個案總覽

Alibris is an Internet-era company providing search and fulfillment services for hard-to-find (rare, used, and out-of-print) books. At the time of the case, the company had made decisions to change its revenue model, to become involved in the fulfillment process for each book it sells by establishing a cross-dock facility, and to purchase Oracle's Internet commerce software. However, the implementation of this software has been very difficult, delaying the launch of the new fulfillment business and costing large amounts of money at a time when cash is scarce. The company's leaders, who are not IT professionals, must decide whether to continue with Oracle or begin anew with another product.

Takes place more than two years after the (A) case. Alibris has weathered the storms and has built a popular, growing business. As the Christmas season of 2000 approaches, the company is confronted with two IT projects that both seem urgent and important. The first is an effort to replace the software tool used by book dealers and others to upload their listing to the Alibris database. The current tool is error prone and does not provide rich information about each book uploaded. This lack of rich information makes useful searches of the Alibris database difficult. The second project involves ensuring the integrity of the database itself. Recent evidence suggests that records are not being uploaded, updated, and deleted as they should be in all cases, with adverse effects for customers. Alibris must decide which of the two projects to pursue immediately. There are not enough resources to do both.

Plum Creek Timber Co. decides to go ahead with negotiations for a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) on its Pacific Northwest properties. HCP represents a new form of public-private-sector collaboration and innovation to improve upon command-and-control environmental policy solution. Throughout the negotiation process, the company must manage several factors: identifying which native fish species to include beyond the bull trout, matching "best science" standards with cost-efficient conservation commitments, minimizing the regulatory burden while enhancing species protection, and fostering support and avoiding conflict with a range of interested stakeholders, from environmental activists to forest products executives.

An analyst's critique of Amazon's prospectus from the perspective of its bond holders.

This case presents four exercises that teach compounding interest and valuing bonds.

Spreadsheet Supplement for case 101045.

eCircle, a German Internet-based group communications company, was founded in 1999 with a half-dozen employees and a few hundred thousand users on its new C2C platform. By early 2001, the cofounders had built eCircle's technology platform, had acquired 4.5 million users and 90 employees, and had raised two rounds of financing. It appeared that the company had overcome the initial challenges of a start-up--it had cash, advertising customers for its C2C business, and two customers for its new B2B business. However, despite their early success, the cofounders faced a number of challenges. Could they leverage a relatively successful C2C group communications platform into other profitable business lines, especially B2B offerings? Could they fend off new competition within Europe and the United States? And could they manage their cash flows to survive the financing market slump? The tight economic environment and the struggles and failures of numerous Internet start-ups in early 2001 made growth strategy more of a challenge for eCircle. Its margin for error in such an environment was smaller than when the company first started.

Assistant Professor Sam Benson was about to end the class session portion of his course with only student projects remaining. Then, he received a phone call from a student, George McHenry, who had missed 11 of 20 sessions. McHenry wanted to know what he needed to do to salvage his standing in the section so that he would be given a category-III grade and not a category-IV grade and avoid review by the Academic Performance Committee (perhaps jeopardizing his chances for graduation). In his first year of teaching, Benson didn't know how to handle the situation and received conflicting advice from senior faculty colleagues. Teaching purpose: Presents an actual situation and challenges the reader to arrive at an appropriate solution. The reader will have to consider short-term and long-term consequences of the decision that is chosen, with careful consideration concerning the reader's own philosophy about the division of responsibility in the learning process and the role of punitive measures to motivate and punish.

This case describes the development and use of a neutral B-to-B marketplace (mondus.com), set up for small- and medium-sized enterprises. It analyses how mondus matches buyers and sellers through the request-for-proposals model. The case also describes the international expansion of mondus and the entrepreneurial leadership of its founders, and highlights the benefits and drawbacks for the e-marketplace players.

Only a few weeks ago, Greg McNally, the CEO of software start-up DataClear, had called an off-site in Montana to celebrate his company's success in racking up $5 million in sales from its first product, ClearCloud--a powerful data analysis package. But that was before his talented and successful head of sales, Susan Moskowski, gave him the news about VisiDat, a British start-up that was testing a data analysis package of its own that was only weeks away from launch. "We need to agree on a strategy for dealing with this kind of competition," Susan had told Greg. "If they start out as a global player, and we stay hunkered down in the U.S., they'll kill us." Because of that news, Greg had changed the agenda of the off-site, instead having Susan present the options for taking DataClear global. The meeting had taken place two weeks ago, at which point the consensus had been to establish a European presence and probably one in Japan. The only question seemed to be whether to do it from scratch or to form partnerships with local players. Did DataClear really need to go global? Should it instead expand into different domestic markets? Should it do both at once? Could the company afford to? In R0106A and R0106Z, four commentators offer their advice in this fictional case study.

