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The case describes the startup circumstances for Three Buoys Houseboats. It is an example of several young individuals stumbling into an opportunity and deciding to run with it without much evaluation, assessment or planning. The Three Buoys Houseboat case 9A86F005 is a detailed description of what actually happened.

A small American cookware manufacturer must decide whether to try to penetrate the Japanese market. The risks were enormous because major commitments were needed and the sales potential in a new market was hard to pin down. (Two sequels to this case are available, Cambridge Products Inc. (B) and Cambridge Products Inc. (C).)

A small American cookware firm has been negotiating with the Japanese to sell in Japan. Major commitments had been made to develop the product. Just when everything seemed settled, the Japanese wholesaler announced that modifications were needed. Should the company modify its product for the Japanese market? (This is the second case in a series titled Cambridge Products Inc. (A), Cambridge Products Inc. (B) and Cambridge Products Inc. (C).)

A small American cookware manufacturer has been very successful in selling to Japan. Suddenly the market in Japan has collapsed. What should be done now? (This is the last case in a series titled Cambridge Products Inc. (A), Cambridge Products Inc. (B) and Cambridge Products Inc. (C).)

The president of Medtron Limited, a fast growing Canadian manufacturer of wheelchairs, was preparing for a strategic planning session with his management group. In recent years, Medtron had met its sales growth and dealer expansion objectives and earned healthy profits. The president saw tremendous potential for further growth. He was concerned nevertheless that growth might outpace the company's financial and manufacturing capabilities and that a larger scale operation would create inflexibility. Our planning job is to identify any constraints and develop a strategy that maintains our reputation for quality products and fast, personalized service. As competitive conditions became more difficult and the company's environment changed, the president had to decide how aggressively Medtron should grow. What are management's realistic choices and which of these decisions would you recommend?

On December 19, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz, stung the administration when he publically threatened to resign. This action was not based on a substantive disagreement over foreign policy. Instead, Shultz was demonstrating his strong opposition to an administration plan to require polygraph tests for all government officials with access to "highly classified information." Roughly 182,000 government employees were to be affected by this plan, including some 4,500 members of the State Department. From the outset, the Reagan administration had been strongly interested in crushing espionage activities within the U.S. Government due to several recent instances during which breeches in U.S. security occurred. This case provides several examples of times when security was breached and chronicles the Reagan Administration's plan to squash espionage. It then details the series of actions that followed as Congress debated the issue. HKS Case Number 681.0.

This case discusses the effect import taxes had on Harley-Davidson. Using statistics on "average unit value" of 790cc and larger imports, Harley determined that eh real value of imports had dropped by $883 between 1979 and 1982. As such, a tariff rate of 48% would be necessary to restore import values to their 1979 level. The case continues by documenting the process Harley Davidson underwent to propose and implement a tariff. Through Harley's process, Japanese cycle producers challenged Harley's case for a steep import. Japanese producers negotiated with Harley to find a solution that suits all parties. This case may be used to discuss demand elasticities, tariffs and regulations, and international business. It should be paired with HKS case This is HKS Case Number 780.0

This case is the sequel to HKS815, which discusses the effect import taxes had on Harley-Davidson. Using statistics on "average unit value" of 790cc and larger imports, Harley determined that eh real value of imports had dropped by $883 between 1979 and 1982. As such, a tariff rate of 48% would be necessary to restore import values to their 1979 level. The case continues by documenting the process Harley Davidson underwent to propose and implement a tariff. Through Harley's process, Japanese cycle producers challenged Harley's case for a steep import. Japanese producers negotiated with Harley to find a solution that suits all parties. This case may be used to discuss demand elasticities, tariffs and regulations, and international business. It should be paired with HKS816. This is HKS Case Number 780.1

When introducing a new technology to their company, implementation managers must bridge the gap between the designers and the users of the innovation, and make the transition as smooth as possible. This task is especially difficult when they are met with employee ambivalence and resistance. Moreover, those employees who enthusiastically accept the innovation may not be regarded as leaders in the company. Implementation managers, then, must learn to see themselves as internal marketers, guiding the innovation from the laboratory to the workplace and meeting both developer and user needs, while preparing the organization to receive the technology.

Describes events and raises issues subsequent to Charlie McCall's acceptance of the job of CEO at CompuServe.

Describes events and raises issues subsequent to Charlie McCall's acceptance of the job as CEO at CompuServe.

Describes events and raises issues subsequent to Charlie McCall's acceptance of the job of CEO at CompuServe.

Describes the first four years of Jack Welch's tenure as CEO of the General Electric Co. Deals with the ways Welch has tried to change GE's strategy and planning activities and his attempts to make the company more entrepreneurial.

New managers need from 24 to 36 months before they can be said to have mastered their jobs. Research on 14 U.S. and European new managers, which included turnaround and normal situations, reveals that the taking-charge process involves five predictable stages of learning and action: taking hold, immersion, reshaping, consolidation, and refinement. Success depends on critical factors such as experience and special competence, management style, relationships with key people, and critical front-end work.

Integrated manufacturing, the simultaneous collaboration of specialized functions, brings manufacturing engineering, quality engineering, and test engineering in during the early stages of the design process. The work cell integrates the design, development, and procurement functions in the new type of manufacturing. To redesign manufacturing around the work cell, companies must train engineers and managers in statistical quality techniques, put engineers and managers through apprenticeships in all phases of their businesses, encourage employees to adopt attitudes that foster integration of functions, and organize integrated task forces.

A study of U.S., Japanese, and European companies shows that, contrary to the claims of some corporate critics, large companies can be as technologically innovative as small companies. The effective management of innovation is surprisingly similar in both. Founders of small companies pursue their technological goals over many years, keeping costs low, tolerating uncertainty and setbacks, and readily adapting their products to meet market needs. By contrast, many managers of large organizations emphasize orderly and predictable operations. Innovative large companies accept the tumultuous realities of the innovative process and behave much like their smaller counterparts. McKinsey Award Winner.

New projects, especially those involving high technology, are prone to cost overruns that may double, triple, or even quadruple original estimates. An inadequate design is often the cause. If necessary, management should abandon a project, and corporate environments should encourage honest appraisals and courage in their project managers. Suggestions for solutions include: verifying the nature of the problem, reengineering the project, and identifying underestimated areas.

Reviews and updates the structure and characteristics of the earth-moving equipment industry presented in the companion case, Caterpillar Tractor Co. After revealing that CAT has suffered major financial losses during the period from 1981 through 1984, the case describes how Komatsu grew from a $170 million local manufacturer in 1963 to become CAT's major challenge in the emerging global competitive battle. The case traces the strategy followed by Komatsu in developing its product technology, manufacturing capability, and marketing skills worldwide. The supplement, Caterpillar-Komatsu in 1986, provides an update to the global competitive interaction between Caterpillar and Komatsu. Caterpillar's response to Komatsu's growing market share is outlined, then the impact of rapidly changing dollar/yen exchange rates provides Caterpillar with an interesting pricing decision.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 385277.

Describes the structure and evolution of the earth moving equipment industry worldwide in the post war era, particularly focusing on developments in the 1960s and 1970s. Describes Caterpillar's strategy in becoming the dominant worldwide competitor (industry market share exceeding 50%). Includes details on CAT's manufacturing, marketing research and development, and organizational policies. Concludes with a description of some environmental changes occurring in the early 1980s, and raises the question of how these might effect Caterpillar Tractor Co.'s record 1981 performance and require changes in its highly successful strategy.