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In late 2011, Netflix was migrating from its highly successful business model of delivering DVDs by mail to streaming movies and other media content directly to subscribers' televisions. To be profitable, Netflix decided to charge more for receiving DVDs by mail—a service that its existing customers had come to expect as a minor add-on to their original subscription arrangement. This charge led to a huge backlash: subscribers defected and Netflix's stock price dropped. Netflix faced the dilemma of remaining profitable in the video streaming business while paying much more for content and dealing with competition that had been absent in its DVD-by-mail business model. The company was at a crossroads; the path it chose would affect its future. Should it return to combining the two services or continue with two separate services and live with the consequences?<br><br>This case is a follow-up to Netflix, 9B09M093, and precedes Netflix: Proving the Skeptics Wrong, 9B16M081.

Netflix, a subscription-based movie and television show rental service, offered content to subscribers either via DVDs delivered by mail, or through Internet-based streaming. After splitting the two services, the company lost subscribers, and its stock price plummeted. Most observers were skeptical that Netflix could maintain its profit margins, given the increased cost of acquiring streamable content. However, Netflix not only reduced its cost per user but also increased its subscriber growth both in the United States and internationally. Were these moves sufficient to deliver the growth needed to support its rising stock price? Netflix also faced increased streaming costs because it used disproportionately more bandwidth than other streaming companies. Would these costs mean that the Netflix business model was no longer viable?<br><br>This is a follow-up case to Netflix, 9B09M093, which describes the company’s innovative business model of delivering DVDs by mail, and Netflix Inc.: The Second Act—Moving into Streaming, 9B16M080, which describes the after-effects of the dual-subscription model.

In April 2014, a research analyst for UR Investing, an investment group from the University of Regina, in Saskatchewan, Canada, was contemplating the decision of investing in a real estate investment trust (REIT). The decision had strategic implications because it would affect the risk profile of the student-managed fund. The analyst was given the task of evaluating the H&R REIT in particular and estimating a target price for H&R’s units. He had to carefully weigh the benefits in terms of returns generated against the risk of taking a position in the REIT. He had to analyze the strategic value of investing in REITs and decide whether to recommend that UR Investing should buy H&R units.

In May 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Valspar Corporation (Valspar) contacted the CEO of an industry competitor to discuss a potential strategic combination of the two companies. As discussions continued, Valspar’s board and senior management realized that an alternative strategic collaboration might be more beneficial, so Valspar then contacted the CEO of the second-largest comparable firm in the industry, Sherwin-Williams, which had previously expressed an interest in a business combination with Valspar. Valspar was awaiting a “compelling and pre-emptive” offer from Sherwin-Williams on an “accelerated timetable.” However, several questions remained. What maximum price could be justified in a bidding contest? What was the probability that antitrust regulators would eventually block the deal, resulting in a waste of time and resources to structure a deal that would later collapse? Could the negotiating teams for Valspar and Sherwin-Williams structure the merger agreement to allow for a potential consent decree?

In 2013, the chief executive officer of Porter Airlines, a Toronto-based regional airline, announced an expansion project to expand the airline’s destinations. The project required that Porter Airlines expand its fleet of jets to accommodate longer distances, and that its transport hub, the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, be renovated. The airport was governed by a tripartite agreement between the federal government, the City of Toronto, and PortsToronto; any amendments to the agreement required a consensus of the three governing parties. Despite active petitioning, the federal government announced in 2015 it would not support an amendment to the agreement. Should Porter Airlines continue to petition? Or should it consider alternative options to achieve growth?

In August 2016, it had been almost two years since American fashion retailer Nordstrom opened its first Canadian store in Calgary. Nordstrom believed Canada to be an ideal location for its global expansion. Executives identified the country as a potential US$1 billion opportunity with no language barrier and a population with a higher average income than in the United States. Despite this enticing potential market, Nordstrom executives entered Canada with a slow, conservative approach. Nordstrom faced slow economic growth in Canada and fierce competition from other luxury retailers. Although Canada was an attractive potential market, increased competition and a changing economic environment presented new challenges to the retailer’s international expansion plan. How could Nordstrom find success in Canada?

In April 2016, a large U.S. proprietary trading group in New York, with a significant fixed-income portfolio, was debating what discount rate to use to value the group’s interest-rate swap portfolio. The counterparties to these swaps were major banks, and the deals were collateralized. Criticisms about the use of the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) as a benchmark for valuing these swaps were circulating, and there were reports that LIBOR was being manipulated. There was talk about an alternative, nearly “risk-free” reference rate that could potentially be launched during 2016. Was it time for the trading group to substitute some of its maturing LIBOR-based interest-rate swaps with overnight index swaps?

