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IDEC, the Brazilian Consumer Protection Institute, is a nongovernmental organization created in 1987 by a group of volunteers aiming to promote consumer rights and build consumer awareness mainly through information and education in collective action and prevention. IDEC's activities were conducted largely by volunteers. The institute prioritized a financial sustainability strategy focused on raising funds among foundations and cooperation agencies. When this system proved insufficient, the organization resorted to membership fees. It also continued to pursue funding from financing entities, enabing IDEC to develop the capability to diversify activities like comparative product tests, the publication of books and manuals, and class actions representing consumer interests. Along with the growth went an increasing formalization of IDEC's organizational structure and a rising professionalization of its team. However, IDEC failed to develop strategies and activities toward its sustainability and, thus, became overly dependent on project funds. Aiming to regain a perspective of long-term survival, in late 2003 IDEC developed a business plan, the purpose of which was to become a self-sustaining organization by increasing revenues from the sale of memberships, products, and services. The dilemma IDEC faced was whether to implement the business plan, as it could transform IDEC into a provider of services for paying customers, which clashed with its orginal objective that underlay its creation. How can IDEC balance economic and social value?

This case study examines-through the lens of governance structure-the evolution of the Central Artery (or "Big Dig") in Boston, a public works project of historic proportion which had the potential to create a green oasis of parks in the heart of downtown. It tells the story of the struggle over who would eventually control and finance the maintenance of the Rose F. Kennedy Greenway-the name given to land created when an elevated highway was dismantled and the roadway rebuilt underground. Those who wanted control, but not necessarily financial responsibility, included the mayor of Boston, the governor, the legislature and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (a quasi-governmental body). Issues of park design entangled with governance questions, leading to a stalemate of nearly 15 years. But in 2004, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) pushed for a resolution so that the Greenway could be dedicated in connection with Boston's role as host of the July Democratic Party presidential convention. Over the years of debate, various models of governance for the Greenway were discussed and dismissed. Some of them involved private sector partners; some did not. Students will have the opportunity to compare and contrast the proposed governance models, judging them on their merits as well as on their political suitability. They will gain insight into the differences in operations and public accountability among a public agency, a foundation, a conservancy or a nonprofit trust. HKS Case Number 1839.0

ENVIE and ACTIF are two French social enterprises that aim at creating employment opportunities for long-term unemployed people through refurbishing and selling used goods. Both organizations are regarded as successes in their field, as both their economic and social performances are superior to the averages of other organizations in the field, yet ENVIE scaled much further than ACTIF. The case describes how they were founded as well as how each of them grew from one local site to a national network. Their respective scale-up strategies are illustrated at length, emphasizing how each of them designed a new organizational structure, selected new sites, hired new site entrepreneurs, raised start-up funds, developed partnerships and built systems and capacity.

Every year, at the annual summit of Ralston Crane's marketing group, Chief Marketing Officer Ruth McViney homes in on an important organizational objective. Last year, the architecture and design firm was focused on green building initiatives. This year, Ruth says, is the year of customer loyalty. Toward the end of her keynote remarks, she introduces two kickoff projects. The goals of one, Project Holding Pattern, sound familiar to Ralston's Guy Christiano; if the project team structures its loyalty program to look like the one he'd been associated with in his previous job, it could be a boon for the company. "Why didn't they put me on that project?" he wonders. "Then again," Guy figures, "I've got plenty to do already." Several weeks after the conference, Guy is contacted by a member of the project team. Guy's ready to share the key success factors for the loyalty program he'd been involved with before: a marketing initiative that looks like a service offering. But what the team is proposing sounds more like a run-of-the-mill seminar series. Against his mentor's advice, Guy calls team leader Charyl Urquhart to make the case for a different approach, going so far as to e-mail her his suggested outline for the program. Miffed, Charyl cuts the call short and never follows up. Guy considers going over her head, to McViney. But another friend in the firm warns him off: "If it's as screwed up as you say it is...you don't want to be associated with it." Should a colleague with strong opinions butt in or butt out? In R0606A and R0606Z, four expert commentators--consultant and author Marcus Buckingham, Harley-Davidson's Joanne Bischmann, former Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, and Umea University School of Business professor Tomas Blomquist--offer their advice on this fictional case study.

