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Unhaggle is a business model that uses a website to link up consumers with automobile dealers. The consumer describes the sort of vehicle they are looking for and the dealers compete to serve the consumer at the lowest possible price. The case illustrates how power in a negotiation comes from supply and demand. By bringing dealers to the consumer, Unhaggle helps drive down the cost of the vehicle to the consumer while reducing the dealer’s marketing costs. The case thus illustrates how technology changes a business, and specifically what players hold the power in a market. This case can also be used to illustrate a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma (game theory). Doing so involves arguing that dealers collectively would be better off if they refused to join Unhaggle’s dealer network (all would gain higher margins), but any individual dealer has an incentive to defect and join, in order to gain access to Unhaggle’s consumers.

Pak Elektron Limited was a prominent manufacturer of consumer home appliances, large distribution and power transformers, and switch gears for power companies in Pakistan. From 2007, the company had started the process of changing the information systems of the company. These systems had become outdated as Microsoft withdrew its support of Visual FoxPro, the platform on which all systems had been developed. The company decided that a Tier 1 ERP (enterprise resource planning) system with strength in manufacturing modules would be suitable. An ERP system was then selected and a firm was appointed as implementer in December 2009. The case describes the issues surrounding the implementation, including many unexpected events. It presents the situation as of the fourth quarter of 2011, after Phase 1 of the implementation had finished in December 2010 and the company had decided in March 2011 to dispense with the services of the consulting firm supporting the implementation. Pak Elektron Limited was facing a liquidity crisis and had to save costs even though there was insufficient corporate knowledge of ERP procedures. The staff was not comfortable with the ERP system and would not let go of the legacy systems and, as such, the project was in trouble.

Employees are faced each day with important decisions that they need to make, which force them to evaluate potential benefits and risks and act accordingly. Organizations depend on the successful decisions that business leaders make. Unfortunately, business students do not spend as much time as they should studying decision-making risk and how to evaluate it. Recent organizational failures, such as the collapse of Enron and Lehman Brothers, exhibit a fundamental lack of understanding.<br><br>Decision-making risk (DMR) is, quite simply, the risk associated with making a decision. With each decision, there are risk variables that interact with one another to create an overall risk profile. It is this interaction that is arguably under-observed in business schools. Furthermore, it is contended that a lack of focus on this interaction often leads to poor decision-making.<br><br>In this note, we use the Bear Stearns collapse and the Maple Leaf Foods listeria outbreak as timely examples of miscalculated decision-making risk. After examining these cases, it is quite clear that the associated risks in both were quite high. This raises a number of questions. Why didn’t the decision-makers at the time realize the risks that their organizations were facing? How can business leaders learn from these failures to ensure similar mistakes are not made in the future? In particular, this note was written to answer the question: Is there a comprehensive framework that can be used to assess decision-making risk?

This case is about an ambitious “technopreneur” with ideas that were at the forefront of technology, such as in enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. Compassion Web had been successful initially, then swamped with challenges, and the original business model needed major changes in order to work in the fast-changing environment. At the same time, the company was facing a lawsuit with a major client, which could threaten its survival. To make matters even worse, the company lacked the strong and unified leadership necessary to pull it out of its difficulties.

In 2009, when the Indian cement market was strong, major Indian players were preparing to move from a regional emphasis to pan-India penetration. To become a national player, Jaiprakash Associates Limited grew through acquisitions and setting up new plants. To strengthen its position, the company decided to move from a multiple-brand cement portfolio to a single-brand entity. It merged its two existing brands of cement, Buniyad Jaypee Cement and Jaypee Buland Cement, into a new brand, Jaypee Cement. Expanding into new geographic markets and creating a pan-India presence for the brand was the motive for this merger. When global brands such as Swiss giant Holcim and France’s Lafarge continued with a multi-brand strategy in India, it was understandable that industry experts doubted whether Jaypee’s decision to move from multi-branding to mono-branding was correct.

It was late January 2011, and although Rachel De Marchi had gotten used to the long days of physical labour, she knew it was bothering her, and today brought her to a reality that she knew she would have to face. Since having founded her dog-walking service six years ago in Oakville, Ontario, this was the first time she had asked for help. She made a very embarrassing phone call to her father when she could not wrestle a dog into her car. What made the day even more frustrating was that she received three phone calls from potential clients, none of whom she could fit into her schedule. De Marchi knew that she was running out of capacity, both in terms of time and energy, and that something would have to change, but she wondered where to begin.

