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When it comes to philanthropy, executives increasingly see themselves as caught between critics demanding ever higher levels of "corporate social responsibility" and investors applying pressure to maximize short-term profits. Increasingly, philanthropy is used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company's image through high-profile sponsorships. But there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and economic goals and improves a company's long-term business prospects. Addressing context enables a company not only to give money but also leverage its capabilities and relationships in support of charitable causes. Taking this new direction requires fundamental changes in the way companies approach their contribution programs. Adopting a context-focused approach requires a far more disciplined approach than is prevalent today. But it can make a company's philanthropic activities far more effective.

For better or worse, investors now view chief executives as the primary determinant of corporate performance. But the reality is that most companies perform no better after they dismiss their CEOs than they did in the years leading up to the dismissals. Worse, the organizational disruption created by a rushed firing can leave a company with deep and lasting scars. The blame for such poor results, the author argues, lies squarely with boards of directors. Boards often lack the strategic understanding of the business necessary to give due diligence to choosing a replacement CEO. Concern over restoring investor confidence quickly--rather than doing what's right for the company--drives the selection process. And all too often, companies continue to be dogged by the same old problems after the new CEOs come on board. But a good board can make a CEO replacement pay off if its members first develop a better understanding of the business context, worry less about pleasing the investment community and more about a replacement's strategic fit, and take an active role in overseeing the new CEO and the performance and direction of the company. In the long run, such approaches are likely to foster stability at the helm--making it less likely that a company will have to fire its CEO in the first place.

It's natural to promote your best and brightest, especially when you think they may leave for greener pastures if you don't continually offer them new challenges and rewards. But promoting smart, ambitious young managers too quickly often robs them of the chance to develop the emotional competencies that come with time and experience--the ability to negotiate with peers, regulate emotions in times of crisis, and win support for change. Indeed, at some point in a manager's career--usually at the vice-president level--raw talent and ambition become less important than the ability to influence and persuade, and that's the point at which the emotionally immature manager will lose his effectiveness. This article argues that delaying a promotion can sometimes be the best thing a senior executive can do for a junior manager. The authors recommend that senior executives employ these strategies to help boost their proteges' people skills: sharpen the 360-degree feedback process, give managers cross-functional assignments to improve their negotiation skills, make the development of emotional competencies mandatory, make emotional competencies a performance measure, and encourage managers to develop informal learning partnerships with peers and mentors.

The use of stock options for executive compensation has become a lightning rod for public anger, and it's easy to see why. Many top executives grew hugely rich on the back of the gains they made on their options--profits they've been able to keep even as the value they were supposed to create disappeared. The supposed scam works like this: Current accounting regulations let companies ignore the cost of option grants on their income statements, so they can award valuable option packages without affecting reported earnings. Not charging the cost of the grants supposedly leads to overstated earnings, which purportedly translate into unrealistically high share prices, permitting top executives to realize big gains when they exercise their options. If an accounting anomaly is the problem, then the solution seems obvious: Write off executive share options against the current year's revenues. The trouble is, Sahlman writes, expensing option grants won't give us a more accurate view of earnings, won't add any information not already included in the financial statements, and won't even lead to equal treatment of different forms of executive pay. Far worse, expensing evades the real issue, which is whether compensation (options and otherwise) does what it's supposed to do--namely, help a company recruit, retain, and provide the right people with appropriate performance incentives. Only ethical management, sensible governance, adequate internal control systems, and comprehensive disclosure will save the investor from disaster.

The sheer enormity of last year's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon gave new meaning to the term "crisis management." Suddenly, companies near Ground Zero, as well as those more than a thousand miles away, needed a plan. Because the disasters disrupted established channels not only between businesses and customers but between businesses and employees, internal crisis-communications strategies that could be quickly implemented became a key responsibility of top management. Without these strategies, employees' trauma and confusion might have immobilized their firms and set their customers adrift. In this article, executives from a range of industries talk about how their companies, including Morgan Stanley, Oppenheimer Funds, American Airlines, Verizon, the New York Times,Dell, and Starbucks, went about restoring operations and morale. From his interviews with these individuals, author and management professor Paul Argenti was able to distill a number of lessons, each of which, he says, may "serve as guideposts for any company facing a crisis that undermines its employees' composure, confidence, or concentration." His advice to senior executives includes: Maintain high levels of visibility, so that employees are certain of top management's command of the situation and concern; establish contingency communication channels and work sites; strive to keep employees focused on the business itself, because a sense of usefulness enhances morale and good morale enhances usefulness; and ensure that employees have absorbed the firm's values, which will guide them as they cope with the unpredictable. The most forward-thinking leaders realize that managing a crisis-communications program requires the same dedication and resources they give to other dimensions of their business. More important, they realize that their employees always come first.

