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This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touch upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

This case study is comprised of two vignettes about startup companies considering whether and how to change their sales compensation plans. ElMenus.com is a restaurant app venture in Egypt seeking to lower customer churn while confronting new competition. BigBelly is a "smart" waste receptacle venture that is changing its business model. The case allows for the comparison and contrast of the roles of sales compensation in different ventures with different sales funnel activities. The case also allows for an overview of all the core components of sales compensation.

Set in July 2015, the case follows Matrix Cellular (International) Services (Matrix), a telecommunications company that forayed into the nascent cellular telephony market in India, as a retailer of mobile handsets, accessories and international SIM cards. The Managing Director and Chairman of the Risk Management Committee of the company, Gagan Dugal, identified the potential demand for international SIM cards in the Indian outbound travel market that was set to boom on the back of globalisation. MCIS bought international minutes in bulk from Mobile Service Providers (MSPs) in destination countries and retailed them through SIM cards to outbound Indian travellers. The service was an instant hit among elite travellers. Matrix, exploiting its pioneer advantage, began to strategically build its capabilities in the areas of sourcing, marketing, distribution and servicing, and expanded its product portfolio. Thus, from being a retailer of hardware and accessories, Matrix quickly evolved into a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), trading and retailing talktime and data. From 2010 onwards, Matrix started facing intense competition from new market entrants and mainstream MSPs. Additionally, events that affected the outbound travel industry also impacted Matrix. Realising its twin identity as a telecom and travel company, Matrix launched additional services - forex cards, travel insurance and VAT recovery. While the services did not significantly contribute to the revenue of the company, they did add to the attractiveness of the company's competitive advantage. Amidst intensified competition and faltering revenue, Dugal and his team had to tap into their core resources to innovatively disrupt the market yet again, but how?

This case is set in November 2012, when Olam International, a Singapore-based agricultural supply chain company, was in the midst of a reputational crisis. An analyst firm had shorted Olam's stock and raised red flags about the company's solvency and accounting practices. A poster boy for Singapore's leading businesses, Olam was a highly respected company in Singapore and within the commodity industry. Sunny Verghese, Co-founder, Group Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Olam, had seen the company grow from a small exporter of cashews in Nigeria in 1989 to a multi-billion dollar business managing the global supply chains of more than 20 products across 65 countries. Verghese himself was known for his passion and zeal to see the company expand and perform. But equally, his 18,000 employees admired him for his humility and integrity, and for developing a cohesive culture throughout the organisation that combined ambition and ownership with mutual respect and teamwork. Olam had always prided itself in inculcating a culture of listening, learning and changing for the better. For Verghese, the priority was to win back the confidence and trust of his stakeholders. He came to realise that he had to use the company's culture of humility - and lead by example - to come out of what had evolved to be the worst crisis in the company's 23-year existence. It was time to think clearly, understand where Olam had gone wrong, and recalibrate the strategies for the future.

There is no escaping the Big Data hype. Vendors are peddling Big Data solutions; consulting firms employ Big Data specialists; Big Data conferences are aplenty. There is a rush to extract golden nuggets (of insight) from mountains (of data). By focusing merely on the mountain (of Big Data), these adventurers are overlooking the source of the revolution-namely, the many digital data streams (DDSs) that create Big Data-and the opportunity to improve real-time decision making. This article discusses the characteristics of DDSs, describes their common structure, and offers guidelines to enable firms to profit from their untapped potential.

Big data analytics has become an imperative for business leaders across every industry sector. Analytics applications that can deliver a competitive advantage appear all along the supply chain decision spectrum-from targeted location-based marketing to optimizing supply chain inventories to enabling supplier risk assessment. While many companies have used it to extract new insights and create new forms of value, other companies have yet to leverage big data to transform their supply chain operations. This article examines how leading companies use big data analytics to drive their supply chains and offers a framework for implementation based on lessons learned.

A signature story is an intriguing, authentic, involving narrative with a strategic message that enables a firm to grow by clarifying or enhancing its brand, customer relationships, organization, and/or the business strategy. Signature stories represent a critical asset that can be leveraged over time and which can provide inspiration and direction both inside and outside the firm. The challenges are to find, evaluate, gain exposure for, and give legs to signature stories.

How a social or political issue is framed shapes the "nonmarket" context that surrounds it. Issue frames are not random; rather they are the product of strategic behavior by firms, government agencies, NGOs, and similar actors. Frames are not fixed and issues can be reframed over time. Framing is a powerful strategic tool that enables firms to shape the structure of the nonmarket environment to their advantage. This article identifies and illustrates five distinct pathways through which firms can shape different dimensions of the nonmarket environment.

