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In 2016, the newly appointed president and chief executive officer of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), an alcoholic beverages retailer and a Crown corporation of the province of Ontario in Canada, was weighing his options in developing and executing a strategy for organizational transformation. The trigger for transformation was external. The provincial government, which fully owned the LCBO, had decided to allow grocery stores to sell alcoholic beverages. What strategy should the chief executive officer use to ensure the LCBO would be relevant to its existing and future customers and therefore remain a competitive player in the market?

In May 2014, Honda Canada was planning to relaunch the Honda Fit—its entry-level car. The purpose of the relaunch was to kick-start growth in sales of the Honda Fit, which had fallen from 14,836 units in the launch year of 2008 to 9,512 units in 2013. The target customer group was an up-and-coming demographic cohort known as millennials. Honda Canada's manager of Customer Conquest Management was mandated with strategizing and executing the relaunch. She had to make two core decisions: How should Honda Canada connect with millennials, and what communication medium should it choose to reach them?

In January 2017, the owner of Re-Matt Inc. (Re-Matt), a mattress recycling operation, was considering the way forward for the business he had developed in the city of Calgary, Alberta. Re-Matt was a unique enterprise in Alberta where municipalities, both urban and rural, had been categorizing mattresses as waste, and sending them to landfills for disposal, for decades. Re-Matt's business was diverting used mattresses from landfills and recycling them by routing their individual components back into the economic streams and recovering value. The company had reached an annual revenue of CA$500,000 in just two years. Its owner was now weighing his options with respect to scaling up Re-Matt's operations, as well as trying to identify ways of differentiating Re-Matt from its potential competition.

In early 2017, the vice-president, Enterprise Innovation, at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), one of Canada's leading banks, encountered roadblocks in partnering with a fintech firm as part of the bank's open innovation strategy. The vice-president wondered how she could leverage the learnings from her experience with onboarding the fintech firm to better manage future open innovation projects at the bank. Streamlining the onboarding process was a priority, as was dealing with internal pushback. The vice-president thought about the role of the facilitator in this process, and whether she should pursue an enterprise innovation lab within the bank.

In early 2017, the vice-president, Enterprise Innovation, at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), one of Canada’s leading banks, encountered roadblocks in partnering with a fintech firm as part of the bank’s open innovation strategy. The vice-president wondered how she could leverage the learnings from her experience with onboarding the fintech firm to better manage future open innovation projects at the bank. Streamlining the onboarding process was a priority, as was dealing with internal pushback. The vice-president thought about the role of the facilitator in this process, and whether she should pursue an enterprise innovation lab within the bank.

In 2012, a pilot study undertaken by the data services team of the Dow Chemical Company in the polymer division of the multinational company’s Midland, Michigan, plant had revealed an uncanny trend on the company’s shop floor. Plant engineers were working for the data; the data was not working for them. The data services director saw an opportunity to reverse the trend through the deployment of big data capabilities and, more specifically, enterprise manufacturing intelligence (EMI), a subset of big data. How should he gain user acceptance of the proposed EMI?

In 2016, the chief operating officer (COO) of InteraXon Inc., a Toronto-based technology start-up in the health and wellness sector, needed to put together a revised supply chain that was consistent with the company's new strategic plan. InteraXon's flagship product was a lightweight headband called Muse, aimed at measuring the wearer's brain activity. The COO needed to keep in mind two major requirements of the new plan: a) the company would be relocating the production of Muse from China to the United States and b) it needed to quickly scale up its manufacturing and marketing operations. What plan of action should the COO develop?

In mid-January 2017, at the Vancouver head office of Clearly, Canada's leading online optical products company, the chief executive officer was reviewing plans for the company's participation in an upcoming international eyewear exhibition. The event provided more than 1,000 optical companies with an opportunity to showcase their latest offerings. The worldwide market for eyewear was growing, and customers were increasingly turning to online retailers for many products. However, the rate of annual growth in online sales of optical products was slow. Clearly's chief executive officer wondered how to approach this challenge: How could his company increase online sales beyond the current 4 per cent of industry sales? What role would Clearly's existing brick-and-mortar stores around the world play with respect to online sales?

In October 2013, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Canada's largest bank, hired a new head of Enterprise Fraud Strategy, a department tasked with protecting RBC's global customers from fraud. The department head's immediate priority was to prevent fraudulent transactions by RBC's own customers-a phenomenon called first-party fraud-by implementing a bourgeoning technology called social network analysis (SNA). The technology used predictive analytics and big data to forecast the occurrence of first-party fraud. The head of Enterprise Fraud Strategy had three primary questions: First, how should SNA be used to bring down the ratio of fraud alerts to actual fraud at RBC? Second, how should the cost of maintaining SNA protocols be reduced? Finally, how should the issues around systemic performance of SNA be resolved?

In October 2013, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Canada’s largest bank, hired a new head of Enterprise Fraud Strategy, a department tasked with protecting RBC’s global customers from fraud. The department head’s immediate priority was to prevent fraudulent transactions by RBC’s own customers—a phenomenon called first-party fraud—by implementing a bourgeoning technology called social network analysis (SNA). The technology used predictive analytics and big data to forecast the occurrence of first-party fraud. The head of Enterprise Fraud Strategy had three primary questions: First, how should SNA be used to bring down the ratio of fraud alerts to actual fraud at RBC? Second, how should the cost of maintaining SNA protocols be reduced? Finally, how should the issues around systemic performance of SNA be resolved?

