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In tough times, many retailers focus on their most loyal customers. That seems sensible enough. But, paradoxically, your most loyal customers are not your best source of revenue growth in a recession. You're already collecting most of the money they're spending. If they suddenly spend 25% less, most of that will come out of what they spend in your stores. It's not likely that you'll pry away customers who are fiercely loyal to other retailers either. Your best opportunity lies with "switchers" - the people who spend money both in your shops and elsewhere. If you collect, say, only 20% of what they're spending today but can increase that to 30%, you'll still realize a net gain even if their total spending drops by 25%. Drawing on a study of more than 50 major U.S.-based retailers and over 20 years of global consulting experience, consultants Favaro, Romberger, and Meer set out five operating rules to help retail executives determine where to direct recession-squeezed resources for the biggest return. These rules basically boil down to: (1) Identify the people who are shopping both in your stores and in others'. (2) Figure out what they're buying elsewhere (or want and can't find at all) and adjust your offer so you can give it to them. (3) Analyze which of your costs contribute to producing the benefits the switchers want, then spend more on those activities and less on the ones that don't matter to them. (4) Organize your efforts efficiently by grouping your stores into clusters based on different populations of switchers. And, finally, (5) focus your customer research, merchandise-planning, performance management, and strategic-planning processes on the switchers. By following those rules, struggling retailers will discover that they have a larger universe of growth opportunities than they might think.

Multisided platforms can lower your transaction costs and increase customer reach. But powerful MSPs like Microsoft, Google, and Apple have also tended to extract most of the value from their platforms, mainly because companies that played with them didn't adequately understand their motives and operating strategies. As a result, firms can easily find themselves ceding control over customers to MSPs or being unwittingly turned into commodities. Hagiu and Yoffie, both professors at Harvard Business School, explore how MSPs can use their power to "hold up" companies that join them. The authors offer guidelines to help managers create an effective strategy for dealing with MSPs, identifying three basic issues that managers must address: (1) Whether to play with existing MSPs, build their own platform, or do both; (2) once they've concluded that at least one third-party MSP can benefit their business, deciding how many to join; and (3) figuring out how to play - that is, which features or services they should adopt and which they should reject in order to maintain their company's competitive advantage. Some companies that lack the power to influence an MSP's actions may have few options. But many firms - either on their own or in alliances - can make choices that will differentiate them from competitors and curb MSPs' power over their businesses.

Understanding how competitors will respond to your actions should be a critical component of decision making. Few companies, however, incorporate such insights into their strategic decisions, in large part because most methods for obtaining them are complex and unreliable. The authors have drawn on their research and work with companies to develop an approach for predicting rivals' behavior that is both accurate and easy to apply. It involves considering just three questions: Will the competitor react at all? Few strategic planners consider the possibility that a rival may not respond to a company's competitive move. Yet 17% of the companies surveyed by the authors did not react to a rival's major initiative. Some competitors may not detect a company's move, while others may not feel threatened by it or may simply be unable to coordinate a timely response. What options will the competitor actively consider? Most companies seriously examine fewer than four response options, and it's likely that among them will be the most obvious, such as introducing a me-too product or matching a price change. To come up with a short list of options, companies will probably look at what they have done in similar situations. Which option will the competitor most likely choose? Your adversaries will choose the option that they consider to be most effective. It helps to know that in anticipating competitive behavior, most companies analyze only one round of moves and countermoves, and they evaluate their options using simple, short-term measures. The key is to get inside your rival's head and look at the situation from that perspective, not yours.

What does it take to have staying power in today's economy - to not only survive, but to prosper and thrive? It's a question that has grown all the more pressing of late, as we've watched once-mighty companies like Merrill Lynch and AIG falter and crumble. While examining lending provisions, banking regulations and derivatives structures can provide insight into the specifics of the crash, focusing our attention on the intricacies of the sub-prime mortgage market and asset-backed securities obscures the real lesson, says the author. He argues that our own management theories are the prime culprit - a triumvirate of well-intentioned theories that are taught in every business school and entrenched in every significant publicly-traded company. Intended to ensure longevity and profitability, they have instead led to the opposite - transience - and contributed mightily to both the technology crash of 2001-02 and the financial-services crash of 2008. Neither crash would have happened, he argues, if our theories were as robust as those used to govern America's National Football League (NFL).

We now live and work in a 'butterfly effect' environment, the notion from Chaos Theory that the flapping of a butterfly's wings in China might cause a hurricane on the other side of the world. As a result, the authors argue that today's leaders must develop 'vigilance' - the ability to scan the periphery of their environment and spot opportunities and threats before their rivals. While investors don't expect prescience, they do rely on a leadership team to sense and act on early warning signs. They describe the three primary qualities that distinguish vigilant leaders from those in the majority, who strive primarily for operational excellence.

