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Trust Merchant Bank (TMB), a leading bank in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), needs to decide whether to enter the soon-to-be-liberalized insurance industry. Since its founding in 2004, TMB has played a pivotal role in reshaping the DRC banking landscape by focusing on retail customers and thus promoting financial inclusion in the DRC. In 2018, the Congolese government decided to open up the insurance industry, formerly a state-owned and mismanaged monopoly. TMB is considering applying for the newly available insurance licenses as the bank is well-positioned to capitalize on its existing banking infrastructure to begin selling insurance. The bank's leadership team is assessing the opportunities and challenges with such a move. What is required of TMB to make this move a success? How will TMB's customers react? How should the bank grow in an increasingly competitive environment?

This case describes the history of Oriental Land Co. Ltd.'s (OLC's) Tokyo Disney Resort (TDR), its operations, the extent of vertical integration, and the challenges it faced in 2018 as OLC's chairman and CEO, Toshio Kagami, contemplated how best to deal with congestion in the park. As of 2018, Tokyo Disneyland and Tokyo DisneySea, the two parks that comprised TDR, were the only Disney parks not owned and operated by Disney. Instead, OLC paid royalties to Disney based on the parks' revenue (in yen). The parks were immensely popular, but OLC had begun to see lower customer satisfaction ratings in recent years as high attendance led to long wait times. Although it continuously added new attractions to TDR, the company now faced a dilemma regarding how to expand further, given the limited land available around the parks. Kagami also considered whether to focus on OLC's other businesses, such as hotels, and even its nascent agriculture business, which it used to grow food served in the two parks.

This case is an abridged version (part 2 of 2) of "Walmart's Omnichannel Strategy: Revolution or Miscalculation?", HBS Case 720-370. The (B) case describes Walmart's omnichannel strategy in 2018 as it battled Amazon for online retail market share. Walmart aimed to integrate its enormous brick and mortar footprint with its growing ecommerce business, e.g., through merchandise and grocery delivery and order online, pickup in store options. It also followed a two-part acquisition strategy that included specialty retailers such as Shoes.com and digitally native vertical brands that developed their own products and sold them directly to consumers, such as ModCloth and Bonobos. In 2016, it acquired the ecommerce retailer Jet.com. In addition to building its online marketplace, Walmart hoped to leverage its existing assets, such as its massive network of retail stores and thriving grocery business, in the fight against Amazon. The case poses the question: Could Walmart successfully compete against Amazon and other online retailers in areas such as grocery delivery, product selection, shipping costs, and delivery times?

This case is an abridged version (part 1 of 2) of "Walmart's Omnichannel Strategy: Revolution or Miscalculation?" HBS Case 720-370. The (A) case discusses Walmart's early forays into online retail, as well as improvements made under Doug McMillon beginning in 2014. The case describes Walmart's physical stores, delivery options, grocery business, online marketplace, and distribution system. It also discusses the ecommerce startup Jet.com, which Walmart was considering purchasing in 2015. The case poses the question: How could Walmart best use its existing resources to compete against major ecommerce players like Amazon? Should it focus on its in-store business, build up its web-to-store capabilities, or compete head-on with pure ecommerce players in web-to-home sales? Alternatively, should it consider an omnichannel strategy, attempting to grow all these aspects of the business at once?

This case discusses the alternative social media site Steemit, including the principles it was founded on in 2016 and the challenges it faced in 2019. Steemit was a blockchain-based platform that aimed to differentiate itself from other social media companies by returning power to its users, rather than centralizing control among company executives. Steemit rewarded its users with cryptocurrency for posting, commenting on, and upvoting content on the site. Although it championed itself as a bastion of free speech, in January 2019, it banned a user for soliciting funds in exchange for the release of conspiracy-theory-related documents. This ban called into question the degree to which Steemit was willing to exert control over the content posted to its site. In addition to these censorship issues, Steemit's developers had to weigh a number of strategic considerations about the future of the site. Questions they faced included how to avoid alienating potential users with Steemit's complex features (such as its intricate payment system) and how to prevent certain users (e.g., those who had been kicked off of other sites) from becoming overly dominant on its platform.