In 1994, the consumer products company Alberto-Culver North America faced flattened sales and the most difficult competitive environment of its history. President Carol Bernick knew that overcoming these challenges would require a certain kind of corporate culture--but it wasn't the culture the company had. She changed that by focusing on four areas. First, Bernick made culture visible and elevated it to priority status, often by highlighting desired values and behaviors that already existed in pockets of the company. Second, Bernick and her executive team created the role of growth development leader (GDL). Each mentors about a dozen people. Her frequent meetings with GDLs make them effective agents of change upward and downward. Third, the company uses an employee survey to identify areas for improvement and to provide 360-degree feedback to GDLs and top management. And fourth, successes are celebrated constantly--through stock awards for the best GDLs, Business Builders Awards for great innovators, and many other, less formal means. Since 1994, the company has cut employee turnover in half, seen sales grow 83%, and watched pretax profits rise 336%--indicators of how cultural change is driving business results.

Quarterly earnings numbers dominate the decisions of executives, analysts, investors, and auditors. Yet for all the attention paid to these numbers, they're not much use in predicting a company's future performance and cash flows. Even economists are unanimous in their view that these numbers say next to nothing about a company's prospects beyond the next quarter. Nonetheless, meeting analysts' expectations that earnings will rise in a smooth, steady, unbroken line has become, at many corporations, a game whose imperatives override even the imperative to deliver the highest possible return to shareholders. The fetishistic attention paid to this almost meaningless indicator might be cause for amusement, except for one thing: the earnings game does real harm. It distorts corporate decision making. It reduces securities analysis and investing to a guessing contest. It compromises the integrity of corporate audits. Ultimately, it undermines the capital markets. In this article, HBR senior editor Harris Collingwood takes an in-depth look at these effects, examining the intricacies of the earnings game and why companies believe they have no choice but to play it. Until more corporate executives change their practices, he explains, the earnings game will never lack for players.

It may seem like the topic of service management has been exhausted. Legions of scholars and practitioners have applied queuing theory to bank lines, measured response times to the millisecond, and created cults around "delighting the customer." But practitioners haven't carefully considered the underlying psychology of service encounters--the feelings that customers experience during these encounters, feelings often so subtle they probably couldn't be put into words. Fortunately, behavioral science offers new insights into better service management. In this article, the authors translate findings from behavioral-science research into five operating principles: 1) finish strong; 2) get the bad experiences out of the way early; 3) segment the pleasure, combine the pain; 4) build commitment through choice; and 5) give people rituals and stick to them. Ultimately, only one thing really matters in a service encounter--the customer's perception of what occurred. This article will help you engineer your service encounters to enhance your customers' experiences during the process as well as their recollections of the process after it is completed.

Business runs better when people within a company have close ties and trust one another. But the relationships that make organizations work effectively are under assault for several reasons. Building such "social capital" is difficult in volatile times. Disruptive technologies spawn new markets daily, and organizations respond with constantly changing structures. The problem is worsened by employees' working off-site or on their own. The authors describe how managers can help their organizations thrive by making effective investments in social capital. For instance, companies that value social capital demonstrate a commitment to retention as a way of limiting workplace volatility. The authors cite SAS's extensive efforts to signal to employees that it sees them as human beings, not just workers. Managers can foster cooperation by giving employees a common sense of purpose through good strategic communication and inspirational leadership. Johnson & Johnson's well-known credo, which says the company's first responsibility is to the people who use its products, has helped the company in times of adversity, as in 1982 when cyanide in Tylenol capsules killed seven people. Other methods of fostering cooperation include rewarding the behavior with cash and establishing rules that get people into the habit of cooperating.

Drawing on extensive research of Fortune 500 companies that have lived through industry downturns and economic recessions over the past two decades, Darrell Rigby, a director of Bain & Company, reveals how companies need to go against the grain of convention and exploit industry downturns to harness their unique opportunities for upward mobility. The author explains that every downturn goes through three phases. He examines each phase and shows how successful players navigate the huge waves of a downturn. Smart executives, he says, don't panic: they look bad news in the eye and institutionalize an approach to detecting storms. Rather than hedge their bets through diversification, they focus on their core businesses and spend to gain market share. They manage costs relentlessly during good times and bad. They keep a long-term view and strive to maintain the loyalty of employees, suppliers, and customers. And coming out of the downturn, they maintain momentum in their businesses to stay ahead of the competition they've already surpassed. Every industry will face periodic downturns of varying severity, says Rigby. But executives with the vision and ingenuity to take unconventional approaches can buoy their companies to new heights.

