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The critically admired author of 16 novels talks about the silence and mental rambling out of which his ideas emerge. "Characters walk to you as through a mist," he says. He values hesitation, loves solitude, and thinks one of the most potent forms of satisfaction available is achieving total absorption in something that interests and challenges him.

Charles Begley is the first ever managing director of diversity recruiting for GlobeBank, and he has worked hard to develop a pipeline of high-potential minority talent. He and his deputy director, Kumkum Bhatnagar, see an article their CEO has written for a business magazine website that downplays their efforts. Kumkum thinks the company should start pegging compensation to executives' minority hires and promotions. Charles resists her idea--particularly after his teenage son says he would never want to work for a company that used quotas. But two of Charles's high potentials complain about the low-level deals they're consistently stuck with, and when Charles approaches another senior executive to ask why, he gets stonewalled. Should he advocate for financial incentives to increase the number of minority promotions? With commentaries by Steve Reinemund, of Wake Forest University; John B. Veihmeyer, of KPMG; and George Borst, of Toyota Financial Services.

Charles Begley is the first ever managing director of diversity recruiting for GlobeBank, and he has worked hard to develop a pipeline of high-potential minority talent. He and his deputy director, Kumkum Bhatnagar, see an article their CEO has written for a business magazine website that downplays their efforts. Kumkum thinks the company should start pegging compensation to executives' minority hires and promotions. Charles resists her idea--particularly after his teenage son says he would never want to work for a company that used quotas. But two of Charles's high potentials complain about the low-level deals they're consistently stuck with, and when Charles approaches another senior executive to ask why, he gets stonewalled. Should he advocate for financial incentives to increase the number of minority promotions? With commentaries by Steve Reinemund, of Wake Forest University; John B. Veihmeyer, of KPMG; and George Borst, of Toyota Financial Services.

After a global bribery investigation that lasted several years, the CEO of Siemens was asked to resign in 2007, and Loscher, then the president of Merck, was brought in to replace him. There was no question that the company needed to change--and quickly. The scandal provided the necessary sense of urgency in the company's ranks, and the new CEO set out to reorganize the top three levels of management, replacing from 40% to 80% of executives in each. To make the process transparent, each of the positions was benchmarked externally. He centralized decision making in the managing board, streamlined board membership, and created a new position for legal counsel and compliance. Then he turned to the country organizations, whose strength was one of Siemens's secrets to success, but whose growing autonomy had created an eclectic collection of local businesses. Loscher made one person accountable for global performance in every business, grouped the country operations into one fifth as many clusters, and established a steering group to oversee the whole. He added an environmental portfolio to the company's strategy and refocused the top managers on customers. And he put two women on the managing board. "If you want to change a big, complex organization like Siemens," he says, "you have to make your agenda known, and you have to communicate in simple terms."

The old ways of setting and implementing strategy are failing us, writes the author of Leading Change, in part because we can no longer keep up with the pace of change. Organizational leaders are torn between trying to stay ahead of increasingly fierce competition and needing to deliver this year's results. Although traditional hierarchies and managerial processes--the components of a company's "operating system"--can meet the daily demands of running an enterprise, they are rarely equipped to identify important hazards quickly, formulate creative strategic initiatives nimbly, and implement them speedily. The solution Kotter offers is a second system--an agile, networklike structure--that operates in concert with the first to create a dual operating system. In such a system the hierarchy can hand off the pursuit of big strategic initiatives to the strategy network, freeing itself to focus on incremental changes to improve efficiency. The network is populated by employees from all levels of the organization, giving it organizational knowledge, relationships, credibility, and influence. It can liberate information from silos with ease. It has a dynamic structure free of bureaucratic layers, permitting a level of individualism, creativity, and innovation beyond the reach of any hierarchy. The network's core is a guiding coalition that represents each level and department in the hierarchy, with a broad range of skills. Its drivers are members of a "volunteer army" who are energized by and committed to the coalition's vividly formulated, high-stakes vision and strategy. Kotter has helped eight organizations, public and private, build dual operating systems over the past three years. He predicts that such systems will lead to long-term success in the 21st century--for shareholders, customers, employees, and companies themselves.