This case describes the first commercial flight of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner in 2011, three years after originally planned, as well as the first commercial flight of Airbus' superjumbo, the A380, in 2007. It also describes the companies' current endeavors in 2011, including Airbus' work on the A350 and A320neo (new engine option) and Boeing's development of the 737 MAX. Boeing originally considered replacing the 737 with a completely new and redesigned ("clean-sheet") plane, but utlimately (in part due to pressure from the A320neo) decided to modify the 737 instead.

This case describes an issue with the batteries of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner planes overheating and sometimes catching fire in 2013. The planes were grounded for several months until Boeing introduced new safety measures. The case also discusses a problem with cracks on the wings of Airbus's A380 superjumbo, which required the company to make a costly fix to a particular wing component.

This case describes the introduction of Airbus's A350XWB (Xtra Wide Body) in 2015. It also describes Airbus and Boeing's current endeavors in 2015, including Airbus's development of the A330neo, Boeing's work on the 737 MAX, and Boeing's announcement of the 777X.

This case describes Airbus and Boeing developments in 2016, including Airbus's delivery of the first A320neo and Boeing's work on the 737 MAX and 777X programs. It also notes Airbus's restructuring in 2016.

This case describes Airbus's partnership with the Montreal-based aircraft manufacturer Bombardier beginning in 2017. The two companies partnered on the C Series of aircraft (later named the A220 Family), which consisted of small aircraft with 100-150 seats. The case also describes Boeing's 2018 joint venture with the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer, which produced the E2 Family of planes (97-120 seats).

This case describes Airbus's February 2019 announcement that it was ending production of the A380, with the last delivery scheduled for 2021. The announcement followed an order cancellation by Emirates, a major customer of the A380. The A380 had faced significant competition from Boeing's Dreamliner, and airlines had difficulty filling their A380s enough to make them fuel efficient and cost effective. Since the plane's launch, Airbus had sold far fewer A380s than it initially predicted.

This case describes the October 2018 and March 2019 crashes of Boeing MAX 8 jets, which together killed over 300 passengers. The planes involved in both crashes shared a problem with a software system called MCAS, which Boeing had revamped at the last minute prior to selling the planes, but had failed to mention in its pilot manuals until after the first crash. As of July 2019, the MAX 8 remained grounded worldwide. As the investigation into the MAX 8 continued, a simultaneous investigation into a Boeing 787 factory found that the company had repeatedly ignored reports of manufacturing defects and debris left on 787s from the factory.

This case discusses the Kenyan government's decision to increase excise taxes on wines in 2007. The tax increase would cause an average increase in price of 367% on Keroche's fortified wines. Meanwhile, Keroche's competitor EABL had effectively lobbied the government for its Senator beer to receive a zero-tax rating. Since Keroche's wines targeted low-income consumers, Tabitha Karanja knew they would no longer be able to buy its products after the price hike. To make matters worse, Keroche was in the middle of building a brewery, with plans to enter the beer business in 2008. Now Tabitha Karanja had to decide how to react to this tax increase. One option was to lobby the government for a repeal of the tax increase (a long and costly process). Another was to abandon the wine business altogether, either in favor of the vodka Keroche already produced or another alcoholic drink.

This case discusses the situation of the Kenyan alcoholic drinks producer Keroche in July 2004, when co-founder Tabitha Karanja was debating whether to enter the Kenyan beer market. Doing so would mean direct competition with the multinational EABL in an industry and market where Keroche had no experience. It would also require significant investments in manufacturing capacity, technology, and marketing. The case asks whether Tabitha Karanja should enter the Kenyan beer market, and if so, whether she should continue to target the low- to middle-income consumers with whom she had built the Keroche business, or shift the company's focus toward the upper middle- and high-income consumers who had been customers of EABL. The case also describes how the company successfully rebounded from the plant closures, litigation, and media attacks of the previous year, including through court battles and an extensive public relations campaign.