In this interview with HBR senior editor David Champion, Mark Levin, the founder and CEO of Millennium Pharmaceuticals, describes his vision of the future of the pharmaceutical industry in the wake of the genetics revolution and new technologies that have altered the economics of drug development. No company, he argues, will create serious long-term value by staying in just one or two stages of the value chain. That's why Millennium, which started out doing basic research into genes and proteins and selling its findings to pharmaceutical giants, has moved downstream--toward the patients who actually use and pay for the drugs. He explains why the research end has become less lucrative than the more mechanical tasks of identifying, testing, and manufacturing molecules. Levin talks about the changes Millennium has undergone since its inception in 1993--from 30 workers to more than 1,000, and from one end of the value chain to the other. He discusses the company's cultural transformations as well as the partnerships and acquisitions that have helped Millennium become involved in every stage of the chain--from gene to patient. Levin's vigorous approach to balancing long-term strategy with short-term tactics offers important lessons to any executive facing an industry upheaval.

Microsoft and Intel are both obvious targets for antitrust litigation; both wield considerable control in their respective segments of the computer industry. But while Microsoft has been mired in court for years now--its name and business practices dragged through the mud, and its very future as a single company thrown into doubt--Intel has avoided a prolonged, high-profile antitrust case. Intel's success is not a matter of luck. The company's antitrust compliance program, refined over many years, has been an integral element in the chip maker's business strategy. In this article, the authors suggest that Intel's approach to compliance provides a valuable model for any enterprise that may come under regulators' scrutiny. They describe how Intel created extremely conservative antitrust compliance standards and then instituted a series of unique training events that had active support from then-CEO Andy Grove and others in senior management. Intel recognizes that no matter how cautious it is, it will always face extraordinary scrutiny as a market leader. But "since antitrust is embedded in everything we do," Grove says, "we can control our destiny."

Subaru markets an L.L. Bean Outback station wagon. Dell stamps Microsoft and Intel logos on its computers. Such interweaving of different companies' brands is now commonplace. But one of the central tools of brand management--portfolio mapping--has not kept pace with changes in the marketplace. Most conventional brand maps include only those brands owned by a company, arranged along organizational lines with little regard for how the brands influence customer perceptions. In this article, the authors present a new mapping tool--the brand portfolio molecule--that includes all the brands that factor into a consumer's decision to buy, whether or not the company owns them. The first step in creating a brand portfolio molecule is to determine which brands should or should not be included. The second step is to classify each brand by asking five key questions: 1) How important is this brand to customers' purchase decisions about the brand you're mapping? 2) Is its influence positive or negative? 3) What market position does this brand occupy relative to the other brands in the portfolio? 4) How does this brand connect to the other brands in the portfolio? 5) How much control do you have over this brand? The last step is to map the molecule using a 3-D modeling program or by hand with pen and paper.

Only a few weeks ago, Greg McNally, the CEO of software start-up DataClear, had called an off-site in Montana to celebrate his company's success in racking up $5 million in sales from its first product, ClearCloud--a powerful data analysis package. But that was before his talented and successful head of sales, Susan Moskowski, gave him the news about VisiDat, a British start-up that was testing a data analysis package of its own that was only weeks away from launch. "We need to agree on a strategy for dealing with this kind of competition," Susan had told Greg. "If they start out as a global player, and we stay hunkered down in the U.S., they'll kill us." Because of that news, Greg had changed the agenda of the off-site, instead having Susan present the options for taking DataClear global. The meeting had taken place two weeks ago, at which point the consensus had been to establish a European presence and probably one in Japan. The only question seemed to be whether to do it from scratch or to form partnerships with local players. Did DataClear really need to go global? Should it instead expand into different domestic markets? Should it do both at once? Could the company afford to? In R0106A and R0106Z, four commentators offer their advice on this fictional case study.

Only a few weeks ago, Greg McNally, the CEO of software start-up DataClear, had called an off-site in Montana to celebrate his company's success in racking up $5 million in sales from its first product, ClearCloud--a powerful data analysis package. But that was before his talented and successful head of sales, Susan Moskowski, gave him the news about VisiDat, a British start-up that was testing a data analysis package of its own that was only weeks away from launch. "We need to agree on a strategy for dealing with this kind of competition," Susan had told Greg. "If they start out as a global player, and we stay hunkered down in the U.S., they'll kill us." Because of that news, Greg had changed the agenda of the off-site, instead having Susan present the options for taking DataClear global. The meeting had taken place two weeks ago, at which point the consensus had been to establish a European presence and probably one in Japan. The only question seemed to be whether to do it from scratch or to form partnerships with local players. Did DataClear really need to go global? Should it instead expand into different domestic markets? Should it do both at once? Could the company afford to? In R0106A and R0106Z, four commentators offer their advice on this fictional case study.