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We increasingly hear the alarm siren signaling that organizations can no longer survive - much less thrive - by continuing to use frameworks developed during the Industrial Revolution. In recent years, one framework that has emerged to illuminate how networked systems function optimally centers on ecological thinking and its application to organizations. The implication is that an 'organizational ecosystem' functions much as a biological ecosystem does, exhibiting both desirable and undesirable properties that are similar to what we see in nature. The authors discuss four meaningful similarities and four fundamental between organizational and biological ecosystems and in so doing, deconstruct this popular metaphor.

In this interview the renowned psychologist and Emotional Intelligence (EI) pioneer describes the importance of focus for leadership excellence. He explains in detail the three types of focus that leaders must possess to perform optimally: self-awareness, awareness of others and outer focus. Focus, he argues, is a pre-requisite for Emotional Intelligence.

The case looks at the board structure of Research in Motion Limited (RIM) since the probe of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) into the company's stock option granting practices in late 2006. Institutional investors, more specifically Northwest & Ethical Investments LP (NEI), were concerned about RIM's leadership and board structure in 2011 not because of non-compliance with regulations or accounting errors, but because of the drastic fall of the company's share price (see TN-Exhibit 1). Indeed, 2011 was a challenging year for RIM (see TN-Exhibit 2 for a list of events affecting RIM in 2011) as its launch of its tablet PlayBook was not as successful as compared to Apple's iPad 2. There was also increasing competition from Apple's iPhone 4S and other smartphones using the Android platform. In addition, a number of executives left the company in summer and early fall. There was also a service disruption, due to a failure of core switch in RIM's infrastructure, which interrupted email messages and internet services for millions of BlackBerry users over five continents in October 2011. Apart from these serious strategic and operational issues, institutional investors, more specifically NEI, questioned the dominance of executives on RIM's Board and asked for a split of the Chair and Co-CEO roles. In order to avert a showdown with shareholders at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) on July 12, 2011, RIM made an agreement with NEI to establish "a committee of independent directors to study its board structure, the merits of a lead director versus a chair, and the 'business necessity' for the company's co-CEOs to hold 'significant' board-level titles". This sets the theme of the case, i.e., assess RIM's board structure in 2011 and recommend resolutions to be included in the report due on January 31, 2012 to address the governance issues raised by NEI.

This is the "David and Goliath" story of Cooley Distillery, the world's only independent, Irish-owned distiller of Irish whiskey. Against long odds, it survived twenty-five years of brutal competition in the oligopolistic Irish whiskey category of the global spirits industry. Along the way, it began to turn a modest profit and achieved a stellar reputation for quality and innovation in its product offerings. Yet it remained only a niche player. Cooley, a non-listed public company with 290 shareholders, had never paid a dividend, nor seemed in a position to do so for years to come. As 2011 drew to a close, founder and chairman John Teeling, whose family controlled 36% of the outstanding stock in the company, was evaluating a variety of strategic options, which included selling out to a larger multinational player, taking the company private in a management buy-out, partnering in a joint venture with another firm, or continuing to go it alone. Each option had particular challenges. Students must put themselves in Teeling's shoes and decide on the optimal strategy

Telenor Group, based in Norway, experienced stagnating growth in average revenue per user (ARPU) at its 11 subsidiary cellular networks in Europe and Asia. Buying GSM licenses to expand to new markets was now too expensive. Having favoured Telenor Pakistan with more than $1.2 billion of capital expenditure, it was now especially in need of substantial profits from this wholly owned subsidiary. Given this context, Telenor Pakistan and several other subsidiaries were directed to explore diversification avenues. They sought a self-subsisting "growth story." In the case, we follow how the VP Strategy at Telenor Pakistan presented mobile financial services for the "unbanked" as the way forward. However, at the decision point in the case (March 2008), the central bank of Pakistan had sanctioned only a certain set of business models from which the telecommunications company (telco) had to choose one, if it was to provide mobile financial services. A basic constraint was that the venture should be "bankled." There were already various novel mobile financial service models in other emerging markets that were making headlines, such as SMART Money in the Philippines and Vodafones' M-PESA in Kenya. The VP Strategy at Telenor Pakistan had to prepare a presentation to the Board of Directors regarding how to proceed. The major issues and decisions were the following: (1) why and how Telenor Pakistan would achieve a "growth story" by diversifying into financial services; (2) given the peculiarities of the Pakistani market, what type of alliance with a bank should be pursued given the local legal restrictions and the benchmark models in other countries.