In 1886, addressing the nascent American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Henry R. Towne proposed that "the management of works" be considered a modern art--thereby heralding the Management Century, when management as we know it came into being and shaped the world in which we work. Kiechel, a past editorial director of Harvard Business Publishing, elucidates the three eras that punctuate this period: the years leading up to World War II, during which scientific exactitude gave wings to a new managerial elite; the early postwar decades, managerialism's apogee of self-confidence and a time when wartime principles of strategy were adapted, sometimes ruthlessly, to the running of companies; and the 1980s to the present, years that saw fast-moving changes, disequilibrium, and a servitude to market forces but also ushered in globalism, unprecedented innovation, and heightened expectations about how workers are to be treated. Along the way he examines the contributions of thinkers such as Frederick Taylor, Elton Mayo, Peter Drucker, and Michael Porter. What lies ahead? Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the 21st-century company, Kiechel posits, is to truly free the spark of human imagination from the organization's tidal pull toward the status quo. There's almost always a better way, he concludes--and management will continue to seek it.

HBR's 90th anniversary is a sensible time to revisit a basic question: Are organizations more likely to succeed if they adopt good management practices? The answer may seem obvious to most HBR readers, but these three economists cast their net much wider than that. In a decade-long study of thousands of organizations in 20 countries, they and their interview teams assessed how well manufacturers, schools, and hospitals adhere to three management basics: targets, incentives, and monitoring. They found that huge numbers of companies follow none of those fundamentals, that adopting the basics yields big improvements in outcomes such as productivity and longevity, and that good nuts-and-bolts management at individual firms shapes national performance. At 14 textile manufacturers in India, for example, an intervention--involving free, high-quality advice from a consultant who was on site half-time for five months--cut defects by half, reduced inventory by 20%, and raised output by 10%. A control group saw no such gains. The authors' global data set suggests that implementing good management at schools and hospitals yields change more slowly than at manufacturers--but it does come eventually. And the macroeconomic potential--for incomes, productivity, and delivery of critically needed services--is huge. A call for "better management" may sound prosaic, but given the global payoffs, it's actually quite radical.

Harvard Business Review was launched in 1922 by a Harvard Business School dean who wanted to equip managers-in-training with better tools of the trade. Its initial print run was only 6,000 copies, and its initial subscription price--$5--was a point of contention between the dean and his outside publisher. For the next 25 years the magazine barely broke even. But between its founding and World War II, the HBS faculty became competent at translating rigorous research into relevant reading for practicing managers, and by the end of the war HBR was poised to capitalize on the ensuing business boom. Circulation shot up from 14,000 in 1945 to 243,000 in 1985. Kirby, an editor at large for HBR, traces its history from the Roaring Twenties to the present day. "The threads being woven into HBR's fabric as the years passed," she writes, "were not just timely topics for consideration but distinct approaches to studying them." Those topics included "scientific management," women in the workforce, and the power of the consumer, to name just a few. And those distinct approaches brought names such as Peter Drucker, Michael Porter, and Robert S. Kaplan into our pages. Kirby writes as well about some of the colorful personalities behind the scenes at HBR, and about the magazine's falling and rising fortunes. As it enters its 90s, she says, "it does so with a special provenance, some special strengths, and a deeply informed notion of what the management agenda should be."

The dean of Harvard Business School recalls the powerful effect that reading Harvard Business Review had on him as an undergraduate studying engineering in India. It was his first exposure to management thinking, and he witnessed HBR's impact firsthand when the company where he was interning one summer reorganized its largest plant according to the ideas in one HBR article--dramatically improving its productivity. Today the magazine, its website, and its book program help fulfill the HBS mission of educating many more business leaders around the globe, not all of whom can come to the school campus.

