學門類別
哈佛
- General Management
- Marketing
- Entrepreneurship
- International Business
- Accounting
- Finance
- Operations Management
- Strategy
- Human Resource Management
- Social Enterprise
- Business Ethics
- Organizational Behavior
- Information Technology
- Negotiation
- Business & Government Relations
- Service Management
- Sales
- Economics
- Teaching & the Case Method
最新個案
- A practical guide to SEC ï¬nancial reporting and disclosures for successful regulatory crowdfunding
- Quality shareholders versus transient investors: The alarming case of product recalls
- The Health Equity Accelerator at Boston Medical Center
- Monosha Biotech: Growth Challenges of a Social Enterprise Brand
- Assessing the Value of Unifying and De-duplicating Customer Data, Spreadsheet Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise, Data Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise
- Board Director Dilemmas: The Tradeoffs of Board Selection
- Barbie: Reviving a Cultural Icon at Mattel (Abridged)
- Happiness Capital: A Hundred-Year-Old Family Business's Quest to Create Happiness
Asian Corporate Governance Association: Stemming a "Race to the Bottom" by Stock Exchanges?
內容大綱
This case describes the movement towards dual-class listings on Asian stock exchanges and the efforts of the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), a not-for-profit shareholder advocacy group, to discourage this trend. As a not-for-profit organization with no formal regulatory or incentive setting powers, ACGA had been successful in helping to elevate the governance standards in Asian capital markets through its advocacy work, educational efforts, and its biennial publication ("CG Watch") that rated Asian countries' corporate governance quality. With the 2018 decisions by Hong Kong and Singapore to allow for dual-class share listings, which ACGA and its members have previously strongly opposed, ACGA worried about how it could prevent corporate governance standards in the region from deteriorating. Was this a "race to the bottom" by Asian stock exchanges due to their desire to attract listings, or were the proposed safeguards effective in balancing shareholder rights against protecting managers from market pressures? What additional levers of influence should the organization pursue to ensure that shareholder rights were protected or to make corporate governance less of a compliance exercise but more of a value-add in the eyes of corporate managers in Asia?