It's well known that many executives who excel at starting businesses or projects fizzle out--in other words, they fail to "scale"--as their ventures grow. But the reasons have remained fuzzy. In this article, leadership coach John Hamm identifies four management tendencies that work for small-company or business-unit leaders but become Achilles' heels as those individuals try to run larger organizations. The first tendency is loyalty to comrades. In entrepreneurial mode, you need to lead as though you're in charge of a combat unit on the wrong side of enemy lines. But blind loyalty can become a liability in managing a complex organization. The second tendency, task orientation, is critical in driving toward a big product launch, but excessive attention to detail can cause a large organization to lose sight of its long-term goals. The third tendency, single-mindedness, is important in a visionary unleashing a revolutionary product or service on the world but can limit the company's potential as it grows. And the fourth tendency, working in isolation, is fine for the brilliant scientist focused on an ingenious idea. But it's disastrous for a leader whose expanding organization increasingly relies on many other people. Leaders who scale deal honestly with problems and quickly weed out nonperformers. They see past distractions and establish strategic priorities. They learn how to deal effectively with diverse employees, customers, and external constituencies. And, most important, they make the company's continuing health and welfare their top concern.

Part science, part art, decision making is one of an executive's primary accountabilities. A firm's success or failure relies heavily on the quality of the decisions its top managers make. Judging from these conversations and interviews with senior execs in high-tech companies, the decision-making process is, on average, noticeably more egalitarian than in traditional, hierarchical companies. In manufacturing operations, technical specifications drive the process; in service firms, customer behavior does. But in the high-tech world, the process is based on a group-aided or participative style, with a high tolerance for employee error.

Planning teams and boards of directors focus primarily on developing strategy and less on actually implementing it. Here is a technique they can use for incorporating implementation issues into the planning process, rather than dealing with them after the strategy has been approved. By means of a strategy implementation scorecard, they can identify desired outcomes or measures that become part of the firm's formal strategic plan. Considering such measures during the planning stage not only relates individual and department performance to strategy implementation, it also gives the board a more clearly defined role in strategy.

Because companies can no longer possess all competencies themselves, strategic partnerships between customers and suppliers are becoming more and more essential. In fact, firms rely on strategic partners to achieve and sustain a competitive position. Theory helps explain the choice between arm's-length and cooperative relationships, and practice provides some valuable examples. Strategic partnerships, however, need to be set up and managed--a process not yet well understood. Companies often lack strategic thinking and the necessary supplier management capabilities. Advanced corporations continuously improve internal and external collaboration. Moreover, they allocate their scarce resources and time by selectively managing the full range of relationships--from "discrete exchange" to "relational exchange"--across the supplier portfolio.

Recognizing and anticipating change in industry patterns is a core competence for companies today, allowing managers to capitalize on opportunities before they are apparent to others. Yet, companies are far from mastering how to recognize such patterns, especially at the strategic level, where information is usually less profuse and much less precise. Pattern recognition is not a new skill, though, at least not to people outside the business world. Since antiquity, naturalists have relied on their ability to spot patterns to make sense of their surroundings. Surprisingly, there is much businesspeople can learn from bird watching in terms of the cognitive demands pattern recognition requires. To learn more, HBR spoke with David Sibley, perhaps the nation's foremost bird watcher and illustrator, and Julia Yoshida, a birder since 1965 and a physician at the Lahey Clinic in Burlington, Massachusetts. Sibley explains how expert birders draw on a wealth of tacit knowledge built up over the years to make identifications in a matter of seconds: "Once you've mastered common patterns, the real trick is to educate yourself about where discrepancies are most likely to appear--and to concentrate your attention on those areas." Although so fast as to be almost unconscious, the process he describes seems to be as methodical as one of Yoshida's medical diagnoses. According to Yoshida, "I don't think it's a eureka moment at all. It's a methodical process."