On 9 May 2005, Oriental Land Co, Ltd ("OL") announced changes in the company's top management. They were feeling the heat not only from the humid weather in Tokyo in the rainy season but also as a result of the visitors' numbers that had just come in. The total combined attendance at Tokyo Disneyland Park and Tokyo DisneySea Park for the fiscal year (1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005) amounted to 25.021 million guests, 98.2% of the previous year's attendance. The top management was concerned that this decrease in attendance might be a bad sign of tough times ahead and it was a prime example of a successful foreign investment in Japan now caught in a completely new structural change. The factors that had been critical to its past success were now diminishing. The top management thought that the amusement park and leisure land industry provided little cause for optimism, due to factors such as slackening consumer spending and demographic changes. Under these conditions, the top management felt that a study was needed to determine whether OL could diversify the operating base. They specifically wanted to know whether the current pricing policy was effective under deflation, which the Japanese economy had been suffering for a long time, and how changes in pricing to visitors, if necessary, would affect the company's cash flow in the future. The new pricing strategy would be based on the price elasticity of demand by the visitors to the company's services.The top management asked the planning department to study the possible price changes and use net present value ("NPV") methods to evaluate these alternatives on the effect of the future cash flow. The strategy would also need to incorporate the company's long-term strategies.

In the late 1970s, Walt Disney Corporation sought to expand its enterprise to Japan. Oriental Land Corp, which represented the Japanese side of the negotiations, and Walt Disney had to decide on a licensing arrangement or a joint venture. The objective of this study is to examine the actual determinants, models and data of that investment choice. This case study is of value to governments and multinational enterprises that want to explore an optimal alliance with a foreign partner. Based on the law, the Japanese government intervened in the negotiations between the Oriental Land Corp and Walt Disney as to the form of the arrangement for Tokyo Disneyland. Thirty eight years later, it is worthwhile to examine the validity of their decisions and which arrangement benefited the project and the partners most. This case study presents ex post empirical evidence for this discussion. The efficacy and effectiveness of the law that allows the Japanese government to intervene are also questioned.

With several brands in the premium shirt market, the Arrow brand faced the challenge of balancing its premium associations that had been nurtured in the past to make the brand contemporary. The concept of "premiumness" with regard to the category had undergone a shift, with equally strong brands (comparable to the Arrow brand) strengthening their positioning on premiumness. Arrow faced several challenging decisions that involved its original positioning. The fundamental decision on revitalizing and reinforcing the brand would depend on the analysis of the changing environment, competitive offerings from competing brands and the perception of consumers on Arrow and its competitors. The premium shirt market had brands that offered comparable functional attributes; and the differentiation of brands was built by both functional attribute positioning and symbolic positioning. Balancing the two aspects and alternating between these two aspects in a dynamic category and environment required an approach that would bring several aspects of consumer behavior towards a brand's strategy. As the competition intensified, there was need for any brand to delve into the finer aspects of consumer behavior rather than depend on the basic positioning strategies. There was a need to analyze how consumer behavior strategies could contribute to the brand's positioning strategies. Should Arrow retain its category expertise? Should the brand retain its "country of origin" associations? Should the brand focus on the self-concept associated with the consumer segment? A medley of concepts that can trigger Arrow's next level of brand strategy is the context posed by this case in an emerging market such as India.

The case traces the evolution of the carbonated soft drink industry. It describes the emergence of two global majors - Coca Cola Company and PepsiCo. It describes the proliferation of brands of each of the two majors. While Coke, Diet Coke, Sprite, and Fanta belong to Coca Cola Company; Pepsi, Diet Pepsi, Mountain Dew, 7 Up, and Mirinda belong to PepsiCo. The case also describes the local Indian brands - Thums Up and Limca. Many of the soft drink brands have a high brand value and the case describes the role of advertising in building brand equity. The case traces the evolution of advertising over the years globally as well as in India. It engages with the tension between localization and standardization of advertising. It invites students to discuss the role of advertising in building the brand in an emerging market such as India.