Every year, at the annual summit of Ralston Crane's marketing group, Chief Marketing Officer Ruth McViney homes in on an important organizational objective. Last year, the architecture and design firm was focused on green building initiatives. This year, Ruth says, is the year of customer loyalty. Toward the end of her keynote remarks, she introduces two kickoff projects. The goals of one, Project Holding Pattern, sound familiar to Ralston's Guy Christiano; if the project team structures its loyalty program to look like the one he'd been associated with in his previous job, it could be a boon for the company. "Why didn't they put me on that project?" he wonders. "Then again," Guy figures, "I've got plenty to do already." Several weeks after the conference, Guy is contacted by a member of the project team. Guy's ready to share the key success factors for the loyalty program he'd been involved with before: a marketing initiative that looks like a service offering. But what the team is proposing sounds more like a run-of-the-mill seminar series. Against his mentor's advice, Guy calls team leader Charyl Urquhart to make the case for a different approach, going so far as to e-mail her his suggested outline for the program. Miffed, Charyl cuts the call short and never follows up. Guy considers going over her head, to McViney. But another friend in the firm warns him off: "If it's as screwed up as you say it is...you don't want to be associated with it." Should a colleague with strong opinions butt in or butt out? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0606A and R0606Z are four expert commentators--consultant and author Marcus Buckingham, Harley-Davidson's Joanne Bischmann, former Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, and Umea University School of Business professor Tomas Blomquist.

Every year, at the annual summit of Ralston Crane's marketing group, Chief Marketing Officer Ruth McViney homes in on an important organizational objective. Last year, the architecture and design firm was focused on green building initiatives. This year, Ruth says, is the year of customer loyalty. Toward the end of her keynote remarks, she introduces two kickoff projects. The goals of one, Project Holding Pattern, sound familiar to Ralston's Guy Christiano; if the project team structures its loyalty program to look like the one he'd been associated with in his previous job, it could be a boon for the company. "Why didn't they put me on that project?" he wonders. "Then again," Guy figures, "I've got plenty to do already." Several weeks after the conference, Guy is contacted by a member of the project team. Guy's ready to share the key success factors for the loyalty program he'd been involved with before: a marketing initiative that looks like a service offering. But what the team is proposing sounds more like a run-of-the-mill seminar series. Against his mentor's advice, Guy calls team leader Charyl Urquhart to make the case for a different approach, going so far as to e-mail her his suggested outline for the program. Miffed, Charyl cuts the call short and never follows up. Guy considers going over her head, to McViney. But another friend in the firm warns him off: "If it's as screwed up as you say it is...you don't want to be associated with it." Should a colleague with strong opinions butt in or butt out? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0606A and R0606Z are four expert commentators--consultant and author Marcus Buckingham, Harley-Davidson's Joanne Bischmann, former Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, and Umea University School of Business professor Tomas Blomquist.

The case presents CEMEX Mexico's situation in 2004, shortly after its social responsibility committee was created and became operational. Two distinctive stages in SR development are described. During the first stage, the company's SR approach was paternalistic and lacking in strategic meaning. The second stage started as a result of several organizational changes undertaken to streamline SR efforts and to incorporate them into the company's business strategy. This shift was initiated in the late 1990s, when CEMEX reviewed its contingency management processes and fueled the creation of its Social Responsibility Unit, the coordination of community relations and the establishment of its Communications and Social Responsibility Committees. Although social responsibility initiatives had begun to bear fruit, the company faced the challenge of integrating it into its culture. SR was a strategy known mainly to top management, but it was not explicitly embedded in training, recruiting, compensation or performance evaluation practices. This hindered its swift incorporation into the company's organizational culture. The case describes the organizational change process (in terms of strategy, structure and culture) that resulted from SR adoption and the managerial decisions geared at its internalization. There was little evidence to assess how deep this cultural change really was. A personnel survey had revealed that most employees were unaware of CEMEX's community-oriented initiatives. The SR Manager's goal was to turn this issue into a personal trait for both the company and its employees -i.e., to embed it in CEMEX Mexico's DNA. Yet, some members in the organization were still doubtful.

