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The power shortages and blackouts of late 2000 and early 2001 drew international attention to the electricity deregulation regime adopted four years earlier by the state of California. This case provides a definitive account of the nature of that deregulation, as well as the process through which it was developed and the options considered as it was crafted. It focuses on the choices California made as it put in place a system that would divide the electricity generation, transmission and retail distribution systems that had, historically, been integrated. The case describes how California regulators and elected officials sought to maintain the operating and coordination efficiencies associated with the existing vertically- and horizontally-integrated system while allowing a competitive market to flourish. Because it stops short of describing what exactly seemed to go wrong when the power crisis hit California, the case demands discussion and analysis of the unintended consequences of the deregulation regime chosen-including the decision to fix retail prices during a transition period. It provides detailed descriptions of the role of a key new institution, the "independent system operator" and the role California chose for it to play in facilitating power transactions. HKS Case Number 1632.0

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, high atop a great many of the older, concrete-block buildings of lower-income parts of central Hong Kong and the neighborhoods of the Kowloon peninsula, informal metal-framed wooden structures were built to house thousands of the city's families in austere, though inexpensive, quarters. These "illegal rooftop structures" comprised what could be a called a shantytown of the air, one made up of structures which, though built illegally, were nonetheless bought, sold, and rented on the open market. Such structures, moreover, were just one example of the larger phenomenon of so-called unauthorized building works in Hong Kong. These UBWs, as they were known in the city's Buildings Department, included balconies added to windows-sometimes used for beds on which people slept high in the air-as well as hundreds of thousands of storefront street signs and canopy extensions to the ground floors of buildings in commercial districts, the latter used to create spaces rented to stores and restaurants. By 1999, it was estimated that UBWs of all kinds in Hong Kong totaled a staggering 800,000. By one estimate, if authorities continued enforcement as they had been doing, it would take more than 130 years to effect the removal of all such structures-assuming that new ones were not built in their place. This case raises the thorny question of the extent to which and methods by which Hong Kong should use the law to minimize or eliminate such unauthorized building works-in a city where some parts of the public care most about public safety, while others-often much poorer-care most about shelter. HKS Case Number 1631.0

When Hugh Price became president and chief executive of the National Urban League in May 1994, he knew he was taking the helm of an organization groping for new moorings in the post-civil rights, post-Great Society, post-welfare state era. During the Reagan administration of the 1980s, the large annual federal grants and contracts that had steadily grown during the 1960s and 1970s, sustaining the National Urban League and its network of 113 affiliates, were abruptly slashed. People wondered if the Urban League would dissolve. This case chronicles what happened with the NUL during this era of transition. Pair with the sequel (HKS 864). HKS Case Number 1634.0.

When Hugh Price became president and chief executive of the National Urban League in May 1994, he knew he was taking the helm of an organization groping for new moorings in the post-civil rights, post-Great Society, post-welfare state era. During the Reagan administration of the 1980s, the large annual federal grants and contracts that had steadily grown during the 1960s and 1970s, sustaining the National Urban League and its network of 113 affiliates, were abruptly slashed. People wondered if the Urban League would dissolve. This case chronicles what happened with the NUL during this era of transition. Pair with the first part of the case (HKS 863). HKS Case Number 1634.1.

Speed kills: That's the disturbing conclusion of a new study of companies that pioneer markets. Learn why the venerated concept of first-mover advantage may be just an illusion.

If you could move your company's headquarters anywhere in the world, where would you go? How would you narrow the possibilities? Here's what's involved in relocating a $51 billion company.

According to new research, the way deadlines are set has a profound effect on the degree to which workers procrastinate and even on the quality of their work.

The answer is probably "yes." Managers often unintentionally sap their businesses' profits by ignoring the complexities of pricing. Find out what they're doing wrong.

In Russia, 3M is doing more than capitalizing on positive cultural traits. It has also learned how to turn negative cultural traits to its advantage.

Discusses sustaining brand equity after a highly successful commodity-product branding ad campaign.

Henkel has to decide whether to replace its strong local detergent brands in Italy and Spain with its leading international brand, Persil. It faces pressure from retailers for international brand standardization. Its competitors, including P&G and Unilever, are consolidating their portfolios around a few global "power brands."