Like most managers, you probably have some ideas about how to grow your organization. You may even suspect that one or two of them could turn into something big. Unfortunately, you don't have the data to prove that your ideas will be needle-movers, and the 'numbers guys' insist on proof before any financial support can come your way. If this sounds familiar, you are caught in what the author calls 'growth gridlock' - a frustrating place where the corporate entrepreneur's optimism and need for speed collide with the organization's skepticism and need for control. However, she has found that there are people within organizations - whom she calls 'catalysts' - who manage to achieve sustainable growth despite the odds. The author describes their attributes and explains how their leadership initiates a near-chemical reaction that generates significant top-line results.

The global financial crisis of 2008 represents one of the best possible examples of the dangers posed by narrow mental models, say the authors. Before the crisis, people either failed to make sense of what was happening or chose to ignore it because of the profit opportunities. Some of the most basic assumptions implicit in the prevailing worldview before the collapse - such as ever-rising home prices and stock markets - were patently false, but this mindset was so powerful that by and large, objections were not raised. While such narrow mental models can obscure potential threats, the right mental models can open up new opportunities, they say. The authors provide eight strategies for developing a portfolio of mental models and overcoming inhibitors to change. In the end they prove that mental models are not just an abstract concept: millions of dollars will be won or lost based on the mindset of the person making the decision.

Recent economic turmoil has forced companies around the globe to re-evaluate their core business strategies. In order to thrive - indeed, to survive - organizations have to carefully consider how to remain relevant going forward. To do this, the author explains that firms must pay close attention to their customers and what they are demanding. We are now in the Age of Meaning, he says, where businesses and their brands create value and competitive advantage only when they deliver a compelling, holistic experience that is authentic, unique and relevant. Recent behavior on Wall Street has only deepened this trend, amplifying the desire for authenticity and meaning on Main Street. The author provides four key strategies for thriving in the Age of Meaning.

Organizations cannot make significant gains unless some individuals within the organization take significant personal risks that catalyze effective collective action. The authors show that these individuals - whom they call 'Consistent Contributors' -- can change other group members' perceptions by modeling cooperative behavior, thereby increasing the chances for additional cooperation. These individuals, they explain, always contribute, regardless of others' choices. They describe their research findings, which indicate that characterizing consistent contributors as 'suckers' is both misleading and fallacious: indeed, their data leads them to believe that consistent contributors are actually 'saviors' rather than suckers. A serious challenge for managers, then, is the creation of contexts that encourage and support the emergence and recognition of Consistent Contributors.

Today's companies prosper when they tap into a power that each of us already possesses, say the authors: empathy. People in organizations with a widespread sense of empathy share an intuitive vibe for what's going on in the world that helps them see new opportunities faster than their competitors. Creating an 'Open-Empathy Organization' entails a long-term process of organizational change, but the first steps are simple. The authors describe ten strategies that can enable an organization to hear what people outside of its walls are talking about, feel what they are feeling, and see the world through their eyes.

Roger Martin interviews best-selling author Malcolm Gladwell about his latest book, Outliers: The Story of Success (Little, Brown and Company, 2008) and finds that success is much more complex than we might think. Gladwell explains that, if we want to understand why some people thrive and others don't, we should spend the bulk of our time looking around the individual - at such things as their family, their birthplace, even their birth date. Along the way he touches on 'disadvantages that turn into advantages'; the powerful learning strategy of compensating for one's weaknesses; and why only 30 per cent of any outcome can be correlated with general intelligence.

For years, Rotman School of Management Vice Dean Jim Fisher has been bringing Shakespeare's Henry V to business-school classrooms, and in this interview he explains why. He explains how, despite having the cards stacked squarely against him, Henry ends up with the outcome he wants. As he shows, this involves a recognition that with your authority, all you can do is get people to do the minimum necessary to keep their job: everything they give you over and above the minimum, they volunteer to do - every shred. Along the way he provides tips from bringing Henry's approach into the modern day workplace.

The case features a dispute between the US Forest Service and conservation groups over forest management practices on the Bitterroot National Forest in Montana. The conservation groups sued the Forest Service in US District Court and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court with the Forest Service eventually winning on the issues. However, in August 2008, Dave Bull, the Forest Service Supervisor, was frustrated with the recurrent conflicts that impeded the Forest Service's ability to pursue important forest management projects (e.g., fuel reduction projects to protect people's lives and properties). Dave's staff of 145 people spent 80% of its time on data collection and analysis, much of it preparing for anticipated lawsuits, and 20% on project implementation. Dave wanted to reverse those numbers, but after 50 years of conflict, he was not sure where to start. He felt he needed a strategy to improve collaboration, but that carried some risks. If he made things worse, he might get an early retirement. As the case closes, Dave is examining the Forest Service's approach to collaboration. The Forest Service encouraged collaborative strategies but it said, "The final decision still rests with the agency." Given this caveat, Dave was wondering how he could effectively encourage collaboration among the stakeholders. The case explores this issue and gives Dave some direction.

