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The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a network of 250 multinational companies collaborating to achieve Vision2050 ¬- a plan for a world where nine billion people can live well within the limits of the planet. WBCSD sets an ambitious agenda along three imperatives - climate, equity and nature action. The CEO of WBCSD, Peter Bakker, is known for his ambition to drive action at a fast rate. However, moving the agenda too fast risks losing some companies. This case evaluates how Bakker can drive change at the rate needed and his strategy to do so.

SEPTEMBER 2020: Adam Tejpaul and Gabriele Zaninetti were just tasked with the most transformative project J.P. Morgan Private Bank had faced in over 15 years, i.e. the integration of advisory services as part of their offerings. Adam knew the private banking industry inside-out and had witnessed all major changes in the private banking industry. J.P. Morgan private bank was renowned for the quality of its services and an insightful advising culture, but it needed to capitalize on its strengths, namely its strong due diligence and advisory services. How could Adam convince the organization that a change in the investment service model was needed despite being profitable? What options did Adam have to change the advisory model and prepare the bank for the new market environment? How would the new model answer the needs of internal (advisors) and external (clients) customers? How could he implement such an important IT-heavy initiative to bring the most value to the client advisors and clients? What would be the key success factors in this new technology- and fee-based advisory model? What options did they have to implement Engage within J.P. Morgan's IT infrastructure?

MAY 2022: The planning phase for the Engage project has taken way too long, in part because the technological platform was so critical to the success of the project. After months of discussions with a fintech company, a proof of concept had been delivered, showing promising results but it was still far from the fully integrated solution that had been promised. The final quote for the full project finally came in late and higher than expected. This was a big setback for Adam and Gabriele. They thought they had signed up with a development partner, but now they had the distinct impression the fintech saw its role more as a simple service provider, agreeing to client requests without bringing up the cost issues. Adam was particularly upset as he had spent countless days with the technology provider to make sure they understood the requirements and came up with a realistic budget ahead of time. The time felt wasted now, with the whole project on the brink of a complete breakdown. Without the technology-enabled platform delivering the functionalities needed, the whole transition to a new active advisory function was in trouble... There was barely enough time to negotiate again with the fintech. Was it time to reconsider doing it internally? Was it even reasonable to expect they might be able to salvage the project by going to another solution provider? Were they in any way responsible for the budget creep, thanks to the engagement of some many parties, each with its own requirements? How could they ensure Engage did not head for the trash bin of project history? They still believed, but maybe it was time to put milestones and deadlines to the dreams. Very much the definition of strategy...

In 2019, Nissan India found itself facing a turbulent market situation as it contested market space against 14 competitors. Some of its recent product launches had not been well-received, and dealers nationwide were sceptical of associating with Nissan. The following year, Nissan appointed Rakesh Srivastava as the new Managing Director of Nissan Motor India Ltd. By the end of 2019, Srivastava had revamped the entire Nissan team and, by early 2020, he began to prepare for what would be Nissan's India market turnaround - the launch of the Magnite in the compact SUV market, one of India's fastest-growing personal vehicle segments. However, soon after the Magnite was conceived, the Covid-19 pandemic set in, and India went into an unprecedented lockdown. The economy came to a standstill, and every part of the value chain from brand communication, product launch, supply chain to customer service was paralysed. Nissan had to make several changes to meet emerging challenges at each step. Through concerted efforts, Nissan overcame hostile market forces and a negative reputation to emerge as the fastest-growing player in the market. It passed the 50,000 units manufactured milestone for the Magnite within two years, which provided a much-needed boost to its declining share and relevance in the Indian market. The case outlines the journey of Nissan Magnite's launch and draws lessons from the product launch.

Bowtie Life Insurance Company Limited (Bowtie) was the first virtual insurance company licensed by the Hong Kong Insurance Authority. Since obtaining the licence in 2018 and raising two successful rounds of venture capital, Bowtie had developed into a reasonable size, of about a hundred employees, by early 2022. Bowtie was focused on developing and selling medical insurance products under the Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme (VHIS), while also selling term life insurance. The founders' intention is to bring cheaper, more user-friendly insurance products directly to the mass market through online channels, while disrupting the traditional insurance industry by eliminating agents and brokers. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022 brought both opportunities and risks to the virtual insurance sector. While online purchases increased significantly during this period, the overall gloomy macroeconomic outlook put downward pressure on insurtech, fintech industries, and the venture capital that funded them. With Hong Kong's mortality rates soaring, Bowtie had to consider the effects of the pandemic on its profitability and determine its future strategy. While continuing to focus on the VHIS segment, how should Bowtie expand into other product segments? When and how should the company expand to Mainland China and/or other neighbouring markets outside of Hong Kong?