This case is a condensed version of "Philip Morris U.S.A. and Marlboro Friday (A)". In July 1993, Philip Morris executives met to consider second-quarter data on U.S. tobacco sales. Three months earlier, the company had announced a 40-cent-per-pack promotion for Marlboro cigarettes, the number-one-selling cigarette in the world. On the day of the announcement, April 4, Philip Morris stock fell $14.75, to $49.375, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 68.63 points. On June 4, the company announced an extension of the promotion through August 8. After eight months of consecutive share declines, Marlboro's share had rebounded by three points. Philip Morris executives now faced several important decisions: Should the Marlboro promotion be extended beyond August 8? Should the promotion be replaced with a permanent cut in wholesale prices? Should the prices of other Philip Morris premium brands be lowered? Finally, should the prices of the company's discount brands be altered in any way?

The case describes Procter & Gamble's adoption of value pricing, Wal-Mart's introduction of premium store brands, and the evolution of Wal-Mart's relations with its major vendors. In early 1994, Kimberly-Clark agreed to manufacture private-label training pants for Wal-Mart. Students must decide how Procter & Gamble should respond to Wal-Mart's decision to sell private-label diapers manufactured by Kimberly-Clark.

In 1999, Procter & Gamble (P&G) witnessed its first share increase against rival Kimberly-Clark (K-C) in the U.S. disposable diaper sector in five years. However, Sam's Club de-listed P&G's Pampers from most of its stores that August, limiting its diaper offerings to K-C's Huggies and its own private label brand White Cloud, introduced that same year. By mid-2000, P&G's stock had lost more than half its value, and the nature of the company's "special relationship" with Wal-Mart was being called into question.This case is a supplement to UV4013.

Chronicles the successes and failures of the Virgin Group. By examining these examples, students discover attributes of Virgin's overall service concept, which, at its core, competes on quality rather than on price. Students are challenged to consider how Virgin might extend its operations into the U.S. market.

For nearly three months, John Carter, a vascular surgeon by training, had been studying a variety of clinical processes at Deaconess-Glover Hospital in Needham, Mass. Carter was looking for an opportunity to test the applicability of Toyota Production System "Rules-in-Use" in the health care context. After several weeks of increasing focus, he had found a particular process--medication administration--to test his ideas. He had just suggested to John Dalton and Julie Bonenfant, the hospital's president and vice president, that they create a learning unit or model line within one of the nursing wards to begin conducting experiments. Dalton and Bonenfant received his modest proposal negatively. They complained that his proposal seemed remarkably unambitious, yet, paradoxically, they complained that creating a dedicated learning unit within the larger nursing ward would be infeasible. Carter struggled to explain how they could react simultaneously with such seemingly contradictory sentiments.

Examines Microsoft's strategy and competitive position as it prepares to launch Windows XP. The discussion explores how Microsoft builds and sustains its competitive edge.

As equity-linked consideration has become more popular in acquisition and alliances, so has the use of the "price-protection" mechanisms, known variously as floors, caps, and collars. In general, these are contractual agreements that provide insurance to the shareholders of the selling firm, the buying firm, or both.

Examines Webvan's operations and the processes by which it delivers groceries that were ordered from the Internet to customers' homes. Recounts Webvan's history from founding through early 2001 and concentrates on the unique approaches to warehousing, delivery, scheduling, and to a lesser extent, marketing and information technology. Also examines the rest of the Webvan business model and how it was formulated. At the time of the case, there is great pessimism, reflected in the press and the company's share price, that Webvan will be able to execute its business model profitably or even stay in business. Webvan's business model relied heavily on properly designed and executed operations, and it appears clear that the company's operations were neither. In addition, the mismatch between visiting operational capabilities and the operational requirements imposed by the rest of the business model appear to be severe.

Summarizes the debate on accounting for computer software development costs. Provides a historical description of the development of standards on accounting of computer software development costs, both in the United States and internationally. Describes how, after much debate, standard setters gave companies the option to capitalize development costs that meet definitive standards, such as proof of technological feasibility. An exhibit reveals that, despite the requirement in the financial accounting standard to capitalize post-technological development costs, few large software companies in the United States capitalize any of their software development costs.