China's Banks 2010

In the 1990s, considerable debate arose concerning the strength and stability of China's banks. Of particular concern were the debts owed to the banks by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Many SOEs were experiencing financial difficulties and so they might not have been able to repay these loans. Some analysts emphasized that, since the banks and the SOEs were both owned by the government, the only relevant concern was the financial strength of the government and its preparedness to take responsibility for any of the banks' non-performing loans. In the early years of the 21st century, the government undertook a widespread program aimed at improving the balance sheets at the banks by purchasing non-performing loans from the banks and then reselling these at a discount, often to foreign private sector financial institutions. Prior to 2010, this process provided a generally accepted faith in the stability and security of China's banks. Total non-performing loans as a per cent of total bank loans decreased from 20 per cent in 2003 to three per cent in 2008. The year 2010 brought a new realization that the non-performing loan problem had reappeared. However, China's banks now had private as well as government shareholders, and so the solution had become more complex. The government's response was to insist that China's banks increase their capital base by issuing new equity.

• Business and government relations
• Government policy and regulation