學門類別
哈佛
- General Management
- Marketing
- Entrepreneurship
- International Business
- Accounting
- Finance
- Operations Management
- Strategy
- Human Resource Management
- Social Enterprise
- Business Ethics
- Organizational Behavior
- Information Technology
- Negotiation
- Business & Government Relations
- Service Management
- Sales
- Economics
- Teaching & the Case Method
最新個案
- A practical guide to SEC ï¬nancial reporting and disclosures for successful regulatory crowdfunding
- Quality shareholders versus transient investors: The alarming case of product recalls
- The Health Equity Accelerator at Boston Medical Center
- Monosha Biotech: Growth Challenges of a Social Enterprise Brand
- Assessing the Value of Unifying and De-duplicating Customer Data, Spreadsheet Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise, Data Supplement
- Building an AI First Snack Company: A Hands-on Generative AI Exercise
- Board Director Dilemmas: The Tradeoffs of Board Selection
- Barbie: Reviving a Cultural Icon at Mattel (Abridged)
- Happiness Capital: A Hundred-Year-Old Family Business's Quest to Create Happiness
Note on Measuring Controlling Shareholders' Ownership, Voting, and Control Rights
內容大綱
Founders and their families can raise equity without relinquishing control of their companies, through the use of mechanisms such as dual-class stock, pyramidal ownership, voting agreements, and disproportionate board representation. The use of these mechanisms in publicly traded companies is widespread throughout the world, and in the United States. Understanding how the various mechanisms contribute to the separation between economic ownership and control is important for the individuals who set them up because the choice among these mechanisms impacts firm value. It is also important for minority shareholders in these companies and for regulators, for reasons of transparency and investor protection.