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This is the second case in the Valley Carriers series, which also includes Valley Carriers (A): Establishing Status in a Family Business 9B16M095 and Valley Carriers (C): Restructuring the Governance of the Family Firm 9B16M097.

This is the third case in the Valley Carriers series, which also includes Valley Carriers (A): Establishing Status in a Family Business 9B16M095 and Valley Carriers (B): Working on Versus Working in the Business 9B16M096.

Supplement to case W16326.

Supplement to case W16326.

In September 2014, the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) in the US Mid-west, privatized as a 75-year concession at an impressive price of US$3.8 billion only nine years earlier, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy , having chalked up US$6.3 billion of debt. In the subsequent sell-off the ITR managed to attract an even bigger bid than before - of US$5.72 billion.

Supplement to case 116059. Alexi has been hired as CFO for a medical start-up, despite the controversy over his former company. The (B) cases focuses on how to introduce new, high-profile leaders to stakeholders inside and outside the organization.

PowerPoint for product 8B16M084.

This case discusses the decisions and outcomes of CEO Arrigo Berni and founder Maria Sebregondi that the Moleskine (A) case laid out.

Supplement to case IMD818. Atera Restaurant, New York City, February 2015. Jodi Richard closed the door behind her with a ton of questions. She had just come out of the final meeting with Matthew Lightner, the executive chef of her two-Michelin-star restaurant in lower Manhattan. Matthew had just announced he was quitting to "pursue new opportunities." This was the final straw in a long string of events that had unfolded before her eyes. The departure of the multi-starred chef would leave a huge vacuum in the restaurant's organization. Worse, they has agreed that Matthew's departure would be effective very rapidly, by end of March. The situation was critical: finding a new star chef for a fashionable restaurant in the competitive lower-Manhattan food scene was going to be a huge challenge. Several other crucial questions preoccupied Jodi. Should she just close down the restaurant and rent the space out to somebody else? Should she change the restaurant concept completely, moving to something easier like a sushi restaurant? Was a trip to Japan to find a young ambitious chef an option in that respect? How would the staff feel about the chef's departure? Would they follow the exit sign as well?

Supplement to case IMD818. Atera Restaurant, New York City, February 2015. Jodi Richard closed the door behind her with a ton of questions. She had just come out of the final meeting with Matthew Lightner, the executive chef of her two-Michelin-star restaurant in lower Manhattan. Matthew had just announced he was quitting to "pursue new opportunities." This was the final straw in a long string of events that had unfolded before her eyes. The departure of the multi-starred chef would leave a huge vacuum in the restaurant's organization. Worse, they has agreed that Matthew's departure would be effective very rapidly, by end of March. The situation was critical: finding a new star chef for a fashionable restaurant in the competitive lower-Manhattan food scene was going to be a huge challenge. Several other crucial questions preoccupied Jodi. Should she just close down the restaurant and rent the space out to somebody else? Should she change the restaurant concept completely, moving to something easier like a sushi restaurant? Was a trip to Japan to find a young ambitious chef an option in that respect? How would the staff feel about the chef's departure? Would they follow the exit sign as well?

Supplement to case KS1180. In the summer of 2014, Alta Bicycle Share, Inc had just won its second contract to operate the Hubway bike sharing system in the cities of Boston, Brookline, Cambridge and Somerville in Eastern Massachusetts. Emily Stapleton, Hubway's General Manager, was engaged in conversations with project managers from each of the four client municipalities about when and where to expand the system. Expansion was on the agenda because Hubway was widely perceived as a success. Nevertheless the system was facing a number of operating challenges, the most important of which was its effort to ensure that bicycles and empty docks were available when and where needed. Case number 2066.1

Handout to be used with case SMU326.

This brief case is a supplement to "Cresud and Argentina" (515-043) and "Note on Agriculture in Argentina" (515-069). Set in early 2016, it describes developments in Argentina under newly elected President Mauricio Macri, including the country's return to international credit markets, major economic and agricultural policy reforms, and the potential improvements and obstacles Argentina faces under this new administration. The case also describes Cresud's performance in 2015. It allows students to consider the outlook for Cresud amid the evolving context in Argentina, with volatility in Brazil a potentially important factor.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement case to be used with 9B16M015.

The case traces the evolution of the advertising firm DDB Mudra from its founding as an independent "Indian" agency to its current position of being the Indian affiliate of the global advertising major, DDB Worldwide that is going to be overseen directly by the CEO of DDB worldwide. Set in the backdrop of the changes in both the global and Indian advertising industry, this two-part case invites students to consider the strategic choices made by the two leaders who shaped its growth and evolution - the founder CEO, AG Krishnamurthy (AGK) and the current CEO, Madhukar Kamath. The first case - titled DDB Mudra: Transformative Growth captures the company's history from its inception in 1985 until its acquisition by the Omnicom group in 2011, the second case, an update titled DDB Mudra: Profitable Growth focuses on the challenges that Madhukar Kamath faces in 2015, 4 years after the acquisition.

In early 2011, José Manuel Villanueva and Lucas Carné, founders of Privalia, an online fashion discount store, were about to submit to the Board of Directors a strategic plan that could mark the beginning of a new phase in the company's growth. Since its inception in 2006, Privalia had grown at a fast pace: three years later, it was already profitable in Spain and expanded into Italy, Brazil and Mexico. By 2010, it had secured market leadership in every country where it operated. However, the competition grew just as fast, and the experience acquired over recent years indicated that speed and market size proved key in online fashion sales. Privalia already operated in Spain and Italy, but, if it really wanted to become a relevant player in Europe, the company needed to move into the topmost markets like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Villanueva and Carné decided to strengthen Privalia's international expansion by venturing into the German market. Thus far, Privalia's international growth had unfolded organically, via the creation of affiliates in the countries where it had moved into (Italy, Brazil and Mexico). Now, in order to enter the German market, should Privalia set up a subsidiary or should it acquire Dress-for-Less that was up and running in a leading local market position? Villanueva and Carné did not have much time. A board meeting had been scheduled to make a final decision. They needed to design a clear growth strategy, evaluate their options and prepare an entry proposal for Germany.