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Turkey and the Southern Corridor
內容大綱
In December 2014, Russia cancelled the South Stream pipeline that was envisaged to deliver natural gas through the Black Sea basin on to Europe and replaced it with a new pipeline through Turkey. The Turkish Stream was a great opportunity for Turkey to turn itself into an energy hub of its region. It had already secured TANAP, a natural gas pipeline to carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe through Turkey. The country's geographical position was one of its crucial assets: to its east lay 70% of the world's natural gas reserves, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean basin. To its west was Europe, one of the biggest energy consumers of the world. If the Turkish Stream and TANAP pipeline projects were to go through and connect to other possible energy reserves within the wider region, would it be likely that Turkey would eventually become one of Europe's main energy corridors-perhaps even a hub? Was it less risky to remain as a transit country and secure its own energy needs at potentially lower prices? What would be the consequences of being even more dependent on Russian gas through the Turkish Stream? Would Turkey be able to prioritize economic gains and take advantage of the available resources in its south?