In June 2015, a new analyst at an investment fund company had to review the financial performance of a potential investment target, the North West Company Inc. (NWC), and make a recommendation. NWC was a food retailer operating in underserved markets. The company operated retail locations in Western and Northern Canada, Alaska, the South Pacific, and the Caribbean, reporting total sales of CA$1.6 billion in 2014. Twelve years after NWC’s initial push outside of Canada, international sales accounted for 35.8 per cent of the company’s business. Whereas rivalry among competitors and consumer choice defined the mainstream Canadian market, food retail in Northern Canadian markets was characterized by limited offerings, high prices, and few competitors.<br><br>The analyst’s report needed to include an assessment of NWC’s profitability, liquidity, and financial structure. The analyst was particularly interested in NWC’s international operations; although international expansion carried with it the potential for significant revenue growth, she wondered whether the profit potential was as great as that of NWC’s operations in Northern and Western Canada. She also knew that if NWC did choose to expand its international operations, it would require significant capital investment. Was NWC a good investment opportunity?

Founded in 2005, Greek yogourt maker Chobani used value innovation to become the number one yogourt brand in the United States by 2011. However, due to some internal problems such as a lack of seasoned professionals and financial resources, and external factors such as competition and decline in demand, Chobani lost its market share to competitors starting in early 2013. With help from a private venture firm, Chobani took several steps to turn things around by 2016. Will Chobani be able to regain its leadership position going forward? If so, how will it fuel its growth?

De Beers, a sophisticated, international mining company, operated the Victor Mine, an open pit diamond mine in Canada, located within traditional territory claimed by the Attawapiskat First Nation. To develop the mine, De Beers had to follow provincial and federal legislation, meet environmental standards, and most importantly, negotiate use of the land with the First Nation. Although the mine was successful, the First Nation community was suffering with health, education, and housing issues; rampant unemployment; and a remarkably high rate of suicide among its youth. Benefits negotiated in the mining agreement were not resolving the problems, despite the provision of employment opportunities and payment of millions of dollars to the First Nation. In frustration, the First Nation set up road blockades to stop work at the mine. De Beers now wanted to extend their mining operation by using a mine extension, but to do that, they had to seek further agreement from the Attawapiskat. Did the history of First Nations in Canada affect their relationship with De Beers? Were the stakeholders meeting their responsibilities? What lessons could be applied to negotiations for future developments?

In January 2015, the chief executive officer and managing director of Tata Consultancy Services, India’s largest information technology company, expected to face questions from the media related to recent rumours of his company’s plans to lay off nearly 30,000 employees. Over the previous four weeks the reports had spread on both social media and conventional media platforms, leading to widespread protests against the company and attempts to unionize information technology employees (a first in India). The company’s carefully constructed corporate reputation of being employee friendly was threatened. The chief executive officer needed to design and execute a communication strategy that addressed the concerns of the various stakeholders involved.

In 2015, Hanuman Singh, a portfolio investor, was looking for investment opportunities in India. His friend Ram Naik suggested Singh invest in Tata Consultancy Services Limited, an information technology company based in Mumbai. Singh’s normal practice was to look at the company balance sheets, understand the company’s strategy, and then decide whether to invest. But he recently had a bitter investing experience when the company he invested in went bankrupt. Singh now understood that a deeper analysis was required before investing. He was looking for an accounting analysis that would give him insight into any possible manipulations so that his investment decision would yield his expected results.

On June 9, 2011, Empresas La Polar S.A., a Chilean retailer, informed the Chile’s securities commission that it had detected irregularities in its accounting for credit card receivables. A fraudulent credit card scheme masterminded by key executives and missed by directors and auditors was going to result in an estimated write-off in excess of US$300 million. On June 17th, the company advised the commission that the write-off would, in fact, be double the original estimate, amounting to US$640 million, resulting in negative equity. The filing contributed to a decrease in the value of the company’s stock market value, dropping from US$1.2 billion to US$281 million and putting the company at risk of bankruptcy. Should the directors be held responsible and punished for what had happened? What role did the regulators and auditors play? See supplement 9B16C033.

In 2012, the French government was faced with the challenge of setting the standards for socially responsible investment funds. A broader issue was the set of roles and responsibilities that regulators needed to take to ensure the best interest of society and the retail market. Retail consumers were different from institutional clients because they were numerous, they may not have had access to the same information available to more sophisticated investors, and because their thoughts on the financial markets were most likely to be based on what they had read and heard in the news. The government had to decide how to go about creating standards that could be applied to socially responsible investment funds. Also see supplement 9B16N017.