Sherry Noonan, a senior business student, is considering purchasing Cavendish Cove Cottages, a complex of 19 cottage rental units marketed to visitors. The property is located in the heart of Cavendish, a very popular tourist destination on Prince Edward Island (PEI), Canada. Sherry must analyze this opportunity as a going concern. This case presents a unique situation: the opportunity to apply business valuation concepts in a small business environment, and from the perspective of a college-age entrepreneur. This case provides the opportunity to utilize the planning, analytical, and decision-making techniques of a prospective entrepreneur who is considering acquiring an existing business. This is complicated by the fact that the business is seasonal and only open a portion of the year. Also affecting the analysis is the deteriorating economic environment that existed at the time of the case (early 2009), leading to the possibility of declining tourist numbers and spending on PEI. While her family may provide some of the financing to purchase the business, the task of raising the additional funds required could prove difficult given Sherry's young age and the very tight credit markets. A thorough analysis of the business's financial situation must be completed, strengths and weaknesses uncovered, and areas for improvement discussed. Yearly sales, expenses, and cash operating earnings must then be forecast, and the value of the business estimated. A recommendation, based on the various tools used to analyze the case information, must then be made. The Instructor's Manual suggests the types of courses the case is suited for, offers a range of discussion questions and teaching formats, and provides a thorough financial analysis of the business opportunity.

. Maria Gonzalez, a unionized employee of Global Communications, was arrested in an off-duty incident involving drugs, guns, and possible pornography. The news account published the names of those arrested, including Maria, but listed her name as Yvonne Gonzalez. Maria, as she was known in the office, was a customer service representative (CSR) at Global. She had access to private information about Global's customers and was the point of contact for them. Gonzalez reported out sick following the arrest and her immediate boss, unaware of the drug bust and Gonzalez's associated arrest, simply thought this was a typical sick-day call-out. Subsequently and quite by accident, Gonzalez's managers learned that her absences were directly related to events at the drug bust. In turn, when she wanted to report back to work, the managers became concerned about what the appropriate course of action should be regarding Gonzalez's behavior. They were troubled by the potential customer and employee impact, as well as negative publicity that could tarnish Global's overall reputation.

VFC's primary purpose is to assist low-income families own vehicles so that they can achieve financial independence. Most of the vehicles VFC awarded to low-income families were donated. To supplement its budget, VFC also established a used car sales business called Freedom Wheels (FW) which soon became a profitable enterprise. Nearly all of FW's profits were transferred to support VFC's mission. Marty Schwartz, President of VFC, believed that allowing FW to retain more of its profits would allow it to grow its used car business which would bring even larger financial benefits to VFC in the long-run. In the short-term, however, this would reduce the number of vehicles awarded to low-income families-a sensitive issue for many members of his board. At the upcoming board meeting, therefore, Schwartz's primary challenge was to present an assessment of the potential impact on the vehicle award program of allowing FW to retain more of its profits, and to recommend what percentage of its profits FW should be allowed to retain. He was also prepared to examine other options for growing VFC's revenue, and to consider the wisdom of spinning-off FW as a separate for-profit entity.

This case describes the challenges faced by the president of an engineering and environmental services consulting firm (Terra Nova Consulting) as it seeks to address deep internal cultural divisions. Terra Nova began as a small niche firm that has expanded through internal growth and mergers to become an elite, international professional services firm. It was founded upon certain values and principles, but has drifted away from these over time, such that younger members perceived a disconnect between its professed and actual culture. Survival as an elite firm will depend upon the ability to repair this divide and convince the next generation to continue the founders' vision or develop a new shared vision.

. Matthew Haertzen, a timber portfolio manager for Cogent Partners, the fund manager for Cambium Global Timberland (a UK listed timber investment fund), was tasked with the analysis of a managed teak plantation in Honduras for potential cumulative investment in the amount of $21-25 million. Matt was evaluating an opportunity from Beyond Forestry, a Honduran Company that employed a unique accelerated teak growth model. This accelerated growth model allowed for harvesting of teak wood in as few as 7-12 years, as compared to 20-30 years for traditional commercial plantations. The demand for teak was growing and the supply was dwindling due to significant restrictions regarding the harvest of native teak forests, which traditionally have a very long growth cycle of 70-80 years. The current supply/demand conditions led to a shortage of teak and created an opportunity for investment in companies who could grow teak in an ongoing, sustainable basis with manageable harvest rotations. Mr. Haertzen needed to perform a capital budgeting analysis, including deriving an appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital, to use in his investment analysis. He obtained data from Beyond Forestry in Honduras including growth rates of managed teak plantations, teak pricing, and operational expenses necessary to estimate cash flows associated with the managed teak plantations. Of equal importance was an assessment of the many risks associated with the teak plantation investment, given the political and economic environment in a developing market such as Honduras.