Earls Restaurants, Ltd., a Canadian restaurant chain headquartered in Vancouver, was facing a communications crisis in April 2016, when it changed its sourcing policy with regard to beef. In a bid to appeal to millennial consumers, who were conscious of animal welfare standards, it decided to source beef from a U.S. farm that had its beef independently certified as humane. This cut out the restaurant’s traditional supply sources among Canadian ranchers, most specifically in Alberta, where the restaurant chain had been founded. The backlash was immediate. After discussing the situation with his core management team and asking a consultant for help formulating a communication strategy, the company’s president had to decide how to proceed to restore the company’s reputation. Should Earls do nothing and wait for the attention to die down, go back to sourcing its beef through Canadian suppliers, or continue to serve humane beef in its restaurants?

In January 2017, the owner of Re-Matt Inc. (Re-Matt), a mattress recycling operation, was considering the way forward for the business he had developed in the city of Calgary, Alberta. Re-Matt was a unique enterprise in Alberta where municipalities, both urban and rural, had been categorizing mattresses as waste, and sending them to landfills for disposal, for decades. Re-Matt’s business was diverting used mattresses from landfills and recycling them by routing their individual components back into the economic streams and recovering value. The company had reached an annual revenue of CA$500,000 in just two years. Its owner was now weighing his options with respect to scaling up Re-Matt’s operations, as well as trying to identify ways of differentiating Re-Matt from its potential competition.

In 2016, the chief operating officer (COO) of InteraXon Inc., a Toronto-based technology start-up in the health and wellness sector, needed to put together a revised supply chain that was consistent with the company’s new strategic plan. InteraXon’s flagship product was a lightweight headband called Muse, aimed at measuring the wearer’s brain activity. The COO needed to keep in mind two major requirements of the new plan: a) the company would be relocating the production of Muse from China to the United States and b) it needed to quickly scale up its manufacturing and marketing operations. What plan of action should the COO develop?

Earls Restaurants, Ltd., a Canadian restaurant chain headquartered in Vancouver, was facing a communications crisis in April 2016, when it changed its sourcing policy with regard to beef. In a bid to appeal to millennial consumers, who were conscious of animal welfare standards, it decided to source beef from a U.S. farm that had its beef independently certified as humane. This cut out the restaurant's traditional supply sources among Canadian ranchers, most specifically in Alberta, where the restaurant chain had been founded. The backlash was immediate. After discussing the situation with his core management team and asking a consultant for help formulating a communication strategy, the company's president had to decide how to proceed to restore the company's reputation. Should Earls do nothing and wait for the attention to die down, go back to sourcing its beef through Canadian suppliers, or continue to serve humane beef in its restaurants?

In April 2016, Canopy Growth Corporation, one of Canada's top producers of medical cannabis, was planning a strategy for its future. The government of Canada had just announced its plans to introduce a bill to legalize recreational cannabis use in 2017, followed by a rollout of the policy in early 2018. The company's chief executive officer needed to plan a strategy that addressed three main issues: product messaging for recreational cannabis, establishing a retail footprint in recreational cannabis, and building an international business.

In April 2016, Canopy Growth Corporation, one of Canada’s top producers of medical cannabis, was planning a strategy for its future. The government of Canada had just announced its plans to introduce a bill to legalize recreational cannabis use in 2017, followed by a rollout of the policy in early 2018. The company’s chief executive officer needed to plan a strategy that addressed three main issues: product messaging for recreational cannabis, establishing a retail footprint in recreational cannabis, and building an international business.

Saint Elizabeth, a leading Canadian health-care enterprise, had been managing innovation through what it called the Innovation Tripod. This had three components-Ideas (which involved generating innovative ideas from among employees), Solutions (involving outside ventures in innovation), and Impact (consisting of ways in which results were measured). The chief executive officer (CEO) was facing a dilemma with each element of the tripod. How could staff engagement be improved? What was a better way of managing external partners? How could the prevailing metrics of innovation be fine-tuned? What was the way forward for the CEO?

In February 2014, the chairman and chief executive officer of the third-largest law firm in Canada, Gowlings LLP, was examining his options for taking the firm global. On the verge of retirement, he hoped to establish an enduring platform for international expansion based on three aspects: a new global location, a new global partner, and a new organizational structure. Each point was interlinked, and each presented its own managerial dilemmas. Gowlings had already established offices in three locations outside Canada: Moscow, London, and Beijing. The company had been ranked as the top legal advisor based on deal volume for Canadian mergers and acquisitions in both 2012 and 2013. Gowlings was primed to build on these attributes and move to the next level in positioning itself as an international law firm.

In February 2014, the chairman and chief executive officer of the third-largest law firm in Canada, Gowlings LLP, was examining his options for taking the firm global. On the verge of retirement, he hoped to establish an enduring platform for international expansion based on three aspects: a new global location, a new global partner, and a new organizational structure. Each point was interlinked, and each presented its own managerial dilemmas. Gowlings had already established offices in three locations outside Canada: Moscow, London, and Beijing. The company had been ranked as the top legal advisor based on deal volume for Canadian mergers and acquisitions in both 2012 and 2013. Gowlings was primed to build on these attributes and move to the next level in positioning itself as an international law firm.

Spin Master, a children’s toy and entertainment company, was getting ready for an initial public offering (IPO). Its founders were weighing their options with regard to some core issues: What was the right positioning for Spin Master with potential investors? What was the right approach to valuing the business? How did that approach translate into enterprise value, equity value, and share price for the IPO?