Spreadsheet Supplement for CaseW32456

It was the afternoon of December 17, 2020, and Debojit Sen was concerned about the future of his educational technology (EdTech) start-up, Crack-ED, which was founded in March 2020 in Gurugram, Haryana, India. Crack-ED provided training to recent business school graduates in order to help them secure jobs in the competitive, post-COVID-19 marketplace. Several other EdTech start-ups such as such as Scalar Academy and upGrad Education Pvt. Ltd. had also emerged to address the gaps in the Indian education system. Crack-ED faced two challenges: it needed to differentiate its service from that of its competitors and promote its relatively new brand of EdTech service platform in a highly competitive market with stronger players. Most EdTech companies were aggressively promoting their brand digitally. Search engine optimization, video marketing, and social media promotion were among the options available for Sen to promote Crack-ED, and each option had its own pros and cons. Sen wondered which digital promotion strategy would be the best fit for Crack-ED as the company's promotional budget did not allow him to choose all options available.

Annapurna Seva Sangh was a non-governmental organization (NGO) located in the civil hospital compound in the Lalitpur district of Uttar Pradesh, India. The organization's primary objective was to assist the patients and their families at the district civil hospital. Most patients were living below the poverty line and lacked sufficient funds to cover their daily expenses while receiving treatment. Since the patients were accompanied by their family members, they were all under considerable financial pressure. To cater to the patients' needs, Annapurna Seva Sangh managed a clothing bank, an oxygen bank (to supply oxygen concentrators and cylinders), and a dining hall that provided free lunch and dinner. The NGO also offered ambulance services and frequently organized blood donation clinics. The organization, which had grown tenfold since 2016, efficiently used its resources under limited funding opportunities. However, it was also operating with very thin cash reserves and was therefore exploring other sources of revenue so that it could provide uninterrupted services to people in need.

In the summer of 2023, the co-founders of Infarm, a controlled environment agriculture (CEA) company, were contemplating a major pivot going forward. While Infarm had successfully shown it could grow over 75 products-mainly herbs, leafy greens and mushrooms-in modular indoor facilities, and was able to sell the yield to major supermarket chains across Europe and North America for almost a decade, recent developments required a major rethink of the business. The dramatic rise in energy prices, especially in Europe, as a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, made growing crops indoors much costlier; inflationary pressures had further led retailers to look for cheaper produce alternatives. Consequently, Infarm had to shut down most of its growing centers. At the same time, the company's scientists had demonstrated the ability to grow wheat indoors, with a yield per square meter that was already thirty-eight times that of wheat grown conventionally in an open field. CEO Galonska and his leadership team were now pondering whether to shift the company's focus to wheat and target countries that desired to achieve food self-sufficiency. For the pivot to be successful, Infarm would have to convince leaders in these countries to heavily support (and subsidize) the creation of massive "gigafarms," capable of producing thousands of tons of wheat annually, as well as develop a plan for selling at least some of the yield commercially. Another decision facing management was what to do with the existing units in Europe. Infarm could either try to find a local player to take on their operation, or again aim for countries that imported much of their produce and ship the units there. Either way, Infarm would remain involved in technical and operational support under a Food as a Service (FaaS) model.

Like other small shops based in Chongqing, China, Zongshen Industrial Group started by assembling motorcycles from "standard" parts. The quality of its early products was good enough for rural Chinese buyers, though wealthier consumers usually purchased premium Japanese-made models. Zongshen struggled to differentiate itself since its competitors assembled motorcycles using essentially the same parts. This case looks at its struggles and how it continued to grow and improve. This is a classic setting for disruptive innovation, and the case offers insight into the mechanisms.

This case tells the story of Microsoft's 2018 acquisition of GitHub and the subsequent launch of GitHub Copilot, a tool that uses generative artificial intelligence to suggest snippets of code to software developers in real time. Set in late 2021, when Copilot was still in beta, the case asks how Microsoft and GitHub should roll out Copilot to the public.