When Birnbaum joined SodaStream, in 2007, it was a sleepy company whose managers liked to boast that they had an 85% share of the "home carbonation business." He and his all-new management team brought enthusiasm and vision--and shortly began talking about a new cola war to grow SodaStream's share of the $260 billion global soda business. The ad they created for the 2013 Super Bowl reached more than 100 million viewers--but in an unexpected twist, an ad that never even got on the air garnered more attention. The original spot (called "Game Changer"), which took a direct shot at Coke and Pepsi, was rejected by CBS. The legal wrangling that followed generated headlines around the globe--newspapers in countries that don't even air the Super Bowl began doing stories on it. And the controversial ad has been viewed more than 5 million times on YouTube. From a marketing standpoint, it was a great investment.

Since the financial crisis of 2008, there has been widespread agreement on the need for public companies to build value for the long term. Nonetheless, because of pressure from financial markets, a detrimental focus on short-term performance persists. Reversing this trend, the authors say, depends on the leadership of major asset owners such as pension funds, insurance firms, and mutual funds. They should act by taking four practical, proven steps: 1 Define long-term objectives and risk appetite, and invest accordingly. Major asset owners should set a multiyear time frame for creating value, decide how much underperformance they can tolerate in the short term, and then align their investments with this agenda. 2 Practice engagement and active ownership. Big investors should cultivate ongoing relationships with the companies they invest in, collaborating with management to optimize corporate strategy and governance. 3 Demand long-term metrics from companies to improve investment decision making. Rather than focusing on quarterly financial statements, investors should seek to obtain and analyze data that indicate a company's long-term health. 4 Structure institutional governance to support a long-term approach. Big investors must have competent board members committed to investing for the long term, as well as policies and mechanisms to translate this philosophy into action.

Leaders can do few things more important than encouraging helping behavior within their organizations. In the highest-performing companies, it is a norm that colleagues support one another's efforts to do the best work they can. That has always been true for efficiency reasons, but collaborative helping becomes even more vital in an era of knowledge work, when positive business outcomes depend on high creativity in often very complex projects. A help-friendly organization has to be actively nurtured, however, because helpfulness among colleagues does not arise automatically: Competition, pride, or distrust may get in the way. The trickiness of this management challenge-to increase a discretionary behavior that by definition must be inspired-makes all the more impressive what the design firm IDEO has already achieved. Its help-seeking and help-giving culture is behind the firm's success. But how has IDEO managed to make helping the norm? To answer this question, the authors spent two years observing, interviewing people, and conducting surveys at one office of the firm. They discovered four keys to building a help-friendly organization that leaders of other organizations could learn and apply to similar effect.

When most of the world's financial services giants were stumbling and retrenching in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, the asset management firm BlackRock was busy charting a course for growth. Its revenues, profits, and stock price all performed consistently through this tumultuous period. The authors looked at BlackRock and other game-changing companies-the Mumbai-based global conglomerate Tata Group, and Envision, an entrepreneurial alternative energy company based in China-and found significant commonalities. These three companies demonstrate the essential attributes of a game-changing organization: They are driven by purpose, oriented toward performance, and guided by principles. In the process of conducting interviews with these companies, the authors discovered a fourth thread that weaves them even more tightly together: Each is supported by a game-changing talent strategy. But, they write, the path to such a strategy seems rife with complexity and ambiguity. How can both strategy and execution be consistently superior? How can they support a collective culture yet enable high potentials to thrive as individuals? How can the strategy be global and local at the same time? And how can its policies endure yet be agile and constantly open to revitalization? BlackRock's approach provides the answers.

When Netflix executives wrote a PowerPoint deck about the organization's talent management strategies, the document went viral-it's been viewed more than 5 million times on the web. Now one of those executives, the company's longtime chief talent officer, goes beyond the bullet points to paint a detailed picture of how Netflix attracts, retains, and manages stellar employees. The firm draws on five key tenets: Hire, reward, and tolerate only fully formed adults. Ask workers to rely on logic and common sense instead of formal policies, whether the issue is communication, time off, or expenses. Tell the truth about performance. Scrap formal reviews in favor of informal conversations. Offer generous severance rather than holding on to workers whose skills no longer fit your needs. Managers must build great teams. This is their most important task. Don't rate them on whether they are good mentors or fill out paperwork on time. Leaders own the job of creating the company culture. You've got to actually model and encourage the behavior you talk up. Talent managers should think like businesspeople and innovators first, and like HR people last. Forget throwing parties and handing out T‑shirts; make sure every employee understands what the company needs most and exactly what's meant by "high performance."