The case describes the evolution of 3M as an innovative organization over its 110-year history. It highlights the early challenges faced by the founding entrepreneurs that had an impact on the tolerance for failure in the 3M culture, and also the entrenchment of its innovation philosophy in the ''William L. McKnight Management Principles''. Further, it describes the role of structures, processes, rewards and people in continuously sustaining the innovativeness of the company over its lifetime. The case then describes 3M's approach to innovation across its global subsidiaries, wherein innovators from subsidiaries in different geographies are expected to drive innovation for their context based on their understanding of local user needs. 3M's strategy for innovation among its subsidiaries is somewhat different from that of most other multinationals that still rely largely on innovation from their home country organization. The case throws light on the efforts by the parent company to transfer and entrench its innovative culture at 3M India, its subsidiary in India. While 3M had a presence in India for over 20 years, for much of this period, the emphasis on innovation was rather limited. However, with the inauguration of its new 3M Research and Development Centre in 2011, 3M India, with the full support of the parent organization, has provided a renewed thrust to innovation for the Indian market under its "In India for India" strategy. At the end, the case highlights some of the challenges faced by 3M India and some potential challenges that it might face as expected by analysts.

This case on CavinKare's founding describes the entrepreneurial journey of the founder, C K Ranganathan. As the enterprise outperformed expectations, the organization set itself an incredible vision. This case traces the history of the entrepreneur and the growth story of the enterprise. The case describes the context of opportunity recognition and exploitation, and elucidates the significant decisions taken by the entrepreneur and the organization in order to sustain rapid growth amidst liberalization and stiff competition from multinational companies with deep pockets and significant stakes in the industry.

This case on CavinKare describes the incredible vision the organization set itself. This case is set at a time, when the company had achieved significant progress towards its incredible vision, but needed a quantum jump in performance to sustain its growth. The case describes the FMCG industry and the firm's capabilities, and evolves strategic challenges facing the company, including sustaining high-growth, expanding the product focus to men's range of products, and investment in the services business.

This case exposes students to financial decision-making in government enterprises and the concepts of financial and economic rates of return. It is based on actual electrification projects being undertaken by Indian Railways, one of the largest government organizations in the world. Electrification projects require large capital outlays with significant financial and welfare implications. The case analysis involves (i) estimating incremental cash flows under alternative scenarios, (ii) calculating the financial rate of return, and (iii) conducting a sensitivity analysis to identify the key value drivers. It also provides opportunities to discuss nominal vs. real cash flows, differences between internal rate of return and net present value, and the choice of different discount rates. The case is suitable for a course on Corporate Finance and Valuation.

Spreadsheet for case IMB395

Changes in the global environment are generating opportunities for companies to build advantage by creating loosely coupled networks or ecosystems. Ecosystems are larger, more diverse, and more fluid than a traditional set of bilateral partnerships or complementors. By leveraging ecosystems, companies can deliver complex solutions while maintaining corporate focus. This article describes six keys to unlock ecosystem advantage: pinpointing where value is created, defining an architecture of differentiated partner roles, stimulating complementary partner investments, reducing the transaction costs, facilitating joint learning across the network, and engineering effective ways to capture profit.

Confronted with public concerns about health and obesity, food companies are taking several initiatives. However, it is unclear to what extent they should communicate these policies. This article explores reactions in the blogosphere to health-related announcements by large food companies. Results show that taste-related announcements generate not only more reactions, but also more positive buzz than knowledge-related announcements. Valence is influenced by issue association per company type: those with highest obesity associations generate more negative blog posts. In case of low issue association, there are only limited blogosphere reactions. This analysis has important implications for managing interaction with social media.