In November 2011, the State Fair of Virginia, Inc. (SFVA), which had been operating since 1854, was facing a dire financial situation. SFVA was a privately held, not-for-profit organization that operated the state fair independent of the state government, and received no operating support from state or local governments. In 2003, the organization had borrowed $83 million against a $47 million investment portfolio in order to develop its new fairgrounds, which opened in 2009. The new site had been attractive because it included The Meadow Farm, a horse farm famous for being the birthplace of the Secretariat, winner of the 1973 Triple Crown. The unprecedented collapse of the financial markets in the United States in 2008, combined with a poor economy and terrible weather for the fair’s first two years, resulted in a situation where in late 2011 the organization did not bring in enough income and donations to cover the loan payments. Creditors were demanding an immediate solution. The board of directors of SFVA realized that it had no choice but to consider strategic options including applying for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which would give it time to try to restructure its debt, or shutting down immediately.

This case is a supplement to Research in Motion: Sincerely, a RIM Employee (A).

Mike Lazaridis, co-CEO of Research in Motion (RIM), faced a situation of truly disastrous proportions. Earlier that week, service outages had started occurring on RIM’s popular BlackBerry smartphone devices, affecting over 30 million BlackBerry users globally. For a total of three days, RIM engineers worked around the clock to fix the widespread technical problems. However, with the company providing only brief comments to the public, many consumers and industry officials became increasingly frustrated. With the worldwide release of the new Apple iPhone 4S just days away, Lazaridis was presented with the additional challenge of how and if RIM should respond publicly to help restore consumer and market confidence.

This case is a supplement to Research in Motion: Blackberry Blackout (A).

On the morning of September 19, 2011, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the online movie provider Netflix Incorporated became witness to growing public discontent and media criticism directed at the company. The previous evening, the CEO had announced on the company blog that Netflix would be splitting into two separate entities. With the proposed change, the Netflix DVD-by-mail service would be spun out and renamed Qwikster. The move would leave the Netflix brand to focus on offering online streamed entertainment. This was not the first time Netflix had caused large-scale consumer frustration, as a few months earlier in July 2011 the company had announced it would be increasing rates by as much as 60 per cent. The result was a loss of over one million Netflix subscribers by September 2011, representing the first time the company had ever lost subscribers from one quarter to the next. Although the split into two separate entities could be seen as a good business strategy, Netflix did not follow through with a well-developed communication plan. Moving forward, both Netflix and Qwikster had come to represent an unfortunate dichotomy, and Netflix’s management was in desperate need to develop better communications with disgruntled consumers or risk losing additional subscribers and lucrative profits to a number of growing competitors.

Medupi was the first baseload project in South Africa in 20 years. It would be the largest dry-cooled, coal-fired power station in the world and was being developed by Eskom, which generated 90 per cent of Southern Africa’s power, at an estimated cost of R125 billion. In spite of the worldwide concern about greener energy, coal remained the most popular power station fuel for South Africa, due to the country’s vast resources of 224 million tonnes annually. The new capacity that Medupi would offer was sorely needed.<br><br>It had been challenging to follow a project schedule that involved various suppliers providing different packages at different dates and that required accommodating several interfaces during both design and implementation. Due to the massive scale and complexity of the project, three companies had joined forces to tackle the job, namely Murray & Roberts, Aveng, and Concor. Murray & Roberts had appointed Coenie Vermaak as project director at Medupi and, at 34, he was the youngest project director in the group. The managers of the joint venture had realized quickly that this would be “a project like no other.” The three companies’ different ways of working necessitated much more integrated coordination. For instance, employees from the different parent organizations had different job descriptions, remuneration, benefits, structures, processes, and cultures. Medupi’s uniqueness provided an opportunity to be pioneers in the construction industry and to “reconstruct construction.” A culture of employee engagement and alignment was required.

On June 30, 2011, Research in Motion (RIM) co-CEOs Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis unexpectedly found themselves facing serious public scrutiny, not from competitors, market analysts, or consumers, but from one of their own senior executives. In an attempt to have their voice heard, an anonymous senior-level RIM employee addressed an open letter to both Balsillie and Lazaridis; however, the letter was sent to the online technology news provider Boy Genius Report (BGR). In a year during which RIM already faced pressures from a dwindling market share, failed product attempts, and a sinking stock price, Balsillie and Lazaridis needed to figure out how to respond to the claims of the letter publicly, but more importantly how to communicate to RIM employees internally.