Strategy making forces executives to confront a future they can only guess at. It's not surprising, then, that they try to make the task less daunting by preparing a comprehensive plan for how the company will achieve its goal. But good strategy is not the product of endless research and modeling; it's the result of a simple process of thinking through how to hit a target and whether it's realistic to try. Discomfort is part of the process. If you are entirely comfortable, you're probably stuck in one or more of the following traps. (1) Strategic planning. Planning arguably makes for more thorough budgets, but it must not be confused with strategy. (2) Cost-based thinking. Costs lend themselves wonderfully to planning, because the company controls them. But for revenue, customers are in charge. Planning can't make revenue magically appear. (3) Self-referential strategy frameworks. Even managers who avoid the first two traps may end up using a framework that leads them to design a strategy entirely around what the company controls. A company can avoid those traps by focusing on customers, recognizing that strategy is about making bets, and articulating the logic behind strategic choices.

The search for new business ideas--and models--is hit-or-miss at most firms. Tackling the problem systematically, of course, will improve your odds of success. Traditional ways of framing this search examine competencies, customer needs, and shifts in the landscape. This article proposes adding a new IT-based framework. It involves asking, How can data and analytic tools be used to create new value? The authors have explored that question with many clients. In their work, they've seen IT create new value in five patterns: using data from sensors in objects to improve offerings (think smart energy meters); digitizing physical assets (such as health records); combining data within and across industries (to, say, coordinate supply chains); trading data (as mobile providers do with information on users' whereabouts); and codifying best-in-class capabilities (such as online expense management) as services. Drawing on examples from their own experience and their clients', the authors walk readers through each of the five patterns and how to apply them. They also provide advice and questions that will help executives get started on their own searches.

Traditional methods of managing supply chain risk require estimations of how likely a disruption is to occur. For fairly common risks--poor supplier performance, forecast errors, transportation breakdowns--the traditional methods work quite well. But it's a different story for rare, high-impact events such as megadisasters, pandemics, and political upheavals. These risks are hard to quantify using traditional models, and as a result, many companies do not adequately prepare for them, which can have calamitous consequences when catastrophes do strike. A new model allows managers to quantify the "impact" of a supply chain disruption on a company's operational and financial performance, rather than focusing on the "cause" or "likelihood" of the disruption. This type of analysis obviates the need to determine the probability of any specific risk's occurring--a valid approach since the mitigation strategies are equally effective regardless of what caused the disruption. In this article, the authors describe how companies can use the model to reduce their exposure to all types of supply chain risk.

Until 2008 going global seemed to make sense for just about every company in the world. Since then, we've entered a different phase, one of "guarded globalization." Governments of developing nations have become wary of opening more industries to multinational companies. They are defining national security more broadly and perceiving more and more sectors to be of strategic importance, taking active steps to deter foreign companies from entering them and promoting domestic, often state-owned enterprises. Indeed, the rise of state capitalism in some of the world's most important emerging markets has altered the playing field. To factor globalization's new risks into strategy, executives must consider their industry's strategic importance to the host government and their home government. They can then choose among various approaches: strike alliances with local players, look for new ways to add value abroad, enter multiple sectors, or stay home.

Feedback is crucial--but almost everyone, from new hires to C-suite executives, struggles with receiving it. The authors, who have spent 20 years working with managers on difficult conversations, outline six steps that can help you turn feedback into an important, and unthreatening, tool. (1) Know your tendencies. Look for patterns in how you respond. (Do you defend yourself? Do you lash out?) Once you understand your standard operating procedure, you can make better choices about where to go from there. (2) Separate the "what" from the "who." Your feelings about the messenger might be short-circuiting your ability to learn from the message. (3) Sort toward coaching. Work to hear feedback as well-meant advice, not as an indictment. (4) Unpack the feedback. Resist snap judgments; explore where suggestions are coming from and where they're going. (5) Request and direct feedback. Don't wait for a formal review; ask for bite-size pieces of coaching. (6) Experiment. Try following a piece of advice and seeing what happens. Criticism is never easy to take--but learning to pull value from it is essential to your development and success.