The U.S. Social Security system is in deep trouble--and that's not just bad news for your friends and family. It's also bad news for your company. Unless the Social Security system is changed, by 2041 the system will be utterly insolvent. In the next decade, the very prospect of the rising deficit will mean serious pressure on recent tax cuts, higher long-term interest rates, increased pension-funding costs, and other punishing conditions for U.S. businesses. Executives need to participate in the growing debate about Social Security reform, says Robert Pozen, a visiting professor at Harvard Law School who served on the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security. In this article, he urges business leaders to take a stance on how the system should be reformed, suggesting they work with interest groups to make their voices heard. Pozen outlines the three main alternatives executives might choose to support: increasing contributions to Social Security, decreasing the growth of benefits for more affluent workers, and increasing investment returns on Social Security assets. What's needed to fix the current system, he contends, is a careful balance of all three.

Industry leaders frequently worry that their companies will fall victim to some revolutionary business model or disruptive technology. But new research shows that it's strategically better for incumbents to counter a revolution than to ignore or fully embrace it. Successful incumbents rely on one or more of five approaches to restrain, modify or, if necessary, neutralize a revolutionary threat. A company that perceives a revolution in its earliest stages can use containment strategies. By throwing up roadblocks, an incumbent can often limit the degree to which customers and competitors accept a nascent insurgency. And, sometimes, revolutions die there. If not, early containment buys a company some time to shape the revolution so that it complements, rather than supersedes, the incumbent's strengths. And even if shaping efforts fail, they can give an industry leader more time to work out how to absorb the threat by bringing the new competencies or technologies inside the firm in such a way that they don't destroy its existing strengths and capabilities. When revolutions have progressed too far to slow them down, incumbents must take a more aggressive tack. Neutralizing strategies meet a revolution head-on and terminate it--by, say, temporarily giving away the benefits offered by the challenger for free. Annulment strategies allow the market leader to leapfrog over or sidestep the threat. These five strategic approaches need not be used in isolation.

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails?

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. The corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.

Large, tradition-bound organizations can make space for radical, low-cost (and therefore low-risk) innovations. Just ask executives at the World Bank. The story of this best practice begins in 1998, when a young new-products group at the international funding agency proposed holding an Innovation Marketplace to capture novel ideas within the bank for alleviating poverty. The forum, which eventually was opened to external participants, let people informally present their antipoverty ideas to potential funding sources. Funders could move among hundreds of booths and evaluate proposals. The marketplace concept met with some skepticism at the beginning. However, the marketplace team believed an open process for allocating grants would produce more breakthrough ideas in the long run than a centralized one. In this article, the authors describe how the new-products team brainstormed to create a market for ideas, how it got senior management's support, and how it has expanded on the original concept for these innovation marketplaces.

We've all heard the stories about corporate giants who ignored disruptive innovations and paid a steep price. Most of the nascent technologies that typically bombard executives will not amount to competitive threats and deserve to be ignored. As a result, disruptions are usually not taken seriously until they become obvious--when it's often too late. A disruptive innovation is a technology, product, or process that creeps up from below an existing business and threatens to displace it. Gradually, it improves to the point where it displaces the incumbent. But, the authors argue, disruption isn't inevitable. They have developed a tool that can help companies detect potential disruptive innovations while management still has time to respond effectively. The tool's decision-making methodology harnesses the organization's collective wisdom to determine how likely it is that a particular innovation will seriously damage an incumbent's business. The methodology has two components: an analytical instrument and an organizational process. And the tool's rigorous approach can spell the difference between flailing around and acting effectively in the face of a serious competitive threat.

Corporate values can motivate employees, but handled incorrectly they can do just the opposite. A recent study shows how the CEO of a small ad agency promoted strong values, only to see his staff misinterpret them and brand him as a hypocrite. Here's how to avoid a similar catastrophe.

Managers' desire to work with "a number," to plug in an average figure, is legendary. But using an average to represent an uncertain quantity usually yields a wrong answer, compromising decisions in accounting, investment, sales, and other areas. Simple software can help.

Is your corporate law firm really acting in your company's best interests? Legal ethics scholar Susan Koniak advises managers to make sure their outside counsel understands that the goal is not to push the limits of the law. Then they should get their legal advice in writing, record all oral communications, and seek second opinions.

The strife between Israel and the Palestinians is largely viewed as a political problem requiring a political solution. But it's also economic, says this researcher, who asserts that Japan's role in the development of South Korea can inform economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians.