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Using Social and Economic Incentives to Discourage Chinese Suppliers From Product Adulteration
內容大綱
The American public raised serious concerns about product safety in 2007, when the number of product recalls broke a new record. Following a temporary drop in 2008, both the number and retail value of recalled units have been increasing, despite various efforts exerted by government agencies and private companies to combat this trend. Currently, many countries--including China itself--are expressing serious concern over adulterated or unsafe food made or sold in China. What are the underlying reasons for some Chinese suppliers to adulterate product? When law enforcement is still weak in China, what can western manufacturers do to reduce the risk of product adulteration? To develop effective deterrence mechanisms, we first identify four underlying factors that create incentives for some Chinese suppliers to produce unsafe products. Then we propose ideas to discourage Chinese suppliers from producing adulterated products based on two underlying strategies: (1) creating economic incentives through contingent payments, and (2) creating a social incentive by threatening public exposure through the power of the Internet and social networking sites.