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- A practical guide to SEC ï¬nancial reporting and disclosures for successful regulatory crowdfunding
- Quality shareholders versus transient investors: The alarming case of product recalls
- The Health Equity Accelerator at Boston Medical Center
- Monosha Biotech: Growth Challenges of a Social Enterprise Brand
- Assessing the Value of Unifying and De-duplicating Customer Data, Spreadsheet Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise, Data Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise
- Board Director Dilemmas: The Tradeoffs of Board Selection
- Barbie: Reviving a Cultural Icon at Mattel (Abridged)
- Happiness Capital: A Hundred-Year-Old Family Business's Quest to Create Happiness
New York Times Co.
內容大綱
The Sulzberger family owns 20% of the New York Times Co. (NYT) but controls 70% of the board through a dual-class share structure. At the company's April 2006 annual shareholder meeting, Morgan Stanley Investment Management (MSIM) and other investors, holding 28% of the company's stock altogether, withheld their votes for the 30% of directors that they could vote on as a sign of protest against the management of Arthur Sulzberger, Jr. and the dual-class structure that protects him. MSIM later submitted a proposal urging the NYT to subject the dual-class structure to a vote. In evaluating the proposal, Sulzberger feels torn by his responsibilities to three different constituencies: his readers, his family, and all other NYT shareholders.