Brooks Sports, Inc. (Brooks) strove to inspire and promote an active lifestyle through its innovative gear, enabling its customers to run longer, farther, and faster. The shoe company had endured a number of growths and declines in its 100 years of operations. Nearly bankrupt by 2000 because of its attempt to compete with diversified athletic brands, Brooks had finally found a strategy to compete in the sports market. Operating as an independent subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Brooks focused entirely on the niche running market, transforming into a brand that generated over $500 million in 2014. Now Brooks had set its sights on becoming a $1 billion brand by 2020. In the past, few companies had focused on the small but growing running industry; however, with the running market becoming increasingly competitive, would Brooks’s runner-focused strategy carry the company to its $1 billion goal by 2020, or would it be forced to shift back to a diversified approach as the running market became more crowded?

In 2015, Nintendo—the iconic Japanese video game company—was faced with the decade-long challenge of responding to an industry that had changed in ways it had not anticipated. Under its new president, Nintendo had to contend with large-scale changes in the global gaming market. By not adapting to changing customer needs, Nintendo had lost the customer loyalty it had once enjoyed, as was evident from the decline in the number of units sold. It faced daunting challenges in the traditional console gaming segment from Sony and Microsoft, as well as more recent threats to its competitive position from the mobile gaming segment, which had become a preferred platform for game developers. Nintendo needed to decide how to revise its business model and strategies to move away from the decline that had been part of the company for years. Could the once-dominant Nintendo connect with its customers as it had done in the past, or was it better off as an acquisition target by a large entertainment company?

In July 2015, the largest automobile company in India, Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL), took the initiative to improve its market penetration in a particular category of the passenger car market—the premium segment. Although MSIL was the current market leader in India’s entry-level car segment, the company had not been successful in establishing itself as a dominant player in the premium segment—a segment that had seen intense competition since 2008. By launching Nexa, a new nationwide premium dealership, through its existing dealer network, MSIL was attempting to create a differentiated car buying experience. MSIL planned for all-new premium models to be launched exclusively from Nexa outlets. Would the launch of Nexa help MSIL attain its desired objective of becoming a major player in India’s premium car market?

OYO Rooms had been growing exponentially since its inception in 2013. By January 2016, it had registered 1 million check-ins and was set to become India’s largest budget hotel chain. The venture's unique business model helped it to offer effective solutions for the difficulties that were faced by customers seeking budget hotel accommodation in India. OYO Rooms' potential for rapid growth made it a candidate for even greater expansion in the global arena. However, OYO Rooms needed to prove its ability to sustain growth in the Indian budget accommodations market. The company’s success and the opening of a huge untapped market had led to a flurry of competition. Would the entrepreneurial founder be able to sustain his company's early momentum in the wake of increased competition? What would be the best strategy to achieve growth and monetize the company’s operations? Should OYO Rooms diversify into allied services or apply a more focused strategy? The founder needed to answer these questions to retain the company’s dominant position in the market.

On July 24, 2013, the management of Ambuja Cements Limited announced the merger of Holcim (India) Private Limited with Ambuja Cements in a two-stage process. First, Ambuja Cements would buy a 24 per cent stake of Holcim (India) from Holderind Investments Ltd. of Mauritius for ?35 billion. Subsequently, Holcim (India) would be merged with Ambuja Cements. The management of Ambuja Cements projected huge synergy from the merger, whereas proxy firm advisors called it corporate misgovernance. The case gives students an opportunity to analyze this two-step transaction to determine whether it compromised the interests of minority shareholders. The case also presents an opportunity to estimate the marginal impact of the transfer of cash and the cancellation of shares on the stock price of the acquiring company.

Several private startups, including Planetary Resources, SpaceX, and Deep Space Industries, had initiated plans to mine minerals in space. The ventures looked promising: an asteroid one kilometre in diameter contained, potentially, $20 trillion worth of industrial and precious metals. Governments had become involved in space exploration as well, with interests that ranged from projecting military power in space to claiming resources. The current legal framework surrounding space exploration was vague, but the United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space recognized extraterrestrial resources as the “common heritage of humankind.” What should a privately funded venture company consider when developing a strategy for space exploration and mining? What would be the concerns of a senior government official or a representative from a global organization such as the United Nations? Are the concerns different for different countries? Optional supplement, 9B16M054, is available.