This case describes Keroche co-founder Tabitha Karanja's 2012 decision to invest in additional production capacity. In November 2012, with a loan from Barclay's bank, Keroche began constructing a new state-of-the-art beer brewery using German technology. The new plant, completed in March 2015, greatly increased Keroche's beer production capacity. The company also made investments to increase capacity for its Viena Ice and Crescent vodka drinks. The case describes Tabitha Karanja's aggressive production, marketing, and distribution strategy, and the company's resulting growth by 2017. It also describes Keroche's ongoing competition with EABL, including a 2016 EABL lawsuit against Keroche, and Keroche's continuing struggles with the Kenyan government.

This case describes Keroche's growth after entering the beer business in 2008. Although the company was operating at full capacity and not able to fulfill all of its orders, Tabitha Karanja had set a goal of growing Keroche's share of the Kenyan beer market from slightly over 1% to 20%. In 2010, Tabitha Karanja had invested US$2.5 million in a PET bottling line to increase capacity of Keroche's vodka drinks. However, in 2010, the government had passed a law requiring alcoholic drinks to be sold in glass containers, which made the PET investment obsolete. Now, in 2011, Tabitha Karanja sought new funding for a glass bottling line. The case asks whether, in the midst of these new investments, it was also time to expand beer capacity by building a new and larger plant.

This case discusses the challenges faced by Kenyan alcoholic drinks producer Keroche Industries Limited in 2003, when the Kenyan government accused the company of manufacturing and selling substandard alcoholic drinks, revoked its liquor licenses, and shut down its manufacturing facility. At the same time, the multinational East Africa Breweries Limited (EABL) was planning to enter the same low-income market as Keroche. The husband and wife duo Tabitha and Joseph Karanja had founded Keroche in 1997 with the aim of providing Kenya's low-income consumers with a cheap and safe alcoholic drink alternative, since these consumers frequently turned to unregulated, informally brewed alcohol that could blind or even kill those who drank it. However, the government was now claiming that Keroche, too, produced substandard drinks. Tabitha Karanja was convinced that EABL was behind these government attacks. The case describes the history of Keroche and EABL, and asks what Tabitha Karanja might do now to combat the allegations of the government and respond to the factory closing.

This case describes Keroche co-founder Tabitha Karanja's decision to exit the wine business following the Kenyan government's 2007 increase in excise taxes on wine. In August 2007, Keroche introduced the vodka drink Viena Ice as a replacement for its fortified wines, and in August 2008, it entered the beer market with the launch of its Summit Lager premium beer. The case describes the success of Keroche's products in the Kenyan beer market, despite an initial intense advertising campaign by Keroche competitor EABL for its own Tusker beer.

This case describes Walmart's omnichannel strategy in 2018 as it battled Amazon for online retail market share. The case discusses Walmart's early forays into online retail, as well as its 2018 strategy, which aimed to integrate Walmart's enormous brick and mortar footprint with its growing ecommerce business, e.g., through merchandise and grocery delivery and order online, pickup in store options. Walmart's strategy also included the acquistion of Jet.com (in 2016) as well as the acquistion of a number of other specialty eretailers (e.g., Shoes.com, Moosejaw, Bare Necessities) and digitally-native vertical brands that developed their own products and sold them directly to consumers, such as ModCloth, Bonobos, and Eloquii. In addition to building its online marketplace, Walmart hoped to leverage its existing assets, such as its massive network of retail stores and thriving grocery business, in the fight against Amazon. The case poses the question: Could Walmart successfully compete against Amazon and other online retailers in areas such as grocery delivery, product selection, shipping costs, and delivery times?

The case opens in 2018 after KITEA has recorded two years of double-digit sales growth following IKEA's entry into the Moroccan market. It then traces the factors that contributed to KITEA' success and that led Tana Africa Capital Limited to acquire a minority stake in the company. In February 2018, following the acquisition, the partners announced plans to create a presence in North and West African countries through KITEA's stores. The case asks whether, after a number of frightening years, KITEA was ready to expand internationally to Sub-Saharan Africa, and if so, what the optimal structure and pace for this expansion should be.