In April 2011, Vithal Gambhir, the marketing director of Vibhava Chemicals, an entrepreneurial venture and leader in the black phenyl category in the home cleaning agents (HCA) market in South India, was faced with a marketing challenge. A slew of multi-national corporation (MNC) brands in the emerging new category of specialty cleaning agents had eroded Vibhava’s share of the traditional black phenyl category by 50 per cent over the previous eight years. The marketing efforts of the MNCs had also led to a gradual transformation of the HCA market, expanding and segmenting it in terms of applications (e.g. floor-cleaning agents and toilet-cleaning agents) and benefits (e.g. disinfecting, cleaning, and deodorizing). As a result, Vibhava’s leading brand, “Black Belt” black phenyl disinfectant, had begun losing ground in the market. Vibhava had successfully responded to this decline by launching Ozone, a pine-oil-based floor cleaner, in 2003. Positioned as an herbal, eco-friendly, deodorizing floor cleaner, Ozone had managed to avert Domex, the leading MNC brand of disinfecting floor cleaner. However, during the last couple of years Domex had been available in many variants serving many segments and the market had become flooded with both MNC and established Indian brands. While the sale of Ozone rose in absolute terms, Vibhava’s share in the growing home cleaning market dropped from 25 per cent in a predominantly traditional product market in the 1990s, to 11 per cent in the transformed market of 2010. Gambhir now faced the daunting challenge of meeting an ambitious sales target of INR 1 billion for 2011-2012, which was double the sales of the previous year.

The world had changed as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Canada was engaged in the Afghanistan War, and the first casualties were being felt. It was November 28, 2005, as Rene LaRose, the director general of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto, sat in his office preparing for an all-staff briefing the following day. He knew that for his research institute to remain relevant and be a major contributor to the emerging needs of the Canadian Forces and national security in this rapidly changing landscape, a major transformation of his centre was required. The Canadian Forces was undergoing its own metamorphosis under its new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, and DRDC Toronto needed to be in synch with this development. LaRose had spent several years trying to convey the message that profound changes at DRDC Toronto were needed — changes that were as much cultural as they were structural. The sense of urgency was now acute with Canada at war, and DRDC Toronto was poised to embark on a major organizational alignment program.

This case is a supplement to Defence Research and Development Canada — Toronto (A): The Organizational Alignment Program.

In August 2010, SKS Microfinance became India’s (and South Asia’s) first publicly traded microfinance institution with a stock exchange listing. A share in the company was offered at INR 985 and it commenced trading at INR 1,036, reaching INR 1,404 within a month. However, that was the extent of the good news as far as the company and its shareholders were concerned. Things began to unravel rapidly. The initial public offering of shares was seen as the initiation of a conflict between the interests of the company’s shareholders and the poor rural borrowers it was expected to serve. Further, the company fired an arguably successful chief executive officer due to “inter-personal issues” within days from the end of the post-listing 40-day silent period. Matters were aggravated when 30 women who happened to be microfinance borrowers committed suicide within a span of 45 days, 13 of whom were reported to have been SKS members. The provincial government in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the hub of microfinance activity in the country, brought out an ordinance that effectively curbed microfinance lending and recovery operations. By May 2011, the Reserve Bank of India, the country’s banking regulator, had issued a notification placing caps on interest rates and margins and specifying minimum tenures for relatively larger loan sizes. Was this the end of the microfinance movement in India?

Goli Vada Pav Pvt. Limited (GVPPL) identified an opportunity to brand one of Mumbai’s favourite fast foods — the vada pav. GVPPL’s founders saw a huge opportunity in the Indian fast food industry, which was highly unorganized and largely serviced by small-time local vendors. There was a need in the market for a hygienic, branded product and Goli Vada Pav was created to fill this void. GVPPL broke the stereotype of unhygienic, manhandled vada pav. Its strategy for success was built on the four-point formula for a high-quality product, with value for money and efficient delivery to customers. The absence of a hygienic, branded product in the Indian fast food industry contributed to the initial success of GVPPL. This case series illustrates an entrepreneur’s ability to identify and exploit a market opportunity. It details challenges faced by GVPPL in the competitive dynamics of the Indian fast food industry. These cases further question the viability of GVPPL’s business model as one of the founders aspired to expand to the national and international markets. Would he be successful in strategizing GVPPL’s future growth?

This case is a supplement to The Goli Vada Pav — Fast Food of India (A).

The Singaporean software company Lan-Ray attempted to enter the prepaid cash card (PCC) business in China. Equity funds were sourced to acquire Protection Communications Network (PCN), a payment intermediary in Quanzhou, China, with a vast payment network that could be instrumental to the success of the PCC business. However, PCN would need to demonstrate profitability before it could obtain the licence to run the PCC business.<br><br>Together, Lan-Ray and PCN ventured into the mobile phone campus e-card business, which was initially thought to be able to help PCN achieve profitability in the short run. However, the campus e-card business did not prove to be as profitable as expected. At the same time, the acquisition of PCN by Lan-Ray was problematic, as PCN was unwilling to transfer shares to Lan-Ray. How could Lan-Ray’s CEO finish the acquisition of PCN and make the campus e-card business profitable?