Driven by recent socio-economic developments, manufacturing firms increasingly adapt their business models along two dimensions. Apart from vertically integrating the entire product life cycle, traditionally separated tasks are re-allocated into new forms of horizontal stakeholder collaborations. Incorporating these two dimensions, this article develops a framework of nine business model archetypes that holistically capture the increasing openness of business models towards consumers in the emerging closed-loop value chain. Using illustrative examples, it demonstrates their broad applicability in different industries and derives important managerial implications for firm-consumer relationships, the relevance of consumer communities, new product development activities, and the sustainability of business models.

Competitive retaliation is a significant constraint to merger and acquisition performance that has largely been overlooked by management research. This article employs competitive dynamics theory to explore how acquisition characteristics impact the risk of competitor retaliation. It then outlines different tactics that acquiring firms can use to reduce competitor awareness, motivation, and capability associated with retaliation. It provides managers with a path to improving acquisition performance and also opens new avenues for research.

In October 2013 GT Advanced Technology closed a deal to supply industrial-sapphire material to Apple; the material was to be used to improve the quality of iPhone screens. Prior to this deal, GTAT had been a leading supplier of equipment used to create industrial-sapphire, not a producer of the material itself. Apple helped to finance the scaling up of GTAT's industrial-sapphire manufacturing facilities by providing GTAT with a prepayment that was secured by an equipment lien; however, their agreement did not stipulate that Apple had an obligation to purchase any of GTAT's industrial-sapphire output. In September 2014 Apple announced that its production plans had changed and its new iPhone would not have a sapphire crystal screen. Soon thereafter, GTAT filed for bankruptcy. This case asks students to consider why GTAT took on the terms of such a risky deal, how their risk might have been mitigated, and what options were open to both GTAT and Apple in the aftermath of the deal.

On August 3, 2015, Fitbit, Inc.'s (Fitbit) stock price hit an all-time high of $50.99. A few months earlier, when Fitbit went public on June 18, it had opened on its first day of trading at a price of $30.40 - 52 per cent higher than its initial public offering price. As what appeared to be the most successful initial public offering of the year, Fitbit attracted significant attention and inevitably drew controversy as well. Some investors saw great potential and a promising future for Fitbit. Others were less positive, calling it a fad without any real opportunity for future development. In the face of growing competition from rivals with more extensive consumer bases, Fitbit wanted to ensure that it achieved sustainable growth. What was Fitbit, and what could it become? The question concerned not only potential investors but also the chief executive officer of the high-tech company.

Lending Club follows the path of founder and CEO Renaud Laplanche as he scales his successful P2P lending company both pre- and post-IPO. From debating with bankers on the proper valuation metrics for the company, to managing customer acquisition costs as the competitive landscape rapidly changes, the Lending Club case explores several key challenges that come with operating a fin-tech company at scale.

The Chairman of the Priceline Group is considering the actions he must take to confront an evolving external environment, new direct competition, disintermediation and substitute offerings. Does his response require an increased coordination of each historically autonomous division or some other approach?

AbbVie made headlines in March 2015 when it announced its $21 billion acquisition of Pharmacyclics. AbbVie, a research-based pharmaceutical company was founded in 2013 when Abbott split into AbbVie and Abbott Laboratories. Pharmacyclics is a biotechnology company that had received FDA approval in late 2013 for its flagship asset Imbrivica (ibrutinib), a biologic treatment for chronic lymphocytic leukemia and two other even rarer blood malignancies. Entering it's second year on the market, Imbrivica was considered a breakthrough, with revenue expectations of $1 billion in 2015. At the time of the acquisition, AbbVie received more than 60% of its sales from the biologic drug Humira, a biologic agent used to treat several autoimmune diseases and malignancies. However, Humira would soon lose patent protection and face competition from the new class of follow-on biologics, or biosimilars.

In October 2012, the executive vice-president (EVP) at the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Canada's leading bank, faced managerial dilemmas with regard to the launch of a mobile wallet. RBC had developed a cloud-based application that differed from industry standard SIM card-based payment methods. The EVP was evaluating areas of contrast between the two models as part of arriving at a decision. There was likelihood that the cloud solution was disruptive. But would it become the dominant solution? Would it give RBC a first-mover advantage among its peers?

This case explores the experiences of three Manhattan-based hospitals during Superstorm Sandy in 2012. Beginning with an overview of how the hospitals prepared in the months and days leading up to the storm, it focuses primarily on decisions made by each institution, as Sandy approached, about whether to shelter-in-place or evacuate hundreds of medically fragile patients -- the former strategy running the risk of exposing individuals to dangerous and life-threatening conditions, the latter being an especially complex and difficult process, not without its own dangers. Ultimately, each of the three hospitals profiled in the case took a different approach, informed by their differing perceptions of risk and other unique circumstances. The case illustrates the very difficult trade-offs hospital administrators and local and state public health authorities grappled with as Sandy bore down on New York and vividly depicts the ramifications of these decisions, with the storm ultimately inflicting serious damage on Manhattan and across much of the surrounding region.