Zopa, a U.K.-based peer-to-peer lending company, connected individual lenders and borrowers via an online interface. The company charged a small fee for completed loan transactions but has not turned a profit. Zopa offered two platforms, Markets and Listings. Markets was an automated system that assembled loans by combining lowest loan offers from different Zopa lenders. Zopa Listings allowed prospective borrowers to post eBay-like listings explaining who they were, how much money they needed, and how they would use it. Lenders then made offers specifying how much they were willing to lend and at what rate. Neither platform met with much success. In February 2009, the CEO of Zopa is considering withdrawing from Listings, and focusing on Markets, even though a company in the U.S., Prosper, had attracted many users with a product akin to Zopa Listings.

The Guardian had been an early innovator in online newspapers and had not only become the leading U.K. newspaper web site, but was making strides with audiences outside of the U.K. However, The Guardian had been losing money since 2000, and, in spite of the relative success of the website, online revenue remained less than 20% of the newspaper's total revenue. What changes would The Guardian have to make to sustain its mission of being "the world's leading liberal voice in perpetuity?"

This note is a primer on the newspaper industry, which has been in decline in the U.S. and Western Europe. The 19th century business model whereby news and editorial content was packaged and delivered to homes daily and paid for by national advertisers has been overturned by the internet and the corresponding immediate access to global information. The note covers the history of newspapers, industry economics, current news consumption trends, the response of the newspapers to the threat of the internet, and vignettes highlighting newspaper business models throughout the world.

Describes the Spine Center at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, a multidisciplinary unit that offers patients suffering from spinal problems "one-stop" access to a range of providers including orthopedic surgeons, neurosurgeons, neurologists, medical specialists in physical medicine and pain management, mental health providers, and occupational and physical therapists. The Center was created to address what its founder, James Weinstein, M.D., saw as the uncoordinated and inefficient delivery of spinal care in the United States. The Center emphasized using non-surgical treatments (e.g., physical therapy and exercise, behavioral modification, pain-relieving drugs) as either a complement to, or substitute for, surgical procedures, and patients were actively engaged in the process of determining what type of care to pursue. In addition, Weinstein and his staff collected data from the Center's clinical practice to conduct academic research on the outcomes and cost-effectiveness of various approaches to treatment. The case allows for a critical analysis of the Spine Center's unique approach to care delivery and provides an opportunity to examine the applicability of this model in other clinical areas.

Robert D. Walter built Cardinal Health into the most valuable company in the U.S. health care services industry and the world's largest distributor of health care products. With revenues of $81 billion in 2006, it was ranked Number 19 on the Fortune 500 list, and owned a third of the drug distribution business; yet most people had never heard of Cardinal Health. The case begins in 1979 with Walter's purchase of Monarch Foods, a wholesale food distribution company, which he built into a strong regional food wholesaler, Cardinal Foods, in the subsequent decade. Through a series of acquisitions, Walter repositioned the company into the pharmaceutical distribution industry. The result was the emergence of Cardinal Health, Inc. Cardinal was one of a handful of large U.S. companies that had achieved earnings-per-share growth in excess of 20 percent for 15 years straight. Nevertheless, by 2007, Wall Street was questioning whether Cardinal Health could continue to grow at this remarkable rate through acquisitions. This general doubt, coupled with questionable "stock crushing" accounting practices among wholesalers, including one of their own suppliers, was weighing down Cardinal's stock price despite their continued earnings growth. Cardinal Health, the merger and acquisition juggernaut, had hit an earnings speed bump. As Walter contemplated retirement, he was faced with the challenge of reinventing the company one last time.

Growing from a passive investment in a Chicago delicatessen in 1978, into a national foodservice company by 2007, Levy Restaurants (Levy) served approximately 63 million customers a year at more than 85 different restaurants and sporting and entertainment venues. Then Levy expanded its fine-dining restaurant business into sports and entertainment venues and such unexpected places as Disney World. Levy grew at greater than 20% compounded growth rates between 1999 and 2007 because of a plethora of newly constructed baseball, football, basketball, and hockey arenas and stadiums. When construction growth leveled off, Levy responded by expanding into entertainment venues. How could Levy maintain its stellar growth rate? Levy's answer to this question depended, in part, on how it defined its core competencies; it needed to decide whether it was a fine-dining company or a foodservice company and how its customer-value proposition differed from its competitors. Levy had to determine which new customer segments to expand and whether to grow, maintain, or shrink its restaurant business.

This case is designed to teach how to structure information technology (IT) infrastructure outsourcing deals from both the outsourcer and the client perspective. Office Supply Incorporated (OSI) is a company in crisis, with challenges in its cost structure and poor IT performance. Outsourcing to Technology Infrastructure Solutions is an opportunity to both reduce costs and complexity for the firm, but students first must consider whether outsourcing is a good strategic fit for OSI. Detailed spreadsheet templates are given that are based on a real outsourcing client engagement for a major infrastructure outsourcing company. The spreadsheets are complex but have been simplified so that they automatically calculate when populated, allowing the students to quickly move to answering the management challenge: how should TIS price and structure the outsourcing deal? Answering this question provides deep insights into the business case for IT outsourcing and how outsourcers financially engineer a deal structure to ensure a win-win outcome for both the client and outsource service provider.