January 27, 2005, was an extraordinary day for Gillette's James Kilts, the show-stopping turnaround expert known as the "Razor Boss of Boston." Kilts, along with Procter & Gamble chairman Alan Lafley, had just orchestrated a $57 billion acquisition of Gillette by P&G. The creation of the world's largest consumer products company would end Kilts's four-year tenure as CEO of Gillette and bring to a close Gillette's 104-year history as an independent corporate titan in the Boston area. The deal also capped a series of courtships between Gillette and other companies that had waxed and waned at various points throughout Kilts's stewardship of Gillette. But almost immediately after the transaction was announced, P&G and Gillette drew criticism from the media and the state of Massachusetts concerning the terms of the sale. Would this merger actually benefit shareholders, or was it principally a wealth creation vehicle for Kilts?

On April 6, 2005, Sony Corporation announced the signing of a global partnership program contract with the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the organizer of the FIFA World Cup. The contract, which represented the first global marketing and communications platform for the Sony Group, would run from 2007 to 2014 with a contract value (excluding services and product leases) of 33.0 billion yen (approximately $305 million). This was a very significant marketing investment for Sony, since the cost of event sponsorship with advertising was typically two or three times the cost of the sponsorship rights; hence, Sony was potentially investing a billion dollars or more on FIFA-related marketing campaigns over the next several years. Many Sony senior executives were questioning the return on investment (ROI) of the FIFA sponsorship opportunity.

'It's only a web site. What could be so difficult about that?' This quote is from the cafeteria of a start-up business funded by a North American retailer, after the disastrous 'Black Friday' of 2000, during which its web site experienced systemic failure. This case describes the dynamics, complexities and consequences of fast tracking an e-business start-up. This consumer electronics retailer created one of the most visited retail web sites, from concept to operation in 6 months. Market analysts were predicting a major increase in online sales while consumers were adopting the Internet at a rate faster than any previous technology. Meeting the multi-channel demands of the dynamic and competitive environment required operational balance, stability, innovative flexibility, organizational fit and the alignment of resource capabilities with technology. This case challenges the reader to comment on how a large company positioned itself and integrated the necessary competencies to compete successfully in a developing market by establishing a spin-off operation, separate from the main company.

PacifiCare's African American Health Solutions (AAHS) focused on improving the health outcomes of African Americans by providing culturally sensitive health education, health improvement opportunities, and access to high-quality health care services. By early 2006, approximately two years after the program's inception, the initiative had made significant headway in its two primary markets of Dallas and Los Angeles. In the new year, however, AAHS would face new challenges. Limited information was captured and tracked regarding the program's potential effect on the level of risk in the company's portfolio, and little was known about the profitability of the target community. Also, was AAHS making a positive contribution to the company? Finally, competition for African Americans' business was intensifying among health insurance providers. In 2006, AAHS had to define its purpose more clearly in the face of growing competition. The initiative also needed to decide on a customer acquisition approach. Was it really a goodwill program designed primarily to educate and inform African Americans? Or, was AAHS a powerful acquisition tool that should be integrated more directly into PacifiCare's mainstream customer acquisition strategy?

In 2002, when Wal-Mart became the largest U.S. company in sales, it began to attract considerable attention. Its expansion into the grocery business seemed to ignite a firestorm of contention and bad press. Wal-Mart was criticized for providing low wages and inadequate health care benefits, driving small merchants out of business, damaging the culture in small towns, harming the environment, and violating workers rights. The company realized that its practice of focusing solely on customers and employees was no longer sufficient--it needed a nonmarket strategy to address the criticism and repair its deteriorating reputation. This case explores the opposition that organized around Wal-Mart's practices and the issues raised. It sets the stage for developing and analyzing a successful nonmarket strategy for Wal-Mart.

General Electric thrived in every decade of the 20th century. Since its founding in 1892, GE has placed a high value on picking and training the best people. Staff members worked with other scientists in the company's research lab to design and manufacture new and better products to satisfy the growing American consumer demand for lighting, appliances, and consumer electronics in the 1910s to 1920s as well as in the 1950s and 1960s. GE's top executives have shown a clear understanding of the leadership and managerial styles that were appropriate for the years in which they worked. In the first decade of the 20th century, Charles Coffin demonstrated that he was an adept negotiator who amassed great wealth for GE in building generators and power equipment for local utilities in which GE also had a financial stake through bond issues. In the final decades of the 20th century, Jack Welch emphasized that GE should support only the most profitable businesses in the company's portfolio, a logic that led Welch and GE to phase out GE's consumer electronics division while bolstering the financial position of GE capital. Profiles all of GE's top executives.

