurses would need to work more efficiently than ever, and elevating local, variegated learning to company-wide best practices would be one way to do so. How could Buurtzorg break the tradeoff between prizing self-management and effective sharing of best practices for organizational learning?