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Spreadsheet for case UV2479

A potential investor in General Motors is gathering information about investment in General Motor's stock. The investigation leads the investor to review the General Motor's Web site and several CNBC interviews of General Motors' executives.

A potential investor in General Motor's stock reviews the retiree benefit note data included in the company's 2001 financial statements as part of the investment analysis of the company.

Acoplasticos was established in 1961 as a lobbying group for Colombia's major plastics manufacturing companies. In the early 1980s, the organization shifted its focus toward improving the productivity of the Colombian plastics and rubber cluster, which also included certain petrochemical, manmade fiber, paint, and ink industries. Over time, the organization's activities expanded to include cluster technology upgrading, training, trade fair production, joint procurement, and information collection and dissemination. Despite significant improvement in the performance of the Colombian plastics and rubber cluster during the 1990s, however, Executive Director Carlos Garay was concerned about the challenging economic and political environment in 2002.

Ember is a venture capital-funded start-up that hopes to establish a standard for ubiquitous wireless networks. Its unique approach and proprietary technology promises to create enormous value in a wide variety of markets, particularly in local sensing and control. However, competition has emerged much faster than expected. What should Ember do next?

Data spreadsheet for use with case (9-796-059), The Baseball Strike. Download Only. (Exhibits 8 and 10).

Spreadsheet for use with case (9-702-443). Download Only. (Exhibits 1 and 3).

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Spreadsheet to (9-203-042). Test the impact of changes in wage rates on the value of debt and equity securities. Download only.

For ten years, Jeff Patterson's firm, Flynn Fuller Consulting, has worked on projects for financial services giant GloBank. Now Jeff's contact, Bill Holland, says another project is imminent--good news for the recession-battered consultancy--but there's just one problem: GloBank has an enigmatic new CEO, H. Frank Maloney III. Brought in to restore profitability, Maloney has been examining GloBank's bottom line, looking for places to cut. The new CEO wants to slash GloBank's extensive use of consultants, which means that division presidents like Bill must justify major consulting projects. Worse, firms like Flynn Fuller must sell themselves again to GloBank. Jeff will have just one hour to try to sway Maloney, or his client will disappear. How can Jeff persuade Maloney that outside consultants are worth the cost? Jeff's presentation isn't a progress report or a pitch to a new client; rather, it's a defense of Flynn Fuller's continuing added value. Jeff pulls together a team to make the case, but he hears as many approaches as there are people in the room. In R0302A and R0302Z, commentators P. William Bane, a recently retired vice-president and director at Mercer Management Consulting; Tom Van Berkel, the president and CEO of insurance firm Main Street America Group; Peter Klein, the senior vice-president of strategy and business development for Gillette; and Tricia Stone, a founding partner of Stone Communications, offer advice in this fictional case study.

Americans are outraged at the greediness of Wall Street analysts, dot-com entrepreneurs and, most of all, chief executive officers. How could Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski use company funds to throw his wife a million-dollar birthday bash on an Italian island? How could Enron's Ken Lay sell thousands of shares of his company's once high-flying stock just before it crashed, leaving employees with nothing? Even America's most popular domestic guru, Martha Stewart, is suspected of having her hand in the cookie jar. To some extent, our outrage may be justified, writes HBR senior editor Diane Coutu. And yet, it's easy to forget that just a couple years ago these same people were lauded as heroes. It could easily be argued that it was public indulgence in corporate money lust that largely created the mess we're now in. It's time to take a hard look at greed, both in its general form and in its peculiarly American incarnation, says Coutu. If Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan was correct in telling Congress that "infectious greed" contaminated U.S. business, then we need to try to understand its causes--and how the average American may have contributed to it. Why did so many of us fall prey to greed? Can we be sure it won't happen again?

Even at the prototype stage, experts were saying the technology was obsolete. Yet, in the face of tepid consumer response, the company stubbornly kept increasing production capacity and developing new models. By the time it was finally killed, the initiative had cost the company an astounding $580 million and had tied up resources for 14 years. The product was RCA's SelectaVision videodisc recorder, and its story is hardly unique. Companies make similar mistakes--if on a somewhat smaller scale--all the time. But why? No one comes to work saying, "I'm going to pursue a project that will waste my company millions of dollars." Quite the opposite. They come to work full of excitement about a project they believe in. And that, surprisingly, can be the root of the trouble--a fervent belief in the inevitability of a project's ultimate success. Starting, naturally enough, with a project's champion, this faith can spread throughout the organization, leading everyone to believe collectively in the product's viability and to view any signs of impending doom merely as temporary setbacks. This phenomenon is documented here in two chillingly detailed case studies, one involving Essilor, the world's largest maker of corrective lenses for eyeglasses, and the other involving Lafarge, the largest producer of building materials. By counterexample, they point the way toward avoiding such morasses: assembling project teams not entirely composed of like-minded people and putting in place--and sticking to--well-defined review processes.

There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "Balanced Scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.

Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? The authors also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.

If your company operates in a developing country, AIDS is your business. Although Africa has received the most attention, AIDS is also spreading swiftly in other parts of the world. Why should executives be concerned about AIDS? Because it is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy--cheap labor and fast-growing markets--in countries where people are heavily affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, investments in programs that prevent infection and provide treatment for employees who have HIV/AIDS are profitable for many businesses--that is, they lead to savings that outweigh the programs' costs. Due to the long latency period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms, a company is not likely to see any of the costs of HIV/AIDS until five to ten years after an employee is infected. But executives can calculate the present value of epidemic-related costs by using the discount rate to weigh each cost according to its expected timing. That allows companies to think about expenses on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs as investments rather than merely as costs. Fighting AIDS not only helps those infected; it also makes good business sense.

Researchers have established that trust is critical to organizational effectiveness. Being trustworthy yourself, however, does not guarantee that you are capable of building trust in an organization. That takes old-fashioned managerial virtues like consistency, clear communication, and a willingness to tackle awkward questions. It also requires a good defense: You must protect trust from its enemies. Any act of bad management erodes trust. Among the most common enemies of trust are inconsistent messages from top management, inconsistent standards, a willingness to tolerate incompetence or bad behavior, dishonest feedback, a failure to trust others to do good work, a tendency to ignore painful or politically charged situations, consistent corporate underperformance, and rumors. Fending off these enemies must be at the top of every chief executive's agenda. But even with constant vigilance, an organization and its leaders will sometimes lose people's trust. During a crisis, managers should enlist the help of an objective third party.