In June of 2003, PeopleSoft management announced a merger with J.D. Edwards. Within hours of the announcement, Oracle had launched a hostile takeover attempt of PeopleSoft. Oracle's bid raised enormously difficult questions for the PeopleSoft board, questions about whether PeopleSoft products would continue to be supported and customers became reluctant to buy PeopleSoft software. Managers were therefore faced with a decision about how to respond to the bid and the uncertainty it created. To regain customer and analyst confidence, PeopleSoft's board considered adopting a Customer Assurance Program in which customers would receive a cash payment in the event of a takeover. This promise of a cash payment would not only encourage customers to invest in PeopleSoft products, but also created a liability that might be large enough to derail Oracle's takeover attempt altogether. The board therefore had to consider the implications of a Customer Assurance Program for the welfare of the firm, its customers, and its duties to shareholders faced with a tender offer.

Excellence in exploiting customer information and leveraging its affiliation to the GM group are among the strategic options that GMAC Insurance CEO Gary Kusumi is considering. GMAC Insurance, the wholly-owned auto insurance subsidiary of General Motors, formed through the merger of two smaller insurance firms, is at a strategic cross-roads. Progressive changed the competitive landscape with its superior pricing abilities, and now Kusumi must decide whether to compete on the ability to use customer information for pricing or whether even larger rewards could be found in leveraging the connection to the GM family. However, although jointly selling auto insurance and cars is common in many countries, the ability to do so at the GM Group is called into question by several significant organizational stumbling blocks.

This case provides students with an opportunity to practice a set of activity-based costing calculations. More importantly, it provides an instructor with the opportunity to challenge students to think about and to discuss the rationale used by the case protagonist to revise the means by which the company allocates corporate support costs to the product lines and to the business units. It is best used as an introduction to activity-based costing and/or the more general topic of cost allocations. As such, it is amenable to undergraduate and graduate managerial accounting courses, as well as executive education financial management programs.

In 2006, the DVD was the most popular storage medium in the entertainment and computer industries. The development of high-definition (HD) technology created a need for a format with greater storage capacity. Instead of agreeing on a single standard for a new HD disc, however, key players had formed two rival camps. The Blu-ray and HD-DVD formats each had distinct technical advantages and enjoyed the support of different groups in the consumer electronics, personal computer, and entertainment industries. Set at a time when companies were starting to release products for each format, this case includes a brief history of the format war along with information on the rival camps and their product offerings. Also, covers factors that might affect the future course of this battle, such as the role of copy protection features in HD devices, the bundling of each format with video game consoles, and competing modes of delivering video content.

Traces the development of De Beers and the diamond industry from its inception in the mid-1800s to the year 2000. Discusses De Beer's history and strategy as the industry leader and its role in industry development. Enables deep examination of the interdependence of companies and the locations and communities in which they operate and the role of a company in economic and social development. In 2000, De Beers faces critical choices about both its economic and social policies and how they interrelate.

As Ron Sege, president and CEO of Tropos Networks, walked through the halls of the firm's offices, he realized that the space they had moved into only about a year ago was already becoming too small. The company, based in Sunnyvale, California, was founded in late 2000 to provide wireless broadband access. By 2005, the company was primarily focused on supplying metro-scale wireless fidelity (Wi Fi) mesh networking products and services. Tropos began shipping products in September 2003, and by December 2005 the company had over 300 customers and 60 resellers in 29 countries. Accordingly, the company's head count grew from 65 in 2004 to 103 in 2005 and was expected to reach 150 by the end of 2006.

Willa Seldon, an African-American woman with 16 years of for-profit experience, was hired as executive director of Tides Center, a nonprofit in San Francisco, CA. Tides Center was a fiscal sponsor dedicated to supporting individuals and groups working toward social change. In her first few months as executive director, Seldon quickly and deliberately rolled out initiatives to ensure that Tides Center became a customer-centric organization capable of delivering exceptional fiscal sponsorship services and steady organizational growth. One aspect of this involved conducting a comprehensive performance management review. Examines the transition from the for-profit to the nonprofit sector and deals with change management.