The board of Aviva Plc, one of the world's largest insurers, must review its climate risk exposures and evaluate next steps. Risk experts at the firm have conducted a robust set of analyses prepared for its regulator, the Bank of England, simulating how various climate scenarios could impact the business. Against this uncertain future-and given their history of leadership in sustainability, the board and CEO Amanda Blanc will review options for Aviva Plc to address this business and societal challenge, ranging from dealing with flood risk to working to effect large scale systems change.

Teresa Ward, founder of Grandma Treesaw's Bannock (GTB), had recently received positive media coverage from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and was hoping to leverage it to grow her Yukon-based bannock-mix business. She was considering two options: expand her direct to consumer offer by working with Shopify Inc. to improve GTB's e-commerce sales or grow her product portfolio by introducing two new flavours of bannock mix. A few questions loomed in Teresa's mind: Could she do both? Did GTB have the organizational resources to pursue this expansion plan successfully? What should her implementation timeline look like? What financial analysis would need to be done to support the decision-making process? She wanted to decide which option to pursue in the next three to four weeks.

Set in April 2022, the case chronicles how Kering-owned luxury-fashion house Gucci underwent a comprehensive creative and cultural transformation, making it more inclusive, agile and digital. Faced with the emergence of the metaverse, Gucci decided to take the lead, bargaining that a test-and-learn approach would mitigate the risk of operating in such a loosely defined, unproven domain. Under the direction of EVP of Brand and Customer Engagement Robert Triefus, Gucci ran a number of experiments in social gaming, established a dedicated metaverse team, launched NFT drops and scooped virtual real estate. As the cash-flow engine of Kering, Gucci could afford to explore the metaverse without needing to generate revenue immediately. But, as Gucci set ambitious medium-term performance targets for itself and competitors flocked to the metaverse, Triefus and his colleagues had to address several questions; from sizing the addressable and obtainable market opportunity to seizing its innovation potential.

Spreadsheet supplement for case LBS344.

Set in September 2018, the case describes De Beers' attempt to halt the escalating disruption to its core business posed by diamonds grown in laboratories. Since its inception over a century ago, De Beers had created and nurtured the perception of diamonds as rare objects and exclusive symbols of love. But lab-grown diamond makers now had the capabilities to mass-produce and sell at a discount diamonds with the same optical, chemical and physical characteristics as natural ones, possibly jeopardising the entire mined-diamond industry. To counter the threat, De Beers introduced its own lab-grown diamond jewellery brand, called Lightbox. Lightbox diamonds were positioned as cheerful fashion items and sold directly to consumers at a substantial discount to generic lab-grown diamonds. Over its history, De Beers had had a remarkable track record of dwarfing competition. Would it succeed this time?

Spreadsheet supplement for case LBS346.

The case describes how AntChain's parent, Ant Group, started to invest in blockchain in 2015 as it believed the technology would build trust between different actors in a system. The earliest use case was a cross-border remittance service. The team continued to build and develop its blockchain technology, launching a new generation of blockchain-enabled high-speed communication networks and reducing bandwidth costs by 80%. The team went on to win many Chinese and international awards and partnered with training centres and universities to develop the technology. The team was able to monetise its blockchain through BaaS with different strategies, such as service fees and subscription models, depending on what the client needed.

Laura Chavez was delighted beyond words when the Atelier Asymmetric Bow suite, designed by her luxury jewellery company Lark & Berry, won the 2019 Goldsmiths' Craft and Design Council Graff jewellery award. The Graff Award was the jewellery industry's equivalent of the Oscars award for Best Picture and conferred immense prestige on its maker. Unfortunately, the euphoria of the win lasted barely 24 hours for Laura. The award had made history: it was the first time that a piece made exclusively with lab-grown diamonds had scooped the top Craft and Design Council prize. But, when the awards committee realised the suite had been made with lab diamonds, they insisted that Lark & Berry disassociate themselves from the prize - even though they had designed and commissioned the piece

For marketers, budget averages have long equaled spending power â€" or vulnerability. When budgets are below average, CMOs seek more funding. When budgets are above average, CFOs seek to tighten the belt. However, the authors argue that marketing-budget averages can be misleading. Here’s what they learned about how marketing budgets break down across several more-specific factors â€" and how to make better comparisons â€" through their analysis of data from The CMO Survey.